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Abstract		
The	 participation	 of	 large-scale	 agricultural	 investors	 in	 African	 land	 transactions	 raises	
concerns	 about	 the	 impacts	 on	 a	 rather	 hitherto	 local	 and	 smallholder	 dominated	 land	
market.	However,	there	is	still	 limited	empirical	study	on	how	large-scale	agro-investments	
have	 influenced	 changes	 in	 land	markets	 and	 smallholder	participation	 in	 agricultural	 land	
markets	 in	 West	 Africa.	 Hence,	 this	 study	 examined	 how	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 in	
Ghana	 have	 influenced	 land	 market	 changes	 and	 impacted	 smallholders;	 and	 how	
institutional	 dynamics	 influence	 land	markets.	 The	 study	 relied	 on	 village	 level	 surveys	 to	
examine	 the	 formation	 of	 land	 prices.	 Key	 stakeholders	 interviews	 were	 used	 to	 study	
institutional	 changes	 in	 Ghana’s	 land	 markets.	 Focus	 groups	 discussions	 were	 used	 to	
identify	 winners	 and	 losers	 in	 land	 transactions,	 and	 to	 examine	 the	 nature	 of	 gains	 and	
losses.			
Using	stakeholder	mapping,	it	was	identified	that	linkages	among	the	major	institutions	and	
stakeholders	 in	 large-scale	agro-investments	are	weak,	and	 the	powers	of	 the	government	
are	 limited	in	customary	grants.	 It	was	revealed	that	customary	land	transactions	 in	Ghana	
are	characterised	by	lack	of	-	transparency,	participation	and	accountability.	The	study	also	
found	that	 limited	consultations	with	 the	village	chiefs	were	 inadequate	 in	articulating	 the	
concerns	 of	 expropriated	 smallholders.	Migrant	 farmers	 who	 use	 customary	 land	without	
title	were	the	most	vulnerable	for	expropriation.	Also,	smallholders	who	are	unable	to	prove	
their	 ownership	 of	 land	 are	 not	 compensated	 for	 land	 loss.	 It	 was	 revealed	 that	 total	
household	farm	size,	land	productivity,	and	trust	were	the	main	determinants	of	customary	
land	prices.	From	the	study,	transaction	costs	of	acquiring	land	are	largely	influenced	by	the	
nature	of	 land	tenure,	social	capital,	geographical	 location	of	 the	 land,	and	citizenship.	For	
winners	and	losers,	entrenched	unequal	power	relations	between	land	custodians	and	land	
users	 influenced	 who	 benefited	 more	 from	 land	 transactions.	 Chiefs	 and	 family	 heads	
entrusted	 with	 allodial	 titles	 were	 perceived	 to	 be	 gaining	 the	 most	 from	 recent	 land	
transactions,	while	 sharecroppers,	 seasonal	 licensees	especially	women	who	cultivate	 land	
under	insufficiently	secure	conditions	were	the	most	adversely	affected.		
	
The	way	 forward	 is	 to	 undertake	 institutional	 reforms	 that	make	 chiefs	more	 transparent	
and	 accountable	 for	 their	 trusteeship,	while	 limiting	 their	 enormous	 powers	 as	 the	 front-
liners	of	land	administration	in	Ghana.	Proceeds	from	land	transactions	should	be	invested	in	
social	infrastructure	and	services	for	the	benefit	of	the	larger	community.	There	is	the	need	
to	deepen	stakeholder	consensus	building,	through	consultations	with	affected	communities	
and	land	users.	Since	land	prices	have	tended	to	be	discretionary,	there	is	the	need	for	the	
standardisation	of	 ‘drink	money’.	 Land	 sector	 reforms	 in	Ghana	 should	be	geared	 towards	
building	 efficient	 institutional	 collaboration	 and	 consultation	 between	 the	 formal	 and	
informal	 sectors,	 while	 improving	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 among	 the	 major	
stakeholders	at	all	levels.		
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Zusammenfassung		
Der	Handel	mit	 landwirtschaftlichen	Flächen	 in	Afrika	durch	große	 Investoren	gibt	Anlass	zur	Sorge	
angesichts	des	Einflusses	auf	den	von	kleinbäuerlichen	Strukturen	geprägten	 ländlichen	Raum.	Zum	
jetzigen	 Zeitpunkt	 gibt	 es	 kaum	 verfügbare	 empirische	 Studien,	 die	 den	 Einfluss	 von	 großen	
Agrarinvestitionen	 auf	 den	 Handel	 mit	 landwirtschaftlichen	 Flächen	 und	 die	 Beteiligung	 von	
Kleinbauern	in	Westafrika	untersuchen.	Aus	diesem	Grund	untersucht	diese	Studie,	wie	großflächiger	
Landerwerb	 (LSLAs)	 in	 Ghana	 Veränderungen	 des	 ländlichen	 Grundbesitzmarktes	 	 sowie	 die	
Beteiligung	 von	 Kleinbauern	 am	Marktgeschehen	 stimuliert,	 unter	 Berücksichtigung	 institutioneller	
Dynamiken.	 Des	 Weiteren	 ermittelt	 sie	 Gewinner	 und	 Verlierer	 von	 LSLAs	 und	 die	 generellen	
Veränderungen	 im	 Handel	 mit	 landwirtschaftlichen	 Flächen.	 Hierbei	 stützt	 sich	 die	 Erhebung	 auf	
gezielte	Umfragen	auf	Dorfebene	bezüglich	der	Festsetzung	von	Landpreisen.	Interviews	wurden	mit	
den	 Hauptakteuren	 geführt,	 um	 institutionelle	 Veränderungen	 im	 Handel	 mit	 landwirtschaftlichen	
Flächen	in	Ghana	zu	ermitteln.	Gruppendiskussionen	mit	Fokusgruppen	auf	Gemeindeebene	wurden	
genutzt,	um	Gewinner	und	Verlierer	von	Grundstückstransaktionen	zu	identifizieren	und	das	Ausmaß	
von	Gewinn	und	Verlust	zu	bestimmen.		
	
Die	Nutzung	von	Stakeholder	Mapping	belegt	die	schwache		Ausprägung	von	Verbindungen	zwischen	
relevanten	 Stakeholdern	 in	 LSLAs	 und	 zeigt,	 dass	 die	 Eingriffsmöglichkeiten	 des	 Staates	 sich	 auf	
marktübliche	 Kredite	 beschränken.	 Übliche	 Flächenverkäufe	 in	 Ghana	 sind	 von	 einem	 Mangel	 an	
Transparenz,	aktiver	Beteiligung	und	Verantwortung	gekennzeichnet.	Außerdem	wurde	 festgestellt,	
dass	 die	 einfache	 Konsultation	mit	 	 dem	Dorfoberhaupt	 nicht	 ausreichend	 ist,	 um	 die	 Sorgen	 von	
enteigneten	 Kleinbauern	 adäquat	 widerzugeben.	 Kleinbauern,	 deren	 Landnutzung	 auf	 saisonal	
begrenzten,	 oftmals	 gemeinschaftlichen,	 Pachtverträgen	 beruht,	 sind	 am	meisten	 gefährdet	 durch	
Zwangsenteignung.	 Kleinbauern,	 die	 ihren	 Grundbesitz	 nicht	 	 nachweisen	 können,	 erhalten	 keine	
Kompensation	 für	 den	 Verlust	 dieser	 Flächen.	 Landeinheiten,	 Flächenproduktivität,	 und	 Vertrauen	
die	Haupteinflussfaktoren	auf	die	Flächenpreise	sind.	Transaktionskosten	verbunden	mit	Landerwerb	
werden	stark	beeinflusst	von	den	Besitzverhältnissen,	dem	sozialen	Kapital,	der	geographischen	Lage	
und	 der	 Nationalität.	 Für	 Gewinner	 wie	 Verlierer	 gilt,	 dass	 die	 fest	 verwurzelten	 ungleichen	
Machtverhältnisse	 zwischen	 Landbesitzern	 und	 Landnutzern	 bestimmten,	 wer	 vom	 Handel	 mit	
landwirtschaftlichen	 Flächen	 profitierte.	 Dorf-	 und	 Familienoberhäupter,	 die	 über	 Landbesitztitel	
verfügten,	 haben	 am	 meisten	 von	 jüngst	 getätigten	 Landtransaktionen	 profitiert,	 während	
Landpächter,	 saisonale	 Arbeiter	 und	 insbesondere	 Frauen,	 die	 das	 Land	 unter	 unsicheren	
Bedingungen	bearbeiten,	am	stärksten	negativ	betroffen	sind.		
	
Zukünftige	 Bemühungen	 müssen	 institutionelle	 Reformen	 unterstützen	 um	 die	 hierarchischen	
Strukturen	rund	um	die	Dorfoberhäupter,	die		als	wichtige	Hauptakteure	in	der	Bodenverwaltung	in	
Ghana	auftreten,	zum	einen	transparenter	zu	gestalten	und	diese	zum	anderen	durch	die	Begrenzung	
des	 Machtmissbrauchs	 haftbar	 für	 ihre	 treuhänderischen	 Tätigkeiten	 zu	 machen.	 Einkünfte	 aus	
Landtransaktionen	könnten	durch	Konsultationen	mit	betroffenen	Gemeinden	und	Landnutzern	zum	
Wohle	 der	 Gemeinschaft	 in	 die	 soziale	 Infrastruktur	 und	 Dienstleistungen	 investiert	 werden.	
Landpreise	 weisen	 oftmals	 einen	 willkürlichen	 Charakter	 auf,	 weswegen	 die	 Standardisierung	 von	
„drink	 money“	 nötig	 ist.	 Die	 	 Landreformen	 in	 Ghana	 sollten	 auf	 den	 Aufbau	 effizienter	
institutioneller	 Kollaborationen	 und	 Beratungen	 zwischen	 formellen	 und	 informellen	 Sektoren	
orientiert	sein,	und	dabei	Transparenz	und	Verantwortlichkeit	zwischen	den	Hauptakteuren	auf	allen	
Ebenen	verbessern.	
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Chapter	One :	Agricultural	Land	Markets	and	Smallholder	Farmers	in	West	
Africa	
	
1.1	Introduction	
It	 is	 generally	 argued	 that	 the	 food,	 fuel	 and	 financial	 crises	 of	 2007/2008	 fostered	
renewed	 momentum	 for	 land	 acquisition	 and	 agricultural	 investment	 in	 lower	 and	
middle	income	countries	(Cotula	et	al.,	2009;	Deininger	and	Byerlee,	2011;	Deininger	et	
al.,	 2011).	 Though	 the	 food	 prices	 have	 eased	 down	 since	 2009/2010	 (Deininger	 and	
Selod,	 2011),	 global	 demand	 for	 land	 for	 agricultural	 investments	 remain	 on	 the	
ascendancy	and	may	continue	into	the	future	due	to	population	growth,	rising	incomes,	
and	 urbanization	 (Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Cotula	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Reports	 from	 the	 Land	
Matrix	Global	Observatory	 indicate	 that	 both	private	 and	public	 investors	 are	 seeking	
suitable	lands	for	investment	globally,	and	so	are	local	and	foreign	investors.		According	
to	Väth	and	Kirk	(2014),	this	demand	is	largely	driven	by	the	desire	for	food	and	fodder,	
industrial	 raw	materials,	biomass	or	purely	by	financial	speculation.	Also,	most	 foreign	
governments	are	striving	to	secure	reliable	water	and	food	supply	as	insulation	against	
tighter	 and	 more	 volatile	 markets,	 while	 the	 private	 sector	 expects	 to	 cash-in	 on	
promising	positive	returns	from	agriculture	(Badiane,	2011;	Cotula,	2011).	On	the	other	
hand,	it	is	believed	that	most	governments’	enthusiasm	to	supply	land	in	Africa	for	agro-
investments	 are	 hinged	 on	 bountiful	 promises	 and	 expectations	 for	 ancillary	
investments	 in	 technology,	 employment	 creation,	 infrastructural	 development	 and	
many	other	spill	over	effects.			
Even	 though	 the	 commercialization	 of	 agriculture	 is	 identified	 to	 be	 central	 to	 rural	
development	and	for	poverty	alleviation,	the	process	has	stagnated	in	many	developing	
countries	in	the	last	decade	especially	in	Africa	(Dixon,	et	al.,	2001;	World	Bank,	2005).	
As	indicated	by	von	Braun	and	Meizen-Dick	(2009:1),	large-scale	agro-investments	have	
the	potential	 to	 inject	the	much-needed	 investment	 into	agriculture	and	rural	areas	 in	
poor	developing	countries.	Besides	the	huge	capital	injection,	anticipated	opportunities	
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of	agro-based	foreign	direct	investments	include	stabilization	of	global	food	prices,	if	the	
momentum	of	investments	is	sustained	over	time.	On	the	contrary,	the	spate	of	recent	
agricultural	 investments	 raises	 concerns	 about	 the	negative	 externalities	 on	 the	poor,	
who	risk	losing	access	to	and	control	over	informal	land	rights.	Also,	it	is	feared	that	the	
high	level	demand	for	land	may	entice	smallholders	to	resort	to	distress	sale1	of	land	to	
foreign	and	 local	 investors	and	speculators	due	to	the	potential	attractiveness	of	 local	
land	prices	(Platteau,	1996;	Platteau,	2000;	Jin	and	Jayne,	2011).			
Generally,	 agro-based	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 (FDIs)	 have	 targeted	 developing	
countries	with	large	amount	of	arable	land	especially	countries	in	Africa,	Latin	America,	
Central	 Asia	 and	 Southeast	 Asia.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 2011,	 the	 International	 Land	 Coalition	
(2011)	 estimated	 that	 about	 80million	 hectares	 of	 land	 were	 already	 under	 foreign	
acquisition	globally	and	about	50	percent	of	these	are	in	Africa.	Africa	has	become	the	
hotspot	 for	 agricultural	 investments	 because	of	 its	 huge	potential	 for	 investment	 and	
agricultural	growth	(Deininger	and	Byerlee,	2010).	The	World	Bank	(2009:2)	highlighted	
that	 expansion	 in	 land	 supply	 is	 possible	 in	 Africa’s	 Guinea	 Savannah	 Zone.	 They	
indicated	 that	 the	 region	 comprises	 600million	 hectares	 of	 land,	 of	 which	 400million	
hectares	 are	 suitable	 for	 agriculture	 and	 smallholders	 currently	 crop	 only	 about	 40	
million	hectares.	Even	though	the	World	Bank	(2009)	report	insists	that	smallholders	in	
Africa	are	practically	unable	to	cultivate	all	the	available	arable	land	in	the	region	due	to	
technology	and	capital	constraints,	the	estimation	of	total	cultivated	lands	under	recent	
LSLAs	are	yet	to	exceed	30	percent	of	their	concessions.			
From	 our	 compilation	 of	 all	 LSLAs	 in	 14	 West	 African	 countries	 (from	 2005-2014),	
4,503,542	hectares	of	 land	have	been	acquired	 in	 recent	 large-scale	 land	acquisitions,	
and	130,975	hectares	 (about	3	percent)	 are	 currently	 cultivated	 (see	Table	1.1).	 From	
this	 compilation,	 very	 little	 of	 the	 recently	 acquired	 agricultural	 lands	 are	 actually	
committed	to	production	in	West	Africa.	It	is	therefore	probable	that	recent	private	and																																																									
1		A	distress	land	transaction	in	this	context	is	used	to	refer	to	lands	rented	out	in	order	to	obtain	income	
to	resolve	difficulties	at	the	household	level	due	to	distresses	such	as	food	shortage,	death	of	a	household	
member,	sickness	of	a	household	member,	debt,	damage	of	house,	bush	fires,	and	court	cases).	
	 3	
public	sector	participation	 in	LSLAs	 in	Africa	may	not	be	driven	solely	by	 resource-rich	
investors	who	 are	 targeting	 agriculture,	 but	 could	 be	motivated	 by	 a	myriad	 of	 other	
unexamined	factors.		
Table	1.1	LSLA	in	West	Africa	showing	signed	contracts	and	operated	sizes	of	land	
Country	 Signed	Contracts	Size	(ha)	 Operated	Parcels	Size	(ha)	 Cultivated	Size	(%)	
Ghana	 904,016	 12,790	 1.50			
Liberia	 1,340,777	 26,397	 2		
Mali	 169,286	 -	 -	
Sierra	Leone	 1,183,274	 6,365	 				0.50		
Senegal	 254,200	 206	 				0.08		
Nigeria	 187,419	 31,000	 16.5		
Burkina	Faso	 200,644	 644	 					0.32	
Cote	d’Ivoire	 68,101	 53,573	 79	
Guinea	 107,215	 -	 -	
Niger	 19,600	 -	 -	
Guinea	Bissau	 210	 -	 -	
Gambia	 30,000	 -	 -	
Benin	 36,800	 -	 -	
Mauritania	 2,000	 -	 -	
Total	
Acquisition	in	
West	Africa	
4,503,542	 130,975	 3	percent		
Source:	Compiled	by	Author	from	Land	Matrix	Global	Observatory	(2014)	
	
Also,	 in	 as	 long	 as	 agriculture	 in	 the	 region	 remains	 smallholder-based,	 it	 is	 very	
unrealistic	 that	 the	 remaining	 360	million	 hectares	 of	 land	 can	 be	 completely	 put	 to	
productive	use	within	current	limited	government	investment	in	agriculture.	Agriculture	
in	Africa	remains	 largely	traditional	 in	nature	(i.e.	 relying	on	the	hoe	and	cutlass),	and	
with	 limited	 inputs.	 African	 smallholders	 lack	 access	 to	 credits,	 technology,	 market	
access,	 and	 extension	 services.	 With	 the	 low-level	 production	 capacity	 of	 African	
smallholders,	recent	foreign	direct	investment	in	agriculture	presents	an	opportunity	to	
commit	the	outstanding	uncultivated	lands	to	productive	use	in	a	region	that	is	already	
food	 insecure,	 and	 requires	 job	 creation	 for	 its	 youth.	 The	 most	 approved	 land	
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transactions	 to	 recent	 agro-investors	 were	 documented	 in	 Africa	 between	 2006	 and	
2009	 in	 Madagascar,	 Ethiopia,	 (Cotula	 et	 al.,	 2009),	 Congo,	 Mozambique,	 Zambia,	
Tanzania	and	Sudan	(IFPRI,	2009).	In	West	Africa,	countries	such	as	Liberia,	Mali,	Ghana,	
Senegal,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Burkina	 Faso,	 and	 Nigeria	 have	 all	 recorded	 huge	 land	
acquisitions.	 Although,	 many	 of	 the	 reports	 on	 these	 land	 acquisitions	 are	 largely	
speculative,	evidences	of	signed	and	operational	investments	do	exist.	Recent	estimates	
and	distributions	of	foreign	direct	agricultural	 investments	 in	West	Africa	are	captured	
in	the	Table	1.1.	
1.2	Problem	Statement	
The	participation	of	 large-scale	agricultural	 investors	in	African	land	transactions	raises	
concerns	about	the	impacts	on	a	rather	hitherto	local	and	smallholder	dominated	land	
market.	 However,	 due	 to	 data	 lapses,	 data	 inaccuracies	 and	 data	 hoarding	 at	 various	
national	levels	across	the	region,	the	impact	of	LSLAs	on	land	markets	and	smallholders	
is	 yet	 to	 be	 empirically	 studied	 in	 much	 of	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 Existing	 studies	 have	
largely	focused	on	exploring	the	risks	of	land	investments	on	the	rights	and	livelihoods	
of	the	rural	poor.	Others	have	pointed	out	potential	opportunities	for	food	security	and	
rural	development	arising	from	the	new	investments	in	an	already	long-neglected	sector	
(Haralambous	et	al.,	2009;	Cotula	et	al.,	2009;	Odhiambo,	2011;	Deininger	and	Byerlee,	
2011;	Deininger	et	al.,	2011;	Dessy	et	al.,	2012).	There	are	also	some	studies	on	 large	
biofuel	 investments	 and	 food	 insecurity	 (Cotula	et	 al.,	 2008;	 Daniel	 and	Mittal,	 2009;	
Boamah,	 2011).	 Some	 researchers	 have	 delved	 into	 the	 implications	 of	 large-scale	
investments	on	water	rights	and	local	livelihoods	(Smaller	et	al.,	2009;	Smaller	and	Man,	
2009;	Bues,	2011;	Williams	et	al.,	2012).	It	was	also	identified	that	several	policy	papers	
have	mainly	focused	on	how	to	attain	responsible	agricultural	investment	and	devising	
voluntary	win-win	 principles	 and	 strategies	 (FAO,	 2005;	 von	 Braun	 and	Meinzen-Dick,	
2009;	 Schutter,	 2009;	 Cotula	 and	 Leonard,	 2010;	 FAO,	 IFAD	 U.	 a.	 t.	 W.	 B.	 G.,	 2010;	
Harold,	2010).			
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Following	persistent	concerns	about	the	welfare	 impacts	of	LSLAs	 in	Africa,	many	case	
studies	and	reports	that	examined	land	investment	deals	and	their	welfare	implications	
in	Africa	 that	 found	mixed	 impacts	 in	different	case	scenarios	 (Deininger	and	Songwe,	
2009;	 Daniel	 and	Mittal,	 2009;	 Cotula	et	 al.,	 2009;	 Dossou,	 2011;	 Dessy	et	 al.,	 2012).	
Deininger	 and	 Songwe	 (2009)	 have	 highlighted	 some	 potential	 positive	 impacts	 of	
agricultural	 investments.	 They	 were,	 however,	 quick	 to	 caution	 that	 the	 ensuing	
modernization	of	 these	 investments	may	not	 necessarily	 improve	 the	welfare	of	 local	
people	unless	diligently	harnessed.	Daniel	and	Mittal	(2009)	have	critiqued	the	viability	
of	 the	win-win	 argument	 describing	 it	 as	 a	 strategy	 promoted	 to	 stall	 the	 large-scale	
agro-investments	criticisms,	and	 lamenting	 the	 relegation	of	 food	security	of	 the	poor	
from	 the	 forefront	 of	 the	 international	 debate.	 Cotula	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 have	 also	
acknowledged	the	potentials	of	 land	investments,	but	warn	these	may	not	be	handy	if	
host	governments	 fail	 to	build	capacities	necessary	 to	negotiate	better	 terms	 for	 their	
people.	 Dessy	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 have	 expanded	 this	 literature	 by	 revealing	 the	 conditions	
that	 are	 sufficient	 for	 land	 investment	 deals,	 to	 improve	 the	 experiences	 of	 local	
communities	from	which	land	is	leased	or	purchased.				
Characteristically,	 these	studies	 largely	 focused	on	media	 reports	and	expert	opinions,	
with	 limited	empirical	 research	due	to	 limited	access	to	data.	Generally,	 there	are	still	
limited	empirical	studies	on	how	large-scale	agro-investments	have	influenced	changes	
in	 land	 markets	 and	 influenced	 smallholder	 land	 transactions	 in	 West	 Africa.	 Also,	
empirical	studies	on	how	institutions	and	institutional	changes	influence	land	markets	in	
Africa	is	limited.	It	is	against	this	backdrop	that	this	study	aims	to	assess	the	implications	
of	 large-scale	 agricultural	 investments	 on	 land	markets	 and	 smallholder	 farmers	with	
emphasis	on	Ghana.	Ghana	is	an	important	destination	for	large-scale	land	acquisitions	
in	Africa	because	the	government	markets	 it	as	the	gateway	to	Africa	(Anseeuw	et	al.,	
2012);	 and	 it	 is	 also	 characterised	 by	 a	 reasonable	 degree	 of	 macro-economic	 and	
political	 stability	with	access	 to	 sea	 transportation	 (Mehler	et	al.,	 2012).	 Existing	 road	
network	in	the	cocoa	producing	areas	of	Ghana,	provide	a	further	boost	for	agricultural	
investments.	 According	 to	 MoFA	 (Interview,	 2013),	 Ghana	 has	 large	 tracts	 of	 fertile	
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lands	 with	 a	 growing	 demand	 for	 major	 staples	 like	 maize,	 rice	 and	 soybean.	 The	
availability	of	significant	water	resources	for	all	year	 irrigation	farming	makes	Ghana	a	
target	 for	 LSLA.	 Water	 resources	 further	 boost	 opportunities	 for	 the	 cultivation	 of	
water-base	crops	such	as	sugarcane.	 In	Ghana,	these	demand-driven	 land	transactions	
may	as	well	be	driven	by	colonial	relationships,	population	growth	(Cotula	et	al.,	2004),	
socio-economic	changes	(Ellis	and	Allison,	2004)	and	political	process	(Cotula,	2007).			
The	study	looks	at	LSLAs	within	Ghana’s	customary	tenure	arrangement	in	four	different	
papers.	It	is	largely	a	qualitative	study	and	tells	the	story	behind	land	transactions.	The	
first	 empirical	 chapter	 examines	 how	 land	 management	 institutions	 and	 institutional	
changes	have	impacted	on	land	markets	from	both	customary	and	statutory	land	tenure	
perspectives.	 The	 second	 examines	 land	 rental	 approaches	 in	 Ghana,	 including	 the	
direct	and	the	indirect	(transaction	costs)	costs	of	acquiring	land.	The	third	examines	the	
determinants	of	land	prices	(rents),	particularly	the	considerations	taken	by	landowners	
in	fixing	land	rents	or	charging	a	price	for	agricultural	land.	The	forth-empirical	chapter	
identifies	 losers	 and	winners	 in	 land	 transactions	 in	 Ghana	 and	 narrates	 exactly	 how	
these	gains	or	losses	are	emerging.		
1.3	Main	Research	Objective	and	Questions	
Within	the	above	research	problem	and	identified	knowledge	gaps,	this	study	examines	
how	 large-scale	 agricultural	 investments	 in	West	 Africa	 have	 influenced	 land	markets	
and	 smallholders	 through	 land	price	 dynamics;	 and	how	 institutions	 and	 their	 change	
influence	land	price	formation.	In	line	with	the	above	main	objective,	specific	research	
questions	necessary	 to	address	 the	above	 research	objectives	 include	 the	 following	 in	
Table	1.2.		
Table	1.2	Main	research	question	and	specific	objectives	of	the	study	
Main	Questions	and	Specific	Research	Objectives		
1. How	have	institutions	and	institutional	changes	influenced	land	markets	in	Ghana?		
• Identify	the	formal	and	informal	institutions	that	regulate	land	transactions.	
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• To	assess	changes	of	these	institutions	in	the	last	decade.	
• Examine	how	these	institutional	changes	have	influenced	land	markets.	
2. How	are	land	prices	formed	in	Ghana?	
• To	look	at	the	complications	of	land	price	formation.	
• To	examine	smallholder	land	transaction	processes.	
3. What	determines	agricultural	land	price	levels?	
• To	examine	the	nature	of	land	rents	to	smallholders	and	large	holders.	
• Examine	farmers’	liabilities	and	entitlements,	and	the	influences	on	land	prices.	
• Examine	the	factors	that	determine	land	prices	(rents).	
4. Who	are	the	winners	and	losers	when	land	prices	change?		
• Identify	who	benefits	from	land	price	changes.	
• Identify	who	loses	when	land	prices	change.	
• To	see	how	these	people	benefit	or	lose	when	land	prices	change.		
1.4	Significance	of	the	Study	
This	study	is	relevant	in	understanding	the	emerging	impacts	of	 large	land	acquisitions	
in	 Africa	 on	 smallholders	 in	 Africa.	 Besides	 the	 land	 market	 changes	 studied,	 this	
research	is	relevant	in	assessing	the	processes	and	costs	of	accessing	land	in	the	study	
area,	 and	 how	 systems	 are	 changing	with	 the	 heightening	 of	 large-scale	 investments.	
This	study	is	to	inform	policy	making	and	public	opinion	about	agricultural	investments.	
Already,	 existing	 data	 from	 the	 Land	Matrix	 Global	 Observatory	 project	 points	 to	 the	
fact	that	large-scale	agricultural	investment	in	Africa	is	not	just	a	bubble,	but	has	come	
to	stay	and	the	trends	may	continue	into	the	near	future	(Anseeuw	et	al.,	2012a).	Under	
the	current	global	economic	dispensation	and	the	enormous	potential	of	agriculture	to	
promote	growth,	the	agricultural	sector	in	Africa	indeed	requires	huge	investment.	Such	
investments	 need	 to	 be	 studied	 because	 they	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 trigger	 many	
positive	impacts	such	as	improving	smallholder	productivity	and	expansion	of	marketed	
surplus	(von	Braun	et	al.,	1989;	von	Braun	et	al.,	1994;	FAO,	2009).			
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Furthermore,	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	 LSLAs	 on	 land	 markets	 will	 enable	
policy	 formulation	 on	 how	 to	 insulate	 poor	 and	 landless	 peasants	 from	 exploitation.	
Land	 markets	 in	 Africa	 have	 recently	 been	 found	 to	 be	 more	 widespread	 with	 wide	
variance	 in	 the	nature	of	 transactions	and	 contractual	 arrangements	among	 countries	
(Otsuka	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Holden	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 African	 land	 markets	 have	 become	 more	
complex	and	globalized	because	of	the	foreign	interest	in	agricultural	land.	Though	the	
increasing	marketization	of	African	farmlands	has	largely	been	attributed	to	the	gradual	
disintegration	of	the	system	of	communal	property	rights	towards	individualized	rights	
(Bruce	 and	 Migot-Adholla,	 1993;	 Otsuka	 and	 Place,	 2001),	 recent	 market	 trends	 are	
driven	by	surging	 interest	 in	 large-scale	commercialization	of	agriculture	 in	Africa.	This	
new	land	market	structure	has	numerous	benefits	 for	smallholders,	 if	 they	are	able	to	
participate	effectively	in	it.	Therefore,	this	study	is	significant	to	examine	the	nature	and	
extent	of	impacts	of	large-scale	investments	on	land	markets	and	smallholders.			
Also,	 this	 study	 will	 enable	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 recent	 large-scale	 agricultural	
investments	in	West	Africa	are	influencing	land	market	dynamics	–	land	price	formation	
and	costs	of	access	to	land.	Large-scale	agro-investments	in	Africa	are	expected	to	inject	
considerable	liquidity.	With	an	emerging	vibrant	land	market,	land-poor	households	can	
acquire	 extra	 land,	while	 land	 rich	 households	 can	 alienate	 excess	 land.	 According	 to	
Deininger	and	Binswanger	(2001),	land	rental	markets	can	help	to	improve	land	use	and	
access	by	 the	poor.	On	 the	 contrary,	 large	agricultural	estates	may	 result	 in	 land	 rent	
and	price	hikes,	and	consequently,	hamper	poor-landless	farmers	who	rely	on	the	land	
market	in	accessing	productive	space.	Since	the	positions	of	various	researchers’	remain	
different	 about	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 new	 land	markets	 in	 Africa,	 there	 is	 the	 need	 for	
empirical	research	to	posit	the	debate	in	proper	perspective.			
Furthermore,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 land	
institutions	 and	 their	 evolution	 under	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 in	 Ghana.	 It	 is	
believed	 that	 large-agro	 investors	 are	 targeting	 countries	 with	 weak	 governance,	
corruptible	politicians,	and	weak	 land	 rights	of	existing	users	both	 in	 law	and	practice	
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(Deininger,	 2011;	 Hall,	 2011;	 Arzeki	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Global	 land	 demand	 opens	 up	
opportunities	 for	 corruption	 for	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	 land	 institutions.	 Typically,	
these	institutions	and	institutional	changes	have	influences	on	the	current	land	market	
operations	and	land	tenure.	Hence,	how	these	institutional	changes	are	influencing	land	
pricing	 in	 Ghana	 are	 examined	 in	 this	 study.	 This	 study	 therefore,	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	
broader	 goal	 of	 undertaking	 development	 research	 necessary	 for	 poverty	 alleviation,	
enhancing	sustainable	development	and	improving	development-oriented	policy	making	
with	relevance	to	developing	countries.		
1.5	Research	Methodology	
The	study	adopts	a	case	base	approach	to	critically	examine	from	the	community	level	
the	impacts	of	large-scale	land	acquisitions	on	land	markets	and	smallholder	farmers.		
1.5.1	Case	studies	
Two	 large	 agro-investment	 projects	 were	 purposely	 selected	 for	 this	 study	 out	 of	 a	
number	 of	 companies	 operating	 in	 Ghana.	 The	 selection	 was	 made	 from	 a	 list	 of	
registered	 agro-companies	 obtained	 from	 the	 Ghana	 Investment	 Promotion	 Centre	
(GIPC)	in	2012.	A	number	of	factors	were	taken	into	consideration	in	selecting	the	two	
projects.	 Firstly,	 the	 two	 companies	 are	 located	 within	 two	 different	 agro-ecological	
zones	of	Ghana,	but	with	a	similar	land	tenure	system.	This	allowed	for	comparisons	to	
be	made	in	terms	of	the	processes	and	costs	of	land	acquisitions,	and	the	unique	roles	
of	 various	 stakeholders	 and	 institutions	 in	 those	 regions	 of	 Ghana.	 Also,	 due	 to	 the	
nature	of	data	required	from	the	Companies	regarding	processes,	costs	and	operational	
impacts,	 it	was	 imperative	 to	 select	 only	 agro-companies	 that	 offered	 approval	 to	 be	
studied.	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 impacts	 of	 these	 projects	 on	 local	 communities,	 the	
proximity	of	these	investments	to	neighbouring	communities	was	a	major	requirement	
for	the	selection	of	studied	cases.	Furthermore,	the	sizes	of	the	investments	(exceeding	
1,000	 acres),	 the	 operational	 status	 of	 the	 companies	 (operation	 or	 non-operational),	
and	the	nature	of	business	operations	were	also	 taken	 into	consideration.	Since	some	
registered	large	agro-companies	had	already	collapsed	or	did	not	start	operations	at	the	
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time	of	 the	 study,	 only	 projects	 that	were	 actually	 operational	were	 targeted	 for	 this	
study.	 Using	 these	 criteria,	 the	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 located	 in	 the	 Ashanti	 Akim	North	
District	 and	 the	 Integrated	 Tamale	 Fruit	 Company	 (ITFC)	 Ltd	 in	 the	 Savelugu-Nanton	
District	were	selected	for	the	study.			
A.	ScanFarm	Ltd	(Gh)	Ltd,	Agogo	–	Ashanti	region	
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 formally	 ScanFuel	 (Gh)2	Ltd	 came	 to	 Ghana	 in	 2008	 through	 the	
efforts	 of	 a	 native	 of	 Agogo,	 resident	 in	 Norway.	 The	 Norwegian	 investors	 were	
convinced	they	could	obtain	about	400,000ha3	of	 idle	and	underutilised	farmland	from	
the	Omanhene	 [Paramount	 Chief	 of	 the	 Agogo	 Traditional	 Area]	 for	 the	 commercial	
production	 of	 Jatropha	 curcas	 for	 export.	 However,	 after	 negotiations,	 a	 parcel	 of	
19,058	hectares	was	granted	through	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU)	in	2009.	
At	the	commencement	of	registration	of	the	lease	agreement	at	the	Lands	Commission	
in	2010,	it	was	realised	that	a	lease	of	about	6,000	hectares	had	already	been	granted	to	
one	Bernard	Ofori.	Upon	ceding	this	portion,	ScanFarm’s	concession	currently	stands	at	
13,058	hectares.			
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 entered	 Ghana	 to	 produce	 Jatropha	 curcas,	 but	 after	 1year	 of	
cultivation,	 diverted	 into	 the	 production	 of	 maize,	 soybeans,	 and	 sorghum4.	 Various	
factors	 accounted	 for	 this.	 First	 the	 discovery	 and	 extraction	 of	 crude	 oil	 in	 Ghana	
implied	 that	 the	 local	 economic	 viability	 of	 Jatropha	 crude	 was	 less	 competitive.	
Secondly,	since	2009	the	global	prices	of	crude	oil	continued	to	witness	huge	declines.	
Also,	 it	was	realised	that	to	enhance	commercial	viability	of	Jatropha	curcas	there	was	
the	need	for	extra	land,	which	was	impossible	to	acquire	around	the	Agogo	area.	Lastly,																																																									
2	ScanFarm	 Ghana	 Ltd	 is	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 ScanFuel	 AS	 based	 in	 Norway.	 The	 name	 was	 changed	 from	
ScanFuel	(Gh)	Ltd	to	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	in	2010	following	a	shift	of	company	focus	from	Jatropha	curcas	in	
2009	to	food	crops	largely	maize,	soybeans	and	sorghum.		
3	This	 figure	was	hugely	 reported	by	 the	media	 and	 variously	described	as	 land	 grabbing	by	 foreigners,	
accompanied	 by	 displacements	 and	 evictions	 with	 no	 compensation.	 However,	 on	 the	 ground,	 this	
planned	 acquisition	 never	materialised.	 Earlier	 upheavals	 against	 agro-investments	were	 largely	 due	 to	
these	 sensationalised	 reporting	 by	 the	 media	 and	 spearheaded	 by	 a	 few	 prominent	 groups.	 See	
http://bit.ly/1a3KPg2	and	http://bit.ly/9dZ09p		
4	ScanFarm	 Ltd	 is	 currently	 nurturing	 plans	 to	 add	 upland	 rice	 and	 teak	 production	 in	 future	 to	 their	
portfolio.	
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it	was	 realized	 that	 the	 global	 projection	of	 Jatropha	 curcas	 as	 a	magic	plant	 and	 the	
panacea	 to	 mankind’s	 energy	 challenges	 was	 exactly	 not	 the	 case	 (interview	 with	
ScanFarm	Manager,	2012).	Per	the	Ghana	Free	Zones	Board	certificate	(GFZB)	it	meant	
that	 Jatropha	 curcas	 products	 had	 to	 be	 exported	 and	not	 sold	 locally,	 yet	marketing	
was	 also	 a	 problem.	 Though	 currently	 operating	 based	 on	 a	 Memorandum	 of	
Understanding	(MoU),	ScanFarm’s	 lease	under	registration	with	the	Lands	Commission	
is	for	50yrs5	in	two	streams	of	25yrs	each	and	the	second	subject	to	re-negotiation	and	
renewal.	A	lump	sum	of	US	$23,0006	was	paid	to	the	Agogo	Traditional	Council	(ATC)	for	
the	 land,	 subject	 to	 annual	 ground	 rent	 payment	 of	 US	 $1	 per	 acre	 per	 annum	with	
upward	reviews	by	UD	$0.50	every	twelve	months	to	a	maximum	of	US	$3.50	in	the	60th	
month	 (that	 is	 in	 2014).	 Other	 issues	 that	 are	 documented	 in	 the	 lease	 agreement	
include	 the	 granting	 of	 unrestricted	 access	 to	 water	 on	 the	 land	 for	 agricultural	
production.	 Land	 disputes	 are	 to	 be	 resolved	 at	 the	 Agogo	 Traditional	 Council	 (ATC).	
Also,	 investors	 are	 obliged	 per	 the	 MoU	 to	 promote	 development	 and	 provide	
employment	in	the	operational	communities.			
The	 Agogo	 area	 operates	 a	 Stool	 land	 tenure	 system	with	 families	 who	 hold	 various	
usufruct	rights	(village	surveys,	2013).	The	ScanFarm	(Gh)	concession	dispossessed	some	
75	 usufructs	 together	 with	 migrant	 farmers	 (Wisborg,	 2012).	 This	 subsequently	
triggered	demonstrations	in	Agogo	town	in	2010	and	required	compensation	payments	
to	disposed	usufructs.	Compensation	was	paid	subsequently	in	2011	at	Gh¢	33	per	acre	
or	Gh¢80	(US$	41.6	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	per	hectare	(Interview	with	ScanFarm	Manager,	
2012).	 Some	 families	 who	 refused	 compensation	 had	 their	 lands	 severed	 for	 them.	
Migrant	farmers	from	the	northern	regions	of	Ghana	constitute	about	70	percent	of	the	
population	in	the	seven	communities	around	ScanFarm	Ltd.	They	pay	a	pre-season	rent																																																									
5	According	to	Article	266	(4)	of	the	1992	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana,	no	interest	in,	or	right	over,	
any	 land	shall	be	created	which	vests	 in	a	person	who	 is	not	a	citizen	of	Ghana	 leasehold	 for	a	 term	of	
more	than	fifty	years	at	any	time.	 It	 is	also	generally	 the	rule	that	agricultural	 leases	should	not	exceed	
50yrs	at	any	time.	
6	Implying	 an	 average	 of	 $1.75	 per	 ha	 based	 on	 the	 lump	 sum	 payment	 and	 the	 size	 of	 plot	 that	 was	
rented-out.	 This	 figure	 is	 not	 different	 from	 reported	 averages	 of	 $1	 to	 $	 2	 per	 ha	 of	 agricultural	 land	
rentals	globally.			
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of	Gh¢	40	(US$	20.8	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	for	an	acre	of	land	farmed	or	the	value	of	1	to	3	
bags	 of	 maize	 after	 harvest	 depending	 on	 agreements	 with	 their	 usufruct	 landlords	
(Interview	ATC	Registrar,	2012).	Amanor	(2006)	described	this	practice	as	nkotokoano,	
which	 implies	a	sack	 filled	 to	 the	brim.	Figure	1.1	shows	the	 location	of	 the	ScanFarm	
concession	and	surrounding	communities.			
	
Figure	1:1	ScanFarm	Project	showing	communities	in	Ashanti-Akim	North	District	
Source:	Boamah,	2014		
B.		Integrated	Tamale	Fruit	Company	(ITFC),	Tamale	-	Northern	region	
ITFC	is	a	Limited	Liability	Company	Incorporated	in	1999	under	the	Ghana	Company	Act	
1963	 (Act	 179).	 It	 commenced	 business	 in	 the	 year	 2000.	 Ghanaian	 and	 Dutch	
shareholders	 own	 the	 company	 on	 70/30	 bases	 respectively	 –	 Wienco	 (Ghana)	 has	
50percent,	the	Nanton	Chief	owns	10percent,	African	Tiger	Mutual	Fund	owns	5percent,	
Tamale	 Investments	 owns	 5percent	 and	 30	 percent	 is	 owned	 by	 Komma	 BV	 (Dutch)	
(Osei,	2007).	It	was	established	to	produce	mango	for	both	export	and	the	local	market.	
The	 company’s	 nucleus	 farm	of	 1,363	 acres	 (568	 hectares)	 is	 located	 between	Dipale	
and	 Tunayili.	 ITFC	 also	 operates	 outgrower	 schemes,	 where	 individual	 farmers	 or	
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families	 produce	 mango	 on	 their	 own	 plots	 with	 the	 logistical	 assistance	 of	 the	
company,	especially	water,	seedlings	and	bushfire	prevention.	Currently	ITFC	has	1,2007	
outgrowers	over	1,200acres	(500hectares)	of	land	(i.e.	100	mango	trees/acre/outgrower	
farmer).	 The	 company	 initially	 targeted	 2000	 outgrowers	 but	 realised	 that	 output	 fell	
below	expectations	and	hence	 it	 suspended	expansion	 in	order	 to	address	 low	yields.	
The	land	for	the	nucleus	farm	was	obtained	from	the	Ya	Na	with	the	assistance	of	the	
Nanton	 Na	 and	 Dipale	 Na.	 Unlike	 the	 constitutionally	 specified	 tenure	 of	 50yrs	 for	
commercial	agricultural	land,	ITFC	holds	a	long-term	lease	of	99	years.		In	an	interview	
with	 ITFC	 (2013),	 it	was	 revealed	 that	 initial	 payments	 amounted	 to	GH¢	6,000	 (part-
payment	for	the	land	in	1999)	for	the	1,363	acres	(552	hectares).	The	company	in	2004	
acquired	 an	 additional	 205acres	 (83	 hectares)	 at	Gushie	 for	 its	 office	 accommodation	
and	mango	processing	plant.	This	additional	land	was	acquired	at	a	cost	of	GH¢	10,000	
with	an	annual	rent	of	GH¢	100	per	annum	subject	to	periodic	reviews.	An	amount	of	
GH¢	 5,000	 was	 paid	 as	 compensation	 to	 dispossessed	 farmers	 through	 the	 chief	 of	
Gushie	(Interview	with	ITFC	manager,	2013).			
ITFC	 uses	 a	 micro-irrigation	 system	 that	 places	 a	 sprinkler	 per	 plant	 to	 receive	 the	
required	amount	of	water.	The	water	is	pumped	directly	from	the	White	Volta	River	for	
which	 water	 rights	 were	 expressly	 included	 in	 their	 lease	 agreement	 as	 well.	 Upon	
harvest,	the	cost	of	mango	seedlings,	water,	water	tank,	field	education,	and	fire	control	
are	 deducted	 seasonally	 and	 the	 profits	 paid	 to	 farmers.	 Other	 key	 issues	 that	 were	
agreed	between	ITFC	Ltd	and	the	community	stakeholders	included;	the	reservation	of	
70	 percent	 of	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 the	 people	 of	 the	 four	 operational	
communities	(Gushie,	Tunayili,	Tigla	and	Dipale),	provision	of	potable	water,	electricity,	
roads,	school	 infrastructure	and	scholarships	schemes.	 ITFC	Ltd	also	operates	a	mango	
pack	 house	 and	 processing	 factory.	 Besides	 organic	 mango,	 they	 are	 also	 into	 maize	
																																																								
7	Each	farmer	 in	 the	outgrower	scheme	 is	 limited	to	owning	an	acre	of	mango	farm	but	 in	a	continuum	
with	other	farms	of	up	to	20acres	(8hectares)	and	there	may	be	several	or	few	of	such	holdings	in	a	village	
depending	on	land	availability	and	how	many	small	farmers	may	have	embraced	the	out	grower	idea.		
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production,	bee	keeping	and	butternut	squash	farming.	The	company	also	plans	to	start	
a	citrus	plantation	in	the	future.		
	
Figure	1:2	ITFC	project	-	showing	focus	communities	in	the	Savelugu-Nanton	District	
Source:	Own	illustration			
	
1.5.2	Data	collection		
The	study	is	based	on	village	survey	data	collected	from	smallholder	households	in	four	
(4)	 selected	 communities	 in	Ghana.	 The	data	was	both	qualitative	 and	quantitative	 in	
nature	 collected	 between	 September	 2012	 and	 April	 2013.	 Qualitative	 data	 sources	
included	 Focus	 Group	 Discussions	 (FGDs),	 stakeholder	 interviews,	 reports	 and	 policy	
documents.	 Focus	 Group	 Discussions	 (FGDs)	 were	 conducted	 in	 Dukusen,	 Afrisire,	
Gushie,	 and	 Tunayili	 to	 gather	 community	 level	 information	 on	 land	 markets.	 Focus	
groups	 at	 the	 respective	 villages	 consisted	 the	 village	 chief,	 village	 elders,	 the	 village	
secretary,	 two	 women	 representatives,	 a	 youth	 representative,	 the	 assemblyman,	
village	 development	 committee	 chairman	 (or	 member),	 and	 the	 Tendaana	 (spiritual	
head/landowner).	Since	the	study	centred	on	the	impact	of	large-scale	land	acquisitions	
on	 land	 markets,	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 the	 two	 (2)	 managers	 of	 both	
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ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	and	ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd	projects,	using	interview	guides.	Four	(4)	separate	
interviews	were	also	conducted	with	the	chiefs	of	the	study	communities;	to	understand	
the	land	market	dynamics,	land	pricing	and	rents	agreed	upon	at	the	time	of	the	grants.		
Institutional	data	on	land	acquisition	and	investment	legitimisation	was	collected	using	
institutional	 surveys	 through	 snowballing	 and	 purposive	 sampling.	 The	 study	 also	
undertook	 critical	 review	 of	 existing	 legal	 documents	 as	 well	 as	 key	 stakeholder	
interviews	with	 regional	 officials	 of	 the	 Lands	 Commission,	 officials	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	
Food	and	Agriculture	(MoFA),	and	the	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Lands	(OASL).	
Two	 (2)	 officers	 each	 from	 the	 Lands	 Commissions	 in	 Kumasi	 and	 Tamale	 were	
interviewed	 on	 the	 leasing	 arrangement	 of	 the	 studied	 agricultural	 estates.	 These	 in-
depth	interviews	were	necessary	to	obtain	essential	supplementary	qualitative	data	on	
the	processes	of	land	acquisition	and	transaction	costs.	At	the	national	level,	secondary	
data	was	gathered	 from	the	Ghana	 Investment	Promotions	Centre	 (GIPC),	Ghana	Free	
Zones	Board	(GFZB),	Water	Resources	Commission,	and	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	
(MoFA).	A	combination	of	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	enabled	the	study	to	
go	 beyond	 the	 legislative	 prescriptions	 of	 land	 administration	 in	 Ghana,	 to	 include	
evidences	on	actual	practices	of	land	acquisitions	on	the	ground.			
Quantitative	 data	 was	 collected	 from	 a	 total	 of	 175	 agricultural	 households	 using	
questionnaires.	 The	 survey	 questionnaire	 gathered	 information	 on	 household	
composition,	household	characteristics,	type	of	farming	activity,	land	ownership,	type	of	
landholdings,	 land	 tenure	 security,	 ownership	 of	 main	 agricultural	 assets	 and	 values,	
access	to	credits,	access	to	water	and	water	rights.	The	data	also	included	distress	land	
transactions,	 land	 rentals,	 changes	 in	 land	 rents/land	 prices,	 determinants	 of	 land	
rents/prices,	 and	 use	 of	 agricultural	 inputs.	 In	 addition,	 some	 other	 essential	 data,	
related	 to	 the	 recent	 large	 land	 deals	 –	 nature,	 processes	 of	 acquisition,	 rents/prices	
paid,	 consultations,	 recruitments	 and	 employment	 opportunities,	 expectations,	
promises	 and	 disappointments,	 were	 gathered.	 Together	 with	 the	 agricultural	
household	 surveys,	 a	 community	 survey	was	 also	 undertaken	 to	 assess	 the	 level	 and	
nature	of	 land	 transactions,	 community	characteristics,	 farming	practices,	 land	market	
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activities,	 prevailing	 land	 tenure	 systems,	 land	 rents/prices	 and	 costs	 of	 labour.	 The	
locations	of	selected	study	districts	and	communities	in	Ghana	are	shown	in	Figure	1.3.																																																																												
	
Figure	1:3	Map	of	Ghana	showing	administrative	regions	and	study	districts	
Source:	Own	Illustration			
1.6	Land	Tenure	–	Interests	in	Land	in	Ghana	
Ghana	operates	a	hybrid	system	of	both	customary	and	statutory	 land	tenure	systems	
(Ubink	 and	 Quan,	 2008).	 The	 customary	 tenure	 system	 operates	 under	 the	 customs,	
rules,	norms	and	traditions	of	 the	community.	Statutory	 lands	comprise	of	state	 lands	
and	 vested	 lands.	 State	 land	 refers	 to	 lands	 held	 by	 the	 state	 for	 public	 purposes	 or	
acquired	through	the	state’s	powers	of	eminent	domain	[acquired	under	the	State	Lands	
Act	1962	(Act	125)]	 in	the	interest	of	the	public.	There	are	also	vested	lands	[acquired	
A. Savelugu	District	
• 	Gushie	
• 	Tunayili	
B.			Asante-Akim	North	District	
• Dukusen	
• Afrisire	
A	
B	
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under	 the	Administration	of	 Lands	Act,	1962	 (Act	123)]	–	 referring	 to	 lands	owned	by	
customary	 authorities	 but	 administered	 in	 trust	 by	 the	 state	 for	 the	 beneficial	
enjoyment	 of	 the	 owners.	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 about	 80percent	 of	 all	 landholding	 in	
Ghana	is	under	customary	tenure	while	the	remaining	20percent	is	held	by	the	state	for	
public	 purposes	 (Kasanga	 and	 Kotey,	 2001;	Mahama	 and	 Baffour,	 2009).	 The	 various	
types	 of	 interests	 that	 exist	 in	Ghana	 over	 customary	 land	 are:	 allodial	 title,	 freehold	
title	 (customary	 freehold	 or	 common	 law	 freehold),	 leasehold;	 and	 a	 lesser	 interest	
created	by	sharecropping	e.g.	abunu	and	abusa	tenancies	(Ollennu,	1962;	da	Rocha	and	
Lodoh,	1999;	Ghana	Land	Policy,	1999).			
The	allodial	interest	is	the	highest	customary	title	in	land	in	Ghana	and	is	held	by	stools	
(skins)8,	 sub-stools,	 clans,	 families,	 as	 well	 as	 individuals	 (see	 Bentsi-Enchill,	 1964;	 da	
Rocha	 and	 Lodoh,	 1999).	 In	Akan	 and	 in	 some	Ga	 communities,	 stools	 and	 sub-stools	
hold	 the	 allodial	 title.	 In	 some	 parts	 of	 Adangme	 (Greater	 Accra),	 the	 Anglo	 (Volta	
region)	and	Adjumaku	(Central	region),	 families	and	clans	own	 land.	 In	the	Upper	East	
and	Upper	West	regions	and	in	some	parts	of	the	Northern	region,	Tendaamba	hold	the	
allodial	 interest	 (Kasanga,	 1988;	 Bentsi-Enchill,	 1964).	 Incidental	 rights	 of	 allodial	
interest	 include	exclusive	possession,	use	and	enjoyment,	proprietorship	 in	perpetuity	
and	right	of	alienation.	The	position	of	every	allodial	interest	holder	in	Ghana	is	titular,	
holding	land	in	trust	for	the	whole	community	(Kasanga,	1988)	as	well	as	in	trust	for	the	
family	or	clan	as	the	case	may	be.	The	person	in	whom	the	allodial	interest	is	vested	has	
complete	and	absolute	power	to	use	the	land	in	a	manner	so	desired	but	only	subject	to	
local	 customs	 (da	 Rocha	 and	 Lodoh,	 1999).	 However,	 these	 absolute	 land	 ownership	
powers	 of	 allodial	 holders	 are	 limited	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 usufructs	 and	 other	 lesser	
interests.		
																																																									
8	The	use	of	the	terms	stool	and	skin	represents	the	symbols	of	authority	of	chiefs	 in	Ghana.	Whilst	the	
stool	 is	 the	 symbol	of	 authority	 for	 chiefs	 in	 the	 southern	part	of	Ghana,	 the	 skin	 (of	 an	animal)	 is	 the	
symbol	of	authority	for	chiefs	in	the	northern	part.	There	is	often	the	tendency	in	Ghana	to	refer	to	the	
chieftaincy	of	 a	 particular	 area	 as	 the	 stool	 or	 skin.	 There	 are	 even	 verbal	 forms	 created:	 to	enskin,	 to	
enstool;	and	derived	nouns:	enskinment	and	enstoolment.			
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The	freehold	or	usufructuary	interest9	is	the	highest	interest	that	an	individual	can	hold	
in	 land	 through	 outright	 purchase	 or	 gift.	 Individuals	 and	 families	 from	 the	 allodial	
landholding	group	hold	the	customary	freehold	–	denoting	the	near	maximal	interest	in	
land	 (Bentsi-Enchill,	 1964).	 Chiefs	 and	 Tendaamba	 belonging	 to	 families	 also	 have	
inherent	interest	in	family	or	communal	land	(Kasanga	1988;	Kasanga	and	Kotey,	2001).	
Both	 members	 of	 the	 land	 owning	 group	 (subject	 usufruct)	 or	 strangers10	(stranger	
usufruct)	can	hold	the	customary	freehold	interest.	This	interest	is	secure,	alienable	and	
inheritable	(Ollennu,	1962).	It	is	instructive	to	state	that	the	creation	of	freehold	interest	
over	lands	in	Ghana	is	currently	prohibited	over	stool	 land	per	the	operation	of	Article	
267	(5)	of	the	Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992).	This	provision	prohibits	
the	 creation	of	 all	manner	of	 freeholds	 in	 stool	 land	but	 not	 family	 and	private	 lands	
(Asiama,	 2008).	 The	 freeholder	 continues	 to	 hold	 the	 land	 and	 even	 upon	 death,	 the	
land	is	passed	unto	his	successors	(Sarpong,	2006).	The	usufructuary	right	is	said	to	have	
emanated	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 migrants	 and	 subjects	 require	 land	 for	 their	 economic	
activity	 and	housing	 (Asante,	 1969),	 hence	 compelling	 the	 allodial	 entities	 to	disburse	
land	to	them	for	farming	and	settlement.		
The	leasehold	is	a	modern	day	addition	to	the	land	tenure	system	in	Ghana	that	allows	
one	to	acquire	 land	for	a	particular	use	over	a	specified	timeframe.	A	valid	 lease	must	
have	a	date	of	commencement	and	a	date	of	expiration.	The	leasehold	is	a	landholding	
right	 that	 emanates	 from	 the	 allodial	 title	 or	 the	 usufruct	 interest	 and	 is	 backed	 by	
contractual	agreements	(see	Ollennu,	1962;	da	Rocha	and	Lodoh,	1999:29).	Leaseholds	
can	be	classified	into	customary	or	common-law	leaseholds	depending	on	whether	they	
are	derived	from	the	customary	or	common	law	freehold.	Indeed	both	lease	forms	co-
exist	 in	Ghana	especially	 for	agricultural	 land.	Leases	 in	Ghana	are	registered	with	 the																																																									
9	The	term	Usufructuary	right	is	synonymous	to	English	Common	Law	freehold.	It	is	the	highest	interest	in	
land	 to	 which	 members	 of	 the	 landholding	 community,	 clan	 or	 group	 of	 the	 allodial	 community	 are	
entitled.	It	is	usually	acquired	by	allotment	from	the	landholding	clan	or	group	or	by	first	cultivation.	It	can	
exist	into	perpetuity	and	is	alienable	to	ones	descendants	(as	fee	life	estate).	
10	A	stranger	is	a	non-subject	of	a	tribe,	clan,	skin	or	stool.	Strangers	who	wish	to	acquire	land	must	first	
seek	 the	 permission	 of	 the	 chief	 to	 settle	 in	 his	 area.	 If	 permission	 is	 granted,	 the	 stranger	may	 then	
contact	any	landholder,	or	most	frequently	the	family	he	may	be	residing	with	for	land	on	a	contractual	
basis,	such	as	on	sharecropping	terms.	
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Lands	 Commission	 as	 land	 title	 (Land	 Title	 Registration	 Division	 of	 the	 Lands	
Commission)	or	as	deeds	of	transaction	(Public	and	Vested	Land	Management	Division	
of	the	Lands	Commission).	Different	timeframes	accrue	to	the	lease	of	land	for	different	
land	use	types.	At	the	end	of	the	lease	period,	the	land	reverts	to	the	allodial	group,	the	
usufruct	holder	or	the	lessee	that	sub-let	it.	Under	lease	arrangements,	the	lessee	also	
pays	annual	rents	on	the	land	to	the	landlords.	In	the	absence	of	any	prohibition	within	
the	 lease	 agreement,	 the	 leaseholder	 is	 allowed	 to	 sub-let	 the	 land	 to	 a	 third	 party	
within	the	confines	of	the	main	lease	instrument.	
	
	
Figure	1:4	Interests	subsisting	in	land	in	Ghana		
Source:	Own	Illustration		
The	last	category	of	land	interests	in	Ghana	is	customary	tenancies.	Da	Rocha	and	Lodoh	
(1999)	identified	two	main	types	of	customary	tenancies	in	Ghana.	These	are	tenancies	
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for	 valuable	 consideration	 and	 gratuitous	 tenancies.	 A	 gratuitous	 tenancy	 is	 created	
when	the	landlord	gives	out	his	 land	to	the	tenant	to	use	free	of	any	charge.	The	only	
known	gratuitous	tenancy	in	Ghana	is	a	license	–	seasonal,	annual	or	indefinite	licenses.	
The	 license	 can	 either	 be	 for	 farming	 (farming	 license)	 or	 building	 (building	 license).	
Tenancies	 for	 valuable	 consideration	 are	 granted	 in	 majority	 of	 cases	 for	 agricultural	
purposes	for	the	cultivation	of	food	crops	or	cash	crops	such	as	cocoa	and	oil	palm.	The	
payment	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 yearly	 or	 seasonal	 rents	 (cash)	 or	 produce	 sharing	
arrangement	in	the	case	of	abusa11	and	abunu12	(ibid).	Abusa	and	abunu	sharecropping	
agreements	are	the	commonest	customary	tenancies	and	are	mostly	in	respect	of	tree	
crops	 (Blocher,	 2006)	 but	 can	 also	 be	 in	 respect	 of	 seasonal	 food	 crops.	 The	
relationships	of	these	interests	in	land	pertaining	to	Ghana	are	illustrated	in	Figure	1.4.		
1.7	 Organization	of	Chapters	
The	remaining	parts	of	 this	 thesis	are	structured	 into	 four	empirical	chapters	with	 the	
general	 conclusion	 in	 chapter	 six.	 Chapter	 two	 examines	 institutions	 and	 institutional	
changes	 and	how	 these	 impacted	on	 land	markets	 in	Ghana.	 Chapter	 three	 examines	
land	rental	approaches	and	transaction	costs	in	order	to	understand	the	complexities	of	
agricultural	 land	 pricing	 in	 Ghana.	 Chapter	 four	 examines	 the	 determinants	 of	
agricultural	land	prices,	the	nature	of	smallholder	and	large	holder	rental	payments,	and	
liabilities	and	entitlements	of	 large	agro-investors	 in	Ghana.	 In	Chapter	 five,	 the	thesis	
presents	a	detailed	description	of	the	winners	and	losers	of	large	land	transactions	and	
from	price.	This	chapter	also	 looks	at	 the	nature	and	extent	of	gains	and	 losses	 in	 the	
study	 communities	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	 question	 three.	 Chapter	 six	
concludes	the	thesis	with	a	summary	of	the	major	findings	and	policy	interventions.																																																									
11	In	the	case	of	abusa,	the	sharing	proportions	are	two-thirds	to	the	tenant	farmer	and	one-third	(1/3)	to	
landlord.	 Under	 the	 arrangement,	 the	 tenant	 farmer	 bears	 the	 expense	 of	 clearing	 and	 cultivating	 the	
virgin	 forestland	 allocated	 by	 the	 landlord.	 The	 tenant	 is	 then	 rewarded	with	 a	 two-third	 share	 of	 the	
returns	for	his	investment	in	the	land.	
12	Under	 the	abunu	 system,	 the	 farm	proceeds	 are	 shared	 equally	 between	 the	 tenant	 farmer	 and	 the	
landlord	(da	Rocha	and	Lodoh,	1999).	With	this	tenancy,	the	landlord	does	not	only	provide	the	land	but	
also	contributes	to	the	establishment	and	management	of	the	farm.	It	suffices	to	mention	that,	under	the	
abusa	or	abunu	system,	the	farm	itself	may	be	what	is	shared	and	not	the	produce.		
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Chapter	Two :	Impact	of	Institutions	and	Institutional	Changes	on	Land	
Markets	
	
2.1	Introduction		
Land	institutions	are	intricately	intertwined	in	their	functions	to	promote	efficient	land	
delivery.	The	 increasing	commoditization	and	commercialization	of	 land	puts	 immense	
pressure	on	 customary	 land	 institutions	 to	 reposition	 themselves	properly	 in	order	 to	
remain	dynamic	yet	relevant	in	handling	land	administration	in	Ghana.	Customary	land	
institutions	 remain	 essential	 in	 Ghana’s	 land	 administration	 system	 since	 they	 are	
estimated	 to	 control	 the	majority	 of	 the	 total	 landholding	 (Kasanga	 and	 Kotey,	 2001;	
Sarpong,	 2006;	 Agbosu	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 A	 number	 of	 state	 institutions	 have	 also	 been	
established	 to	 complement	 the	 efforts	 of	 these	 customary	 institutions.	 Efficient	
customary	institutions	are	considered	essential	in	ensuring	land	tenure	security	(Migot-
Adholla	et	 al.,	 1994;	 Kasanga	 and	Kotey,	 2001	 and	Anyidoho	et	 al.,	 2008:1).	 They	 are	
also	 identified	 to	 be	 flexible,	 open	 and	 responsive	 to	 changing	 socio-economic	
circumstances	(Platteau,	1992;	Delville	et	al.,	2002a;	Deininger,	2003;	Arko-Adjei,	2011)	
but	may	be	unable	to	deal	with	recent	land	demand	trends.	For	this	reason,	increase	in	
demand	 and	 commercialisation	 of	 land	 may	 create	 room	 for	 manipulation	 and	 the	
advancement	 of	 personal	 parochial	 interests	 (Ubink	 and	Quan,	 2008).	 Increasing	 land	
marketization	may	also	push	customary	land	custodians	such	as	chiefs	and	family	heads	
to	commence	charging	fees	on	gratuitous	land	users,	increase	existing	fees,	or	motivate	
them	to	resort	to	evictions	(Cotula,	2013).	Such	fees,	according	to	Delville	et	al.	(2002b)	
can	be	 very	high,	 and	almost	 equivalent	 to	 the	market	 value	of	 the	 land	especially	 in	
peri-urban	areas	(Cotula	and	Chauveau,	2007).		
According	 to	 Berry	 (1993),	 African	 land	 tenure	 is	 founded	 on	 adaptive	 arrangements,	
which	are	negotiable,	fluid,	open	and	ambiguous.	African	 land	tenure	has	transformed	
severally	 over	 generations,	 and	 emerging	 social	 relationships	 tend	 to	 redefine	
customary	land	relations	(Kasanga	et	al.,	1996;	Berry,	2001).	Juul	and	Lund	(2002)	are	of	
the	 view	 that	 the	 dynamism	 of	 customary	 land	 tenure	 in	 Sub-Saharan	 Africa	 is	
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attributable	 to	 the	 fluidity	 of	 customs,	 institutions	 and	 legal	 pluralism.	 These	
characteristics	 of	 customary	 land	 tenure	 may,	 however,	 open	 the	 floodgates	 for	
powerful	social	groupings	to	“renegotiate	identities	and	social	relations	in	order	to	either	
confirm	existing	land	tenure	arrangements”	(Amanor,	2006:11)	or	“change	them	in	their	
favour”	 (Ubink	 and	 Amanor,	 2008:12).	 Furthermore,	 the	 customary	 custodianship	
concept	 also	 allows	 for	 the	 politically	 powerful,	 and	 unscrupulous	 elites	 within	 the	
community	 to	 manipulate	 communal	 interests	 for	 their	 own	 selfish	 benefits.	 Even	
though	 lands	 in	Ghana	are	administered	under	both	statutory	and	customary	tenures,	
increasing	 pressures	 of	 population	 growth,	 migration	 and	 urbanization	 have	 caused	
significant	changes	in	the	informal	system	as	they	respond	to	market	forces	(Kasanga,	et	
al.,	 1996;	 Gough	 and	 Yankson,	 2000;	 Yankson	 and	 Kala,	 2008;	 Aryeetey	 et	 al.,	 2007).	
These	 institutional	 changes	 to	 a	 larger	 extent	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 agricultural	 land	
markets	(Ciaian,	et	al.,	2010).			
One	key	advantage	of	the	operations	of	customary	land	tenure	systems	in	Africa	is	that	
it	presents	opportunities	for	land	to	be	held	and	managed	by	traditional	authorities	as	
trustees	 (Ubink	and	Quan,	2008),	 in	direct	 consultation	with	 the	 local	 land	users.	This	
customary	conception	of	communal	land	presents	opportunities	for	local	people	to	take	
centre	 stage	 in	 land	 ownership,	 and	 fosters	 the	 sense	 of	 belongingness	with	minimal	
state	interferences.	However,	this	has	also	opened	up	the	Pandora’s	Box	to	a	myriad	of	
challenges	 as	 the	 economic,	 demographic	 and	 environmental	 pressures	 on	 land	
increase.	 Some	 of	 these	 structural	 challenges	 of	 customary	 tenure	 account	 partly	 for	
reasons	why	 large-scale	 agro-investors	 are	 acquiring	 lands	 directly	 from	 sovereignties	
(i.e.	 governments	 and	 chiefs).	 More	 importantly,	 acquiring	 land	 directly	 from	
governments	 and	 chiefs	 cut	 down	 on	 transaction	 costs.	 The	 targeting	 of	 particular	
countries	could	also	be	because	land	institutions	are	weak,	corruptible	and	exploitable	
in	these	areas.			
A	study	by	Montford	and	Birner	(2013)	examined	the	role	of	customary	land	tenure	in	
large-land	acquisitions	in	Ghana	and	found	that	political	and	spiritual	powers	bestowed	
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upon	chiefs,	 insulated	them	from	legal	tussles	for	 infringements	on	smallholder	rights.	
However,	 the	 study	 did	 not	 examine	 changes	 in	 these	 institutions	 and	 how	 these	
changes	 have	 impacted	 on	 land	 markets	 in	 Ghana.	 Maclnnes	 (2012)	 in	 a	 study	 on	
corruption	and	 large	 land	acquisition	found	that	corruption	of	 local	elites	 in	 large	 land	
transactions	 undermine	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 In	 a	 desktop	 study,	 Verhoog	
(2013)	reviewed	literature	on	the	politics	of	land	deals,	and	critiqued	the	global,	regional	
and	national	guidelines.		Even	though	German	et	al.,	(2011)	already	studied	some	of	the	
institutional	 dimensions	 of	 large	 land	 acquisitions	 based	 on	 theory	 and	 largely	media	
reportage,	empirical	studies	on	how	 institutional	dynamics	affect	 land	markets	remain	
limited.				
This	 study	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 institutions	 (i.e.	 formal/statutory	 and	
informal/customary)	 are	 relevant	 to	 enhance	 land	 investment,	 improve	 benefits	 and	
reduce	 losses	 from	 emerging	 land	 market	 and	 losses	 to	 smallholders.	 Indeed	 it	 is	
believed	 that	 efficient	 institutions	will	 protect	 the	 interest	of	 the	 vulnerable	 including	
the	 youth,	 women	 and	migrants	 (see	 Kasanga	 and	 Kotey,	 2001;	Wily	 and	 Hammond,	
2001;	 Ubink,	 2007;	 Amanor,	 2008).	 This	 study	 therefore,	 examines	 how	 institutional	
changes	have	 impacted	agricultural	 land	markets	 in	allocating	 land	resources	between	
large	and	smallholder	farmers,	and	how	customary	land	tenure	systems	and	institutions	
are	 faring	amidst	 the	growing	demand	 for	 commercial	 agricultural	 land	 in	Ghana.	The	
specific	 objectives	 of	 this	 study	 are	 therefore	 embedded	 in	 the	 following	 research	
questions:	 (a)	what	are	the	processes	through	which	agricultural	 lands	are	acquired	 in	
Ghana?	(b)	Which	are	the	main	institutions	(formal	and	informal)	involved	in	these	land	
transactions	and	how	do	they	interrelate?	(c)	Have	these	institutions	changed	with	the	
recent	 demand	 for	 large	 lands	 in	 Ghana?	 (d)	 What	 are	 the	 weaknesses	 within	 the	
existing	 customary	 institutional	 governance	 structure	 that	 regulate	 these	 large	 land	
acquisitions?			
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2.2	Customary	land	institutions,	actors,	responsibilities	and	constraints		
2.2.1	Traditional	institutions	and	actors	handling	LSLA	in	Ghana	
Historically,	 land	 administration	 and	 institutions	 in	 Ghana	 have	 undergone	 series	 of	
changes	through	colonial	and	post-colonial	regimes	into	their	present	structures.	Some	
of	 these	 interventions	 involved	 direct	 government	 interferences	 with	 customary	 land	
management	structures	(Anyidoho	et	al.,	2008;	Ubink	and	Quan,	2008)	in	frantic	efforts	
to	 improve,	 regulate,	 and	 streamline	 customary	 institutions	and	 their	 activities,	which	
were	 regarded	 as	 anachronistic	 and	 non-progressive.	 Many	 of	 these	 interventions	 in	
Ghana	 that	 permeated	 both	 cephalous	 and	 non-centralized	 societies,	 saw	 chiefs	
consolidating	their	positions	over	land	and	set	the	foundation	for	the	transformation	of	
communal	land	into	titled	private	land	for	investment	purposes	(Bugri,	2008).	According	
to	 Arko-Adjei	 (2011),	 wars,	 conquests,	 religious	 conversions,	 state	 policies,	 and	
technological	 changes	 have	 also	 historically	 tended	 to	 influence	 changes	 in	 land	
institutions.	 Conflicts	 and	 HIV/AIDS	 are	 also	 major	 agents	 of	 change	 in	 land	 tenure	
relationships,	with	 implications	 for	 land	rights	and	customary	practices	due	to	distress	
transactions	(Cotula,	2007).			
In	pre-independent	Ghana,	the	government	revised	severally	the	role	of	chiefs	and	their	
land	 relations,	 as	 a	means	 to	establish	 control	 over	 essential	 resources.	 Prior	 to	1900	
when	 indirect	 rule	was	 adopted,	 the	 Land	 Bill	 (1894)	 entrusted	 all	 identified	 idle,	 un-
owned	 and	 unused	 land	 in	 the	 then	 Gold	 Coast	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 colonial	
government.	According	 to	Amanor	 (2006),	 the	 Land	Bill	 restricted	 land	 from	 the	 local	
authorities	and	disenfranchised	many	smallholders	and	migrant	farmers.	These	colonial	
initiatives	repressed	the	development	of	land	markets.	Contrary	to	the	colonial	views	on	
idle	 land,	 Sarbah	 (1968)	 held	 there	was	 no	 land	 in	 the	Gold	 Coast	without	 an	 owner.	
Various	contentions	on	idle	and	un-owned	land	raised	tenure	insecurity	concerns.		
	
In	1928,	the	Native	Administration	Ordinance	(NAO)	was	passed	seeking	to	administer	
the	Colony	under	indirect	rule	through	native	authorities	who	managed	communal	land.	
In	 many	 instances	 customary	 land	 management	 practices	 were	 subjected	 to	
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interpretations	 and	 inventions	 (Rathbone,	 1993).	 Before	 independence,	 reports	 from	
the	Watson	(1948)	and	Coussey	(1949)	Committees	further	consolidated	the	position	of	
the	 native	 authorities	 (chiefs)	 in	 the	 control	 of	 customary	 land.	 Since	 the	 immediate	
post-independence	era,	the	position	of	native	authorities	as	trustee	of	customary	 land	
has	 been	 consistently	 retained	 and	 enhanced	 in	 all	 four	 Republican	 Constitutions	 of	
Ghana.	 Since	 1962,	 successive	 governments	 made	 various	 critical	 interventions	 into	
Ghana’s	 land	market	 through	 various	 legislations	 to	 accelerate	 land	 privatisation	 and	
commoditisation.			
The	Figure	2.1,	Nkwae	(2006:	26)	illustrates	the	evolution	of	land	tenure	in	Africa	from	
communal	to	the	private	tenures	especially	in	urban	areas.	From	the	Figure,	land	tenure	
has	evolved	significantly	from	an	era	of	political	and	social	relations	through	the	era	of	
economic	 pressures	 to	 the	 era	 of	 population	 pressure.	 This	 economic	 and	 population	
pressure	driven	tenure	evolution	at	the	macro-level	has	impacted	on	the	redefinition	of	
land	right	as	well,	from	communal/group	rights	to	usufruct	rights	at	the	household	level,	
to	 private	 proprietary	 rights	 with	 clearer	 boundaries.	 Consequently,	 the	 level	 of	
ownership	by	centrally	placed	authorities	 like	community	or	tribal	chiefs	has	also	seen	
disintegration	into	small	unit	families	and	even	in	some	cases	among	individuals	in	the	
urban	areas	where	rising	land	values	allow	for	commercialisation.		
	
Figure	2:1	Evolution	of	land	tenure	in	Africa	-	communal	to	private	rights	
Source:	Nkwae	(2006:29)	
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Much	of	 the	 land	privatisation	witnessed	 in	Ghana	and	 in	most	of	 Sub-Saharan	Africa	
followed	 the	World	Bank’s	 promotion	of	 land	 title	 registration	programmes	 to	 secure	
rights	 and	 improve	 investments	 under	 private	 ownership	 in	 the	 1980s.	 Following	 the	
World	 Bank’s	 land	 title	 registration	 programme,	 Ghana	 promulgated	 the	 Land	 Title	
Registration	 Law,	 1986	 (PNDCL	 152)	 and	 started	 its	 implementation	 in	 Kumasi,	 Accra	
and	Tema.	However,	due	to	the	limited	implementation	of	the	Land	Registration	Law	in	
only	a	few	cities,	communal	land	administration	in	Ghana	remains	bedevilled	with	many	
challenges.	 For	 example,	 a	 greater	 part	 of	 customary	 land	 is	 still	 un-surveyed,	
unmapped	 and	 unregistered.	 As	 a	 result,	 land	 ownership	 and	 land	 use	 disputes	 have	
arisen	in	many	urban	and	peri-urban	communities	where	 land	values	for	housing	have	
appreciated	 considerably	 due	 to	 population	 growth	 and	 urbanisation.	 Wily	 and	
Hammond	 (2001),	Chauveau	et	al.	 (2006),	Agbosu	et	al.	 (2007)	 and	Amanor	 (2008)	 in	
their	works,	however,	pointed	out	some	of	the	damaging	 impacts	of	 land	privatisation	
on	vulnerable	social	groups	such	as	women,	youth	and	migrants.	
	
In	order	to	resolve	these	persistent	land	use	and	land	market	challenges	in	Ghana,	the	
Ghana	 Land	 Policy	 was	 drawn	 in	 June	 1999.	 As	 part	 of	 measures	 to	 implement	 the	
Ghana	 Land	 Policy,	 the	 Land	Administration	 Project	 (LAP)	 is	 being	 implemented	 since	
2003	to	restructure	land	administration	in	Ghana.	It	also	aims	to	clean	up	legislative	and	
institutional	challenges	that	persist	in	the	land	market.	So	far,	the	Project	has	succeeded	
in	merging	 four	of	 the	previously	 six	 independent	 land	 sector	agencies	 into	 the	 Lands	
Commission13	as	part	of	efforts	to	streamline	land	administration	nationwide	and	avoid	
duplication	 of	 functions	 (World	 Bank,	 2011).	 The	 LAP	 also	 spearheaded	 the	
promulgation	 of	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 Act,	 2008	 (Act	 767)	 and	 the	 setting	 up	 of	
Customary	 Land	 Secretariats	 (CLSs)	 across	 the	 country.	 Customary	 land	 boundary	
demarcation	and	harmonization	of	customary	land	laws	were	also	undertaken	under	the	
project	to	minimize	the	incidences	of	land	disputes	and	to	expedite	resolutions.	Before																																																									
13	The	newly	restructured	Lands	Commission	 is	sometimes	referred	to	as	 the	New	 Lands	Commission	to	
differentiate	 it	 from	 the	Old	 Lands	Commission,	which	was	 rechristened	as	 the	Public	 and	Vested	 Land	
Management	Division	(PVLMD).	
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2004,	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	were	not	 topical	 to	 the	 legislative	 and	 institutional	
reforms	of	the	LAP	and	hence,	these	were	never	incorporated	into	its	agenda.		
	
Over	 the	 last	decade,	attempts	at	 improving	 the	 land	administration	 system	 in	Ghana	
have	focused	on	state	 institutional	and	legislative	reforms.	These	institutions	operated	
on	 non-structured	 linkages	 with	 existing	 customary	 land	 administration	 structures.	
Recognizing	 the	 crucial	 role	 that	 customary	 institutions	play	 in	 land	management,	 the	
LAP	earmarked	the	Customary	Land	Administration	Unit	to	be	responsible	for	customary	
land	 issues.	The	Unit	was	 tasked	 to	establish	Customary	Land	Secretariats	 (CLSs)	 in	all	
major	 land	 owning	 communities.	 The	 CLSs	 were	 supposed	 to	 come	 under	 the	 direct	
control	of	the	traditional	authorities	to	facilitate	their	participation	in	streamlining	land	
management	and	administration	practices	across	 the	country.	They	are	also	meant	 to	
strengthen	 the	 institutional	 capacity	 of	 customary	 land	 administration	 systems	
(Interview	 with	 Lands	 Commission,	 2012).	 The	 CLSs	 operate	 within	 the	 jurisdictional	
area	of	 traditional	 leaders,	where	common	customary	 laws	apply	 in	administering	 the	
land.	The	LAP	in	2004	began	with	ten	(10)	pilot	CLSs,	one	in	each	region	and	currently	
has	37	CLSs	throughout	the	country.			
Notwithstanding	these	 interventions	 in	customary	 land	administration,	Whitehead	and	
Tsikata	 (2003)	 and	 Amanor	 (2006),	 have	 doubted	 customary	 institutions’	 abilities	 to	
improve	equitable	land	delivery	to	socially	disadvantaged	groups.	This,	 in	their	view,	is	
due	to	the	skewed	social	and	power	relations	inherent	in	the	local	political	entities.	It	is	
feared	 that	 inefficient	 customary	 institutions	 may	 worsen	 equitable	 land	 access	 and	
land	 tenure	 insecurity	 of	 vulnerable	 groups.	 Customary	 land	 in	 Ghana	 remains	
communal	and	entrusted	to	lineage,	clan	or	family	heads	to	manage	on	behalf	of	their	
people.	These	actors	are	entrusted	with	powers	at	the	community	level	to	drive	change	
and	 lead	 in	development	endeavours	 (Ubink,	 2006).	Customary	 institutions,	 especially	
chieftaincies	 have	 remained	 resilient	 despite	 the	 numerous	 government	 interventions	
to	curtail	the	powers	of	chiefs.	The	establishment	of	the	Regional	and	National	Houses	
of	Chiefs	further	consolidated	the	position	of	chiefs	in	the	national	political	structure.	By	
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and	 large,	 customary	 institutions	 have	 acted	 as	 ‘autonomous’	 entities	 in	 land	
administration	 and	 have	 not	 collaborated	 much	 with	 state	 agencies	 for	 fear	 of	
interference	and	power	usurpation	(see	Anyidoho	et	al.,	2008;	Ubink	and	Quan,	2008).		
Table	2.1	Land	sector	agencies	in	Ghana	and	their	major	functions	
Name	of	Land	Sector	Agency	 Major	Functions		
Public	and	Vested	Land	Management	
Division	 -	 Lands	 Commission	 Act,	
1994	Act	483	and	Lands	Commission	
Act,	2008	(Act	767).	
Public	 land	 management,	 provides	 land	 delivery	
services,	 maintains	 stool	 and	 public	 land	 records,	
manages	 deeds	 registration	 records,	 aids	 in	 private	
land	management,	formulates	and	recommends	land	
policies	and	land	use	preferences.	
Land	 Valuation	 Division	 (LVD)	 -	
Section	43	of	the	PNDC	Proclamation	
(Supplementary	 and	 consequential	
Provisions	Law,	1982	(PNDCL	42).	
Capital	valuation	 for	sale	or	purchase	of	property	by	
government,	 rating	 valuation,	 rental	 valuation	 for	
government,	 compensation	 valuation,	 stamp	 duty	
assessments,	 and,	 collecting	 data	 for	 government	
land	values.	
Town	and	Country	Planning	
Department	(TCPD)	-	Town	and	
Country	Planning	Ordinance,	CAP	84.	
Help	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	to	prepare	and	implement	
settlement	 plans	 to	 promote	 harmonious	
development,	 aid	 in	 implementing	 development	
controls.		
Survey	and	Mapping	Division	(SMD)	-	
Survey	Act,	1962	(Act	127).	
	
Survey	and	demarcate	 land	boundaries,	demarcation	
and	 preparation	 of	 composite	 plans,	 engineering	
survey	 for	 construction	 works,	 advise	 the	 Local	
authorities	on	survey	and	mapping.	
Land	 Registration	 Division	 (LRD)	 -	
Land	 Title	 Registration	 Law,	 1986	
(PNDCL	152).	
Responsible	 for	 land	 title	 registration.	 But	 only	
operational	 in	 Accra,	 Kumasi	 and	 the	 Tema	
registration	districts.	
Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	
Lands	(OASL)	-	Office	of	the	
Administrator	of	Stool	Lands	Act,	
1994	(Act	481).	
Responsible	 for	 the	 Collection	 and	 disbursement	 of	
stool	land	revenue,	by	operating	a	stool	land	account.	
Also	 empowered	 under	 Article	 267	 of	 the	 Ghana	
Constitution	(1992).		
Source:	Own	Compilation,	2013		
Consequently,	 stools	 and	 heads	 of	 families	 dominate	 land	 transactions	 in	 Ghana	
(Kasanga	and	Kotey,	2001;	Sarpong,	2006;	Agbosu	et	al.,	2007).	Governments	have	also	
used	 legislative	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 State	 Lands	 Act	 1962	 (Act	 125)	 and	 the	
Administration	of	Lands	Act	1962	(Act	123)	to	compulsorily	acquire	customary	land	for	
public	 purposes	 including	 agriculture.	 Colonial	 and	 some	 post-independence	
	 29	
governments	of	Ghana	used	compulsory	acquisition	 to	acquire	 land	 for	 infrastructural	
development	 and	 to	 catapult	 economic	 development.	 The	 abuse	 of	 the	 power	 of	
eminence	 domain	 in	 some	 instances,	 however,	 resulted	 in	 conflicts	 regarding	
outstanding	 compensation	 across	 the	 country.	 In	 order	 to	 resolve,	 formalise	 and	
streamline	 land	 administration	 in	Ghana,	 several	 statutory	 institutions	were	 set	 up	 to	
perform	various	land	administrative	functions. Some	of	these	institutions	and	their	core	
legislative	functions	are	summarized	in	Table	2.1.	
2.2.2	Responsibilities	and	constraints	of	chiefs	in	land	administration	in	Ghana	
Prior	 to	 colonization,	 traditional	 authorities14	all	 over	 Africa	 functioned	 as	 religious,	
political,	judicial	and	the	spiritual	authorities	of	the	community,	and	performed	various	
responsibilities	 in	 the	management	of	communal	 resources	 (Appiah-Opoku	and	Hyma,	
1999).	Their	authority	hinged	on	land.	Land	is	a	source	of	power	and	an	embodiment	of	
socio-cultural	 (Crook,	 2005),	 and	 spiritual	 identity	 (Lentz,	 2006).	 The	 chief	 is	 also	 the	
custodian	 of	 cultural	 and	 community	 values	 (Lars,	 1999).	 It	 is	 believed	 that	 before	
colonization	 in	 the	 then	 Gold	 Coast,	 various	 forms	 of	 patriarchal	 social	 organizations	
existed	in	the	then	northern	protectorates	of	the	country	(Mohammed-Katerere,	2004).	
These	societies	were	governed	through	norms	and	values	(Platteau,	2000).	In	the	Asante	
and	Dagbon	 areas,	 chiefs	own	and	manage	 land	as	 fiduciaries.	However,	 chiefs	 in	 the	
Upper	West	and	Upper	East	regions	remain	political-administrative	heads,	with	limited	
roles	 in	 land	 administration.	 In	 these	 areas,	 the	 Tendaana15	is	 the	 ultimate	 authority	
over	 community	 land	 (Kasanga,	 1995),	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	 religious	 and	 spiritual	
issues	(Abu	and	Millar,	2004).	Though	chiefs	wield	enormous	power	to	propel	local	level	
development	including	natural	resource	management	and	dispute	resolution,	they	have																																																									
14	The	 term	 traditional	 authorities	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 Chiefs,	 Tendaamba,	 Clan	 heads,	 Family	 heads,	
Magazias	(women	leaders),	and	Soothsayers,	Diviners,	Rainmakers,	indigenous	groups,	and	organizations	
as	 well	 as	 the	 societal	 norms,	 values,	 beliefs,	 cosmovision	 and	 practices	 such	 as	 festivals	 that	 ensure	
community	 natural	 resource	 management	 (Millar,	 2003).	 They	 are	 self-identified	 human	 groups	 and	
structures	 characterized	 by	 peculiar	 socio-politico-cultural	 systems,	 languages,	 cultures,	 values	 and	
beliefs,	by	a	close	relationship	with	the	land	and	natural	resources	as	a	whole	in	their	territory	(Goodin,	
1996).	
15	The	 Tendaana	 (plural	 –Tendaamba)	 are	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	 pioneer	 migrants	 and	 they	 are	 the	
ultimate	authorities	regarding	land	in	their	respective	villages	and	towns	(Kasanga,	1995).	
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always	 performed	 these	 roles	 together	 with	 community	 elders	 who	 constitute	 the	
traditional	council.			
In	the	post-colonial	era	of	Ghana,	some	powers	of	chiefs	were	restricted	while	new	roles	
were	 imposed,	 invented	 or	 re-invented.	 For	 example,	 all	 the	 lands	 in	 the	 northern	
protectorates	(now	Northern,	Upper	East	and	Upper	West	regions)	were	vested	 in	the	
government	under	 the	 Land	and	Native	Rights	Ordinance,	 1931	 (CAP	147)	 in	 trust	 for	
the	 people	 of	 Ghana.	 This	 remained	 so	 until	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Republican	
Constitution	 of	 Ghana	 (1992),	 which	 returned	 these	 lands.	 The	 return	 of	 these	 lands	
redefined	land	relations	of	chiefs	and	the	roles	of	Tendaamba.	Though	the	role	of	chiefs	
as	 custodians	 of	 customary	 land	 remains	 the	 same	 in	 the	 States	 of	 Dagbon,	 Asante,	
Akyem	and	Abuakwa	states,	Kunbuor	 (2002:11)	 reports,	“the	 role	of	 the	 ‘Tendaana’	 is	
fading	into	oblivion”.	This	is	because	land	is	gradually	reduced	to	family	use	in	northern	
Ghana	(Bugri,	2013).	From	the	above	narrative,	 the	authority	of	chiefs	 is	derived	from	
legislative	 powers	 (Acts,	 Laws,	 and	 Decrees),	 customary	 rules	 and	 regulations;	 and	
precedents	 from	 judges,	 customary	 courts,	 communal	 meetings,	 and	 traditional	
councils.		
	
According	 to	Crook	 (2005),	 chiefs	are	also	development	agents.	 In	 their	position,	 they	
lead	 in	 attracting	 investments	 into	 their	 communities	 by	 illuminating	 opportunities	 in	
their	 localities,	as	heads	of	 the	 traditional	council.	The	Chieftaincy	Act,	2008	 (Act	759)	
mentions	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 traditional	 council	 to	 include	 the	management	 of	 stool	
[skin]	land,	and	the	review	and	modernisation	of	customary	laws	considered	obnoxious.	
Even	 though	 some	 of	 these	 roles	 have	 been	 embedded	 into	 the	 Fourth	 Republican	
Constitution	 of	Ghana	 (1992)	 as	well,	 the	 rights	 of	 chiefs	 to	 administer	 land,	 and	 the	
extent	 of	 community	 consultation	 that	 is	 required	 prior	 to	 land	 alienation,	 remain	
succinctly	unexpressed	in	the	statutes	(Adarkwah,	2006).	The	chiefs’	rights	to	administer	
communal	 land	has	been	gravely	 influenced	by	national	politics	(Sarpong,	2006),	rising	
population	pressures,	growing	demand	 from	commercial	 investors	 (Berry,	2001;	Ryan,	
2006),	 and	 the	 extraction	 of	 new	 agricultural	 frontiers	 (Ubink,	 2008).	 In	 the	 view	 of	
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William	et	al.	(2012),	the	excessive	powers	of	chiefs	to	negotiate	the	terms,	price,	and	
conclude	land	transactions	need	to	be	regulated.	
Table	2.2	Land	transfer	restriction	by	land	use,	size	and	years	
Land	to	Individuals	 Lower	Size	Limit	 Upper	Size	Limit	 Upper	Year	Limit	
	 Km2	 Acres	 Km2	 Acres	d	 Years	
Residential	 -	 -	 -	 -	 99	a	
Commercial	Agriculture	b	 2.59	 640.0	 7.77	 1,920.0	 50	
Poultry	and	cereals	 2.59	 640.0	 7.77	 1,920.0	 10	
Mining	 5.80	 1,433.2	 155.40	 38,400.0	 60	
Timber	 103.4	 25,550.6	 621.60	 153,600.0	 30	
Land	Grant	c	 12.95	 3,200.0	 25.90	 6,400.0	 -	
a	Non-Ghanaians	are	restricted	to	50year	residential	leases		
b	Ranching,	mixed	or	permanent	crops			
c	Body	Corporated	or	unincorporated	
d	1acre	is	equivalent	to	0.4047hectares			
Source:	Kasanga	et	al.,	1996	
	
To	curtail	these	enormous	powers	of	chiefs	to	administer	customary	land	in	Ghana,	the	
state	 instituted	checks	on	the	extent	to	which	these	powers	can	be	exercised	to	avoid	
misuse.	The	Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992)	specifies	the	limits	in	years	
and	 sizes	 of	 various	 acquisitions	 by	 nationals	 and	 non-nationals	 and	 for	 various	 land	
uses.	 For	 example	 Article	 266	 (1)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 prevents	 non-Ghanaians	 from	
holding	 freehold	 interests.	 Furthermore,	 Article	 267	 (5)	 prohibits	 the	 creation	 of	
freehold	 interest	 over	 any	 stool	 land	 in	 Ghana	 in	 favour	 of	 any	 person	 or	 group	 of	
persons.	The	Administration	of	Lands	Act	(Amendment)	Decree	1979	(AFRCD	61)	further	
details	 various	 land	uses	with	 the	 respective	 limitations	on	 land	 sizes	 and	duration	of	
tenure.	As	shown	in	Table	2.2,	non-citizens	can	acquire	land	for	residential	purposes,	for	
a	period	of	not	more	than	50years,	while	Ghanaians	can	acquire	residential	 land	 for	a	
period	of	99years.	 In	 the	same	way,	 there	exist	upper	and	 lower	 limits	 to	 the	sizes	of	
parcels	 that	 can	be	acquired	 for	 residential,	 commercial,	mining	and	agriculture.	 Even	
though	sizes	of	recent	land	acquisitions	in	Ghana	have	exceeded	these	upper	limits,	they	
are	 condoned	 within	 the	 current	 economic	 and	 agrarian	 landscape	 of	 Ghana.	 These	
excesses	are	permissible	under	Section	12	[4]	of	the	Administration	of	Lands	Act,	1962	
(L.I.	232)	that	allows	for	the	President	to	waiver	restrictions,	when	the	limits	in	Section	3	
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are	prejudicial	to	national	interest.		
The	major	obligation	of	chiefs	towards	their	subjects	is	embedded	in	Article	36(8)	of	the	
Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992),	that:			
“the	State	shall	recognise	that	ownership	and	possession	of	 land	carry	a	
social	 obligation	 to	 serve	 the	 larger	 community	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	
State	 shall	 recognize	 that	 the	managers	of	public,	 stool,	 skin	and	 family	
lands	 are	 fiduciaries	 charged	 with	 the	 obligation	 to	 discharge	 their	
functions	for	the	benefit	respectively	of	the	people	of	Ghana,	of	the	stool,	
skin,	 or	 family	 concerned	 and	 are	 accountable	 as	 fiduciaries	 in	 this	
regard”.		
Hence,	traditional	 leaders	entrusted	with	communal	or	family	 land	have	obligations	to	
live	 up	 to	 their	 duties	 and	 expectations,	 else	 risk	 being	destooled16.	 In	 performing	 all	
these	duties,	chiefs	may	be	constrained	with	the	know-how	in	negotiating	complex	land	
transactions,	sometimes	amidst	widespread	land	litigations.			
Based	on	the	enormous	customary	and	legislative	powers	bestowed	on	chiefs,	they	play	
very	important	roles	in	land	market	activities	from	negotiations	through	to	signing	land	
deals.	 There	 are	 variations	 between	 the	 ideal	 powers	 of	 the	 chief	 and	 in	 reality,	 the	
powers	 they	 exercise	 in	 relation	 to	 land	 (Tsikata	 and	 Yaro,	 2011;	 Bugri	 and	Coulibaly,	
2012).	 There	 are	 numerous	 reports	 of	 abuse	 of	 powers	 by	 chiefs	 in	 many	 parts	 of	
Ghana,	 and	 the	 general	 unscrupulousness	 and	 disingenuousness	 in	 administering	
customary	land.	Examining	this	is	even	more	critical	as	most	chiefs	are	seeking	complete	
autonomy	and	legitimacy	from	the	state.	In	Ghana,	chiefs	continue	to	refute	accusations	
of	 land	sales.	They	 insist	all	payments	amount	to	 ‘drink	money’/‘kola	money’/‘aseda’17																																																									
16	To	 ‘destool’	 a	 chief	 means	 to	 remove	 from	 office.	 Since	 the	 symbol	 of	 authority	 of	 the	 chief	 is	 the	
‘stool’,	to	‘destool’	will	mean	to	recall	the	stool	from	the	chief	and	all	his	traditional	authorisations.	 It	 is	
used	in	contrast	of	‘enstool’	–	to	install	a	chief.			
17	The	term	‘drink	money’	is	used	to	refer	to	the	lump	sum	payment	made	for	the	allocation	of	customary	
land	in	Ghana.	In	the	past,	acquiring	land	required	greeting	the	chief	or	family	head	with	a	drink	mostly	
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as	 part	 of	 customary	 protocol	 fees	 to	 symbolise	 political	 allegiance	 (Platteau,	 1993).	
Albeit	drink	money	 in	some	cases	may	appear	exorbitant	within	 local	standards	(Alden	
Wily	and	Hammond,	2001),	it	only	transfers	land	use	rights	and	not	outright	ownership.	
Furthermore,	 drink	 money	 as	 a	 social	 fee	 has	 come	 to	 stay	 across	 Ghana,	 without	
standardisation	for	these	payments.	According	to	Amanor	(2006),	payment	of	aseda	 is	
instrumental	 to	 accessing	 farmland	 in	 economic	 crop	 frontier	 areas,	 even	 if	 one	 is	 a	
family	member.	 However,	 the	 discretionary	 charging	 of	drink	money	 leaves	 room	 for	
exploitation.		
2.3	Institutional	innovations,	land	tenure	and	land	market	linkages		
Within	 the	 institutions	 and	 institutional	 change	 discourse,	 institutions	 according	 to	
North	 (1990:4)	 are	 formal	 rules	 and	 laws...“human	 beings	 devise	 to	 shape	 human	
interaction”.	Williamson	 (2000)	 defines	 institutions	 as	 the	 informal	 rules	within	which	
formal	 institutions	 are	 embedded.	 Institutions	 may	 be	 intentionally	 formulated	 or	
evolve	 extemporaneously.	 Greif	 (2006:30)	 expands	 the	 definition	 of	 an	 institution	 to	
include	 system	of	 rules,	beliefs,	norms	and	organizations	 that	 together	 regulate	 social	
behaviour.	Within	this	context	of	Grief’s	definition,	institutional	change	implies	marginal	
adjustments	 to	 the	 complex	 rules,	 norms,	 and	 enforcement	 that	 constitute	 the	
institutional	 framework	 (North,	 1990:83).	 In	 line	 with	 North	 (1990),	 land	 institutions	
must	 achieve	 basic	 objectives	 including	 the	 following:	 protect	 their	 people	 from	
exploitation,	 promote	 their	 welfare	 and	 development,	 ensure	 tenure	 security	 for	 all,	
enhance	equitable	 access	 to	 land	by	all,	 promote	peace	and	 tranquillity,	 and	 improve	
dispute	resolution	and	tenure	security.			
Institutions	 and	 institutional	 changes	 are	 relevant	 in	 shaping	 customary	 land	
administration	 in	 Ghana.	 Efficient	 institutions	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 influence	 the																																																																																																																																																																						
schnapps.	 Over	 the	 years	 as	 the	 demand	 for	 land	 increased,	 it	 became	 a	 practice	 that	 money	 was	
preferable	 to	 schnapps.	 Subsequently,	 the	 practice	 metamorphosed	 into	 presenting	 ‘drink	 money’	 to	
chiefs.	These	amounts	however,	vary	across	space	and	time	in	Ghana	and	may	amount	to	cash	payment	
equivalent	 to	 the	economic	 value	of	 land	 (see	Delville	et	al.,	 2002b).	Nevertheless,	 chiefs	 still	maintain	
that	this	does	not	amount	to	a	sale	price	or	even	a	rent	 for	 land	but	a	gift	 to	use	agricultural	 land.	The	
story	may	be	different	in	urban	estates,	where	land	market	activities	are	quite	brisk.	It	is	common	to	have	
both	the	drink	and	drink	money	paid	these	days	as	well.		
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welfare	 contribution	 of	 land	 transactions.	 Failure	 of	 customary	 land	 administration	
systems	 to	 secure	 the	 expected	 benefits	 from	 large-scale	 land	 deals	 may	 thus	 be	 a	
reflection	of	poor	governance	systems.	Wallis	and	North	(1994)	already	 identified	that	
changes	in	the	production	process	induce	changes	in	institutions.	Similarly,	agricultural	
commercialisation	has	potential	influences	on	changes	in	both	formal	and	informal	land	
institutions,	and	the	efficiency	or	 inefficiency	of	these	institutions	can	impact	the	level	
of	benefit	to	host	communities.			
Following	 the	 general	 challenges	 informal	 land	 tenure	 systems	 pose	 to	 land	
administration	in	Africa,	various	institutional	innovations	have	been	devised	to	improve	
it.	Since	the	1980s,	emphases	are	made	for	the	transformation	of	communal-customary	
landholdings	into	formalized	private	titles.	The	works	of	de	Soto	(1989)	motivated	many	
governments	in	developing	countries	to	adopt	land	privatisation	through	land	titling	as	a	
panacea	to	wealth	creation.	Due	to	the	uniqueness	of	various	informal	tenure	systems,	
many	African	governments	adopted	various	land	formalisation	models,	as	a	remedy	to	
urban	 land	 administration	 challenges.	 Unfortunately,	 most	 of	 these	 programmes	 in	
Africa	have	either	completely	failed	or	are	partly	implemented	in	the	urban	centres.	De	
Soto	 (2000:171)	 has	 attributed	 the	 failures	 of	 land	 formalisation	 programmes	 to	 the	
disregard	 for	 pre-existing	 social	 and	 collective	 contracts	 that	 underpin	 landholding	
arrangements.	In	Ghana,	land	title	registration	could	not	be	scaled	up	nationwide	since	
1986	 due	 to	 funding	 and	 logistics	 constraints,	 and	 the	 total	 disregard	 for	 customary	
systems	that	existed	before	(Kasanga,	2002).			
In	the	urban	and	peri-urban	areas	of	Africa,	central	and	local	governments	have	devised	
various	 tools	and	approaches	 to	 regulate	 land	administration.	Modelled	along	colonial	
ideologies,	most	 land	management	 approaches	were	 fashioned	 to	meet	 the	 needs	 of	
colonial	 agricultural	 production	modules	 (Durand-Lasserve	et	 al.,	 2002).	 In	 the	 French	
West	African	colonies,	various	legislations	were	deployed	to	emphasise	individual	access	
to	 and	 ownership	 of	 land,	 while	 nationalising	 idle	 lands.	 The	 French	 colonial	 states	
further	ensured	that	private	rights	were	documented	and	registered.	In	Benin,	Burkina	
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Faso	 and	 Senegal,	 portions	 of	 land	 that	were	 deemed	 vacant	 and	 unclaimed	 became	
state	lands,	as	the	state	provided	opportunities	for	the	registration	of	customary	lands.	
According	 to	 Mabogunje	 (1992),	 these	 centralised	 land	 management	 procedures	
enabled	 large	 tracts	of	unoccupied	customary	 lands	 to	be	nationalised	 in	 the	name	of	
social	justice,	equitable	access	to	land	and	prevention	of	speculation.			
Land	 supply	 to	 the	 urban	 poor	 remains	 dominated	 by	 customary	 interests	 (Benton,	
1994)	and	this	has	remained	resilient	to	pressures	of	radical	state	reforms	and	market	
pressure	(Durand-Lasserve	et	al.,	2002).	For	example	in	Benin,	Burkina	Faso	and	Senegal	
the	state	monopoly	on	land	is	gradually	softened	due	to	pressure	from	civil	societies.	In	
Benin,	 informal	 practices	 regarding	 the	 provision	 of	 land	 for	 housing	 have	 been	
successfully	 integrated	 into	 formal	 structures,	 and	 informal	 institutions	 are	 offered	 a	
considerable	level	of	legitimacy.	On	the	other	hand,	Mali,	Mauritania	and	Cote	d’Ivoire	
have	 remained	 adamant	 to	 liberalise	 their	 land	 markets.	 Mauritania	 for	 example	
continues	 to	 postpone	 land	 market	 privatization,	 while	 Senegal	 and	 Guinea	 adopted	
land	privatization	 in	principle,	but	have	not	 implemented	these	policies	 (Payne,	2002).	
Burkina	 Faso,	 however,	managed	 to	 create	 land	 development	 agencies	 with	 financial	
autonomy,	 but	 still	 operate	 under	 government	 control.	 In	 the	 urban	 and	 peri-urban	
regions	of	Africa,	 central	 governments	 continue	 to	hold	 grip	 to	 customary	 land	under	
the	 pretext	 of	 protecting	 them	 from	 improper	 use,	 speculation	 and	 for	 public	 service	
and	infrastructure	planning	purposes.		
2.4	Methodology		
2.4.1	Sources	of	data	
A	case	study	approach	was	adopted	since	it	is	conducive	for	the	study	of	the	interaction	
between	a	 social	 phenomenon	and	 social	 actors	 (Yin,	 2003).	 The	empirical	 analysis	 of	
this	chapter	is	based	on	multi-level	qualitative	data	collected	between	August	2012	and	
April	 2013	 in	 Ghana	 using	 institutional	 surveys	 through	 snowballing	 and	 purposive	
sampling.	 The	 qualitative	 studies	 also	 involved	 the	 critical	 review	 of	 existing	 legal	
documents	as	well	as	 interviews	with	chiefs,	elders,	officials	of	the	Lands	Commission,	
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officials	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	 (MoFA),	 and	 the	 Office	 of	 the	
Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	 (OASL).	 To	 be	 able	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 land	
acquisition	 between	 community	 smallholders	 and	 large-scale	 investors,	 household	
interviews	were	also	conducted	in	four	(4)	communities	–	Dukusen,	Afrisire,	Gushie	and	
Tunayili	around	the	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	(Asante-Akim	North	District)	and	the	Integrated	
Tamale	 Fruit	 Company	 (ITFC)	 Ltd	 (Savelugu-Nanton	 District).	 Some	 officials	 of	 the	
selected	investment	companies	were	also	interviewed.	Interviews	were	conducted	using	
semi-structured	 interview	 guides.	 In	 studying	 institutional	 governance,	 17	 key	
stakeholders	 comprising	4	 village	 chiefs,	 2	Assembly	members,	 4	 village	 secretaries,	 2	
officials	 from	 the	 Lands	 Commission,	 2	 officials	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Food	 and	
Agriculture,	 1	 from	 the	Office	of	 the	Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands,	 2	managers	 of	 the	
agro-companies,	were	interviewed	on	designed	land	indicators.		The	responses	of	these	
stakeholders	are	displayed	in	Appendix	6	and	7.		
2.4.2	Analytical	framework		
Descriptive	narratives	were	used	to	present	and	analyse	qualitative	data	in	this	chapter.	
Narratives	 are	 preferred	 because	 they	 vividly	 tell	 the	 story	 behind	 the	 phenomenon.	
Data	on	the	key	 institutional	stakeholder	relationships	was	analysed	using	 institutional	
mapping.	 Institutional	 mapping	 is	 a	 strategic	 tool	 that	 examines	 the	 stakeholder’s	
powers,	 interest,	 influences	 and	 relationships	 among	 them	 (Morris	 and	 Baddache,	
2012).	 The	 analysis	 of	 institutional	 governance	 was	 undertaken	 based	 on	 the	 Land	
Governance	 Assessment	 Framework	 (World	 Bank,	 2010).	 Key	 stakeholders	 with	
knowledge	 on	 the	 studied	 LSLAs	 and	 land	 tenure	 undertook	 the	 ranking	 of	 land	
governance,	and	these	responses	were	compared	with	existing	 literature	(World	Bank,	
2010;	Bugri,	2012).	Experts	 interviewed	on	 land	governance	 issues	were	asked	various	
questions	 on	 the	 land	 indicators,	 which	 were	 developed	 by	 the	 study,	 based	 on	 the	
literature	on	the	various	governing	principles	of	LSLAs.	The	responses	were	presented	in	
Likert	Scale	of	4	 to	1	 in	descending	order	 to	correspond	with	A	 to	D	as	adopted	 from	
Bugri	(2013)	and	Hilhorst	(2014)	in	Table	2.3.		
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Table	2.3	Scores	of	land	governance	based	on	global	experiences	
Dimension	 Assessment	Scale	
Brief	
Description	 of	
Dimension	
A	 -	Best	option	 towards	a	good	 land	governance	scenario.	Scored	greater	 than	90	
percent.	
B	-	Second	best	set	of	options	for	making	progress	towards	good	land	governance.	
Scored	between	70	percent	and	90	percent.	
C	-	Generally	struggles	to	meet	the	criteria	for	good	land	governance	however	some	
attempts	are	being	made.	Scored	between	50	percent	and	70	percent.	
D	 -	 No	 attempts	 in	 this	 area	 towards	 good	 land	 governance.	 Scored	 less	 than	 50	
percent.	
Source:	Bugri	(2013);	Hilhorst	(2014)	
	
The	averages	of	all	scores	for	each	indicator	from	the	key	respondents	were	then	used	
to	represent	the	overall	score	of	that	indicator	in	the	respective	communities.	Indicators	
that	scored	an	average	of	4	were	rated	A	to	indicate	that	it	was	the	best	option	towards	
good	land	governance	and	could	possibly	attract	an	overall	score	above	90	percent.	An	
average	score	of	3	corresponds	to	B,	indicating	the	indicator	was	the	second	best	option	
towards	good	land	governance.	A	C	rating	denotes	that	the	indicator	scored	fairly	well	
and	lies	in	a	percentage	range	of	50	percent	and	70	percent.	All	indicators	that	scored	1	
on	average	and	fall	below	50	percent	and	rated	D;	imply	they	are	the	worst	performing	
in	 terms	of	 good	 governance.	A	 positive	 picture	 of	 good	 land	 governance	will	 be	 one	
that	 increases	more	 of	 A	 scores	 and	with	 no	 or	 few	D	 scores.	 Any	 score	 in-between,	
represents	a	fair	assessment	on	governance.	
From	Table	2.4,	Bugri	(2013:67)	sought	to	reflect	in	16	land	governance	indicators	(LGI),	
the	 assessment	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 LSLAs	 in	 Ghana	 and	 the	 procedures	 for	 land	
acquisitions.	 After	 identifying	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 dispossession	 of	 title-less	
holders,	LGI	1	assesses	the	score	for	the	mapping	and	registration	of	forests	lands	at	the	
disposal	 of	 various	 communities.	 Land	 mapping	 and	 registration	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 to	
reduce	 land	conflicts	 and	compensation	 challenges.	Also,	 since	various	 literature	have	
reported	 on	 emerging	 conflicts	 over	 land,	 LGI	 2	 assessed	 if	 avenues	 exist	 to	 address	
conflicts	 generated	 during	 LSLAs.	 Other	 issues	 that	 were	 assessed	 included	 the	
availability	and	accessibility	to	information	relating	to	land	availability,	land	ownership,	
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land	 value,	 land	 use	 by	 both	 community	 and	 investors.	 In	 addition,	 Bugri	 (2013),	
examined	incentives	for	investors,	opportunities	for	profit	sharing,	social	responsibilities	
of	 investors,	 land	 use	 restrictions,	 safeguards	 against	 environmental	 and	 contractual	
abuses,	transparency	in	negotiations,	and	availability	of	procedures	for	complaints.	Even	
though	the	land	governance	indicators	formulated	by	Bugri	(2013)	formed	the	basis	for	
this	 sub-section	 of	 the	 study,	 it	 was	 identified	 that	 these	 indicators	 were	 broad	 and	
covered	a	range	of	other	possible	indicators.	Hence,	as	part	of	the	contributions	of	this	
study,	we	developed	our	own	list	of	indicators	based	on	the	review	of	literature	on	the	
guidelines	of	LSLAs.	
Table	2.4	Land	Governance	indicators	formulated	for	LSLA	in	Ghana	
Large-scale	Acquisition	of	Land	Rights	
LGI	 #	 Indicator	
LGI	 1	 Most	forest	land	is	mapped	and	rights	are	registered	
LGI	 2	 Conflicts	generated	by	land	acquisition	and	how	these	are	addressed	
LGI	 3	 Land	use	restrictions	on	rural	land	parcels	can	generally	be	identified	
LGI	 4	 Public	institutions	in	land	acquisition	operate	in	a	clear	and	consistent	manner	
LGI	 5	 Incentives	for	investors	are	clear,	transparent,	and	consistent	
LGI	 6	 Benefit	sharing	mechanisms	for	investments	in	agriculture	
LGI	 7	 There	are	direct	and	transparent	negotiations	between	right	holders	and	investors	
LGI	 8	 Information	required	from	investors	to	assess	projects	on	public/community	land	
LGI	 9	 Information	provided	for	cases	of	land	acquisition	on	public/community	land	
LGI	 10	 Contractual	provisions	on	benefits	and	risks	sharing	regarding	acquisition	of	land	
LGI	 11	 Duration	of	procedure	to	obtain	approval	for	a	project	
LGI	 12	 Social	requirements	for	large	scale	investments	in	agriculture	
LGI	 13	 Environmental	requirements	for	large	scale	investments	in	agriculture	
LGI	 14	 Procedures	for	economically,	environmentally,	and	socially	beneficial	investments	
LGI	 15	 Compliance	with	safeguards	related	to	investment	in	agriculture	
LGI	 16	 Procedures	to	complain	if	agricultural	investors	do	not	comply	with	requirements	
Source:	Bugri	(2012);	Bugri	(2013:67);	World	Bank	(2010)		
	
Since	 several	 non-mutually	 exclusive	 indicators	 from	 UNDP	 (1997),	 FAO	 (2007),	 FAO	
(2007:12),	World	Bank	(2010)	exist	relating	to	the	ascertainment	of	the	quality	of	 land	
governance,	 7	 main	 good	 governance	 categories	 were	 adopted	 for	 this	 study	 -	
effectiveness	and	efficiency,	transparency,	community	participation,	accountability,	rule	
of	 law,	sustainability	and	equity.	These	indicators	are	preferred	because	of	their	wider	
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application	to	customary	land	tenure	(Arko-Adjei	et	al.,	2010);	they	overlap	(Kaufmann	
et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 allow	 for	many	 governance	 issues	 to	be	 considered.	Based	on	 these	
categories,	30	LGIs	were	developed	for	the	study.	Efficiency	and	effectiveness	relates	to	
the	proper	application	of	rules,	regulations	and	procedures	relating	to	land	acquisition,	
mapping,	 registration	 and	 institutional	 collaboration.	 Also,	 transparency	 assesses	 land	
negotiations,	feedbacks	on	revenue,	access	to	 information	and	arbitrariness	 in	the	use	
of	custodian	powers	by	chiefs.		Detailed	discussions	on	all	the	selected	good	governance	
indicators	 relating	to	Ghana	and	the	study	areas	are	presented	 in	section	2.5.4	of	 this	
chapter.	
2.5	Analysis	and	Findings	
In	this	section,	the	findings	of	the	study	are	discussed	in	line	with	the	objectives	outlined	
in	 the	 last	 paragraph	of	 section	 2.1.	 The	 discussions	 are	 structured	on	 a	 case-by-case	
basis,	and	on	 the	peculiarities	of	each	selected	case	study	community,	 region	and	 the	
respective	 large-scale	 agro-project.	 This	 section	 is	 structured	 under	 four	 main	 sub-
heading:	 processes	 of	 land	 acquisition,	 stakeholders	 and	 their	 relationships	 in	 land	
acquisition,	changes	in	institutional	setups,	and	land	governance	assessment.			
2.5.1	Processes	of	land	acquisition	by	investors	and	subsisting	farmers		
From	the	studies	of	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	(2012),	the	land	was	acquired	through	the	Agogo	
Traditional	Council	(ATC)	for	Jatropha	curcas	production.	A	member	of	the	Agogo	royal	
family	 facilitated	 the	 process	 of	 land	 acquisition.	 According	 to	 the	 facilitator,	 such	 an	
investment	is	an	opportunity	to	stimulate	development	in	the	area	(see	Wisborg,	2012).	
Subsequent	negotiations	between	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	and	the	Agogo	Traditional	Council	
(ATC)	led	to	the	payment	of	the	necessary	customary	‘drink	money’,	and	an	agreement	
on	annual	land	rents.	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	proceeded	to	demarcate	the	whole	concession,	
mapped	 it	 and	 drafted	 a	 lease	 document	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 ATC.	 During	 this	
process	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	dealt	with	the	Agogo	Traditional	Council	(ATC),	with	no	direct	
discussions	 with	 the	 eight	 (8)	 communities	 whose	 communal	 lands	 were	 deemed	
affected	 by	 the	 concession.	 There	 were	 also	 neither	 community	 consultations	 nor	
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sensitizations	 meetings	 to	 inform	 and	 educate	 people	 on	 the	 impacts	 of	 such	 a	
‘development	opportunity’	in	their	locality	as	was	being	promoted.			
The	 exclusion	 of	 the	 local	 people	 from	 the	 ScanFarm	 land	 acquisition	 process	 caused	
initial	upheavals	by	the	residents	of	Agogo	in	2010.	For	example,	 it	was	unclear	at	the	
community	 level	how	the	 ‘drink	money’	was	arrived	at	and	no	 formula	 is	available	 for	
assessing	 it.	Ordinarily,	 ‘drink	money’	which	is	payment	grounded	in	custom	should	be	
negotiated	between	the	investor(s)	and	the	granting	stool,	but	the	actual	amount	paid	
in	 cash,	depends	on	 the	 respective	negotiation	powers	of	 the	parties.	 From	 the	 focus	
group	discussions	 conducted	 in	Dukusen	 and	Afrisire,	 the	 communities	 are	not	 aware	
how	much	 was	 paid	 for	 the	 land	 according	 to	 local	 customs,	 and	 the	 chiefs	 did	 not	
declare	 or	 account	 for	 money	 accruing	 from	 that	 land	 transactions	 (FDGs,	 2012).	
According	to	Belden	(2010:12),	traditional	authorities	always	remain	adamant	to	declare	
and	 account	 for	 land	 revenue	 because	 they	 are	 not	 obliged	 to	 reveal	 the	 amount	
involved	 in	 land	 transactions.	 Contrary	 to	 this,	 Article	 36(8)	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Republican	
Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992)	and	Section	1(1-3)	of	the	Head	of	Family	(Accountability)	
Law,	1985	(PNDC	Law	114)]	both	require	accountability	for	fiduciary	roles	of	chiefs	and	
family	 heads	 respectively.	 Also,	 since	 no	 crops	 were	 destroyed,	 there	 was	 no	
compensation	 for	 crops.	 In	 ScanFarm’s	proposed	 lease	agreement,	 they	were	granted	
interrupted	water	access	for	the	purposes	of	farming	(Interview	with	PVLMD,	2012).			
For	the	Integrated	Tamale	Fruit	Company	(ITFC)	Ltd,	the	land	was	acquired	from	the	Ya	
Na	 through	 the	 local	 chief	 of	 Dipale	 and	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 Nanton	 Na.	
Community	meetings	and	site	inspections	to	ascertain	fallow	and	actively	cropped	lands	
preceded	the	acquisition.	Kola	money	was	agreed	with	the	Ya	Na	and	his	council.	The	
community	 and	 ITFC	 Ltd	 also	 agreed	 on	 developmental	 projects	 and	 job	 creation	 as	
part-payment	 for	 the	 land,	 and	 not	 just	 as	 a	 form	 of	 Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility	
(CSR).	From	the	FDGs	(2013)	held	at	Gushie	and	Tunayili	around	the	ITFC	project,	it	was	
revealed	that	communities	did	not	know	how	much	the	 land	cost	and	by	custom	they	
are	 not	 permitted	 to	 request	 such	 details	 from	 the	 Ya	Na.	 ITFC	 Ltd	 reported	 holding	
	 41	
community	 discussions	 in	 all	 four	 (4)	 affected	 communities	 and	 no	 community	
upheavals	 have	 been	 recorded	 since	 the	 start	 of	 the	 project	 in	 2001.	 Since	 water	 is	
necessary	for	mango	production	especially	in	its	early	years,	the	lease	of	ITFC	required	
uninterrupted	access	 to	water	 from	 the	White	Volta,	which	borders	 the	communities.	
The	details	of	the	two	land	contracts	in	Agogo	and	Gushie	are	summarised	in	Table	2.5.			
Table	2.5	Summary	of	lease	details	for	both	ScanFarm	Ltd	and	ITFC	Ltd	
Detail	 ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	 ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd	
Location	of	Investment	 Agogo,	Ashanti	Region	 Tamale,	Northern	Region	
Investment	Ownership		 Norwegian	 Ghana	and	Dutch	partnership	
Year	of	Inception	 2009	 2001	
Crop	Produced	 Maize,	soybeans	and	sorghum	 Mango	and	biodiversity	field	
Future	crops	in	mind	 Upland	rice	and	teak	 Butternut	squash,	citrus,	maize	
Total	land	Acquired	(acres)	 13,058hectares	 1,363acres	(552ha)	nucleus	farm	
Area	cultivated	(acres)	 About	1,300hectares	(10percent)	 1,000acres	(405ha)	(73percent)	
Declared	Payments	 US$	23,000	 Gh¢	6,000		
Duration	of	Lease	 50years	(25yrs	two	streams)	 99years	
Rent	per	acre	per	year	 From	US$	1/p.a/acre	 in	2009	to	US$	
3.5/p.a/ha	in	2014	
Gh¢100	 (US$	 52	 as	 of	 1st	 April,	
2013)	p.a.		for	whole	parcel	
Form	of	Compensation	 Cash	and	free	tillage	 Cash	through	chiefs	
Who	was	Compensated	 Family	usufructuary	holders	 Active	Fallow	land	owners	
Water	Inclusion	 Uninterrupted	water	access	 Uninterrupted	water	access	
Community	Expectation		 Jobs	and	Development	 Jobs	and	Development	
Promised	Development	 Jobs,	 school,	 toilets	 and	 help	 in	
development	
Jobs,	 scholarships,	 schools,	
teachers,	 water,	
accommodation,	 teachers	 and	
allowances		
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
	
In	 the	 Agogo	 traditional	 area	 where	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 is	 located,	 smallholders	 can	
acquire	 agricultural	 land	 through	 the	 village	 Chief	 (Odikro)	 or	 directly	 from	 the	
Omanhene	depending	on	the	size	of	land	required.	From	the	interviews	with	the	Odikro	
of	Dukusen	(interview,	2012),	the	Omanhene	directly	administers	lands	above	5acres	(2	
hectares)	while	the	village	chiefs	handle	smaller	 land	acquisitions.	For	an	acre	of	 land,	
consultations	are	first	held	with	the	Okyeame	 (linguist	and	secretary	of	the	Chief)	who	
then	 leads	 the	 farmer	 to	 the	 chief.	 Subsequently,	 payment	 is	made	 for	mpaboa	 sika	
(sandals	money)	to	enable	the	chief	or	the	Okyeame	(linguist)	or	a	delegated	community	
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elder	 walks	 the	 farmer	 to	 a	 vacant	 piece	 of	 land.	 Upon	 the	 grant	 of	 land,	 one	 is	
mandated	to	pay	land	rent	to	the	Omanhene	through	his	Odikro	annually	either	in	cash	
or	kind.			
In	 the	 Savelugu	 area	where	 the	 ITFC	 Ltd	 is	 located,	 smallholders,	 who	 are	 indigenes,	
acquire	 farm	or	 building	 land	 through	 first	 settlement,	 inheritance	 and	 explicit	 grants	
from	previous	family	usufruct	holding.	For	settlers,	land	is	acquired	from	the	local	chief	
by	presenting	kola	nuts	or	kola	money	through	the	Gundaanaa	(village	Chief	of	Gushie).	
According	 to	 the	 Chief	 of	 Gushie	 (in	 an	 interview,	 2013),	 a	 village	 in	 the	 ITFC	 Ltd	
operational	area,	
	
	“kola	money	is	never	fixed,	it	depends	on	the	use	of	the	land,	the	person	
involved,	the	chief	at	the	time,	and	the	way	you	approach	him.	Obviously,	
agricultural	land	is	less	expensive	than	building	land”.		
	
The	presentation	of	kola	nuts	or	kola	money	by	potential	tenants	to	the	chief	and	elders	
is	 not	 equivalent	 to	 payment	 for	 land	 according	 to	 the	 land	 custodians.	 A	 grant	 of	
agricultural	 land	 is	 seen	 as	akyedie	 (gift	 in	 Akan	 according	 to	 Amanor,	 2006)	 to	 feed	
oneself.	 A	 grantee	 may	 subsequently,	 voluntarily	 show	 appreciation	 to	 the	 chief	 by	
presenting	him	with	favours	annually	(e.g.	a	portion	of	produce).	Even	though	this	is	not	
compulsory	in	principle,	an	elder	in	Tunayili	(2013),	a	village	in	the	ITFC	Ltd	operational	
area	remarked:	
	
“failure	 to	 perform	 this	 gesture	 has	 consequences.	 If	 the	 chief	 is	 not	
getting	 anything	 from	 you,	 and	 there	 is	 any	 development	 coming	 to	 his	
area	 which	 requires	 some	 land,	 I	 am	 sure	 your	 land	 would	 be	 the	 best	
place	to	start	with”	(interview	with	village	elder	at	Tunayili,	2013).		
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Approaching	 a	 chief	 to	 request	 for	 land	 may	 cost	 12	 pieces	 of	 kola	 nuts18	or	 cash	
equivalent	 or	 both	 as	 greeting	 fee.	 After	 obtaining	 an	 agricultural	 parcel,	 a	 farmer’s	
appreciation	to	the	chief	for	the	land,	may	be	equivalent	to	a	bag	of	the	maize,	millet,	
beans	or	groundnuts	one	produces	seasonally.	Though	the	chief	in	Gushie	insists	annual	
rents	are	optional	for	indigenes	and	settlers,	annual	appreciations	are	always	welcomed.	
Agricultural	 lands	 are	 generally	 not	 registered	 in	 the	 Savelugu	 area.	 This	
notwithstanding,	 tenure	 systems	 are	 reported	 to	 be	 very	 secure	 with	 few	 recorded	
cases	of	land	disputes.		
2.5.2	Stakeholders	in	land	acquisition	processes	and	their	inter-relationship	
The	main	stakeholders	identified	in	large	land	transactions	in	Ghana	are	the	chiefs,	the	
investors,	 the	 government	 and	 the	 host	 communities.	 However,	 to	 facilitate	 these	
transactions,	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 has	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 formalising	 and	
registering	the	deeds	of	land	transactions.	The	Town	and	Country	Planning	Department	
(TCPD)	also	play	a	role	 in	assessing	the	suitability	of	 the	 investment	according	to	 local	
zoning	 regulations.	 The	 Survey	 and	 Mapping	 Division	 of	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 was	
reported	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 vetting	 and	 approving	 surveyed	 lands,	 while	 the	
Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 (EPA)	 assisted	 in	 providing	 environmental	 audits,	
permits	 and	 sanctioning	 of	 environmental	 sanity	 breaches.	 Based	 on	 empirical	 work	
from	 a	 multi-country	 study	 in	 Africa,	 Cotula	 et	 al.	 (2011:104)	 stated	 that:	 “several	
countries	 require	 an	 Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment	 (EIA)	 or	 an	 Environmental	 and	
Social	Impact	Assessment	(ESIA)	to	be	carried	out	prior	to	project	approval”.	In	line	with	
this,	Ghana	requests	an	environmental	auditing	report	as	part	of	the	requirements	for	
issuing	environmental	permits.	However,	no	Social	Impact	Assessment	(SIA)	is	required	
to	grant	operational	certificates	to	the	investors,	as	both	companies	studied	have	no	SIA	
reports.		
	
																																																								
18Twelve	 pieces	 of	 kola	 nuts	 cost	 about	 GH¢	 20	 (US$	 10.4)	 to	 GH¢	 30	 (US$	 15.6)	 as	 of	 1st	 April,	 2013	
depending	on	the	type	and	sizes.	
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The	current	structure	of	the	main	institutions	that	regulate	land	management	in	Ghana	
is	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2.	Under	the	Ministry	of	Lands	and	Natural	Resources,	the	Lands	
Commission	and	the	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Land	(OASL)	are	the	institutions	
directly	into	the	administration	of	large	acquisitions	in	Ghana.	The	Lands	Commission	is	
a	 reconstructed	body	under	 the	Lands	Commission	Act	2008	 (Act	767)	 comprising	 the	
Public	 and	 Vested	 Land	 Management	 Division	 (PVLMD),	 the	 Survey	 and	 Mapping	
Division	 (SMD),	 the	 Land	 Valuation	 Division	 (LVD)	 and	 the	 Land	 Registration	 Division	
(LRD).	Before	the	passage	of	the	Lands	Commission	Act	2008	(Act	767),	which	merged	
these	 institutions	 under	 an	 umbrella	 body,	 these	 institutions	 operated	 independently	
with	limited	collaboration	with	the	others.		
	
Figure	2:2	Institutional	frameworks	of	land	sector	agencies	in	Ghana	
Source:	Own	illustration	
	
The	 Office	 of	 the	 Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	 remains	 an	 independent	 organisation	
because	 its	mandates	 were	 already	 captured	 in	 Article	 267	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Republican	
Constitution	 of	 Ghana	 (1992)	 and	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	 Act	
1994	 (Act	 481).	Under	 the	Ministry	of	 Local	Government	 and	Rural	Development,	 the	
Town	and	Country	Planning	Department	(TCPD)	functions	as	a	decentralised	local	level	
planning	authority	through	designated	District,	Municipal	and	Metropolitan	Assemblies	
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(MMDAs)	across	the	country.	Together,	these	organisations	provide	various	services	to	
individuals,	families,	groups,	and	cooperate	organisations.	
	
Beside	 the	 above	 mainstream	 formal	 land	 administrations	 institutions,	 the	 Ghana	
Investment	Promotion	Centre	(GIPC)	and	the	Ghana	Free	Zones	Board	(GFZB)	have	also	
played	vital	roles	in	promoting,	regulating	and	legitimizing	large-scale	land	investments.	
The	 GIPC	 and	 the	 GFZB	 directly	 attract	 these	 investors	 by	 offering	 various	 incentives	
including	 land	and	tax	exemptions.	The	Water	Resources	Commission	 (WRC)	regulates	
large	 water	 body	 access	 and	 use	 in	 Ghana.	 However,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 study,	 both	
ScanFarm	 (GH)	 Ltd	and	 ITFC	 Ltd	did	not	acquire	water	 resources	 certificates,	 yet	 they	
contracted	with	host	communities’	leaders	to	have	uninterrupted	water	access	from	the	
rivers	Afram	and	White	Volta	respectively.	The	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	(MoFA)	
contributes	 to	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 by	 providing	 assistance	 on	 how	 to	 access	
suitable	 agricultural	 land	 and	 other	 advisory	 services	 to	 investors.	 Under	 the	 Ghana	
Commercial	 Agriculture	 Project	 (GCAP),	 the	Ministry	 of	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	 (MoFA)	
plays	 critical	 roles	 in	 assisting,	 facilitating	 and	 promoting	 access	 to	 appropriate	
agricultural	 lands.	 Chiefs	 are	 encouraged	 under	 the	 project,	 to	 contribute	 agricultural	
lands	 to	 a	 land	 bank	 through	 the	 Ghana	 Investment	 Promotion	 Centre	 (GIPC)	 for	
investment	 attraction.	 Also,	 the	 Land	 Valuation	 Division	 (LVD)	 provides	 valuation	
services	 to	 the	 public	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 state.	 It	 could	 assist	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	
compensation	for	affected	usufructs.		
	
Figure	2.3	 is	an	 illustration	of	 the	current	arrangement	of	all	 the	 institutions	 that	play	
various	 roles	 in	 administering	 large-scale	 land	 acquisition	 in	 Ghana,	 and	 their	
relationship	within	 this	 network.	 From	 Figure	 2.3,	 it	was	 identified	 that	 there	 existed	
strong	 alliance	 between	 some	 of	 the	 institutions,	 a	 weak	 connection	 between	
mainstream	land	organisations	and	certification	authorities;	and	no	connection	between	
land	 agencies	 and	 other	 agencies	 that	 have	 critical	 roles	 to	 play	 in	 enhancing	
responsible	 land	acquisition.	From	the	 illustrations	 in	Figure	2.3,	traditional	authorities	
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remain	as	 fiduciaries	of	customary	 land	 in	Ghana,	and	have	direct	and	regular	contact	
with	large	agro-investors	as	suppliers	of	the	bulk	of	agricultural	land.	In	both	case	study	
agro-investment	 projects,	 the	 chiefs	 together	 with	 their	 traditional	 councils	 directly	
negotiated	 land	 prices	 and	 liabilities	 with	 the	 agro-investors.	 Subsequently,	 these	
investors	 contacted	 the	 formal	 land	 agencies	 –	 the	 Lands	 Commission,	 to	 receive	
approval	 for	 the	 transaction,	 and	 to	 register	 their	 rights	 if	 no	 legal	 injunctions,	
encroachments,	 expropriation	 or	 land	 use	 planning	 breaches	 are	 raised.	 These	
arrangements,	besides	being	essential,	are	also	prudent	to	prevent	fraud,	litigation	and	
to	 legitimize	 the	 transaction.	 Deeds	 registration	 with	 the	 Public	 and	 Vested	 Land	
Management	Division	(PVLMD)	of	the	Lands	Commission	for	instance	helps	to	legitimize	
land	transactions	and	secures	government’s	endorsement.	
	
Figure	2:3	Current	stakeholder	relationships	in	formalising	large	agro-investments		
Source:	Own	Illustration			
The	 relationship	 between	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 and	 the	 traditional	 authorities	 is	 a	
weak	one,	since	the	chiefs	are	autonomous	in	their	negotiations.	Besides	the	mandates	
of	 the	 PVLMD	 to	 give	 “consent	 and	 concurrence”	 (according	 to	 Article	 267[4]	 of	 the	
Constitution	of	Ghana,	1992)	to	stool	land	transactions	in	Ghana,	and	the	Office	of	the	
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Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	 (OASL)	 to	 collect	 and	 disburse	 stool	 land	 revenue	
(according	 to	 Article	 267[6]	 of	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Ghana,	 1992)19,	 the	 chiefs	 and	
traditional	 councils	 have	 handled	 land	 transactions	 with	 minimal	 interference	 by	 the	
state.	 The	 Town	 and	 Country	 Planning	 Department	 (TCPD),	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	
assessing	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 particular	 investment	 within	 local	 land	 use	
planning	 requirements,	 remains	 constrained	 since	many	 towns	 and	 villages	 in	 Ghana	
remain	 un-surveyed,	 un-mapped	 and	 un-planned.	 Consequently,	 allodial	 owners	
continue	to	be	the	main	initiators	of	local	level	planning.	The	prevailing	non-interference	
stance	of	government	in	chieftaincy	and	stool	land	management,	sometimes	creates	the	
lingering	disconnect	between	the	traditional	authorities	and	formal	land	agencies.	Even	
though	 opportunities	 exist	 to	 govern	 the	 processes	 of	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 in	
Ghana,	positive	results	are	impossible	if	the	current	arrangement	persists.		
From	Figure	 2.3,	 there	 also	 exist	weak	 relationships	 among	 the	 certification	 agencies,	
the	 traditional	 authorities	 and	 formal	 land	 agencies.	 The	 functions	 of	 these	
organisations	 though	 essential	 in	 regulating	 the	 activities	 of	 foreign	 investments	 in	
Ghana,	 are	 not	 collaborative	 in	 carrying	 out	 their	 respective	 functions.	 Albeit	 this	
expected	 relationship	 is	 not	 mandated	 by	 any	 legislation,	 information	 from	 the	
institutions	 that	 manage	 land	 registration	 should	 be	 pivotal	 in	 issuing	 operational	
permits	 to	 agro-investment	 companies.	 From	 the	 case	 studies	 in	 Ghana,	 these	
certification	 agencies	 do	 not	 have	 any	 direct	 operational	 relationship	 with	 the	
traditional	authorities	 that	administer	customary	 land.	There,	however,	exists	a	strong	
alliance	 between	 the	 investment	 companies	 and	 the	 certification	 companies	 since	
obtaining	the	necessary	certificates	implies	governmental	approval	of	their	operations.		
																																																								
19	Article	267(6)	prescribes	that:	“Ten	percent	of	the	revenue	accruing	from	stool	lands	shall	be	paid	to	the	
Office	 of	 the	Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	 (OASL)	 to	 cover	 administrative	 expenses;	 and	 the	 remaining	
revenue	shall	be	disbursed	in	the	following	proportions-	(a)	twenty-five	percent	to	the	stool	through	the	
traditional	authority	for	the	maintenance	of	the	stool	in	keeping	with	its	status;	(b)	twenty	percent	to	the	
traditional	 authority;	 and	 (c)	 fifty-five	 percent	 to	 the	District	 Assembly,	within	 the	 area	 of	 authority	 of	
which	the	stool	lands	are	situated”.	
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The	 Ghana	 Investment	 Promotion	 Centre	 (GIPC)	 and	 the	 Registrar	 General’s	
Department,	 in	 issuing	operational	certificates	to	agro-investment	companies,	strongly	
collaborate	with	other	 agencies	 like	 the	Ministry	of	 Food	and	Agriculture	 (MoFA),	 the	
Water	Resources	Commission	 (WRC)	 and	 the	Ghana	 Irrigation	Development	Authority	
(GIDA).	From	the	study,	however,	the	MoFA,	GIDA	and	WRC	do	not	directly	relate	with	
the	agro-investors,	the	traditional	authorities	and	the	Lands	Commission.	The	complete	
disconnect	of	the	certification	companies	with	the	WRC	and	GIDA	is	what	may	be	raising	
serious	 concerns	 about	water	 grabbing.	 Mann	 and	 Smaller	 (2010)	 have	 insisted	 that	
water	is	the	main	motivation	for	large	land	acquisition	in	sub-Saharan	Africa.	The	lack	of	
involvement	 of	 statutory	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	 Water	 Resources	 Commission	 (WRC),	
Lands	 Commission	 and	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 (EPA),	 for	 technical	
knowledge	 and	 information	 throughout	 the	 land	 negotiation	 stages	 of	 the	 projects,	
means	 that	 vital	 information	 on	 long-term	 impacts	 of	 investments	 vis-à-vis	 water	
requirements	 is	 completely	 lost.	 Both	 companies	 studied	 did	 not	 obtain	 water	
extraction	certificates.		
2.5.3	Changes	in	institutional	set-ups	that	influence	land	transactions	
Agricultural	 policies	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 promoting	 LSLAs.	 Following	 the	 persistent	
difficulties	of	the	agricultural	sector	in	Ghana	since	independence,	various	governments	
have	 formulated	 policies	 and	 programmes	 as	 means	 to	 improve	 the	 productivity	 of	
smallholders	who	are	highly	resource-constrained.	The	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	
(MoFA)	among	other	things,	has	formulated	various	policies	and	programmes	intended	
to	 improve	 access	 to	 financial	 services,	 appropriate	 technology,	 improved	
infrastructure,	access	 to	markets,	enhance	human	resource	development,	 institutional	
capacities	(interview	with	MoFA,	2013),	and	to	facilitate	investor	access	to	land	through	
the	establishment	of	land	banks	(see	Aryeetey	and	Udry,	2010;	Schoneveld	et	al.,	2011).			
	
After	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Structural	 Adjustment	 Programme	 (SAP)	 in	Ghana	 in	
the	 late	1980s	through	to	the	mid-1990s,	 the	Medium	Term	Agricultural	Development	
Programme	(MTADP,	1990)	was	implemented	to	improve	agricultural	development.	As	
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part	 of	 the	 programme	 strategies,	 the	 Accelerated	 Agricultural	 Growth	 and	
Development	 Strategy	 (AAGDS,	 1996)	 was	 formulated	 to	 promote	 selected	 products	
through	 improved	 access	 to	 markets,	 technology	 for	 sustainable	 natural	 resource	
management,	 agricultural	 financial	 services,	 improved	 infrastructure,	 and	 to	 enhance	
human	 resource	 and	 institutional	 capacity.	 In	 order	 to	 accelerate	 the	 sector’s	 growth	
rate,	 the	 Government	 of	 Ghana	 committed	 to	 invest	 in	 a	 series	 of	 actions:	 provide	
logistics	and	post-harvest	infrastructure,	improve	planting	material	availability,	invest	in	
applied	 research	 and	 development	 programs,	 provide	 quality	 management	 and	 food	
safety	systems,	support	industry	and	farmer	owned	organizations,	and	provide	strategic	
information	systems	-	that	will	set	the	basis	for	future	agricultural	developments.		
	
In	 2001,	 the	 New	 Patriotic	 Party	 (NPP)	 under	 the	 Growth	 and	 Poverty	 Reduction	
Strategy	(GPRS	I,	2001)	formulated	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Sector	Development	Policy	
(FASDEP	 I).	 FASDEP	 I	 (2002)	 was	 necessitated	 by	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	 modernise	
agriculture	 in	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 then	 President’s	 vision	 of	 transforming	 Ghana	 into	 a	
leading	agro-industrial	country	 in	Africa	by	the	year	2010.	FASDEP	 I	was	to	enable	the	
agricultural	 sector	 adapt	 to	 rapid	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 domestic	 and	 global	
economy,	 to	 help	 increase	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	overall	 development	 and	 growth	of	
the	 national	 economy.	 It	 was	 also	 to	 bring	 out	 the	 linkages	 in	 the	 food	 system,	
production,	 storage	 processing,	 preservation,	 packaging	 and	 marketing,	 as	 well	 as	
linkages	among	the	various	agricultural	and	other	non-agriculture	sub-sectors.	FASDEP	I	
also	 emphasised	 the	 optimum	 and	 sustainable	 utilisation	 of	 all	 resources	 and	
commercialisation	 of	 the	 agricultural	 sector	with	market-driven	 growth	 in	mind.	 	 This	
was	 necessary	 to	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 modernising	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	
making	it	a	catalyst	for	rural	transformation.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	diversified	policy	priorities	of	the	FASDEP	I,	it	failed	to	achieve	the	
desired	 agricultural	 transformation	 for	 agricultural	 commercialisation,	 improve	
smallholders’	productivity	and	impact	on	poverty	for	a	number	of	reasons.	For	example,	
the	expectation	of	modernising	poor	smallholder	agriculture	was	unachievable	because	
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of	improper	targeting	of	the	poor	within	an	environment	where	the	fundamental	drivers	
of	agricultural	modernisation,	access	to	credit,	technology,	 infrastructure,	and	markets	
remained	very	limited.	It	was	realised	that	the	problem	analysis	was	weak	and	did	not	
sufficiently	 reflect	 smallholder	 perspectives,	 needs	 and	 priorities.	 Also,	 the	 specific	
approach	 through	which	 the	Ministry	of	 Food	and	Agriculture	 (MoFA)	 could	 stimulate	
responses	 from	other	ministries,	 departments	 and	 agencies	 for	 interventions	 that	 fell	
outside	the	domain	of	MoFA	was	not	specified.	
	
Due	to	the	shortfalls	 in	FASDEP	I,	 the	Food	and	Agriculture	Sector	Development	Policy	
(FASDEP	II,	2007)	was	formulated.	FASDEP	II	sought	to	improve	the	environment	for	all	
categories	 of	 farmers,	 while	 targeting	 poor,	 risk-prone	 and	 risk-averse	 smallholder	
producers.	 It	 also	 targeted	 fewer	 commodities	 for	 food	 security	 and	 income	
diversification,	 especially	 for	 resource-poor	 farmers.	 Under	 FASDEP	 II,	 a	 number	 of	
policies	were	also	formulated	to	shape	agro-investment	in	Ghana.	For	example,	in	2011,	
the	Medium	Term	Agriculture	Sector	Investment	Plan	(METASIP,	2011)	was	formulated	
as	 an	 investment	 plan	 to	 support	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 medium	 term	 plans	 in	
FASDEP	 II	 (METASIP,	 ibid).	 Under	 the	 Plan,	 the	 government	 committed	 expending	
10percent	of	its	expenditure	towards	agricultural	development	and	targeting	to	achieve	
a	 6percent	 GDP	 growth	 rate20.	 METASIP	 is	 supposed	 to	 finance	 linkages	 between	
smallholders	 and	 agribusiness,	 to	 facilitate	 access	 to	 input,	 research,	 technology	 and	
product	markets,	as	well	as	other	essential	services.		
	
In	 2012,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	 (MoFA)	 commenced	 the	 Ghana	
Commercial	 Agriculture	 Programme	 (GCAP,	 2012)	 aimed	 at	 increasing	 smallholder	
access	to	land,	private	sector	finance,	inputs,	and	output	markets	through	public-private	
partnerships	 in	 the	 Accra	 Plains	 and	 the	 Northern	 Savannah	 Ecological	 zone	 (see	
interview	with	MoFA,	2012).	The	programme	targets	the	private	sector	in	transforming																																																									
20	Note	 that	 the	 targeted	 6	 percent	 growth	 rate	 in	 agricultural	 development	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
ECOWAS	 Agricultural	 Policy	 and	 NEPAD’s	 Comprehensive	 Africa	 Agricultural	 Development	 Programme	
(ECOWAS/CAADP).			
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agriculture	 from	 a	 low-productive	 subsistence-based	 sector	 to	 one	 characterized	 by	
high-productivity,	 integrated	 value	 chains,	 and	 extensive	 value	 addition	 (GCAP,	 ibid).	
Ghana’s	 current	 agricultural	 policies	 are	 shifting	 focus	 from	 a	 subsistence-based	
smallholder	 system	 to	 a	 stronger	 market-oriented	 system	 that	 aims	 at	 integrating	
smallholders	with	larger	commercial	enterprises,	along	a	functional	value	chain	through	
contract	 farming	 and	 outgrower	 schemes.	Since	 2012,	 the	 GCAP	 remains	 in	 its	 initial	
stages	with	few	nucleus	farms	established	in	the	Accra	plains	while	encouraging	foreign	
direct	investments	(FDIs)	into	designated	agricultural	projects	in	the	Savannah	regions.		
It	is	believed	that	implementing	these	policies	will	completely	transform	the	agricultural	
sector	 in	Ghana,	 yet	 insulate	 smallholders	 from	 agricultural	 shocks	 and	 challenges.	 In	
another	dimension,	it	 is	probably	due	to	these	policies	that	the	numbers	of	large-scale	
land	acquisitions	in	Ghana	have	grown	significantly	in	the	last	decade.	In	Ghana’s	case,	
the	 focus	 of	 agricultural	 policies	 has	 always	 been	 towards	 promoting	 large	 producers	
and	 agro-businesses,	 and	 subsequently	 using	 these	 as	 hubs	 to	 enhance	 smallholder	
production	through	sustained	value	chains.	However,	it	remains	unspecified	in	all	these	
policies	about	how	the	land	of	smallholders	can	be	protected	even	amidst	attempts	to	
facilitate	 large-holders’	 land	 access	 through	 established	 land	 banks.	 It	 is	 uncertain,	 if	
these	land	banks	are	being	stocked	with	idle	or	unoccupied	lands	as	is	generally	claimed,	
or	 these	 include	 lands	 already	 cultivated	 by	 smallholders.	 An	 improper	 targeting	 of	
these	policies	may	invariably	influence	land	grabbing	in	Ghana.			
Following	 the	 high	 demand	 for	 agricultural	 land,	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 (2012)	
formulated	 guidelines	 to	 govern	 the	 processes	 of	 LSLAs	 in	 Ghana.	 Through	 the	
guidelines,	the	Lands	Commission	(2012)	reveals	that,	the	new	spate	of	land	and	water	
demands	 in	 Ghana,	 require	 tact	 in	 order	 to	 curtail	 potential	 ramifications	 on	
smallholders.	The	guidelines	also	allude	to	the	inexperience	and	incompetence	of	some	
traditional	 institutions	 in	 managing	 the	 magnitude	 of	 land	 demand.	 The	 Lands	
Commission’s	 land	 acquisition	 guidelines	 acknowledged	 that	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	 have	 possible	 environmental	 implications;	 that	most	 land	 acquisitions	 do	
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not	 conform	 to	 land	 use	 regulations,	 and	 that	 some	 acquisitions	 are	 speculative	 in	
nature.	 The	 various	 Regional	 Lands	 Commissions	 are	 allowed	 to	 administer	 lands	 of	
1000acres	(405ha)	or	less,	but	refer	larger	acquisitions	to	its	head	office	in	Accra.			
Table	2.6	Changes	in	customary	land	tenure	in	Ghana	per	case	studies	
Before-2000	Customary	Land	Tenure	System		 Contemporary	Tenure	System	(in	2012)	
• Allodial	title	with	Chiefs	and	Tendaamba	
	
• Land	 largely	 remained	 communal	 land	 in	
Ghana	
Multiple	 access	 routes:	 Allodial	 with	
Chiefs,	family	heads	and	individuals.		
Ownership	 in	 peri-urban	 areas	 is	 being	
individualized	and	leased	
• Family	 heads	 controlled	 family	 lands	 and	
members’	 land	 access	 and	 use	 rights	 were	
guaranteed	 upon	 request	 at	 both	 rural	 and	
urban	areas	
• Grants	were	largely	oral	with	no	structures	for	
proper	documents,	maintaining	and	recording	
land	information	
Commercialized	 exchange	 systems	
(leases,	subleases,	sales	and	mortgages)		
	
	
Formalized	 land	 transaction	
characterised	by	land	registration	
• Equitable	and	non-monetary	access	to	land		
• Migrant	 farmers	were	encouraged	 to	 settle	 in	
farming	communities	as	tenant/share-farmers	
• Women	were	marginalized	 in	 land	 ownership	
but	 had	 assured	 use	 rights	 to	 family	 land	 or	
borrowing	from	other	owners	
Access	 is	 restricted	 by	 lack	 of	 money,	
gender,	 citizenship	 status,	 and	 ethnic	
connotations,	 (land	 is	 controlled	 by	 the	
money	market).		
Unequal	 benefits	 from	 land	 resources	
between	custodians	and	the	people.		
• Bush	lands	were	available	and	accessible	to	all	
based	on	kinship	and	social	networks	
There	 is	 no	 un-owned	 land	 in	 Ghana,	
patches	of	unoccupied	land	still	abound	
• Non-monetary	 commercial	 transactions	 were	
commonplace		
Drink	money	is	now	equivalent	to	market	
values	of	lands	
• Easy	 access,	 control,	 guaranteed	 security,	
unlimited	term	and	secured	livelihoods	
Restricted	access,	 land	 tenure	 insecurity,	
restricted	term	and	livelihood	threats	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
	
At	 the	 community	 level,	 we	 also	 examined	 the	 changes	 in	 customary	 land	 tenure	
systems	in	the	last	decade	and	the	field	observations	(as	of	2013)	are	summarised	in	the	
Table	2.6.	The	major	change	observed	was	that	land	transactions	in	the	last	decade	have	
transformed	 from	 largely	 gratuitous	 grants	 to	 market-led	 land	 allocations	 in	 Ghana.	
Government	agricultural	policies	encourage	chiefs	to	make	agricultural	land	available	to	
large	investors,	with	little	emphasis	on	smallholders.	The	promotion	of	land	banks	have	
	 53	
rather	disproportionately	affected	smallholder	access	to	agricultural	land;	by	facilitating	
a	 land	market	 that	 targets	 allocating	problem-free	 lands	 to	 large	 investors,	 instead	of	
protecting	 the	 fragile	 rights	 of	 smallholders.	 Also,	 notwithstanding	 the	 numerous	
opportunities	for	community	consultations,	chiefs	are	abusing	their	custodianship	roles	
for	monetary	considerations.	According	to	Bugri	 (2013),	chiefs	 in	 the	 last	decade	have	
begun	 to	 reconstruct	 their	 roles	 as	 landowners	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 Yeboah	 (2014)	
describes	 this	 emerging	 trend	of	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 since	 2009	 as	 a	 form	of	
market-driven	expropriation,	because	 it	 is	motivated	by	the	desire	of	chiefs	and	family	
heads	to	benefit	from	emerging	land	market	opportunities.		
2.5.4	Assessment	of	land	governance	systems	in	Ghana	
According	 to	Kasanga	 (2001),	 agricultural	 development	 in	Ghana	will	 remain	 impaired	
without	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	 that	 guarantees	 smallholders’	 land	 use	 rights,	
secures	title	to	land,	distributes	land	resources	equitably	and	promotes	fair	landlord	and	
tenant	relations.	The	Ghana	Land	Policy	(1999)	already	acknowledged	the	existence	of	
land	governance	challenges	pertaining	to	both	customary	and	statutory	tenure,	and	the	
smooth	 functioning	 of	 land	markets.	 Kasanga	 and	Kotey	 (2001),	 and	Deininger	 (2003)	
have	 argued	 that	 customary	 tenure	 institutions	 are	 a	 preferable	 option,	 to	 reinforce	
accountability	and	equity,	and	to	ensure	that	low-cost	land	delivery	is	achieved.	In	line	
with	this	background,	this	sub-section	of	the	chapter	discusses	the	governance	system	
of	 land	 tenure	 in	 the	 studied	 communities	 and	 juxtaposed	 these	 within	 the	 broader	
national	 land	 governance	 framework	 published	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 (2010)	 and	 Bugri	
(2012	and	2013).	The	scores	of	our	assessments	are	displayed	in	Table	2.7.	In	addition,	
the	 selected	principles	of	 good	 land	governance	are	 thoroughly	discussed	 in	 line	with	
available	 literature.	 The	 good	 land	 governance	 principles	 used	 included	 effectiveness	
and	 efficiency,	 transparency,	 community	 participation,	 accountability,	 rule	 of	 law,	
sustainability	and	effectiveness.			
i. Effectiveness	 and	 Efficiency	 –	 Land	 tenure	 institutions	 can	 be	 described	 as	
efficient	and	effective,	if	they	promote	sustained	tenure	security	for	all	land	users	across	
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space	and	time,	and	for	all	social	classes.	According	to	Arko-Adjei	et	al.	(2010),	efficiency	
and	effectiveness	is	determined	by	how	customary	laws	are	implemented,	how	tenure	
insecurity	is	addressed,	the	competence	of	land	administrators,	the	simplicity	and	clarity	
of	 land	delivery	processes,	 convenience	 and	access	 to	 essential	 information,	 and	how	
resolutions	 from	 land	 disputes	 are	 enforced.	 These	 factors	 are	 essential	 to	 curb	 the	
incidences	of	corruption	and	put	competent	persons	 in	charge	of	 land	delivery.	 In	 line	
with	 these	 expectations	 and	 from	 the	 scores	 obtained	 from	 key	 stakeholders	
interviewed,	 it	was	 established	 in	 the	 study	 areas,	 that	 rules	 and	procedures	 for	 land	
acquisition	though	simple,	are	not	documented.	Land	acquisition	procedures	are	ad	hoc	
and	one	must	rely	on	established	networks	to	acquire	information	and	negotiate	terms	
in	land	transactions.	In	terms	of	time,	it	was	reported	that	acquiring	customary	land	may	
take	 up	 to	 a	 year	 or	more	 because	 of	 the	 delays	 in	 resolving	 interjections	 from	both	
immediate	and	remote	land	right	users	especially	usufructs	holders.			
In	 the	 registration	 of	 agricultural	 land,	 it	 takes	 a	 minimum	 of	 3years	 to	 complete,	
according	 to	 the	 Lands	 Commission,	 due	 to	 the	 numerous	 processes	 involved	 –	 from	
allocation,	 surveying,	 valuation	 and	 registration.	 These	 delays	 sometimes	 compel	
investors	 to	commence	development	of	 land	even	when	 it	 is	unregistered.	Customary	
lands	are	generally	not	mapped,	and	both	allodial	and	usufruct	rights	are	unregistered	in	
all	study	communities.	In	the	Agogo	area	where	ScanFarm	Ltd	is	located,	only	3	farmers	
documented	 allocation	 contracts	 through	 the	 Customary	 Land	 Secretariat	 (CLS).	 After	
5years	 of	 operations,	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 still	 relies	 on	 an	 initial	MoU	 signed	 because	
they	are	still	 in	 the	process	of	registering	their	 lease.	The	process	of	 lease	registration	
has	been	very	slow	and	plagued	with	a	lot	of	objections	from	various	usufruct	families,	
who	are	purporting	ownership	of	 some	portions	of	 the	ScanFarm	concession.	 In	 total,	
the	Kumasi	office	of	the	PVLMD	as	of	December	2012	received	15	objections	(data	from	
PVLMD,	 2012).	 The	 average	 score	 given	 to	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 by	 the	 key	
stakeholders	was	a	C,	implying	that	customary	land	allocation	for	agricultural	purposes	
have	performed	fairly	well	notwithstanding	the	lapses	observed.	
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ii. Transparency	 -	 Transparency	 is	 the	 bases	 for	 assessing	 participation,	
accountability	and	equity	 (UN-HABITAT,	2007).	Transparency	 is	enhanced	when	access	
to	information	is	guaranteed	to	all	persons,	even	if	it	is	at	a	fee.	At	the	community	level,	
the	 existence	 of	 consultative	meetings	 and	 clarity	 in	 customary	 rules	 and	 regulations	
pertaining	 to	 land	 is	a	 sure	way	 to	 improve	 transparency.	Transparency	will	 go	a	 long	
way	 to	 enhance	 efficiency	 and	 accountability	 (Piotrowski	 and	 Van	 Ryzin,	 2007),	 if	
information	on	all	 land	allocations	 and	 the	use	of	 land	 resources	 are	 accessible	by	 all	
people	 to	 enhance	 their	 free,	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent.	 In	 this	 way,	 bribery	 and	
corruption	will	be	controlled	considerably.	To	improve	transparency,	the	customary	land	
secretariats	were	establishment	to	improve	information	capturing	and	storage,	so	as	to	
provide	 the	 interface	 for	 land	 users	 and	 trustees	 to	 interact.	 Subsequently,	 land	
negotiations	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 transparent	with	 feedbacks	 on	 expenditure,	 so	 as	 to	
avoid	 embezzlement	 and	 arbitrary	 expending.	 In	 the	 assessment	 framework,	 study	
communities	 performed	 abysmally	 in	 transparency.	 In	 the	 ITFC	 Ltd	 case	 study	 there	
appeared	 to	 be	 some	 level	 information	 dissemination	 to	 the	 communities	 concerned	
through	 periodic	 community	 meetings.	 The	 story	 of	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 was	 the	
opposite.	 Even	 though,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Agogo	 Customary	 Land	 Secretariat	
offers	opportunities	 for	 farmers	to	access	 information	about	 land	ownership	and	rent,	
the	secretariat	does	not	offer	any	data	on	 income	from	land	transactions.	The	various	
scores	 on	 transparency	 indicators	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 2.7.	 With	 a	 score	 of	 D,	
transparency	continues	to	be	a	major	area	of	concern	of	customary	land	administration.			
	
From	 the	 interview	with	 the	 registrar	 of	 the	 Agogo	 Traditional	 Council	 (2012),	 it	 was	
apparent	that	there	are	no	benchmarks	in	deciding	land	rents.	Rents	are	decided	at	the	
traditional	 council	meetings	with	no	advice	 from	 the	 Land	Valuation	Division	 (LVD)	or	
other	professional	valuation	experts,	who	understand	the	dynamics	of	 local	 land	value	
systems.	The	processes	adopted	by	 chiefs	 to	negotiate	and	balance	potential	benefits	
and	risks	remain	unknown	to	the	local	population.	According	to	Bugri	(2013),	chiefs	are	
negotiating	land	privately	and	these	are	worked	out	on	a	case-by-case	basis	with	no	laid	
	 56	
down	 procedures.	 These	 loopholes	 in	 land	 negotiation	 result	 in	 poor	 or	 ambiguous	
contracts,	which	 fail	 to	 represent	 the	 interests	of	 local	 communities,	 and	permit	 their	
rights	to	be	flouted.	It	is	even	worse	when	these	interests	are	undocumented.		
iii. Community	 Participation	 -	 Participation	 enables	 land-owning	 groups,	 women	
and	 other	 stakeholders	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 land	 governance	 process	 through	
consensus	 building,	 freedom	 of	 expression,	 freedom	 of	 association	 and	 engagement	
with	civil	society	without	media	gagging	(FAO,	2007).	Since	it	may	be	extremely	complex	
to	engage	the	entire	community,	their	appointed	representatives	should	be	included	at	
all	 levels	 to	 take	 critical	 decisions	 on	 the	 use	 of	 communal	 land.	 It	 is	 viewed	 that,	
emerging	conflicts	from	LSLAs	are	usually	a	reflection	of	poor	community	engagement	in	
the	 land	 delivery	 process	 (Bugri,	 2013).	 Community	 participation	 can	 improve	
accountability;	 reduce	 social	 clashes,	 increase	 legitimacy,	 and	 foster	 confidence	 in	
customary	 land	 custodians.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 the	 study	 advocates	 for	 community	
dialogue,	 consultation,	participation,	benefit	 sharing	and	use	of	 land	 revenue	 to	meet	
critical	community	development	needs.	According	to	Amanor	(2006:	9),	the	existence	of	
chiefly	frameworks	as	trustees	of	customary	land:		
	
“establishes	a	process	of	community	participation	and	stakeholder	negotiation	
over	land	in	which	the	masses	of	cultivators,	women	and	youth	are	noticeably	
absent,	 and	 the	 community	 representatives	 are	 dominated	 by	 traditional	
authorities	 and	 the	 rural	 elite	 clientele	 of	 government	 development	 agencies	
and	NGOs”.		
In	 Ghana,	 the	 study	 identified	 limited	 community	 participation	 through	 village	 chiefs	
and	 with	 no	 opportunities	 for	 profit	 sharing	 or	 use	 of	 land	 revenue	 to	 address	 the	
numerous	community	challenges	facing	the	people.	The	study	observed	that	community	
members	in	all	four	study	communities	had	limited	knowledge	about	the	provisions	of	
the	 land	 contract,	 especially	 on	 drink	 or	 kola	 money,	 duration	 of	 lease,	 boundaries,	
rights	and	responsibilities	of	the	investors.	Community	participation	remains	limited	due	
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to	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunities	 for	 broad-base	 discussions	 such	 as	 community	meetings.	
Community	participation	in	the	negotiation	process	of	the	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	concession	
was	 deliberately	 limited	 to	 the	 Odikro’s	 and	 not	 the	 entire	 community.	 Community	
participation	 scored	 an	 average	of	D,	 implying	 that	 consultation	 remains	 an	 area	 that	
needs	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 for	 policy	 intervention.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 following	
quotations	during	the	household	interviews.		
As	one	farmer	(38	year	old	male)	in	Afrisire	put	it,	
	“their	 workers	 had	 a	 tent	 here,	 along	 the	 road.	 They	 were	 surveyors,	 and	
every	day,	they	went	into	the	bush	to	do	measurements	but	we	did	not	know	
what	they	were	doing”	(FGDs,	2012).			
According	to	another	farmer	(42	year	old	male)	in	Dukusen,		
	“we	woke	up	one	morning	and	saw	bulldozers	clearing	the	 land;	they	started	
from	where	we	cultivated	yam.	When	we	asked,	they	said	Nana	asked	them	to	
do	 it.	And	 if	Nana	owns	his	 land	and	gave	us	part	 to	 farm	and	now	he	asks	
someone	 to	 come	 and	 clear	 it,	what	 powers	 do	we	 have	 to	 stop	 them?	We	
later	heard	it	was	a	foreign	company	that	needed	the	land	to	grow	akaneadua	
[twi	translation	of	Jatropha	curcas].	That	is	all	we	know”	(FDGs,	2012).			
iv. Accountability	–	Since	chiefs	and	family	heads	hold	family	land	as	fiduciaries	and	
not	 as	 owners,	 they	 ought	 to	 account	 for	 their	 stewardship.	 According	 to	 the	 FAO	
(2007),	 accountability	 is	 the	 surest	 means	 for	 reducing	 bribery	 and	 corruption.	
Accountability	 and	 transparency	 are	 closely	 intertwined	 as	 they	 both	 emphasize	 the	
necessity	 for	 institutions	 to	 be	 open	 to	 their	 subjects	 (Schultz,	 2008)	 at	 all	 levels	 of	
stewardship.	 In	 the	 view	 of	 Arko-Adjei	 (2010),	 frequent	 interaction	 between	 trustees	
and	community	members,	frequent	feedbacks,	record	keeping	and	publicity	of	financial	
statements	are	important	to	measure	accountability	in	customary	tenure	institutions.	It	
is	 also	 believed	 that	 external	 independent	 bodies	 should	 periodically	 audit	 such	
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accounts	 so	 as	 to	 prevent	 squandering	 of	 income	 through	 corrupt	 and	 arbitrary	
spending.	The	lack	of	external	scrutiny	and	appropriate	legislations	allow	for	some	chiefs	
to	 exploit	 land	 price	 negotiations	 for	 personal	 enrichment.	 In	 the	 study	 areas,	
accountability	 for	 land	 revenue	 was	 totally	 missing	 in	 all	 respects.	 Though	 the	 study	
could	not	establish	concrete	evidences	of	corruption	and	financial	misappropriation,	 it	
can	point	to	the	secrecy	with	which	money	 is	discussed.	 In	the	view	of	Belden	(2010),	
such	secrecy	and	weak	 linkages	between	chiefs	and	their	people	 in	 the	negotiation	of	
land	 investment	 contracts	 may	 be	 signs	 of	 rent	 seeking.	 The	 average	 score	 of	
accountability	was	a	D	due	to	the	secrecy	with	which	money	is	discussed	with	virtually	
no	record	keeping.			
v. Rule	of	law	–	By	rule	of	law,	the	study	implies	the	impartial	enforcement	of	land	
regulations,	 clear	 contracts,	 opportunities	 to	 raise	 complaints	 about	 activities	 of	 large	
investors,	 and	 to	 seek	 redress	 for	 grievances	 against	 other	 land	 users	 (see	 details	 in	
Table	 2.7).	 Legal	 frameworks	 should	 be	 fair	 and	 enforced	 impartially,	 particularly	 the	
laws	 that	 protect	 minority	 or	 vulnerable	 groups.	 Impartial	 enforcement	 of	 all	 laws	
requires	 an	 independent	 and	unbiased	 judiciary	 and	an	 incorruptible	political	 body	 to	
oversee	 enforcement.	 The	 lack	 of	 willingness	 of	 power	 holders	 to	 enforce	 the	 law	
breeds	corruption	and	nepotism	(Zimmermann,	2006).	Bell	(2007)	attributes	bribery	and	
corruption	to	poor	remuneration.	The	study	identified	that	some	oral	agreements	were	
adopted	 to	 create	 beneficial	 opportunities	 for	 host	 communities	 and	 smallholders	
especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ITFC	 Ltd.	 There	 also	 exists	 a	 general	 consensus	 that	 land	
disputes	or	grievances	on	land	use,	should	be	directed	to	the	local	chief	for	resolution.	
Since	 land	 litigation	 in	Ghana	 could	 last	 15years	 in	 the	 Courts	 (see	 Cook.	 2005a),	 the	
requirement	 to	 use	 ADR	 strategies	 is	 commendable.	 Even	 though	 community	 chiefs	
emphasised	that	customary	rules	are	impartially	enforced,	there	is	no	documentation	of	
these	customs,	and	this	makes	 it	extremely	difficult	 to	assess	 the	efficacy.	Rule	of	 law	
obtained	C	as	its	average	score.		
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Table	2.7	LGAF	Indicators	and	how	they	apply	to	large	land	acquisition	
LGAF	Indicators	and	how	they	apply	to	Large	Land	Acquisition		 ScanFarm	Ltd	 ITFC	Ltd	
	 Dukusen	 Afrisire	 Gushie	 Tunayili	
Efficiency	and	Effectiveness	
§ Rules	and	procedures	of	land	acquisition	are	simplified	for	all	farmers	 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Duration	of	procedures	to	obtain	land	approval	are	not	laborious		 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Data	capture	on	new	acquisitions	and	vacant	parcels	are	up-to-date		 C	 C	 D	 D	
§ Customary	and	statutory	agencies	coordinate	in	all	functions		 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Community	agricultural	land	is	completely	or	largely	mapped	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Rights	are	registered	–	through	formal	or	semi-formal	procedures	 C	 C	 D	 D	
Transparency	
§ Land	negotiation	between	right	holders	and	investors	are	transparent		 D	 D	 C	 C	
§ Feedbacks	on	procurements	and	expenditure	of	land	revenue	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Unrestricted	public	accessibility	to	land	information	at	the	CLS	 C	 C	 ---	 ---	
§ Avoidance	of	arbitrariness	in	expending	land	revenue		 D	 D	 D	 D	
Community	Participation	
§ Dialogue	with	community	representatives	in	deciding	land	prices	 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Consultation	allows	active	participation	of	all	stakeholders		 D	 D	 C	 C	
§ There	exist	benefit	sharing	mechanisms	for	investments	in	agriculture	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Land	revenue	is	used	for	community	needs		 D	 D	 D	 D	
Accountability	
§ Declaration	of	total	expected	identified	and	realised	rent/	revenue	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Revenue	from	stool	land	accounts	are	published	annually	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Land	revenue	management	is	void	of	bribery	and	corruption		 ---	 ---	 ---	 ---	
§ Stool/family	land	accounts	are	independently	audited	periodically		 D	 D	 D	 D	
Rule	of	Law	
§ Customary	land	use	rules	and	regulations	are	impartially	enforced	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Clear	contracts	on	costs/benefits	sharing	by	investors	and	community	 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Free	access	to	the	court	to	redress	grievances	for	rights	abuse	 B	 B	 C	 C	
§ Opportunity	to	raise	complaints	on	land	acquisitions	to	authorities		 C	 C	 C	 C	
Sustainability	
§ Land	revenue	(rent)	is	adequate	to	finance	development	projects	 B	 B	 B	 B	
§ Cost	of	monitoring	land	use	is	sustainable/self-financing	 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Corporate	Social	Responsibilities	are	clearly	defined	and	documented	 C	 C	 A	 A	
Equity	and	Fairness	
§ Equal	access	to	land	information	for	all	groups	of	farmers	 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Fair	assessment	of	land	values	to	both	large	and	smallholder	farmers	 C	 C	 C	 C	
§ Availability	of	competent	and	unbiased	valuation	professionals		 D	 D	 D	 D	
§ Few	land	conflicts	generated	are	quickly	resolved	 		C	 		C	 		A	 		A	
§ Existence	of	equal	rights	of	all	persons	in	customary	or	statutory	courts	 		D	 		D	 		D	 		D	
Source:	Field	Data	(2013)	NB.	Dash	implies	lack	of	information	or	non-applicable		
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vi. Sustainability	 –	 Sustainability	 implies	 balancing	 the	 economic,	 social,	 and	
environmental	needs	of	both	 the	present	and	 future	generations	 (FAO,	2007:9).	Curry	
(2001)	 conceptualizes	 sustainability	 as	 intergenerational	 equity.	 It	 requires	 the	
spreading	of	returns	to	land	beyond	the	current	generation	to	cater	for	the	needs	of	the	
future	 generation.	 By	 extension,	 sustainability	 should	 imply	 spending	 land	 revenue	 to	
finance	development	projects	that	meet	the	needs	of	the	people	across	generations.	It	
also	 involves	monitoring	 land	use	to	ensure	that	 investors	are	using	 it	 in	a	sustainable	
manner.	It	is	emphasized	that	Corporate	Social	Responsibilities	(CSRs)	should	be	clearly	
defined	 and	 enforced	 to	 the	 core.	 In	 the	 ITFC	 project,	 proposed	 CSRs	 are	
undocumented,	though	these	were	orally	agreed	upon	among	the	stakeholders.			
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 reported	 some	CSRs	 activities	 around	 their	 project	 area.	However,	
these	 CSRs	 are	 vaguely	 documented	 in	 the	 land	 leases	 and	 not	 enforced	 by	 the	
authorities.	They	also	differ	significantly	from	the	actual	needs	or	expectations	of	host	
communities.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	 people	 of	 Dukusen	 around	 the	 ScanFarm	
concession	desired	water	urgently,	the	Company	was	investing	in	waste	disposal	bins	as	
part	 of	 their	 sanitation	 drive.	 The	 chiefs,	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 or	 even	 the	 local	
government	authorities	do	not	monitor	and	enforce	agricultural	land	use	preferences	in	
the	 studied	 communities.	 Even	 when	 opportunities	 exist	 for	 local	 communities	 to	
benefit	from	investments,	they	are	usually	neither	clearly	documented	in	the	contracts	
nor	enforced	by	community	leaders.	In	the	case	of	ScanFarm	Ltd,	an	assessment	of	the	
performance	of	the	investor	can	only	be	reviewed	after	the	first	25years	of	operations	
as	indicated	in	the	drafted	lease	agreement.	In	the	case	of	ITFC	Ltd,	there	is	no	window	
for	investment	review.			
vii. Equity	and	Fairness	-	Curry	(2001)	describes	equity	as	the	distribution	of	rights	
fairly	 and	 across	 the	 contemporary	 population.	 This	 ensures	 that	 all	 members	 of	 an	
identifiable	group	are	represented	and	not	excluded	from	the	group’s	activities.	In	this	
regard,	 all	 members	 of	 the	 entity	 are	 equal	 and	 are	 active	 stakeholders.	 They	 are	
offered	 opportunities	 to	 improve	 or	 maintain	 their	 wellbeing	 as	 individuals	 or	 as	 a	
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group.	 Similarly,	 both	 indigenes	 and	 migrants	 have	 equal	 stake	 in	 community	 affairs	
especially	 on	 issues	 that	 affect	 both	 groups.	 In	 the	 view	 of	 Kaufmann	 et	 al.	 (2007),	
equity	 implies	 all	 people	 should	have	equal	possibilities	 to	 access	 the	 same	quality	of	
service.	 Customary	 tenure	 institutions	 are	expected	 to	deal	 fairly	 and	 impartially	with	
large	 investors,	 indigenes	and	migrant	 farmers	by	providing	non-discriminatory	access	
to	 land,	 information	and	 justice	(Arko-Adjei	et	al.,	2010).	 In	addition	to	this,	 this	study	
anticipated	 land	 rent	 to	 be	 fair	 among	 farmers	 and	 that	 equal	 rights	 exist	 before	 the	
customary	courts.	In	the	assessment,	it	was	established	that	land	rents	were	arbitrarily	
fixed,	and	social	capital	informed	the	rent	one	paid.	Equity	and	fairness	was	scored	a	C	
on	 the	 average,	 representing	 a	 fairly	 performing	 indicator	 in	 a	 range	 of	 50	 and	 70	
percent.			
2.6	Conclusions	
Institutions	 remain	 essential	 in	 land	 transactions.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 study	 examined	
how	 institutional	 changes	 have	 impacted	 agricultural	 land	 markets	 in	 allocating	 land	
resources	 between	 large	 and	 smallholder	 farmers;	 and	 how	 customary	 land	 tenure	
systems	and	institutions	are	faring	amidst	the	growing	demand	for	land	for	commercial	
agriculture	 in	 Ghana.	 The	 study	 contributes	 to	 the	 literature	 of	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	 by	 setting	 out	 the	 institutional	 basis	 of	 land	 transactions,	 changes	 in	
institutions,	 and	 in	 revealing	 how	 the	 land	 governance	 systems	 have	 performed.	 The	
study	 designed	 governance	 indicators	 as	 the	 bases	 for	 land	 governance	 assessments.	
Though	these	indicators	are	unique	to	the	study	in	Ghana,	they	can	be	applied	to	similar	
studies	in	other	countries	where	customary	land	markets	dominate.			
Using	a	survey	of	various	land	sector	agencies	and	key	stakeholder	interviews,	the	study	
found	 that	 statutory	 agencies	 since	 2008	 have	 been	 consolidated	 into	 the	 Lands	
Commission,	 while	 the	 customary	 institutions	 are	 organised	 into	 customary	 land	
secretariats	and	 traditional	 councils.	At	 the	customary	 level,	 stools/skins	and	heads	of	
families,	clans	and	lineages	continue	to	lead	in	all	land	transactions	in	Ghana.	Customary	
custodians	maintain	the	position	that	customary	land	is	unsellable	but	may	be	granted	
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as	akyedie	 (gift)	 for	which	drink	money	 is	paid.	Even	though	both	 formal	and	 informal	
land	 institutions	 continue	 to	 play	 relevant	 roles	 in	 promoting	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	in	Ghana,	there	remains	limited	collaboration	between	these	institutions	in	
the	 execution	 of	 their	 respective	 duties.	 The	 government	 of	 Ghana	 continues	 to	
promote	 LSLAs	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 while	 local	 chiefs	 coordinate	 the	 actual	
transactions.	 Indeed,	 institutional	 linkages	 between	 the	 customary	 sector	 and	 the	
statutory	 agencies	 are	 weak,	 and	 do	 not	 promote	 broader	 participation	 of	 local	
communities	in	the	process	of	large	land	transactions.	Over	the	last	decade,	there	have	
been	 marginal	 adjustments	 to	 the	 customary	 rules,	 norms,	 and	 enforcement	 that	
appear	to	project	chiefs	as	landowners	in	many	instances	and	not	just	custodians.	It	was	
also	observed	 that	 customary	 land	 institutions	 and	processes	of	 land	acquisition	have	
changed	 from	 oral-gratuitous	 grants	 to	 monetised-semi-formalised	 transactions.	
Existing	 customs	 and	 legislations	 remain	 silent	 on	 transparency,	 equity	 and	
accountability	 for	 returns	 to	 land	 transactions.	 Failures	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 undermine	
opportunities	 to	 address	 grievances	 and	 may	 result	 in	 community	 upheavals.	 The	
efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 customary	 land	 institutions	 have	 been	 constrained	 by	
government’s	unwillingness	to	directly	interfere	with	land	transactions.			
Agro-investors	 in	 Ghana	 have	 targeted	 areas	 that	 present	 minimal	 negotiation	
challenges.	They	have	so	far	operated	on	stools/skin	lands	because	of	the	magnitude	of	
land	required,	and	immunity	by	chiefs.	Recent,	government	advocacy	and	promotion	of	
agricultural	 investments	 in	Ghana	through	 land	banks,	has	tilted	the	allocation	of	 land	
towards	 resourceful	 investors	 rather	 than	 smallholders.	 Gradually,	 a	 market	 driven	
dispossession	 and	 re-allocation	 is	 emerging	 due	 to	 the	 high	 demand	 for	 land.	
Documented	 difficulties	 with	 compensation	 further	 reveal	 the	 extremely	 vulnerable	
position	 of	 smallholder	 farmers	 in	 Ghana,	 in	 the	 use	 of	 customary	 land	without	 title.	
Following	 this,	 there	 is	 the	 need	 to	 promote	 collaboration	 between	 statutory	 and	
customary	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	 better	 manage	 the	 pressures	 of	 large-land	
acquisitions.	At	the	local	level,	there	is	the	need	to	further	improve	upon	the	capacities	
of	customary	land	institutions	to	handle	large	land	transactions	in	rural	areas.		
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Chapter	Three :	Land	Rental	Approaches	and	Transaction	Costs		
3.1	Introduction	
In	Ghana,	over	70	percent	of	all	 farmers	are	operating	on	 informal	 land	 leases	–	 fixed	
rentals	and	sharecropping	due	to	huge	capital	requirements	in	purchasing	land	(Delville,	
et	al.,	2001;	Amanor,	2008).	On	the	other	hand,	the	absence	of	a	vibrant	credit	market	
especially	for	agriculture,	and	high	transaction	costs	involved	in	accessing	loans	in	rural	
areas	of	Ghana,	put	most	smallholders	away	from	land	purchases.	Since	a	major	part	of	
the	 land	 holding	 is	 already	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 informal	 sector,	 the	 customary	 land	
market	remains	the	biggest	outlet	through	which	farm	plots	are	procured	in	the	form	of	
gifts,	 fixed	 cash	 or	 kind	 rentals,	 or	 sharecropping.	Within	 these	 customary	 structures,	
land	 transactions	 have	 tended	 to	 operate	 in	 a	 closed-circle	 of	 friends	 and	 extended	
family	systems,	and	relying	extensively	on	trust,	relationship	and	social	connections.		
	
Though	several	evidences	of	cash	transactions	exist	in	the	cocoa	and	oil	palm	producing	
areas	 of	 the	 wet	 forest	 regions	 of	 West	 Africa,	 many	 of	 the	 land	 transactions	
documented	 are	 based	 on	 various	 informal	 oral-leasing	 systems	 (see	 Amanor,	 1994;	
Migot-Adholla	et	al.,	1994;	Quisumbing	et	al.,	2001).	Following	the	recent	re-emergence	
of	large-scale	land	acquisition	in	Ghana	within	the	customary	landholding	threshold,	the	
Ghanaian	 agricultural	 land	 market	 is	 increasingly	 monetized.	 According	 to	 Bohannan	
and	Dalton	 (1962),	when	money	 is	 introduced	and	accepted	as	a	universal	medium	of	
exchange,	 it	 will	 naturally	 dissolve	 traditionally	 instituted	 barriers	 existing	 between	
different	categories	of	goods	and	services	and	their	legitimate	modes	of	exchange.	This	
is	the	fate	customary	land	tenure	is	prone	to	following	growing	commercial	demand	for	
rural	 agricultural	 land	 in	Ghana.	 Additionally,	monetisation	 is	 creeping	 into	most	 land	
transactions	 due	 to	 population	 growth	 and	 growing	 governmental	 incentives	 for	
agricultural	development.	
	
Since	 the	 last	 decade,	 various	 investors	 are	 acquiring	 large	 tracts	 of	 land	 for	 agro-
investment	in	regions	that	were	hitherto	dominated	by	smallholders	and	medium-sized	
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farmers.	 The	 emerging	 trends	 and	 magnitude	 of	 these	 cash-based	 land	 transactions	
have	 raised	 pertinent	 concerns	 about	 the	 current	 and	 future	 implications	 for	
smallholders.	 Since	 these	 new	 acquisitions	 are	 fast	 transforming	 informal	 agricultural	
land	markets	into	monetised	and	semi-formalised	land	markets,	it	has	certainly	resulted	
in	the	changes	in	modes	of	land	transactions	in	host	communities	in	various	dimensions.	
In	this	chapter,	the	study	sought	to	understand	land	rental	approaches	and	transaction	
costs	 in	 Ghana,	 and	 the	 complications	 of	 land	 price	 formation	 within	 the	 customary	
tenure	system.		
	
Since	the	last	two	decades,	many	farmers	in	West	Africa	entered	into	private	and	largely	
undocumented	rental	or	sharecropping	arrangements	so	as	to	be	able	to	participate	in	
high-value	 agriculture	 especially	 in	 cocoa	 and	 oil	 palm.	 In	 recent	 times,	 population	
growth	 coupled	 with	 the	 near	 non-existence	 of	 a	 vibrant	 off-farm	 economy	 in	 rural	
areas	 rather	 resulted	 in	 more	 and	 more	 widespread	 land	 rentals,	 driving	 towards	
individualisation	 and	 formalisation	 of	 tenures	 (see	 Deininger	 and	 Mpuga,	 2003).	 As	
population	 increases	 and	 the	 competition	 for	 scarce	 land	 become	more	 pronounced,	
land	 markets	 become	 prevalent	 (see	 Boserup,	 1965).	 Other	 reasons	 why	 land	
marketization	 has	 become	 widespread	 in	 West	 Africa	 is	 the	 attribution	 to	 poorly	
managed	 farms	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 agricultural	 capacities,	 aging	 farmers,	 increasing	
apathy	 of	 the	 youth	 towards	 agriculture	 and	 absentee	 landowners	 (Atwood	 1990;	
Bruce,	1993;	Brycenson,	2002).		
	
In	 Ghana,	 the	 growth	 in	 cocoa,	 rubber	 and	 oil	 palm	 production	 frontiers	 in	 the	 early	
1950s	compelled	land	tenure	to	evolve	from	communal	or	family	control	at	the	village	
level	to	more	individualised	ownership	(see	Amanor,	2006).	These	trends,	though	more	
pronounced	 in	the	middle	belts	of	 the	Ashanti	and	Brong	Ahafo	regions	of	Ghana,	are	
also	 widespread	 in	 the	 eastern	 and	western	 corridors	 of	 the	 country.	 Benneh	 (1989)	
revealed	 that	wealthy	 investors	were	 the	main	drivers	 of	 these	 changes	 from	 the	old	
customary	order	since	they	procured	large	bundles	of	land	from	community	land	stocks	
for	 their	 exclusive	 private	 use.	 Benneh	 (ibid)	 added	 that	 such	 investors	 moved	 into	
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vacant	unallocated	communal	land	or	procured	land	use	rights	from	the	communal	land	
stock.	 Even	 though	 some	 of	 these	 land	 acquirers	may	 not	 directly	 be	 participating	 in	
production,	 they	 may	 rent-out	 these	 lands	 to	 smaller	 holders	 or	 engage	 caretaker	
farmers	 as	 sharecroppers	 or	 as	 paid	 labourers.	 Following	 this	 background,	 the	
customary	conception	of	land	belonging	to	the	entire	community/social	group	and	not	
to	 individuals	 in	 Africa	 must	 always	 be	 posited	 carefully	 in	 the	 context	 of	 specific	
communities	where	the	land	markets	remain	largely	underdeveloped	or	un-monetised.		
3.2	Land	rental	approaches	and	transaction	costs	
A	 previous	 study	 by	 Abdulai	 et	 al.	 (2008:5)	 identified	 four	main	 types	 of	 land	 tenure	
arrangements	 in	the	middle	belt	of	Ghana	–	“owner-operated	with	full	property	rights,	
owner-operated	with	restricted	property	rights,	fixed-rent	and	sharecropping	contracts”.	
Owner-operated	parcels	with	full	rights	in	this	sense	refers	to	customary	usufructs	who	
have	use,	management	and	alienation	rights	including	the	rights	to	sell,	rent,	sharecrop	
or	 offer	 seasonal	 licenses	 to	 other	 land	 users.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 family	 land,	 prior	 family	
approval	 is	 required.	 Owner-operated	 with	 restricted	 rights	 refer	 to	 lands	 acquired	
through	express	grants	but	on	fee-life	terms	(limited	to	the	lifetime	of	a	grantee)	which	
cannot	 be	 inherited	 or	 alienated.	 A	 fixed-rent	 agreement	 implies	 a	 contractual	
arrangement	such	as	leaseholds	between	landlords	and	their	tenants	involving	a	parcel	
of	land	for	a	definite	period	of	time	and	at	periodic	rent	either	in	cash	or	in	kind.			
Sharecropping	 are	 farmland	 contract	 arrangements	between	 landlords	 and	 tenants	 to	
cultivate	 farmland	by	contributing	various	proportions	of	 inputs	 including	 land;	and	to	
share	 proceeds	 in	 halves	 or	 one-third	 to	 two-third	 proportions,	 depending	 on	 their	
individual	 amounts	 of	 input	 contributions	 (see	 Abdulai	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 In	 the	 view	 of	
Vranken	(2012),	sharecropping	is	 important	 in	smallholder	 land	acquisition	as	a	means	
to	circumvent	land	market	imperfections	by	reducing	risks,	resolving	liquidity	problems	
and	providing	non-tradable	 inputs.	According	to	Jacoby	and	Mansuri	 (2008),	 fixed-rent	
contracts	may	 end	 up	 with	 tenants	 with	 sufficiently	 high	 wealth	 and	 who	 are	 in	 the	
position	 to	 offer	 rent	 in	 advance,	 while	 tenants	 with	 wealth	 constraints	 will	 take	 up	
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sharecropping	 contracts.	 This	 is	 usually	 the	 case	 because	 of	 the	 somewhat	 huge	
transaction	 costs	 either	 emanating	 from	 existing	 customs	 or	 enshrined	 in	 national	
legislations,	or	both.			
Vranken	 (2012)	 has	 conceded	 that	 rural	 land	 markets	 in	 transition	 countries	 remain	
characterized	 by	 huge	 transaction	 costs	 and	 hence,	 constrict	 access	 to	 land	 by	 rural	
households	willing	to	start	up	or	enlarge	existing	farms.	She	 listed	transaction	costs	to	
include	 information	 costs,	 registration	 costs,	 negotiation	 costs,	 cost	 of	 contract	
enforcement,	withdrawal	costs	and	other	administrative	costs.	Hence,	transaction	costs	
remain	 a	 major	 impediment	 of	 land	 marketization	 everywhere,	 especially	 for	 poor	
households	who	 do	 not	 have	 the	 financial	muscle	 to	 compete	with	more	 resourceful	
households.	 Poor	 households	 continue	 to	 battle	 with	 inefficient	 credit	 and	 insurance	
markets	in	most	parts	of	rural	Africa.	Coase	defines	transaction	cost	as	the	“cost	of	using	
the	price	mechanism”	(Coase,	1988:38)	such	as	discovering	prices,	negotiating,	closing	a	
contract;	and	enforcing	it.	In	the	view	of	Benham	and	Benham	(1998),	transaction	cost	is	
the	 cost	 of	 exchange	 or	 the	 opportunity	 cost	 of	 individuals	 to	 acquire	 a	 commodity.	
According	 to	Allen	 (1999),	 transaction	 costs	 in	 relation	 to	 property	 rights	 refer	 to	 the	
costs	of	establishing,	transferring	and	enforcing	property	rights.			
Land	rental	approaches	and	transaction	costs	are	therefore	 interconnected.	So	 long	as	
property	rights	need	to	be	acquired,	secured	and	maintained	within	existing	information	
asymmetries,	there	is	always	a	transaction	cost	to	property	ownership	(Cheung,	1992).	If	
property	 rights	were	 to	 be	 secured,	 the	 transaction	 costs	will	 be	 zero	 (Allen,	 1999:7;	
Cheung,	 1992).	 Thompson	 (1999)	 in	 his	 institutional	 transaction	 cost	model	 explained	
transaction	costs	to	include	enactment	costs	as	well	as	implementation,	monitoring	and	
enforcement	 costs	 as	 part	 of	 transaction	 costs.	 McCann	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 extended	
Thompson’s	 (1999)	 model	 to	 include	 initial	 information	 costs	 and	 contracting	 costs.	
McCann	and	Easter	(2004)	further	added	that	social	norms	and	social	capital	also	affect	
transaction	costs	of	informal	markets	and	the	implementation	of	formal	markets.		
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North	 (1990)	 puts	 transaction	 cost	 under	 three	 (3)	 categories;	 contact,	 contract	 and	
control	 relating	 to	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 valued	 characteristics	 of	 a	 good	 (North,	
1997).	 Contact	 relates	 to	 costs	 of	 accessing	 information;	 contract	 relates	 to	 costs	 of	
engaging	legal	or	expert	services;	while	control	relates	to	costs	of	enforcing	contracts.	In	
previous	 studies,	 de	 Soto	 (1989)	 documented	 transaction	 cost	 of	 doing	 business	
formally	 in	 Peru	 to	 include	 the	 cost	 of	 legal	 requirements	 and	 informal	 costs	 such	 as	
bribing	public	officials,	resources	spent	waiting	and	cost	of	cutting	down	on	red	tapes	in	
getting	 business	 permits	 (cited	 in	 Wang,	 2003).	 Though	 transaction	 costs	 remain	
fundamental	for	the	rural	poor	in	land	allocation,	with	increasing	population	growth	and	
accompanying	 increase	 in	 the	 demand	 for	 land,	 transaction	 costs	 are	 expected	 to	
reduce	drastically.		
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	transaction	cost	 included	both	the	formal	and	 informal	
costs	 incidental	 to	 inspection,	 searching,	 contacting,	 negotiating,	 contracting	 and	
enforcing	 transactions	 from	the	perspectives	of	both	 large-investors	and	smallholders.	
Enforcement	 costs	 incidental	 to	 real	 property	 rights	 included	 the	 cost	 of	 protecting	
property	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 land	 guards	 (use	 of	 illegal	 armed	 men	 to	 protect	 land),	
fencing,	frequent	clearance	of	land	boundaries	or	the	costs	of	securing	court	orders	and	
dispute	 resolution.	 All	 things	 being	 equal,	 these	 costs	 are	 eventually	 reflected	 in	 the	
pricing	of	land.	Also,	the	cost	of	securing	and	enforcing	tenure	security	for	the	beneficial	
enjoyment	of	property	subsequently	become	pre-determinants	of	land	prices.		
3.3	Description	presentation	of	data		
The	study	was	undertaken	 in	the	Northern	and	Ashanti	Regions	of	Ghana	and	centred	
around	 two	 large	 agro-investment	 companies	 operating	 in	 these	 areas.	 Recall	 data	
technique	was	used	to	capture	 land	prices	 for	 the	2005	base	year	and	the	2012	study	
year.	 Subsistence	agriculture	 remains	a	major	 characteristic	of	 the	 farming	 systems	 in	
these	 communities	 especially	 in	 the	 Northern	 region.	 The	 region	 has	 a	 single	 rainy	
season	with	farmers	farming	averagely	5	hectares	even	though	most	households	in	this	
locality	hold	user	rights	over	very	large	tracts	of	land.	The	temperature,	soil	and	rainfall	
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pattern	 in	 these	 areas	 are	 favourable	 for	mango	 plantations.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
Ashanti	region	benefits	from	bi-annual	rainfall,	allowing	for	all	year	farming.	Production	
in	 this	area	 is	highly	commercial	 though	a	majority	of	 farmers	 retain	 large	portions	of	
their	produce	for	household	consumption.				
The	sample,	which	was	randomly	drawn,	represents	smallholder	households	producing	
a	variety	of	crops	such	as	yam,	maize,	sorghum,	millet,	beans,	cassava,	and	groundnut	in	
the	study	areas.	Male	household	heads	representing	93percent	of	respondents,	with	a	
very	high	 illiteracy	rate	of	73percent	dominated	the	rural	agricultural	households.	This	
figure	is	not	significantly	different	from	the	national	figure	of	72percent	as	reported	by	
UNICEF	 (2013).	 The	 people	 depend	 on	 farming	 as	 a	 major	 source	 of	 livelihood,	 with	
limited	options	 for	non-farm	employment.	The	average	household	 size	was	10	people	
due	 to	 the	 highly	 polygamous	 nature	 of	 rural	 communities	 and	 the	 extended	 family	
systems.	 Sale	 of	 farm	 produce	 and	 the	 renting-out	 of	 labour	 to	 both	 neighbours	 and	
large	agro-investment	companies	provide	the	main	source	of	wage-based	employment	
for	 the	 local	 populace.	 In	 the	 Savelugu-Nanton	 area	 where	 ITFC	 Ltd	 is	 located,	 it	 is	
characteristic	for	most	young	people	to	migrate	to	the	Metropolitan	capital	(Tamale)	or	
to	 other	 urban	 centres	 in	 the	 long	 dry	 season	 for	 menial	 non-farm	 jobs.	 Seasonal	
migration	is	very	relevant	in	influencing	agricultural	land	use	decisions	in	rural	Ghana.		
	
Due	 to	 the	 non-existence	 of	 financial	 organizations	 in	 these	 rural	 communities,	 only	
6percent	 of	 the	 households	 have	 reported	 to	 apply	 for	 credits	 and	 only	 4percent	
obtained	agricultural	loans	in	the	last	decade.	Some	of	the	reasons	underlying	this	trend	
are	the	high	interest	rates	charged,	the	lengthy	nature	of	loan	access,	the	tedious	paper	
work	involved,	the	risk	of	non-payment	due	to	poor	harvest	and	the	delays	in	obtaining	
these	credits,	when	the	farming	season	is	over.	Some	22	household	heads	reported	they	
were	uninterested	in	 loan	facilities,	and	never	applied	for	 it.	Figure	3.1	shows	some	of	
the	 reasons	 that	 underscore	 the	 low-level	 use	 of	 agricultural	 credits	 in	 the	 selected	
study	communities.	The	absence	of	land	certification	in	the	study	areas	further	explains	
why	access	to	agricultural	credits	from	micro-finance	companies	is	complicated.	Titles	to	
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land	 and	 landed	 properties	 are	 often	 preferred	 as	 collateral	 for	 formal	 agricultural	
credits	in	developing	countries	due	to	the	risk	levels	associated	with	rain-fed	agriculture.	
Farmers	with	larger	amount	of	formally	owned	land	have	lower	costs	of	borrowing	from	
formal	credit	markets	(Chavas	(2001)	as	cited	in	Deininger	et	al.,	2011).	The	absence	of	
well-coordinated	 farmer	 cooperatives	 in	 most	 rural	 communities	 of	 Ghana	 further	
makes	it	even	near	impossible	to	access	cooperative	credits.	In	terms	of	infrastructural	
endowment,	Gushie	around	the	ITFC	Ltd	project	is	more	developed	than	the	other	study	
communities.			
	
Figure	3:1	Reasons	accounting	for	the	low	level	credit	use	in	the	study	communities	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
In	2005,	average	land	rent	reported	for	the	Agogo	area	where	ScanFarm	Ltd	is	 located	
was	Gh¢	30	per	acre	(Gh¢	74	per	hectare)	and	this	 increased	to	an	average	of	Gh¢	78	
per	acre	(193	per	hectare)	in	2012	in	nominal	terms.	When	adjusted	for	inflation	using	
the	CPI	table	in	Appendix	6,	average	land	rents	increased	by	only	Gh¢	5.58	per	hectare,	
from	Gh¢	74.12	 to	Gh¢	79.7.	Average	 land	holding	 for	all	 four	 communities	 increased	
marginally	from	20	acres	(8	hectares)	per	household	in	2005	to	21	acres	in	2012	among	
the	 respondents.	 In	 terms	 of	 employment,	 66percent	 of	 the	 studied	 households	
reported	 participating	 in	 employment	 opportunities	 offered	 by	 large	 agro-investors.	
Other	 identified	 benefits	 from	 large	 investments	 in	 operational	 communities	 included	
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the	 provision	 of	 social	 services	 and	 infrastructure.	 A	 summary	 of	 other	 relevant	
variables	from	the	household	data	is	displayed	in	Table	3.1.			
Table	3.1	Descriptive	summary	of	variables	used	in	analysis	
Variable	 Definitions	 Means	 SDb	
Household	Characteristics	
Age	 Age	of	household	head	(years)	 		45.77	 12.72	
Age	Squared	 The	square	of	the	age	of	household	head	(years)	 22260.5
6	
1324.1
3	
Gender	 Gender	of	household	head	(1=Male,	0=Female)	 0.84	 0.37	
Formal	Education	 Literacy	of	household	head	(1,0)	 0.26	 0.44	
Household	Size	 Total	number	of	household	members		 	9.21	 6.78	
Asset	Value	 Total	value	of	household	agro-assets	in	(Gh¢	cedi	a	)	 771.43	 1558.7
1	
DistressExp	 Experience	of	distress	in	the	last	decade	(1,	0)	 0.69	 0.47	
Land	Characteristics	
Plot	Size	 Total	household	landholding	in	2012	(acres)	 21.16	 35.15	
Interest	 Nature	of	household	land	interest		 4.81	 2.12	
Distance	to	Road	 Distance	of	house	to	motorable	road	(km)	 4.04	 2.59	
Distance	to	
Market	
Distance	to	output	and	input	markets	(km)	 3.22	 2.09	
Credit	Access	 Household	access	to	agro-credits	(1,0)	 0.04	 0.19	
Household	Labour	 Total	Household	members	working	on	the	farm	 3.84	 2.75	
Tenure	Security	 Security	of	tenure	on	the	household	landholding	(1,0)	 0.90	 0.30	
Slope	 Relief	of	household	land	in	the	study	community	(1,0)	 0.49	 0.50	
Land	Conflict	 Experienced	land	conflict	in	the	last	decade	(1,0)	 0.06	 0.24	
Proximity	
Irrigation	
Location	close	to	water	body	or	irrigation	scheme	 0.18	 0.38	
Proximity	to	Road	 Farmland	location	close	to	motorable	road	(1,0)	 0.54	 0.69	
Soil	Texture	 Texture	of	soil	on	farm	(black	or	otherwise	1,0)	 0.86	 0.35	
Soil	Fertility	 Soil	fertility	on	farmed	parcel	(fertile,	not	fertile	1,0)	 0.95	 0.22	
Erosion	 Level	of	erosion	on	parcel	(eroded,	not	eroded	1,0)	 0.39	 0.49	
Institutional	Factors	(Transaction	Costs)	
Travel	Cost	 Cost	of	travel	to	landlords	when	acquiring	land	(Gh	¢)	 5.91	 13.15	
Parcel	Protection	 Measures	taken	to	protect	parcel	(1,	0)	 0.03	 0.18	
Land	Secretariat	 Existence	of	land	institution	in	the	District	(1,	0)	 	 	
Village	Dummies		
Village																							Gushie	(1),	Tunayili	(2),	Dukusen	(3),	Afrisire		(4)																				2.34														1.11	
Gh¢	1.9214	is	equivalent	to	US$	1	as	of	1st	April,	2013	during	field	work		
b	SD	is	Standard	Deviation	
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Figure	3.2	displays	responses	on	expectations	of	host	communities	on	large-scale	agro-
investment	 companies	 in	 their	 areas.	 From	 these	 multiple	 responses,	 employment	
opportunities	come	out	prominently.	Over	140	of	the	respondents	were	expectant	that	
the	 operations	 of	 agro-investment	 companies	 would	 offer	 jobs	 to	 a	 majority	 of	 the	
people	 in	 these	 areas	 especially	 for	 the	 youth	 and	 women.	 Indeed	 employment	 was	
used	as	 an	 anchor	 to	promote	 the	 siting	of	 these	 companies	 in	 these	 areas.	 This	was	
followed	by	expectations	on	the	provision	of	social	amenities	and	services	in	the	form	of	
potable	 water	 supply,	 health	 facilities,	 school	 buildings,	 health	 insurance,	 and	
scholarships	among	others.	Also,	due	to	the	rural	nature	of	these	communities,	some	of	
the	respondents	expected	major	infrastructural	developments	in	the	form	of	improved	
roads	and	the	setting	up	of	agro-industries.	Even	though	at	a	low	level,	there	were	also	
expectations	 that	 the	 operations	 of	 large	 agro-companies	 would	 facilitate	 access	 to	
fertilizer,	improved	seeds,	access	to	markets,	irrigation	and	agricultural	loans.	About	20	
of	the	respondents	were	not	expectant	of	any	benefits.		
	
	
Figure	3:2	Community	expectations	from	Agro-investment	Companies	in	Ghana	
Source:	Field	survey,	2013	
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Figure	 3.3	 displays	 the	 actual	 benefits	 households	 reported	 in	 connection	 with	 large	
agro-companies	 in	Ghana	 in	 line	with	the	expectations	 in	Figure	3.2.	Employment	was	
reported	 as	 the	 most	 met	 among	 the	 expectations	 from	 agro-investment	 projects.	
Though	 some	 households	 had	 family	members	 already	 unengaged	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
study,	they	reported	being	offered	jobs	in	the	past.	This	was	followed	closely	by	social	
services	which	were	provided	in	some	of	the	host	communities	especially	water,	health	
screening,	 waste	 disposal	 bins,	 scholarships,	 school	 buildings	 and	 remuneration	 of	
teachers	 in	 these	 deprived	 schools.	 The	 setting	 up	 of	 the	mango	 processing	 plant	 in	
Gushie	by	 ITFC	Ltd	and	the	maize	drier	at	Dukusen	by	ScanFarm	Ltd	were	reported	as	
some	of	the	interventions	in	agro-industry.	Some	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	
these	expectations	were	not	met	because	they	did	not	directly	benefit,	and	also	because	
the	 level	 of	 opportunities	 highlighted	 by	 the	 chiefs	was	 far	 below	 their	 expectations.	
Other	 expectations,	 which	 were	 met	 marginally,	 included	 improved	 roads,	 fertilizer	
access,	irrigation,	loans	especially	to	outgrower	farmers	and	markets.		
	
	
Figure	3:3	Met	expectations	from	large-scale	agro-investments	in	study	communities	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
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3.4	Analysis	and	Findings	
3.4.1	Land	rental	approaches			
Customary	 land	 transactions	 in	Ghana	 are	 often	 regulated	 by	 the	nemo	dat	 rule.	 The	
nemo	 dat	 rule	 is	 captured	 in	 the	 Latin	 phrase	 -	 Nemo	 dat	 quod	 non	 habet,	 literally	
meaning	no	one	gives	what	he	does	not	have.	This	phrase	is	used	to	communicate	the	
capacity	of	a	person	to	make	a	valid	grant	of	customary	land.	This	would	usually	depend	
on	the	nature	of	interest	the	person	has	in	the	land	in	question.	As	discussed	earlier	in	
section	1.6,	five	main	forms	of	customary	rights	exist	in	Ghana	i.e.	the	allodial	interest,	
the	freehold/usufructuary	interest,	leasehold,	sharecropping,	and	customary	licenses21.		
From	Figure	3.4,	we	sought	to	examine	the	forms	of	interests	being	held	by	smallholder	
farmers	as	basis	to	understand	what	forms	of	land	rental	approaches	they	adopt	in	the	
study	communities.	Out	of	the	175	respondents,	105	of	them	reported	holding	usufruct	
rights.	These	were	largely	households	whose	natal	homes	are	in	these	communities,	and	
hence	 entitling	 them	 to	 some	 share	 of	 the	 community’s	 customary	 land.	 Also,	 some	
migrant	 households	 who	 were	 among	 the	 foundation	 layers	 of	 settler	 communities	
enjoyed	usufruct/freeholder	rights.			
Leaseholds	were	reported	by	29	of	the	studied	households.	Leaseholds	usually	take	the	
form	 of	 cash	 and	 kind	 based	 leases.	 They	may	 also	 be	 allocated	 for	 rental	 payments	
seasonally	or	annually	depending	on	the	agreements	between	the	grantor	and	grantees.	
Sharecropping	 was	 used	 by	 21	 of	 the	 households	 to	 access	 agricultural	 lands.	
Sharecropping	may	be	seen	as	a	form	of	land	leasing	where	the	produce	of	the	farm	or	
the	farm	itself	is	shared	between	the	farmer	and	his/her	landlord	in	various	proportions	
as	 may	 be	 agreed	 between	 them.	 Some	 farmers	 were	 also	 found	 to	 be	 operating	
customary	licences	in	the	study	areas.	Licences	may	be	limited	to	the	right	to	use	land	
for	just	a	season,	after	which	the	land	reverts	to	the	owner	automatically.		
	
																																																								
21	Detailed	discussions	of	these	forms	of	interests	in	customary	land	in	Ghana	are	in	section	1.6.	
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Usually,	 customary	 freeholders/usufructuary	 holders	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 create	
leaseholds,	sharecropping	contract	and	licences	out	of	their	parcels	of	land	without	the	
prior	 permission	 of	 the	 chief	 who	 may	 be	 entrusted	 with	 the	 allodial	 interest.	
Leaseholders	may	also	be	able	to	sharecrop	portion	or	whole	of	rented	farms	or	grant	
seasonal	 farming	 licences	with	permission	 from	the	allodial	or	usufruct	 landlord.	Even	
though	 it	 is	 not	 common	 for	 sharecroppers	 to	 make	 grants	 of	 lands,	 it	 is	 possible	
according	to	local	customs	to	grant	seasonal	licenses	to	new	settlers.	Seasonal	licenses	
are	the	least	interest	that	can	be	held	in	land.	They	are	also	largely	associated	with	high-
level	tenure	insecurity	beyond	a	farming	year	or	farming	season.				
	
Figure	3:4	Forms	of	land	interests	held	by	studied	households	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013				
From	 Figure	 3.5,	 out	 of	 the	 48	 respondents	 for	 the	 question,	 16	 of	 them	 reported	
operating	 farm	 lands	 on	 fixed	 rental	 bases	where	 they	 either	 paid	 a	 fixed	 amount	 of	
money	every	season	or	every	year	for	the	use	of	the	grantor’s	 land	or	paid	rent	in	the	
form	of	a	fixed	quantity	of	the	main	crop	produced,	mostly	maize.	Also,	19	respondents	
reported	using	discretionary	payment	arrangement.	In	this	type	of	rental	arrangement,	
landlords	 and	 tenants	 do	 not	 outrightly	 agree	 on	 the	 nature	 or	 amount	 of	 land	 rent.	
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Tenants	are	given	the	discretion	to	make	payments	to	the	chief	or	usufruct	landlord	on	
their	 own	 volition.	 Such	 rental	 arrangements	 are,	 however,	 very	 risky	 as	 tenants	 are	
never	 certain	 about	 what	 amount	 of	 money	 or	 portion	 of	 crop	 harvested	 may	 be	
satisfactory	 to	 the	 landlord	 as	 land	 rent.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 landlords	 are	 uncertain	
about	the	returns	to	land	rented	out.	Furthermore,	10	respondents	reported	operating	
sharecropping	contracts	where	they	share	the	produce	of	the	farm	with	the	landlord	in	
a	proportion	of	1:1	or	1:2	depending	on	which	of	the	parties	contributes	the	most	to	the	
production.		
	
	
Figure	3:5	Nature	of	land	rental	in	study	communities	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
Land	 rental	 systems	 in	 Ghana	 are	 informed	 by	 how	 much	 idle	 lands	 a	 land	 owning	
household	or	stool	has,	and	the	risk	 level	associated	with	 leaving	these	 lands	 idle.	For	
farmers	who	may	not	want	to	lose	family	land	to	community	land	stock	if	it	is	deemed	
customarily	abandoned	due	to	lack	of	use	(see	Ollennu,	1962:	85;	Hill,	1970;	Arko-Adjei	
et	al.,	 2009),	 they	prefer	 to	 rent	 them	out,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 at	 lower	 rents	or	on	 seasonal	
licences.	Also,	as	farmers	are	too	old	to	farm	at	all,	land	rentals/sales	become	the	main	
source	 of	 income	 or	 food	 to	 the	 farmer,	 and	 hence	 rented	 lands	 may	 come	 with	
considerably	 high	 rents.	 According	 to	 Ollennu	 (1962)	 when	 individuals	 or	 households	
fixed	rent	 sharecroping	 discre{onary	rent	payment	 none	
Series1	 16	 10	 19	 3	
0	
2	
4	
6	
8	
10	
12	
14	
16	
18	
20	
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y	
(c
ou
nt
s)
	
	 76	
abandon	portions	of	customary	land	they	hold,	such	lands	will	return	to	the	communal	
stock	 to	 be	 reallocated	 to	 other	 land-poor	 households.	 However,	 Simpson	 (1976)	
observed	that	the	individualization	of	communal	land	rights	prevents	communities	from	
exercising	their	traditional	rights	to	re-possess	customary	land,	if	it	was	construed	to	be	
abandoned.	This	is	especially	applicable	to	peri-urban	and	urban	land	markets	of	Ghana	
where	the	individualisation	of	land	rights	is	more	pronounced.			
For	a	majority	of	rural	communities	in	Ghana,	the	customary	principle	of	abandonment	
is	 still	 applicable	 especially	 following	 population	 growth	 and	 the	 quintessential	
entitlement	of	all	community	members	to	usufruct	rights.	In	line	with	this,	Quisumbing	
et	al.	(2001)	observed	that	land	fallowing	under	emerging	land	tenure	regimes	tend	to	
weaken	tenure	security.	Fallowing	of	land	for	longer	periods	of	time	may	be	construed	
as	abandonment.	Hence,	farmers	who	intend	to	fallow	some	portions	of	their	land,	rent	
these	 lands	 at	 lower	 rents	 or	 grant	 seasonal	 licenses	 to	 mostly	 women	 or	 migrant	
farmers	who	would	produce	legumes	temporarily	on	them	as	a	means	of	improving	soil	
fertility	(see	Goldstein	and	Udry,	2005).	Short-term	rentals	or	seasonal	licenses	are	more	
preferable	to	smallholders	than	long-term	fallow	periods.		
	
It	is	also	worth	mentioning	that	most	customary	land	grants	in	rural	Ghana	remain	oral,	
with	limited	written	evidence.	This	notwithstanding,	one	must	be	careful	not	to	quickly	
equate	 oral	 grants	 to	 tenure	 insecurity.	 Data	 collected	 from	 our	 household	 surveys	
revealed	 that	 98percent	 of	 all	 grants	 in	 the	 study	 area	 were	 orally	 made,	 yet	 only	
6percent	of	the	respondents	reported	various	levels	of	land	disputes.	Smallholders	have	
therefore	 adopted	 various	 measures	 to	 enhance	 their	 tenure	 security	 even	 without	
formal	title	registration.	For	example,	usufructs	and	leaseholders	are	allowed	to	embark	
on	planting	tree	crops,	fencing,	sinking	of	wells	or	the	registration	of	title	that	connote	
secure	possession	or	ownership	of	alienated	land	with	the	consent	of	their	grantors	(see	
Place	and	Hazell,	1993;	Sjaastad	and	Bromley,	1997;	Otsuka	et	al.,	2001,	Brasselle	et	al.,	
2002).			
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Tree	 planting	 has	 always	 been	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	 securing	 land	 rights	 and	 can	 be	
construed	 as	 actual	 ownership.	Hence,	 parcels	 that	 are	 protected	 by	 tree	 fencing	 are	
already	classified	more	secure	than	those	that	are	not	(Besley,	1995).	Since	farmers	do	
not	 want	 to	 rent	 lands	 that	 are	 under	 litigation	 and	 risk	 their	 investments	 through	
protracted	court	cases,	they	demand	rentals	from	secure	tenures.	The	major	means	of	
parcel	protection	 in	rural	Ghana	 is	 tree	planting	along	the	boundaries	of	 the	parcel	as	
reported	by	29percent	of	the	respondents.	In	areas,	where	land	tenure	is	perceived	to	
be	secure,	smallholders	adopt	no	form	of	parcel	protection.	For	instance,	50percent	of	
the	respondents	have	not	used	any	form	of	parcel	protection	at	all	 in	the	study	areas.		
From	the	household	surveys,	some	farmers	protected	their	lands	from	encroachment	by	
simply	farming	on	them	regularly,	while	others	reported	they	used	spiritual	invocations	
to	protect	their	ancestral	lands.	See	details	on	security	of	tenure	in	Figure	3.6.	
	
	
Figure	3:6	Measures	taken	to	protect	households’	farmlands	from	encroachment	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
	
3.4.2	Processes	of	customary	land	acquisition	and	transaction	costs		
In	 the	 process	 of	 land	 market	 development,	 various	 transaction	 costs	 are	 incurred.	
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tenure	 security	 for	 the	 investor	 on	 one	 hand;	 and	 to	 maximize	 returns	 from	 land	
transactions	in	the	interest	of	the	larger	community	on	the	other	hand.	In	Ghana,	these	
processes	 differ	 from	 community	 to	 community	 and	 costs	 involved	 at	 each	 stage	 are	
also	 never	 the	 same.	 Figure	 3.7	 outlines	 processes	 pertaining	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	
agricultural	parcels	in	rural	settings	in	Ghana.	Also,	the	processes	and	costs	presented	in	
this	study	merely	represent	the	situation	in	the	study	communities	and	may	significantly	
differ	from	those	of	other	communities	around	Ghana.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3:7	Processes	of	agricultural	land	acquisition	in	Ghana	
Source:	Own	Illustration	based	on	village	surveys	
	
A	 person	 who	 desires	 agricultural	 land	 must	 first	 approach	 the	 chief	 or	 any	 of	 the	
customary	custodians	including	family/clan	heads	or	their	authorized	representatives	to	
make	 a	 request	 for	 a	 specific	 parcel	 or	 suitable	 unoccupied	 land.	 This	 can	 be	 done	
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directly	by	the	investor	or	his	authorised	agents.		The	chief	is	then	allowed	considerable	
time	 to	 consult	with	 the	 sub-chiefs	 and	 elders	 about	 vacant	 and	 suitable	 land	 for	 the	
investor’s	particular	requirements.	It	may	take	a	meeting	or	more	to	arrive	at	a	decision	
of	a	suitable	 location.	After	this,	a	messenger	 is	nominated	to	 lead	the	 investor	to	the	
selected	parcel	for	his	consideration.	The	investor	is	allowed	some	time	to	examine	the	
site	 and	 assess	 its	 suitability	 for	 his	 particular	 purpose.	 The	 next	 stage	 involves	 the	
negotiation	of	rent/price	between	the	grantor	chief	or	family	head	and	the	new	tenant.	
If	the	purchase/rental	amount	is	agreed	upon,	payments	are	made	directly	to	the	stool,	
after	 which	 the	 rentee	 is	 offered	 an	 allocation	 note	 subject	 to	 the	 payment	 of	
administrative	fees	to	the	Stool’s	Lands	Secretariat.	In	cases	where	the	parcel	is	located	
in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 a	 sub-chief	 (Odikro),	 the	 lessee	will	 have	 to	 approach	 the	 particular	
Odikro	 to	have	his	 grant	 acknowledged.	 The	 customary	process	 is	 concluded	with	 the	
cutting	of	the	tramma/guaha22.			
The	cutting	of	the	tramma/guaha	signifies	the	grantor	has	finally	severed	rights	to	the	
land	and	vested	these	rights	in	the	grantee.	The	guaha	cutting	involves	both	parties	and	
their	 witnesses,	 cutting	 a	 twig	 or	 a	 leave	 at	 both	 ends	 into	 halves	 (see	 Ollennu,	
1962:115/116).	Witnesses	are	usually	paid	a	witness-fee	(Amanor,	2006).	Typically,	the	
grantee	and	grantor	each	nominates	a	younger	representative	to	cut	the	guaha,	to	keep	
the	 event	 in	 their	 memories	 for	 a	 longer	 time.	 This,	 according	 to	 the	 focus	 group	
discussions	(in	2012),	 is	 followed	by	the	performance	of	 libation	and	 invocation	of	the																																																									
22	According	to	Allott	(1960:243),	some	of	the	Akan	customary	laws	provide	for	the	sale	of	land	as	cutting	
guaha.	After	the	agreement	to	purchase	has	been	reached,	the	land	has	been	inspected,	the	price	fixed,	
the	 boundaries	 cut	 and	 marked	 with	 special	 trees	 (themselves	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 extent	 of	 land	
conveyed),	the	parties	return	to	the	land	after	some	days.	The	guaha	ceremony	then	takes	place	before	
many	witnesses	for	both	sides.	Vendor	and	purchaser	each	provide	a	representative,	usually	a	young	boy	
to	 cut	 guaha.	 The	 vendor	 provides	 a	 piece	 of	 fibre	 on	 which	 are	 threaded	 six	 cowry	 shells.	 The	 two	
persons	cutting	guaha	then	squat;	each	passes	his	left	hand	under	his	right	leg	and	grasps	one	end	of	the	
string	of	cowries,	holding	the	three	cowries	nearest	to	him.	The	respective	parties	keep	the	cowries	used	
in	 the	 ceremony	 forever,	 in	 order	 that	 in	 case	 of	 dispute	 between	 them	 or	 others	 over	 the	 sale,	 the	
cowries	 may	 be	 produced	 as	 evidence.	 In	 fact,	 the	 production	 of	 the	 cowries	 is	 an	 essential	 piece	 of	
evidence	to	the	sale.	After	the	ceremony,	the	purchaser	offers	a	drink	(or	drinks)	and	sheep	to	the	vendor	
(the	 stamping	 or	 the	 aseda).	 This	may	 vary	 significantly	 across	 the	 country.	 In	 the	Northern	 regions	 of	
Ghana,	a	typical	guaha	will	involve	the	breaking	of	kola-nuts,	the	sharing	of	tobacco	or	the	sacrificing	of	a	
ram.	See	also	Ollennu	(1962:	115-121).		
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spirits	of	the	gods	and	ancestors	to	seal	the	deal.	The	ceremony	also	strips	the	grantor	
of	 all	 interests	 in	 the	 said	 land,	 for	 the	 entire	 sale	 or	 lease	 period.	 Since	 writing	 is	
considered	alien	in	the	customary	land	system	in	rural	Ghana,	the	cutting	of	the	guaha,	
according	to	the	respondents,	sealed	the	grant.			
This	 notwithstanding,	 the	 defects	 of	 the	guaha	 (such	 as	 the	 death	 of	 parties	 or	 their	
witnesses,	 and	 possibilities	 of	 sabotage	 and	 manipulation)	 have	 made	 written	 deeds	
more	preferable	 in	peri-urban	regions.	Thus,	with	 the	 insurgence	of	 land	conflicts	and	
the	need	for	land	securitisations,	many	grantees	of	customary	land,	proceed	to	translate	
the	 oral	 grants	 into	 formal	 deeds.	 It	 is,	 however,	 noteworthy	 that	 majority	 of	 lands	
granted	 to	 smallholders	 are	 still	 thriving	 on	 oral,	 negotiable	 and	 flexible	 terms	 of	
references.	Out	of	175	households	surveyed,	only	2	percent	 reported	 registering	 their	
grants	 with	 the	 Customary	 Land	 Secretariat	 (CLS).	 The	 majority	 of	 smallholders	 are	
operating	on	oral	leases,	sharecropping	and	seasonal	licenses	especially	in	the	Savelugu-
Nanton	area	of	the	Northern	region	of	Ghana.	
	
All	these	processes	leading	to	the	acquisition	of	a	parcel	of	land	come	with	some	forms	
of	transaction	costs.	From	the	focus	group	discussions	and	interviews	with	chiefs,	it	was	
revealed	 that	 though	 some	 of	 these	 costs	 are	 not	 mandatory,	 they	 are	 generally	
unavoidable.	 Table	 3.2	 displays	 some	 of	 the	 land	 acquisition	 processes	 especially	 the	
stages	at	which	payments	(either	cash/kind	or	mandatory/optional)	are	made	to	a	chief	
and/or	his	nominated	representative.	In	terms	of	time,	it	was	reported	in	Dukusen	and	
Afrisire	 around	 the	 ScanFarm	 Ltd	 project	 that	 access	 to	 land	 was	 becoming	 difficult	
because	the	agro-investment	company	had	taken	a	greater	part	of	the	community	land,	
and	 households	 desiring	 new	 farms	 must	 travel	 outside	 the	 communities.	 The	 time	
spent	sourcing	information	regarding	these	vacant	lands	had	increased	from	2	weeks	in	
2005	 to	between	1	 to	2	months	 in	2012.	 From	 the	 village	 surveys	 (2012),	 community	
members	benefit	a	 lot	from	social	capital	and	hence,	access	to	 information	is	not	paid	
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for,	 even	 though	 one	 may	 show	 appreciation	 in	 cash	 or	 kind	 (drink 23 )	 for	 such	
assistance.	The	cost	of	access	to	information	was	therefore	estimated	to	be	Gh¢	10	(US$	
5.3)	in	2012	using	the	price	of	a	bottle	of	schnapps	in	the	local	market	at	the	time.	Recall	
data	 on	 how	 much	 information	 cost	 in	 2005	 was	 unavailable	 from	 the	 focus	 group	
discussions.			
	
Since	 land	 contracts	 among	 smallholders	 are	 largely	 oral,	 none	 of	 the	 respondents	
reported	engaging	 legal	services	 in	drafting	a	 land	use	agreement	with	their	 landlords.	
Three	 respondents	 who	 contracted	 land	 from	 family	 usufructs,	 however,	 hold	 some	
form	of	written	agreements	prepared	and	signed	with	their	landlords.	These	allocation	
documents	merely	specified	land	use	terms	and	seasonal	ground	rents.	 In	the	ITFC	Ltd	
operational	communities,	land	information	is	obtained	after	offering	the	chief	12	pieces	
of	kola	nuts.	This	was	estimated	 to	cost	Gh¢	20	at	 the	 time	of	 the	study	 (2012).	With	
respect	 to	 travelling	 cost(s),	 migrant	 smallholders	 did	 not	 recollect	 how	 much	 was	
involved	in	travelling	to	the	village	to	obtain	farmland.	In	Agogo,	around	the	ScanFarm	
project,	migrant	farmers	travelled	into	the	community	after	obtaining	information	about	
vacant	 lands,	 soil	 fertility	and	 farming	 terms	 from	 friends	and	 relatives.	 In	 the	Tamale	
area,	over	90percent	of	the	respondents	held	inherited	usufruct	rights	and	did	not	incur	
travelling	costs.	For	cost	of	protecting	acquired	parcels	of	land,	the	major	approach	used	
was	fencing,	by	planting	hedges	or	other	edible	tree	crops	such	as	mango,	cashew	and	
Jatropha	curcas.		
From	Table	 3.2,	 farmers	who	desire	 to	 enhance	 tenure	 security	 through	 title	 or	 deed	
registration,	 incurred	additional	 transaction	costs	of	between	Gh¢	650	-	Gh¢	800	(US$	
338	–	US$	416	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	in	land	surveying	and	deed	registration	fees	(interview																																																									
23	‘Drink’	or	 ‘drink	money’	 is	a	moral	 token	offering	 in	 some	parts	of	Ghana,	 traditionally	paid	 to	 chiefs	
(stools)	in	the	southern	part	of	Ghana,	in	the	form	of	cash	or	a	bottle	of	schnapps,	to	start	negotiations	on	
the	terms	of	the	lease.	However,	as	demand	for	land	has	grown,	this	‘drink’	or	‘drink	money’	is	no	longer	
just	a	pre-negotiation	fee,	 instead,	 it	 is	now	requested	by	the	chiefs	 in	huge	sums	of	cash.	Customarily,	
though	 this	 cash	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 used	 for	 the	 development	 of	 their	 local	 communities	 and	 for	 the	
‘maintenance	of	the	stool’,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	It	is	common	to	hear	a	similar	terminology	as	‘kola’	
or	‘kola	money’	for	the	Northern,	Upper	West	and	Upper	East	regions	of	Ghana.		
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with	Lands	Commission,	2013).	Since	these	costs	are	optional,	most	transactions	remain	
informal	–	oral,	un-surveyed,	unmapped	and	unregistered.	Also,	 this	cost	 is	out	of	 the	
reach	of	many	smallholders	in	the	study	communities.	This	revelation	may	explain	why	
over	90percent	of	landholdings	remain	informally	founded	and	tree	fencing	remains	the	
popular	means	of	ensuring	tenure	security.		
Table	3.2	Transaction	costs	of	access	to	land	in	study	communities	
Process/Activity	 Reported	Costs	 Mandatory	
and	Optional	
payments	
Gushie	 Tunayili	 Dukusen	 Afrisire	
1. Approach	 the	 chiefs	 and	 elders	 with	
local/foreign	 schnapps	 or	 kola	 nuts.	 Local	 gin	
costs	 Gh¢	 4	 and	 foreign	 gin,	 Gh¢10.	 Kola	 nuts	
cost	 approximately	 Gh¢	 20.	 Drink	 (nsa)	 or	 kola	
(monetary	 equivalent	 of	 both	 [nsa	 sika])	 is	 used	
to	 greet	 the	 chief	 and	 serves	 as	 pre-negotiation	
fee.	
Gh¢	30	 Gh¢	30	 Gh¢	20	 Gh¢	20	 	
	
	
	
Mandatory	
	
	
	
	
2. Odikro	 personally	 shows	 you	 vacant	
agricultural	land	if	it	is	less	than	5acres	(2ha).	The	
Agogomanhene	 may	 also	 enquire	 from	 him	
about	 the	 availability	 of	 vacant	 lands	 in	 his	
community.	 Grantee	 pays	 a	 showing	 fee	
[mpaboa	sika]	depending	on	how	far	the	land	is.	
Gh¢	10	 Gh¢	10	 Gh¢	10	 Gh¢	10	
3. An	 allocation	 note	 is	 issued	 from	 the	
Agogohene’s	 Secretariat	 for	 leases	 or	 parcels	
above	 5acres	 (2ha).	 Amount	 and	 nature	 of	 rent	
payable	 is	 specified	 in	 the	 allocation	 note	
depending	on	the	particular	grant.	
n/a	 n/a	 Gh¢	150	 Gh¢	150	
4. Optionally,	 a	 surveyor	 is	 engaged	 to	 pick	
boundary	details	and	prepare	site	plans.		
Gh¢	250		
per	acre	
Gh¢	250		
per	acre	
Gh¢	300		
per	acre	
Gh¢	300		
per	acre	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Optional	
5. Register	 parcel	 with	 the	 Chief’s	 Lands	
Secretariat.	Fees	depend	on	the	tenure	required.	
n/a	 n/a	 Gh¢	100	 Gh¢	100	
6. Optionally,	 one	 may	 proceed	 to	 register	 a	
lease	 with	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 for	 parcels	
larger	than	5acres	(2ha).		Fees	are	dependent	on	
the	 nature	 of	 lease	 registration	 required	 and	
associated	professional	services	to	be	procured.	
Gh¢	400	
per		
acre	
Gh¢	400	
per		acre	
Gh¢	400	
per	acre	
Gh¢	400	
per		acre	
7. Mandatory	 payment	 of	 annual	 or	 seasonal	
rent		
Gh¢	50	 Gh¢	50	 Gh¢	100	 Gh¢	100	 Mandatory	
Total	Cost	of	access	to	land	(TC)	
	
Gh¢	740	 Gh¢	740	 Gh¢	1,080	 Gh¢	1,080	 M	=	Gh¢		280	
O	=		Gh¢	800	
NB.	Gh¢	1.9214	was	equivalent	to	US$	1	as	of	1st	April,	2013	during	fieldwork		
Source:	Field	Survey	(2013)	
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The	non-use	of	allocation	papers	in	the	northern	parts	of	Ghana	reduces	cost	of	access	
to	 land	considerably	from	Gh¢	180	(US$	94	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	 in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	
around	 the	 ScanFarm	 project,	 to	 Gh¢	 40	 (US$	 21	 as	 of	 1st	 April,	 2013)	 in	 Gushie	 and	
Tunayili	around	the	ITFC	project.		Also,	the	nature	of	informal	transactions	reduces	the	
cost	of	access	to	 land	by	Gh¢	800	(US$	416	as	of	1st	April,	2013).	Hence,	the	mandatory	
transaction	cost	of	access	to	customary	land	is	approximately	Gh¢	280	(US$	146	as	of	1st	
April,	2013).		
	
In	Gushie	and	Tunayili	around	the	ITFC	project,	total	transaction	costs	were	estimated	to	
be	Gh¢	 740	 (US$	 385	 as	 of	 1st	 April,	 2013),	while	 the	 figure	 for	 Dukusen	 and	Afrisire	
around	 the	 ScanFarm	 project	 was	 comparatively	 higher	 and	 estimated	 at	 Gh¢	 1,080	
(US$	562	as	of	1st	April,	2103).	These	differences	in	transaction	costs	can	be	attributed	
to	the	different	stages	of	land	market	development	between	the	northern	and	southern	
regions	of	Ghana.	Land	market	development	is	more	advanced	in	southern	Ghana	than	
in	the	north	in	terms	of	the	extent	of	monetization	and	land	tradability.	The	emergence	
of	monetary	transactions	in	northern	Ghana	is	still	relatively	new	and	local	customs	and	
practices	 have	 always	 frowned	 upon	 cash-based	 land	 transactions.	 Due	 to	 these	
customary	 restrictions,	 even	 local	 chiefs	 have	 tended	 to	 shroud	 land	 transactions	 in	
secrecy	 in	 the	 Northern	 region	 of	 Ghana.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 general	 observation	 that	 the	
returns	 to	 agriculture	 are	 comparatively	 higher	 in	 southern	 Ghana	 than	 in	 northern	
Ghana	due	to	the	different	agro-ecological	and	climatic	characteristics.	The	demand	for	
land	in	the	southern	regions	of	Ghana	for	the	commercial	production	of	economic	trees	
such	as	cocoa,	teak,	oil	palm	and	rubber,	makes	land	prices	more	expensive	than	in	the	
northern	regions	where	gratuitous	grants	are	still	accessible.			
3.5	Conclusions	
Land	 markets	 in	 Ghana	 continue	 to	 evolve,	 and	 different	 processes	 and	 costs	 are	
involved	 in	 smallholders’	 participation	 in	 the	 land	market.	 The	main	 objective	 of	 this	
study	 was	 to	 examine	 the	 complications	 of	 land	 price	 formation	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
processes	and	costs	involved	in	land	transactions	in	Ghana.	The	study	identified	that	the	
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remoteness	of	the	communities	 limited	 land	transactions	to	usufruct	holdings	through	
inheritance,	 seasonal	 cash-based	 or	 kind-based	 rentals	 and	 sharecropping	 to	 mostly	
relatives,	 friends	 and	 trustworthy	 migrant	 farmers.	 Since	 different	 processes	 are	
involved	 in	 acquiring	 land,	 the	 related	 transaction	 costs	 were	 also	 identified	 to	 be	
different	 in	the	two	study	areas.	From	the	transaction	cost	 tabulation,	 it	 is	cheaper	to	
acquire	land	from	skin	land	areas	in	northern	part	of	Ghana	than	in	stool	land	areas	in	
southern	 Ghana	 where	 the	 land	 markets	 are	 relatively	 developed	 for	 commercial	
production	of	highly	economic	crops.			
Transaction	 costs	 from	 the	 study	 are	 largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 land	 tenure	
(formal/informal),	 social	 capital	 (relationships	 and	 trust),	 geographical	 location	 of	 the	
land	(north/south	ecological	zones)	and	citizenship.	Citizens	of	the	farming	community	
can	acquire	new	 farmlands	or	additional	 farmlands	without	paying	anything	 for	 them,	
because	 access	 to	 land	 is	 an	 entitlement	 according	 to	 local	 customs.	 The	 costs	 of	
performing	customary	ceremonies	 such	as	 the	guaha	cutting	also	ultimately	 influence	
land	 pricing.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 implications	 of	 guaha	 cutting	 on	 land	 pricing,	 the	
ceremony	 continues	 to	 be	 relevant	 in	 customary	 land	 administration,	 as	 a	 means	 of	
securing	 tenure	 to	 land.	 However,	 to	 enhance	 land	 tenure	 security	 and	 improve	
smallholder	 land	 securitisation,	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 pro-poor	 land	 registration	
systems	 be	 introduced.	 For	 example,	 simple	 land	 use	 contracts	 between	 tenants	 and	
their	landlords,	which	spell	out	the	rights	of	the	land	user	for	a	specified	period	of	time,	
may	 allow	 for	 the	 collateralisation	 based	 on	 such	 rights.	 Also,	 since	 employment	 and	
social	 services	 provision	 appear	 to	 be	 the	 points	 at	 which	 the	 expectations	 of	
smallholder	 communities,	 and	 the	 deliverable	 promises	 of	 large-scale	 agro-investors	
seem	 to	merge,	 emphasis	 should	 be	made	 at	 these	 point	 to	 deepen	 benefits	 to	 host	
communities	in	Ghana.					
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Chapter	Four : Determinants	of	Agricultural	Land	Prices	in	Ghana  
	
4.1	Introduction	
Land	markets	in	Africa	are	recently	more	pronounced	with	wide	variations	in	the	nature	
of	 transactions,	 extent	 of	 acquisitions	 and	 contractual	 arrangements.	 African	 land	
markets	 have	 become	more	 complex	 and	 globalised	 in	 response	 to	 recent	 economic	
changes	 and	 pressures.	 Though	 the	 emergence	 of	 land	 markets	 has	 largely	 been	
attributed	 to	 the	 gradual	 disintegration	 of	 the	 system	 of	 communal	 property	 rights	
towards	 individualized	rights	 (Bruce	and	Migot-Adholla,	1993;	Otsuka	and	Place,	2001;	
Ubink	 and	 Amanor,	 2008),	 recent	 market	 trends	 are	 dominated	 by	 surging	 foreign	
interest	 in	 large-scale24	commercial	 agriculture	 in	 Africa.	 The	 common	 land	 market	
activities25	identified	 in	most	parts	of	Africa	are	 in	 the	 form	of	 rentals,	 sharecropping,	
inheritance,	borrowing	and	usufructs.	Outright	sale26	of	agricultural	land	is	prohibited	in	
most	customary	land	tenure	regimes	in	Africa.	This	explains	why	much	of	the	literature	
on	 African	 land	markets	 (see	 Binswanger	 and	 Rosenzweig,	 1986;	 Hayami	 and	 Osuka,	
1993;	Otsuka,	2007)	appear	to	concentrate	on	land	rentals	and	not	sales.		
In	the	urban	and	peri-urban	areas	of	West	Africa	especially	in	Burkina	Faso,	Côte	d’Ivoire	
and	 Ghana,	 some	 evidence	 of	 land	 sales	 were	 documented	 since	 the	 early	 1900s.	 In	
Burkina	Faso,	Kevane	and	Gray	(1999)	and	Ouedraogo	(2002)	found	that	urban	and	peri-
urban	 land	 markets	 were	 dominated	 by	 developers	 and	 civil	 servants	 buying	 large																																																									
24	Large-scale	agro-investment	is	used	to	refer	to	agricultural	landholdings	extending	up	to	1,000acres	and	
the	farms	operated	as	a	private,	public	or	joint	investment.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	smallholders	are	not	
agricultural	investors	(see	Lipton,	2006).	The	term	is	used	cautiously.	This	study	prefers	to	call	these	kinds	
of	landholdings	agricultural	investments	and	not	‘land	grabs’	as	they	are	popularly	so	called	in	the	media.	
25	Most	agricultural	transactions	in	Ghana	remain	oral	in	nature	unlike	urban	land	transactions,	which	are	
documented	 and	 registered	with	 the	 Lands	 Commission.	 This	 situation	 is	 not	 however,	 synonymous	 to	
tenure	 insecurity	though	 it	may	provide	a	 leeway	for	multiple	transactions,	 indiscriminate	expropriation	
and	interruption	of	quiet	enjoyment	of	land.		
26	In	Ghana,	 traditional	 custodians	of	 land,	 especially	 chiefs	 and	Tendaamba	 are	 fast	 to	 emphasise	 that	
land	 is	 not	 for	 sale.	 However,	 various	 transactions	 such	 as	 –	 leases,	 gifts,	 freeholds,	 share	 tenancies,	
seasonal	licences	and	pledges	are	taking	place	with	both	cash	and	kind	considerations.	For	example	most	
land	grants	made	to	migrant	farmers	are	disguised	as	gifts	but	these	tenants	are	asked	to	pay	all	sorts	of	
customary	 fees	 for	 the	 land	 or	 offer	 a	 share	 of	 their	 produce	 at	 each	 harvest	 or	 even	 work	 for	 their	
landlords	free	of	charge	every	farming	season.	These	at	best	can	be	described	as	 leases	and	not	gifts	as	
usually	reported.	
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portions	of	these	areas.	The	ownership	of	land	is	increasingly	concentrated	in	the	hands	
of	few	wealthy	elites	and	agro-business	entities	(Ouédraogo,	2002;	Mathieu	et	al.,	2003;	
Wouterse	 and	 Taylor,	 2006).	 Also,	 the	 immigration	 of	 returnee	 farmers	 from	 Côte	
d’Ivoire	and	western	Burkina	Faso	led	to	the	development	of	agricultural	transactions	in	
the	Comoe	province	in	southwestern	Burkina	Faso	(Lavigne	Delville	et	al.,	2002).	In	Côte	
d’Ivoire,	newcomers	obtained	property	rights	through	guardianship	arrangements	or	by	
purchasing	 land	use	 rights	 from	exiting	migrants.	 It	 is	 also	 reported	 that	 the	booming	
pineapple	 production	 in	 Southern	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 land	 rental	
markets	in	that	area	(Chauvea	et	al.,	2006).			
Amanor	(1994)	reported	that	land	markets	emerged	in	Ghana	in	the	1890s	at	an	era	of	
immense	 prospecting	 for	 gold.	 It	 was	 also	 found	 in	 the	 densely	 populated	 cocoa	
producing	 areas	 of	Ghana	 that	 land	 sales	 accounted	 for	 18percent	 of	 all	 landholdings	
while	land	rentals	accounted	for	41percent	of	landholdings	(Migot-Adholla	et	al.,	1994).	
Quisumbing	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 revealed	 that	 while	 5percent	 of	 land	 transactions	 in	 the	
Western	 region	 of	 Ghana	 emanated	 from	 purchases,	 about	 19percent	 of	 lands	 were	
acquired	through	rentals	in	migrant	communities,	particularly	in	the	oil	palm	belt.	Since	
these	 areas	 are	 both	 densely	 populated	 and	 vibrant	 agricultural	 zones	 for	 the	
commercial	production	of	cocoa,	rubber,	citrus,	and	oil	palm,	such	evidences	of	actual	
sales	 are	 not	 surprising.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 these	 figures	 on	 land	 sales	 and	
rentals	 might	 have	 changed	 tremendously	 in	 West	 Africa.	 The	 customary	 perception	
that	 land	 is	 not	 for	 sale	 may	 therefore	 need	 to	 be	 reconsidered	 following	 some	
evidences	of	land	sale	in	highly	prospective	agricultural	frontiers	across	West	Africa.			
Several	studies	exist	on	the	emergence	of	 land	sale	and	rental	markets	 in	West	Africa,	
which	 were	 all	 largely	 driven	 by	 the	 production	 of	 high	 value	 economic	 crops	 and	
minerals.	 However,	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 re-emergence	 of	medium	 to	
large-scale	land	acquisitions	for	agricultural	investments	in	the	region.	Even	though	the	
drivers	of	these	recent	agro-investments	have	been	thoroughly	studied	by	Arezki	et	al.	
(2011);	 Deininger	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 Anseeuw	 et	 al.	 (2012,	 2012a)	 among	 others,	 what	
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remains	completely	missing	is	how	these	recent	large	land	acquisitions	across	the	sub-
region	have	impacted	on	customary	land	markets.	This	study	therefore	sought	a	deeper	
understanding	of	the	functioning	of	customary	land	markets	in	West	Africa	particularly,	
Ghana,	following	recent	large-scale	agricultural	land	acquisition	across	the	country.	The	
study	examined	the	factors	that	inform	a	rentor	and	rentee	about	agricultural	land	rents	
to	charge	or	to	accept,	in	a	sector	that	is	highly	constrained	with	information	and	power	
asymmetries,	 and	where	money	 is	 not	 always	 the	 underlying	medium	of	 exchange	 in	
land	transactions.	The	study	contributes	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	functioning	of	
land	 markets	 in	 West	 Africa,	 within	 a	 dominant	 customary	 tenure	 land	 ownership	
system,	where	informal	transactions	abound	and	records	on	land	prices	are	almost	non-
existent.	 The	 findings	 of	 this	 chapter	 are	 relevant	 for	 policy	 formulation	 towards	
protecting	 smallholders	 against	 adverse	 impacts	 of	 land	 market	 transactions	 that	 go	
beyond	their	local	capacities.	
4.2	Literature	Review	
4.2.1	Differing	trends	of	land	markets	in	Africa	–	Are	recent	transactions	new?	
Land	 markets	 in	 Africa	 are	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 1900s	 (Holden	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Various	
evidences	of	 land	 transactions	were	discovered	earlier	 in	 the	 last	Millennium	 in	many	
African	countries.	In	many	parts	of	Africa,	land	ownership	rested	in	the	hands	of	a	few	
ruling	 classes	 like	 the	 Kings	 (Stool/Skin)	 of	 Asante	 in	 Ghana	 or	 in	 families	 who	 were	
among	 the	 first	 settlers	 (Tendaamba)	 of	 the	 land	 (Kasanga	 and	 Kotey,	 2001).	 While	
indigenes	obtained	usufructuary	rights	over	un-appropriated	communal	land	as	a	right,	
strangers	 obtained	 land	 through	 locally	 arranged	 oral	 transactions	 where	 land	 rent	
amounted	 to	 a	 share	 of	 produce	 depending	 on	 the	 extent	 of	 cost	 sharing	 between	
landlord	and	tenant.	Such	rents	ranged	from	one-third	share	of	proceeds	to	the	landlord	
(abusa)	 to	 a	 half	 share	 (abunu).	 These	 arrangements	 differed	 among	 farming	
communities	and	sometimes	even	among	households.			
Historically,	 several	 forms	 of	 land	 transactions	 were	 recorded	 in	 many	 sub-Saharan	
countries.	 In	Ethiopia,	peasant	farmers	served	as	caretakers	of	 land	owned	by	wealthy	
	 88	
urban	 landlords	 who	 then	managed	 them	 through	 intermediaries	 (Rohmato,	 1984	 as	
cited	 in	Holden	et	al.,	2009).	This	 landlord	and	 tenant	arrangement	persisted	 till	1975	
when	 a	 land	 reform	 illegitimated	 land	 and	 labour	 rentals,	 but	 rather	 centralised	 land	
ownership	in	the	state	in	order	to	commence	land	redistribution.	This	position	remained	
until	1991	when	a	new	political	regime	permitted	short	term	land	rentals	and	hiring	out	
labour	 (Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Holden	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 In	 Malawi,	 the	 introduction	 of	
tobacco	 transformed	 land	 relations	 from	 largely	 European	 controlled	 farms	 to	
smallholder	tenancies	for	tobacco	production	(Place	and	Otsuka,	2001).	Land	markets	in	
Uganda	 were	 largely	 influenced	 by	 regional	 imbalances	 in	 population	 density	 and	
migration	 (Holden	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Beside	 land	 markets	 being	 dominated	 by	 usufruct	
holders,	 the	 granting	 of	 land	 titles	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 commencement	 of	 land	
markets	 including	 illegitimate	 land	 sales	 in	 customary	 areas	 (see	 Deininger	 and	 Ali,	
2008).	 In	Kenya,	 land	privatization	 resulted	 in	 some	evidence	of	 land	 sales	 (Place	 and	
Migot-Adholla,	 1998)	 though	 the	magnitude	was	 low	 in	 Central	 Kenya	 (Pinckney	 and	
Kimuyu,	1994).			
Alongside	 these	 recorded	 evidences	 of	 land	 transactions	 in	 Eastern	 Africa,	 similar	
markets	emerged	 in	West	Africa	as	well	especially	 in	 the	 tropical	 rainforest	 regions	of	
Ghana,	Cote	d’Ivoire,	Sierra	Leone,	Benin,	and	Nigeria	(Quisumbing	et	al.,	2001;	Adesina	
and	 Chianu,	 2002;	 Delville	 et	 al.,	 2002).	 Otsuka	 (2007)	 and	 Holden	 et	 al.	 (2009)	
particularly	 noticed	 that	 land	 transactions	 were	 prevalent	 in	 areas	 notable	 for	 high	
population	density	and	massive	 in-migration.	 Land	 transactions	 in	Ghana	date	back	 to	
the	early	days	of	cocoa	and	oil	palm	in	the	1950s;	and	appear	widespread	in	the	middle	
belts	 of	 the	 country	 (Amanor,	 2006).	 Following	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 recent	
cash-based	land	transactions	are	not	new	in	form,	but	may	be	different	in	the	extent	of	
land	 under	 negotiations	 or	 acquired.	 Also,	 unlike	 previous	 land	 transactions	 that	
revolved	around	households	 seeking	 to	 improve	 their	productive	 resources	 (Deininger	
and	 Binswanger,	 2001),	 recent	 land	 transactions	 involve	 large	 tracts	 of	 agricultural	
lands,	owned	by	very	 resourceful	 investors	–	both	private	and	public;	and	 foreign	and	
local	entities.		
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4.2.2	Smallholder	participation	in	land	markets		
Different	factors	influence	the	decisions	of	agricultural	households	to	participate	in	the	
land	market.	The	decision	of	smallholders	to	participate	in	the	land	market	could	be	two	
staged:	 decision	 to	 participate	 and	 the	 actual	 participation	 in	 the	 land	market.	Most	
literature	 have	 cited	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 initial	 land	 and	 labour	 endowments	 of	 the	
household,	income	levels,	access	to	credit	and	other	factor	markets,	extent	of	non-farm	
livelihoods,	 land	tenure	security,	transaction	costs	in	market	participation	and	the	cost	
of	land	as	being	key	to	determining	the	nature	of	land	market	participation	(Holden	and	
Ghebru,	 2005).	 Other	 factors	 such	 as	 trust,	 reputation	 and	 availability	 of	 potential	
tenants	 are	 also	 essential	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 land	markets	 (Pender	 and	 Fafchamps,	
2006).	It	is	believed	that	the	emergence	of	land	markets	offers	an	effective	opportunity	
for	the	transfer	of	land	from	land	rich	agricultural	households	to	land-poor	households.	
It	is	also	contrarily	argued	that	land	markets	only	allow	the	wealthy	class	to	concentrate	
land	by	enticing	the	poor	who	lack	agricultural	credits	and	insurance	to	sell	land	out	due	
to	 distresses	 (Platteau,	 1996;	 Platteau,	 2000;	 Jin	 and	 Jayne,	 2011)	 such	 as	 climate,	
economic	or	health	related	adversities	(Holden	et	al.,	2009:19).			
A	 study	 by	 Andre	 and	 Platteau	 (1998)	 between	 1988	 and	 1993	 found	 land-poor	
households	 in	Western	Rwanda	selling	out	 land	to	meet	their	subsistence	and	medical	
expenses.	 In	 1998,	 studies	 in	 Kenya	 (Place	 and	Migot-Adhola,	 1998),	 on	 the	 contrary,	
found	 that	 land-poor	 households	 rather	 bought	 land	 from	 land	 rich	 households	 to	
support	 their	 sustenance.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 position	 of	 Andre	 and	 Platteau	 (1998),	 von	
Braun	et	al.	(1991)	argue	that	so	long	as	land	remains	the	most	valuable	asset	of	poor	
agricultural	households;	they	are	more	inclined	to	use	it	productively	by	marshalling	all	
their	other	resources.	 In	respect	of	 land	rentals,	several	studies	 in	Rwanda	(Andre	and	
Platteau,	 1998);	 in	 Ghana	 (Migot-Adholla	 et	 al.,	 1994);	 in	 Ethiopia	 (Pender	 and	
Fafchamps,	2006)	and	in	Malawi	(Holden	et	al.,	2006)	have	provided	evidences	that	land	
rentals	contribute	significantly	to	more	equitable	land	holding	between	the	rich	and	the	
poor.			
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In	a	 comparative	 study	of	Ghana,	Kenya	and	Rwanda,	Migot-Adholla	et	al.	 (1991)	and	
Osuka	and	Place	(2001)	identified	population	growth	and	commercialization	as	generally	
associated	with	 the	 individualization	 of	 land	 rights.	 According	 to	 Holden	 et	 al.	 (2009:	
25),	“land	markets	and	 individualization	of	 land	 rights	 seem	 to	move	 in	 tandem”.	 It	 is	
also	believed	 that	high-value	 commercial	 enterprises	and	entrepreneurs	 can	 influence	
land	 tenure	 and	 land	 markets.	 For	 example,	 the	 booming	 cocoa	 production	 in	 West	
Africa	is	known	to	have	stimulated	share	tenancies	and	land	purchases	in	Ghana	and	the	
Côte	d’Ivoire	(Hill,	1963;	Quisumbing	et	al.,	2003,	Amanor,	2006).	It	was	argued	that	the	
activities	 of	migrant	 farmers	 also	 sped	 up	 the	 development	 of	 land	markets	 for	 both	
sales	and	rentals	(Quisumbing	et	al.,	2003).		
	
From	the	above	account,	the	general	 factors	that	may	 influence	the	formation	of	 land	
markets	 include	 institutional	 factors	 (formal	 or	 informal	 norms,	 regulations	 and	
restrictions),	demand	factors	(population	growth,	urbanisation	and	migration),	and	cost	
factors	of	access	 to	 land	 (transaction	cost).	Missing	among	 these	 factors	 is	 large-scale	
land	acquisitions	as	a	demand	side	factor	and	how	it	influences	land	transactions	at	the	
community	 level.	 This	 study	 is	 premised	on	 the	 fact	 that	 land	markets	 in	West	Africa	
have	 indeed	 transcended	 local	 transactions	 into	 international	and	multinational	deals.	
Large-scale	 agricultural	 investment	 projects	 are	 huge	 players	 in	 African	 land	markets,	
which	 are	 dominated	 by	 smallholder	 farmers.	 This	 demand	 factor	 together	 with	
farmland	 supply,	 farmland	 location,	 farmland	 quality	 and	 socio-cultural	 factors,	 and	
non-price	factors	such	as	transaction	costs,	determines	land	sale	and	rental	prices.	Also,	
the	 activities	 of	 medium-scale	 farmers	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 as	 an	 influence	 on	 land	
markets.		
4.2.3	Emergence	of	LSLA	in	West	Africa	
Africa	 is	 targeted	 for	 about	 70percent	 of	 the	 global	 demand	 for	 land	 (Deininger	 and	
Byerlee,	2011)	and	the	growing	demand	is	not	a	flush	in	the	pan,	but	may	continue	into	
the	 near	 future.	 In	 Ghana,	 while	 Schoneveld	 et	 al.,	 (2011)	 reported	 that	 1	 million	
hectares	 of	 land	 were	 under	 biofuel	 production	 alone,	 the	 Land	 Matrix	 Global	
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Observatory	 as	 of	 December	 2012	 reported	 of	 258,950	 hectares	 for	 biofuel.	 Our	
estimation	 from	 various	 sources	 including	 the	 Ghana	 Investment	 Promotion	 Centre	
(GIPC)	and	the	Land	Matrix	Global	Observatory	indicates	that	intended	land	acquisition	
in	Ghana	 as	 of	 August	 2014	was	 2,172,440	 hectares	while	 the	 concluded	 acquisitions	
was	904,016	hectares.	This	puts	actual	 land	acquisitions	at	42percent	of	all	purported	
land	 acquisitions.	 Similarly,	 in	 Liberia,	 intended	 acquisitions	 were	 1,408,048	 hectares	
while	actual	acquisitions	were	1,340,777	hectares	(95percent)	representing	a	shortfall	of	
5percent.	 In	Mali,	 438,286	 hectares	 were	 targeted	 for	 acquisition;	 however,	 169,286	
hectares	representing	39percent	were	finally	signed.	A	lot	of	cross	country	evidences	in	
West	 Africa	 point	 out	 that	 targeted	 and	 negotiated	 deals	 have	 always	 fallen	 short	 of	
completed	and	leased	concessions.		
There	 are	 also	 evidences	 that	 operational	 transactions	 are	 gravely	 different	 from	
negotiated	 deals.	 According	 to	 Cotula	et	 al.	 (2014),	 a	majority	 of	 land	 transactions	 in	
Africa	 for	 agricultural	 investments	 are	 operating	 less	 than	 30percent	 of	 the	 allocated	
lands.	 Deininger	 and	 Byerlee	 (2011)	 estimated	 that	 only	 21percent	 of	 the	 recently	
approved	 agricultural	 projects	 have	 begun	 actual	 production,	 and	 this	 scale	 is	 much	
smaller	than	planned	and	reported	at	the	land	negotiation	stages.	Our	estimations	from	
Ghana,	 Liberia	 and	 Sierra	 Leone	 also	 reflect	 a	 wide	 disparity	 between	 signed	 land	
acquisition	contracts/leases	and	actual	proportions	of	land	put	to	production.	In	Ghana	
for	 instance,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 out	 of	 signed	 contracts	 of	 904,016	 hectares,	 12,790	
hectares	 (1.5percent)	 have	 been	 put	 into	 production.	 In	 Liberia,	 1,340,777	 hectares	
were	 contracted,	 while	 26,397	 hectares	 (2percent)	 have	 been	 put	 into	 production,	
representing	just	2percent.	In	Sierra	Leone,	only	6,365	hectares	(representing	less	than	
1percent)	 of	 the	 contracted	 1,183,274	 hectares	 were	 put	 to	 cultivation.	 In	 Nigeria	
16percent	 of	 the	 acquired	 land	 was	 put	 to	 use.	 Cote	 d’Ivoire	 recorded	 the	 highest	
percentage	of	79percent	usage	of	contracted	land	and	is	by	far	the	highest	proportion	in	
the	whole	of	West	Africa.	 In	 the	 specific	 case	projects	 in	Ghana,	 it	was	observed	 that	
ScanFarm	(Gh),	after	4years	of	operation	had	used	only	10percent	of	their	concession	of	
13,058	 hectares.	 In	 the	 ITFC	 Ltd	 case	 study,	 out	 of	 a	 concession	 of	 1,363	 hectares,	
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73percent	 (1000acres)	 was	 found	 already	 cultivated	 while	 the	 remaining	 27percent	
(363acres)	 is	 preserved	 as	 a	 biodiversity	 zone.	 Further	 details	 of	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	 (LSLAs)	 in	 West	 African	 in	 terms	 of	 number	 of	 investments,	 investor	
countries,	intention,	and	land	size	are	shown	in	Table	4.1.			
Table	4.1	Ghana	-	investors	origin,	intended	use	and	contracted	land	size	
Number	of	
Investments	 Investor	Countries	 Intention	
Contracted	
Land	Size	(ha)	
1	 Italy	 Biofuels	 6699	
2	 India	 Biofuels	and	food	crops	 404,360	
1	 Canada	 Biofuels		 10,000	
9	 USA	 Biofuels,	livestock	and	food	crops	 164,547	
2	 UK	 Biofuels		 50,700	
1	 Singapore	 Edible	oils	 4,678	
6	 Norway	 Food	crops	 55,923	
1	 Spain	 Food	crops	 10,000	
1	 Netherlands	 Carbon	sequestration,	 3,500	
3	 South	Africa	
Biofuels	and	carbon	
Sequestration	 72,531	
1	 UAE	 Wood/fibre	 5,000	
1	 Brazil	 Food	crops	 200	
1	 France	 Food	crops	 3,500	
1	 Kenya	 Food	crops	 1,070	
2	 Ghana	 Food	crops	 1,258	
1	 Germany	 Food	crops	 7,000	
1	 Dutch/Ghana	 Fruits,	food	crops	 1,568	
1	 Israel	 Biofuels	 100,000	
1	 Unknown	 Biofuels	 50	
Total				37	 	 	 904,016	
Source:	Compiled	from	GIPC	(interview	2013),	Land	Matrix	Global	Observatory,	2014;	
Acheampong	and	Campion,	2014		
According	to	the	Land	Matrix	Global	Observatory	(2014),	the	majority	of	LSLAs	in	West	
Africa	 are	 registered	 in	 Ghana,	 Liberia,	 Mali,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Senegal	 and	 Nigeria.	 In	
Ghana,	 the	 investors	 have	 included	 Norway,	 Canada,	 Italy,	 Netherlands,	 Singapore,	
Belgium,	 Britain,	 India,	 USA,	 Israel	 and	 China.	 It	 is	 also	 reported	 that	 some	 national	
elites,	 using	 their	 privileged	 positions,	 local	 know-how	 and	 extensive	 networks,	 have	
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secured	access	 to	 fertile	 land	on	the	continent	 for	agriculture	 (Alden	Wily,	2011).	This	
explains	 why	 between	 2004	 and	 2009,	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 investments	 in	 farmland	 in	
Africa	were	domestically	initiated	(Deininger	and	Byerlee,	2011).	It	is	also	observed	from	
Table	 3.1,	 that	 most	 of	 the	 new	 investments	 were	 not	 into	 food	 crop	 production.	
Deininger	and	Byerlee	 (2011:51)	 reported	that	63%	of	 the	recent	 investments	were	 in	
non-food	agricultural	products;	such	as	biofuels	(21%),	 industrial	cash	crops	(21%)	and	
conservation,	game	reserves,	livestock	and	plantation	forests	(21%).  
 
The	focus	on	biofuels	has	been	greatly	influenced	by	country-level	targets	to	reduce	the	
use	 of	 fossil	 fuel.	 In	 Ghana,	 the	 cultivation	 of	 Jatropha	 curcas	 for	 biofuel	 production	
dominated	the	crops	targeted	by	investors	(29%	according	to	Schoneveld	et	al.,	2011).	
There	 are	 also	 high-level	 investments	 in	 oil	 palm,	 sugar	 cane	 and	 cassava.	 The	 case	
studies	in	this	thesis	showed	that	the	interest	and	hype	in	Jatropha	curcas	had	actually	
waned	 since	 2010	 due	 to	 poor	 performance	 of	 the	 crop	 with	 a	 shift	 towards	 food	
production.	According	to	Schoneveld	et	al.	 (2011),	most	 investors	 lacked	the	expertise	
to	 propagate	 and	manage	 Jatropha	 curcas	 on	 commercial	 bases	 as	 a	 plantation	 crop.	
Also,	 the	 prospects	 and	 profitability	 of	 a	 crop	 may	 motivate	 investors	 to	 expand	 its	
production	or	diversify	their	portfolio.		
4.3	Methodological	Approaches	
Two	 case	 studies	 were	 purposely	 selected	 for	 this	 study	 -	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 in	 the	
Ashanti	Akim	North	District	and	the	Integrated	Tamale	Fruit	Company	(ITFC)	Ltd	in	the	
Savelugu-Nanton	District.	The	study	was	based	on	survey	data	of	smallholders	in	four	(4)	
selected	communities	 in	Ghana	using	Focus	Group	Discussions	(FGDs),	key	stakeholder	
interviews	and	policy	documents.	Together	with	the	household	surveys,	village	surveys	
were	 also	undertaken	 to	 assess	 the	 level	 and	nature	of	 land	 transactions,	 community	
characteristics,	 farming	 practices,	 land	 market	 activities,	 and	 prevailing	 land	 tenure	
systems.			
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The	analysis	of	data	in	this	chapter,	though	largely	qualitative,	will	be	undertaken	in	line	
with	 rent	 theories	 on	 land	 transactions.	 The	 rent	 theories	 help	 to	 understand	 the	
functioning	of	land	markets	and	factors	that	may	be	influencing	prices	determination	at	
the	 local	 level.	Land	rent	 influences	the	allocation	of	 land	among	competing	uses,	and	
hence,	allows	agricultural	households	to	resolve	their	production	constraints.	However,	
different	factors	 influence	the	fixing	and	 interpretation	of	 land	rents.	 In	analysing	 land	
rents,	 two	 main	 theories	 from	 David	 Ricardo	 and	 Heinrich	 Johann	 von	 Thünen	 have	
dominated.	David	Ricardo	(1772–1823)	developed	the	differential	rent	theory	to	explain	
agricultural	 land	rents	as	“that	portion	of	the	produce	of	the	earth	which	is	paid	to	the	
landlord	 for	 the	 use	 of	 the	 original	 and	 indestructible	 powers	 of	 the	 soil”	 (Ricardo,	
1996:45).	He	argued	that	rents	arise	on	land	only	when	increases	in	the	demand	for	land	
necessitate	 the	 use	 of	 less	 fertile	 lands.	 Ricardo’s	 emphasis	 was	 on	 the	 peculiar	
advantages	of	land	in	terms	of	its	quality.	He	explained	that	the	difference	in	yield	that	
accrues	to	a	fertile	land	reflects	the	rent	payable	for	that	land.	In	his	view,	fertility	and	
yield	of	land,	are	the	major	determinants	of	agricultural	land	rents.			
Differing	 from	 Ricardo’s	 proposition	 on	 differential	 land	 rent,	 Heinrich	 Johann	 von	
Thünen	 (1783-1850)	propounded	 the	 location	 theory	 to	explain	 land	 rents,	attributing	
land	rent	to	location	differentials.	Von	Thünen	observed	that	when	crops	produced	for	a	
central	 city	market	are	grown	on	 farther	 lands,	 those	 located	nearest	 the	city	enjoy	a	
definite	 rent	 advantage	over	 those	 located	at	 the	 greater	distance.	 The	extent	of	 this	
advantage	 corresponds	 with	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 transportation	 costs	 that	 arise	 in	
hauling	products	from	the	different	locations	to	the	market.	Even	though	advancement	
in	 transportation	 technologies	 has	 brought	 tremendous	 changes	 to	 this	 thinking,	
transportation	costs	still	have	a	significant	effect	on	rent-paying	capacity	and	define	the	
siting	 of	 production.	 Heinrich	 Johann	 von	 Thünen’s	 emphasis	 was	 on	 the	 location	 of	
agricultural	land	as	a	factor	for	determining	land	rents.			
Due	 to	 the	 identified	 limitations	 of	 household	 data	 in	 explaining	 house	 level	 land	
transactions	 in	 Ghana,	 community	 level	 responses	 from	 focus	 group	 discussions	 and	
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interviews	were	mainly	used	to	explain	the	factors	that	drive	land	prices	in	line	with	the	
Ricardian	 and	 Von	 Thünen	 agricultural	 land	 rent	 discussions.	 These	 responses	 are	
displayed	in	different	tables	in	section	4.4.3.	This	study	is	built	around	telling	the	story	
behind	land	market	arrangements	in	Ghana.		
4.3.1	Descriptive	summary	on	land	characteristics	
From	 the	 household	 data,	 the	 average	 age	 of	 household	 heads	 is	 45years	 and	
dominated	by	males,	with	household	sizes	averaging	10	persons.	Over	60percent	of	the	
households	 are	 holding	 between	 2-5acres	 (2hectares).	 Only	 4percent	 of	 households	
have	accessed	credits	to	purchase	fertilizer,	herbicides	and	insecticides	to	improve	farm	
production.	 Generally,	 90percent	 of	 household	 believe	 their	 tenure	 to	 land	 remains	
secure,	while	only	6percent	have	experienced	land	conflicts	in	the	last	decade.	In	terms	
of	the	physical	characteristics	of	the	household	farmland,	54percent	of	the	respondents	
have	 their	 parcels	 located	 near	 to	 all-weather	motorable	 roads	while	 18percent	 have	
lands	located	close	to	pools	of	water	for	potential	irrigation.	Soil	texture	in	both	studied	
areas	is	reported	to	be	dark	brown	and	black	and	confirms	a	high	level	of	soil	fertility	as	
was	responded	in	the	affirmative	by	95percent	of	the	respondents.	The	average	travel	
cost	reported	for	households	who	had	to	travel	into	these	communities	to	acquire	land	
was	approximately	Gh¢	6	while	only	3percent	of	the	households	have	adopted	various	
measures	to	protect	their	parcels	 from	encroachment	and	trespass.	Though	erosion	 in	
the	savannah	and	transition	forest	zones	of	Ghana	is	generally	high,	less	than	half	of	the	
farmers	interviewed	reported	that	their	farmlands	located	on	eroded	areas.		
Household	land	transactions	in	the	Savelugu	area	where	ITFC	Ltd	is	located	are	limited	
extensively	by	inherited	customary	landholdings	at	the	extended	family	level	as	usufruct	
rights.	 Land	 sales	 are	 prohibited	 in	 the	 area	 according	 to	 local	 customs.	 The	 Ya	 Na,	
through	the	sub-chiefs,	manages	the	allodial	rights	as	trustees	of	communal	land	in	the	
area	while	family	heads	manage	usufruct	allocations.	In	the	Agogo	area	where	ScanFam	
Ltd	is	located,	the	Agogo	Stool	holds	the	allodial	rights	while	families	hold	usufruct	rights	
over	various	portions	of	communal	 land.	Farmland	transactions	 in	 the	area	have	been	
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restricted	 to	 seasonal	 licenses,	 sharecropping	 and	 short-term	 land	 leases,	 with	
payments	 equivalent	 to	 a	 fixed	 quantity	 of	 crops	 produced	 or	 the	 cash	 equivalent	 of	
such	produce	in	the	market	at	the	time	of	harvesting.			
4.4	Analysis	and	Findings	
4.4.1	Nature	of	land	rents	to	smallholders	and	large	holders		
According	 to	Goldstein	 and	Udry	 (2005:11),	 approximately	 half	 of	 all	 agricultural	 land	
transactions	 in	customary	 regimes	are	 sharecropping	contracts,	and	half	are	based	on	
fixed-rent.	In	the	study	communities,	it	was	revealed	that	40percent	of	customary	land	
transactions	 were	 based	 on	 fixed-rent	 contracts	 while	 60percent	 were	 usufruct	
holdings.	 Fixed-rent	 land	 transactions	 comprised	 17percent	 cash-based	 leases,	
12percent	sharecropping	tenancies	and	11percent	seasonal	licences	(see	details	in	Table	
4.2).	 Majority	 of	 customary	 land	 transactions	 are	 often	 disguised	 as	 akyedie	 (gifts),	
though	 in	 reality	 they	 take	 the	 form	 of	 either	 a	 share-contract	 or	 a	 fixed-rent	 over	 a	
specified	time	or	 into	perpetuity.	Land	rents	may	be	in	the	form	of	seasonal	or	annual	
payments	 to	 landowners	 for	 the	use	of	agricultural	 land.	 In	Ghana,	 the	nature	of	 rent	
(cash	 or	 kind)	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 land	 rent	 differ	 from	 community	 to	 community	
depending	on	the	prevailing	customary	practices	and	the	nature	of	agreement.			
Table	4.2	Land	rights	distribution	in	the	study	areas	
	
Response	 Frequency	 																							Percent	(%)	
Valid	 Freehold/Usufructuary	 105	 60	
	
Leasehold	 29	 17	
	
Sharecropping	 21	 12	
	
Customary	License	 20	 11	
Total	
	
175	 100	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
From	the	households	surveys	conducted	 in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	around	the	ScanFarm	
Ltd	project	 in	2012,	 about	70percent	of	 the	 inhabitants	are	migrant	 farmers	with	 less	
than	10percent	of	the	farmers	holding	common	law	freeholds	(stranger	usufruct	rights).	
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Stranger	usufructs	were	 identified	to	be	the	first	migrants	who	laid	the	foundations	of	
these	 villages	 and	 allocated	 to	 themselves	 various	 portions	 of	 the	 community	 land.	
These	classes	of	migrants	do	not	pay	rent	for	land	use	but	rather	assist	in	settling	new	
farmers	on	behalf	of	the	Omanhene	(Paramount	Chief).	Agricultural	rents	are	paid	either	
in	cash	or	in	kind.	For	cash	rentals,	the	average	annual	rent	for	leaseholders	was	quoted	
at	between	Gh¢	40	and	Gh¢	100	per	hectare	per	annum	(US$	20.8	and	US$	50.2	as	of	1st	
April,	2013).	Cash	payments	are	usually	made	in	advance.	For	farmers	who	opt	for	kind	
payments,	a	flat	rate	of	1	to	3bags27	of	maize	may	be	accepted	as	rent	in	a	farming	year.	
For	farmers	cultivating	yam,	the	rent	paid	was	higher.	In	an	interview	with	the	Odikros	
of	both	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	(2012),	it	was	explained	that	soil	depletion	associated	with	
yam	cultivation	 is	 leveraged	 through	higher	 rents	per	 annum.	Yam	 farmers	were	 thus	
requested	to	make	cash	payments	of	Gh¢	200	per	annum	(US$	104	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	
(Interview	with	Dukusen	chief,	2012).		
Another	 form	of	 tenancy	most	common	 in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	around	the	ScanFarm	
(Gh)	 Ltd	 concession	 is	 sharecropping.	 Sharecropping	 may	 take	 the	 form	 of	 abunu	 or	
abusa	 tenancies.	 Under	 these	 sharecropping	 arrangements,	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	 farm	
are	 usually	 shared	 for	 seasonal	 crops,	 but	 sometimes	may	 involve	 the	 sharing	 of	 the	
farm	itself	for	tree	crops	like	cocoa,	oil	palm,	citrus	among	others.	Sharecropping,	as	a	
form	of	land	access	and	land	renting	is	conducive	and	acceptable	to	over	90percent	of	
migrant	farmers	as	a	first	means	to	access	farmland	in	host	communities.	In	many	cases	
sharecropping	serves	as	a	means	to	obtain	input	support	from	resourceful	landlords.	As	
a	 reward	 for	 this	 sharecropping	 contract,	 the	 landlord	 takes	 two-thirds	 (2/3)	 share	of	
the	 farm	 or	 proceeds.	 Since	 the	Odikros	 (Village	 chief)	 are	 unable	 to	 monitor	 actual	
proceeds	 from	 every	 tenant’s	 farm	 at	 the	 village	 level,	 they	 rely	 heavily	 on	 trust	 to	
sharecrop-out	plots	to	new	migrants.	With	these	bases,	social	networks	and	goodwill	in	
host	communities	significantly	influences	access	to	agricultural	land	and	the	amount	of	
																																																								
27	A	bag	of	maize	at	 the	farm	gate	cost	Gh¢	50	 in	December	2012.	Hence,	1-3bags	of	maize	was	valued	
between	Gh¢	50	-	Gh¢	150	in	cash	respectively.	NB.	US$	1	is	equivalent	to	Gh¢	1.9214	as	of	1st	April,	2013.		
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rent	paid.	Table	4.3	shows	quotations	of	various	 rents	paid	 for	 the	use	of	 farmland	 in	
Agogo,	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	from	the	ScanFarm	Ltd	project	area.			
On	 the	 contrary,	 sharecropping	 has	 been	 widely	 criticized	 for	 its	 impacts	 on	 farmer	
inefficiency	and	low	investment	in	soil	conservation	due	to	low	expectations	on	returns	
and	 high	 cost	 of	 supervision	 (Goldstein	 and	 Udry,	 2005;	 Otsuka,	 2007).	 According	 to	
Quisumbing	et	al.	 (2001),	 smallholders	under	 sharecropping	contracts	are	unwilling	 to	
fallow	 land	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 its	 fertility	 due	 to	 tenure	 insecurity	 under	 traditional	
land	tenure	arrangements.	Even	though	fallowing	is	very	profitable	for	smallholder	food	
producers	 (Goldstein,	 2008),	 farmers	 find	 it	 risky	 to	 invest	 in	 soil	 conservation,	when	
their	 tenure	 is	 perceived	 insecure.	 In	 a	 study	 by	Acheampong	 and	Campion	 (2014)	 in	
Ghana,	 it	 was	 revealed	 that	 less	 than	 one-third	 of	 the	 farmers	 studied	 were	 able	 to	
fallow	 their	 lands	 beyond	 three	 years	 after	 Jatropha	 curcas	 was	 introduced	 in	 their	
communities.	They	attributed	this	 to	 land	scarcity.	From	Afrisire	around	the	ScanFarm	
project,	 it	was	reported	that	 the	tenure	of	a	migrant	 farmer	was	secure	so	 long	as	he	
has	crops	on	the	plot.	For	this	reason,	some	usufructs	do	not	trust	that	when	they	rent	
land	to	migrant	farmers	for	a	period	beyond	two	farming	seasons,	they	will	 take	good	
care	of	the	land	and	maintain	its	fertility.	On	the	other	hand,	the	migrants	are	sceptical	
that	when	they	invest	in	soil	fertility,	they	may	not	be	allowed	to	reap	the	full	benefits	
of	their	investments.			
Wilks	(1993:99)	in	his	study	of	the	Ashanti,	quoted	smallholders	who	reported	that	afuo	
yƐ	deƐ,	asase	yƐ	ohene	deƐ	-	literally	meaning	the	farm	is	ours;	the	land	is	the	stool’s.	In	a	
tenure	regime	where	absolute	ownership	always	rests	with	the	stool,	smallholders	will	
be	more	strategic	 in	 their	 investment	 in	 land	and	soil	 conservation	approaches.	These	
uncertainties	 surrounding	 investment	 in	 soil	 conservation	 explains	 why	 some	
smallholders	tend	to	mitigate	their	investment	costs	by	either	under	declaring	output	or	
falsify	poor	harvest	 (see	Yelsang,	2013).	Examples	of	similar	concerns	exist	around	the	
Ashanti,	 Brong	 Ahafo	 and	 Western	 Regions	 of	 Ghana	 where	 migrant	 farming	 is	
widespread.	 In	 the	 Bono	 areas	 of	 Ghana,	 Adjei-Nsiah	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 found	 that	
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landowners	 accused	 their	 tenants	 of	 cheating	 by	 under-declaring	 their	 harvest.	
Following	 this,	 some	tenants	have	been	prosecuted	 in	court	or	 summoned	before	 the	
abusuahene	(land	administrator	as	used	in	Amanor,	2006)	for	various	infractions.		
	
Table	4.3	Summary	of	land	rents	around	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	Project	
Where	 Data	
Source	
What	is	presented	 	 Value	 	
Per	Acre		 Per	Hectare	
Agogo	 CLS,	
Agogo	
For	a	parcel	not	more	than	2acres,	
a	farmer	pays	a	rent	of	Gh¢	50	to	
the	chiefs	per	annum	
Gh¢50	 US$	26	 Gh¢100	 US$	52	
Dukusen	 FGDs	 Migrant	 Farmers	 in	 Dukusen	 for	
lease	 parcels	 pay	 Gh¢	 40	 for	
parcels	 less	 than	 5acres.	 A	 fixed	
price	 value	 of	 3bags	 of	 maize	 is	
acceptable	 from	 maize	 farmers	
per	annum.	
Gh¢40	 US$	21	 		Gh¢80	 US$	42	
Afrisire	 FGDs	 One	third	of	produce	is	acceptable	
per	annum	for	sharecroppers.		
Gh¢50	 US$	26	 Gh¢100	 US$	52	
Source:	FGDs	(2013).		Exchange	rate:	US$	1	to	GH¢1.9214	as	of	1st	April	2013	
	
In	the	study	of	land	rents	paid	by	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd,	it	was	revealed	that	a	ground	rent	
of	US$	1	per	acre	per	annum	was	agreed	for	the	first	year	of	operations.	Subsequently,	
this	amount	is	increased	by	US$	50cent	every	additional	year	till	it	stabilizes	at	US$	3.50	
in	the	60th	month	for	the	remainder	of	the	duration.	Comparing	the	year-to-year	rental	
payments	of	both	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	and	the	neighbouring	smallholder	farmers,	existing	
land	 rents	 in	 the	 host	 communities	 at	 US$	 53,	 appear	 higher	 than	 those	 paid	 by	
ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	at	US$	3.5	 (see	Table	4.4),	on	 the	 face	of	 it.	This	probably	explains	
why	at	a	FGD	 in	Afrisire	 (2012)	around	the	ScanFarm	project,	 the	farmers	were	of	the	
opinion	 that,	 the	 chiefs	were	 increasing	 ground	 rents	 arbitrarily	 as	 an	 eviction	 tactic.	
However,	 the	 rent	 differentials	 may	 be	 tied	 to	 the	 risks	 and	 costs	 of	 administering	
smallholder	 rents.	 This	 is	because,	although	 smallholder	 land	 rentals	 in	 the	area	were	
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reportedly	 driven	 largely	 by	 trust28 ,	 most	 smallholders	 were	 under-declaring	 their	
outputs	 and	 relocating	 to	new	communities	or	 faking	poor	harvests	 to	enjoy	 leniency	
from	the	chiefs.	Following	these	risk	assertions,	 it	was	apparent	that	total	ground	rent	
from	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 was	 higher,	 certain,	 cheaper	 to	 collect,	 and	 stable	 against	
inflation	 (i.e.	 it	 is	 paid	 in	 dollars	 or	 the	 dollar	 equivalent	 in	 cedis).	 The	 rent	 paid	 by	
ScanFarm	Ltd	also	covered	the	entire	concession	and	not	just	the	cultivated	area.			
From	Table	3.4	the	rough	estimation,	in	2009	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	paid	an	annual	rent	of	
US$13,058	 to	 the	Agogoman	Council.	 In	2010,	 the	 rate	per	annum	was	adjusted	 from	
US$	1	per	acre	to	US$	1.5	per	acre	and	hence	pushing	total	ground	rent	to	US$19,587.	
Since	the	project	is	currently	in	its	fith	year,	rents	due	in	2013	should	be	US$	39,174	for	
the	 entire	 project	 site.	However,	 these	 ground	 rents	 are	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 traditional	
council	 through	 the	Office	of	 the	Administrator	of	 Stool	 Lands	 (OASL)	 to	be	disbursed	
according	 to	 the	 constitutionally	 approved	 formula	 as	 indicated	 in	 Article	 267	 of	 the	
Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992).			
Table	4.4	Annual	rental	payments	by	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	to	the	ATC		
Year	 Months	 Basic	Land	Rent		 Total	Rents	
1	 01	–	12	months	of	Lease	Contract	 US$	1.00	per	ha	 US$	13,058	
2	 13	–	24	months	of	Lease	Contract	 US$	1.50	per	ha	 US$	19,587	
3	 25	–	36	months	of	Lease	Contract	 US$	2.00	per	ha	 US$	26,116	
4	 37	–	48	months	of	Lease	Contract	 US$	2.50	per	ha	 US$	32,645	
5	 49	–	60	months	of	Lease	Contract		 US$	3.00	per	ha	 US$	39,174	
6	+++	 60	until	the	end	of	Lease	Contract	 US$	3.50	per	ha	 US$	45,703	
Source:	Lands	Commission	(PVLMD),	2012		
	
The	 story	 of	 land	 acquisition	 and	 rental	 payments	 by	 the	 ITFC	 Ltd	 and	 surrounding	
communities	differs	 significantly	 from	 that	of	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	due	 to	differences	 in	
the	existing	land	tenure.	Unlike	in	Agogo,	where	some	evidences	of	land	sales	and	leases	
were	available,	the	land	market	around	the	Savelugu	area	is	relatively	emerging.	Three																																																									
28	Trust	is	used	to	refer	to	strong	believe	that	a	farmer	will	fully	declare	his	output	and	pay	the	mandated	
rents,	which	are	tied	to	his	output	per	annum	without	concealment	or	absconding.		
	 101	
main	reasons	could	explain	this	observation.	Firstly,	though	the	Ya	Na	owns	lands,	land	
uses	 are	 determined	 at	 the	 community	 level	where	members	 hold	 usufruct	 rights	 on	
rent-free	 terms.	 The	 second	 reason	 could	 be	 attributable	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 Ya	 Na	
(paramount	 chief)	 in	 the	 Tamale	 Traditional	 Area	 (TTA)	 to	 stimulate	 land	 rentals.	 The	
third	 reason	 could	 be	 the	 fact	 that	 agricultural	 lands	 are	 gifted,	 not	 sold.	 The	 large	
landmass	of	the	Northern	region	of	Ghana	coupled	with	low	rural	population	densities	
may	 also	 account	 for	 the	 low	 land	 commoditisation.	 Usufructs	 holders	 who	 need	
additional	 land	are	only	 required	 to	offer	 twelve	pieces	of	kola	nuts	 to	 the	Gundaana	
(village	chief)	according	to	local	custom.	However,	non-indigenes	are	required	to	make	
one-time	cash	payments.	In	both	Gushie	and	Tunayili,	around	the	ITFC	project	site,	such	
one-time	payment	for	a	hectare	of	land	was	quoted	to	be	GH¢100	(US$	52	as	of	1st	April,	
2013)	(FGDs,	2013).	Land	rents	reported	in	the	two	study	communities	around	the	ITFC	
holding	are	shown	in	Table	4.5.		
Table	4.5	Summary	of	land	rents	around	ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd	investment	for	non-indigenes	
Where	 Data	
Source	
What	is	presented		 	 Value	 	
Per	Acre		 	 Per	Hectare	
Savelugu	 Districts,	
Savelugu	
Kola	nuts	and	money	to	
great	the	chief	and	
elders	
Gh¢	200	 US$	104	 Gh¢400	 US$	208	
Gushie	 FGDs	 Kola	nuts	and/or	money	
to	great	chief	and	elders	
GH¢100	
Gh¢	100	 US$	52	 Gh¢200	 US$	104	
Tunayili	 FGDs	 Kola	nuts	and/or	money	
to	great	chief	and	elders	
GH¢100	
Gh¢	100	 US$	52	 Gh¢200	 US$	104	
Source:	 Compiled	 from	 FGDs	 in	 Gushie	 and	 Tunayili	 (2013).	 Exchange	 rate:	 US$	 1	 to	
GH¢1.9214	as	of	1st	April	2013		
4.4.2	Farmers’	liabilities	and	entitlements	–	influences	on	land	prices	
Through	the	interviews	with	the	managers	of	ScanFarm	Ltd	and	ITFC	Ltd	companies,	 it	
was	discovered	that	 the	actual	amount	paid	 for	 land	was	 tied	 to	agreed	 liabilities	and	
entitlements.	For	smallholders	in	the	Savelugu	area	where	ITFC	Ltd	is	located,	they	are	
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required	by	local	customs	to	avoid	bush	fires,	avoid	cutting	economic	tree	species	and	
to	 pay	 customary	 gratuities.	 In	 return,	 the	 local	 chiefs	 offer	 smallholders	 protection	
from	 the	 activities	 of	 unauthorized	 Fulani	 nomads.	 Chiefs	 also	 assist	 smallholders	 in	
resolving	land	disputes	and	maintaining	community	peace.	 	After	studying	contracts	of	
both	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 and	 ITFC	 (Gh)	 Ltd,	 the	 basic	 entitlements	 and	 liabilities	
identified	are	summarized	in	Table	4.6.	 It	 is	noteworthy	that	the	listed	liabilities	play	a	
very	significant	role	in	determining	how	much	a	large	agro-investor	finally	pays	for	land	
in	Ghana.	Ultimately,	large	agro-investment	companies	will	negotiate	for	lower	rents	if	
they	 are	 mandated	 to	 stir	 up	 local	 level	 development	 and	 invest	 in	 infrastructural	
developments	as	well.	In	the	case	of	ITFC	Ltd,	the	company	had	an	oral	agreement	with	
the	chiefs	of	Gushie,	Dipale,	Tunayili	and	Tigla	to	 improve	education	 in	these	areas	by	
investing	 in	 scholarships,	 infrastructure,	 teacher	 remunerations	 school	 uniforms,	 and	
study	 materials.	 In	 respect	 of	 these	 commitments,	 kola	 money	 was	 reduced	
considerably.			
At	the	time	of	conducting	this	study,	the	ITFC	Ltd	was	already	extracting	water	directly	
from	 the	White	Volta	 for	 their	mango	plots	 through	a	 sprinkler	 system.	Though	 some	
smallholders	were	 found	cultivating	rice,	watermelon	and	maize	along	the	same	river,	
they	 did	 not	 interrupt	 the	 water	 demands	 of	 the	 Company.	 The	 Company	 also	
committed	to	establish	outgrower	schemes	in	their	operational	communities.	As	part	of	
their	investments	into	the	outgrower	schemes,	ITFC	Ltd	reserved	the	sole	right	to	supply	
mango	seedlings,	water,	water	storage	tanks,	manure,	tools	and	other	technical	support	
to	outgrowers,	and	to	be	sole	purchasers	of	their	proceeds	until	the	cost	of	production	
was	fully	recovered.	Under	the	outgrower	scheme,	ITFC	Ltd	fully	pre-finances	the	cost	of	
mango	planting	and	management	until	the	third	or	fifth	year	when	it	may	be	possible	to	
commence	harvesting	and	sale.	According	to	Bugri	and	King	(2013)	this	was	essentially	
an	interest	free-loan.	According	to	the	Assemblyman	of	Gushie,	the	initial	commitment	
to	part-take	in	such	an	outgrower	scheme	was	a	bag	of	maize	valued	at	Gh	50	(US$	26	
as	 of	 1st	 April	 2013)	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 study	 and	 a	 hectare	of	 land.	According	 to	 the	
manager	of	ITFC	Ltd	(interview	2013),	the	restriction	to	a	hectare	of	land	was	to	ensure	
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proper	supervision	by	their	trained	field	assistants,	prevent	production	glut	and	also	to	
ensure	 that	participating	outgrowers	did	not	compromise	on	 their	 food	security	when	
managing	 very	 large	 mango	 plantations.	 These	 entitlements	 were	 confirmed	 fulfilled	
satisfactorily,	 except	 that	 some	 farmers	 were	 neglecting	 their	 mango	 plots	 and	
sometimes	the	poor	management	affected	mango	outputs	significantly.			
Table	4.6	Entitlements	and	liabilities	of	large-scale	agro-investors	in	Ghana	
Agreed	
Issue	
ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	 Integrated	Tamale	Fruit	Company	
(ITFC)	
Entitlements	 1. Uninterrupted	water	supply	
from	the	River	Afram	
2. Beneficial	enjoyment	of	land	
without	trespass	or	
encroachment	
3. To	bring	in	third	party	expertise,	
joint	effort	and	technology	to	
improve	farming	in	the	area	
1. Uninterrupted	water	access	from	
the	White	Volta	
2. Quiet	and	beneficial	occupancy	
3. Sole	suppliers	of	seedlings,	manure,	
water,	tools,	water	tanks	and	
technical	support	to	outgrowers	
4. Sole	purchasers	of	mango	from	
farms	till	costs	were	fully	recovered	
	
Liabilities	 1. Employment	creation	for	people	
2. Compensate	affected	usufructs	
3. Construct	roads	–	feeder	roads	
4. Assist	in	providing	social	services	
5. Bring	about	developments	
6. Not	to	use	land	for	any	illegal	
purpose	besides	crop	production	
7. Not	to	use	parcel	for	housing	
except	staff	quarters		
8. Surrender	lease	and	
hereditament	upon	the	
expiration	of	the	lease	
1. 70percent	jobs	to	host	
Communities	
2. Pay	compensation	to	affected	
farmers	
3. Implement	outgrower	Schemes	
4. Supply	water	for	domestic	use	
5. Offer	educational	support	systems	
6. Improve	road	network	from	Gushie	
to	Tunayili	and	Dipale	
7. Surrender	land	upon	the	expiration	
of	the	lease	
8. Support	in	preventing	bush	fires	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
	
In	the	ScanFarm	Ltd	case,	the	company	confirmed	their	access	to	water	from	the	River	
Afram	 for	 the	 application	 of	 insecticides	 on	 their	 farms,	 without	 any	 violent	
confrontations.	 They	 have	 also	 enjoyed	 considerable	 serenity	 with	 no	 reported	
encroachments	from	smallholders	in	the	surrounding	communities.	However,	during	the	
study,	 the	 Manager	 of	 ScanFarm	 Ltd,	 reported	 some	 encroachments	 and	 crop	
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destruction	by	cattle	belonging	to	some	Fulani	herdsmen	operating	 in	the	area.	At	the	
time	 of	 the	 study,	 ScanFarm	 Ltd	 was	 yet	 to	 employ	 third	 party	 expertise,	 enter	 into	
partnerships	or	deploy	modern	technologies	to	improve	smallholder	productions	in	the	
area.	 This	 entitlement,	which	 remains	 in	 both	 the	MoU	 and	 drafted	 lease,	 allows	 the	
company	to	engage	third	parties	if	their	efforts	are	needed	to	improve	their	production	
in	the	area.			
	
In	our	assessment,	the	stated	liabilities	of	ScanFarm	Ltd	and	ITFC	Ltd	in	Table	4.6	have	
been	 considerably	 met.	 These	 liabilities	 are	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 sub-section	 5.4.3.	
Generally,	 the	 liabilities	 of	 the	 two	 Companies	 to	 provide	 employment	 and	 social	
services	were	considerably	met	according	to	data	from	community	stakeholders	and	the	
managers	 of	 these	 companies.	 Even	 though	 the	 figures	 of	 employment	 tended	 to	
decline	over	the	years	notwithstanding	the	expansion	of	companies,	such	trends	in	the	
general	 literature	of	LSLAs	are	not	strange	 (See	Deininger	et	al.,	2011).	At	 the	 time	of	
the	 study,	 no	misuses	 of	 the	 lands	 of	 ScanFarm	 Ltd	 and	 ITFC	 Ltd	were	 reported.	 It	 is	
anticipated	 that,	 per	 the	 separate	 agreements	 between	 the	 two	 Companies	 and	 the	
host	 communities,	 the	 land	 will	 be	 returned	 to	 the	 people	 at	 the	 expiration	 of	 the	
investment	period.		
4.4.3	Qualitative	presentation	of	factors	that	determine	land	rents	
In	examining	the	factors	that	determine	land	rents,	it	was	found	that	village	chiefs	and	
tenant	farmers	at	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	around	the	ScanFarm	project	considered	the	size	
of	 land,	the	total	output	per	each	farming	season	and	the	prices	at	which	the	product	
sells	 in	 the	Agogo	market.	Other	 factors	 such	as	 the	nearness	 to	 roads,	 irrigation	and	
market	 outlets	 were	 found	 not	 to	 be	 instrumental	 in	 deciding	 land	 rents.	 From	 the	
farmers’	 perspective	 (FGDs,	 2012),	 water	 for	 irrigation	 was	 not	 a	 major	 factor	 in	
deciding	land	prices	since	agriculture	was	largely	rain-fed,	and	they	enjoyed	two	farming	
seasons	in	a	year.	On	the	part	of	access	to	road,	there	is	only	one	tarred	road	that	runs	
through	 the	 two	 villages	 and	 is	 accessible	 to	 farming	 households	 who	 live	 along	 this	
road.	However,	 the	distance	of	 a	person’s	 farm	 from	 this	 road,	 influences	 the	 cost	of	
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transporting	 produce	 from	 the	 farm	 to	 the	 market	 or	 home.	 In	 finding	 out	 the	
motivation	to	be	 located	farther	from	the	village	and	from	any	main	road	and	yet	pay	
the	same	rent,	a	farmer	in	Afrisire	(2012)	remarked	that:	
	
“you	 see,	when	your	 farm	 is	 far	 in	 the	bush,	 you	enjoy	a	 lot	of	 benefits.	 For	
example	 you	hardly	have	problems	with	 thieves;	 the	 Fulanis	 don’t	 take	 their	
cattle	 that	 far,	 so	 your	 crops	 are	 safe.	 And	when	 the	 farm	 is	 new,	 it	 is	 very	
fertile	and	we	get	more	harvest	too.	Sometimes	you	are	also	lucky	Nana	does	
not	come	this	far	to	inspect	the	size	of	your	farm.	So	if	you	can	farm	more	land,	
you	can	get	a	lot	of	produce	and	yet	pay	the	same	rent	as	though	you	farmed	
a	smaller	plot”	(Sabastian,	41year	old	male	in	Afrisire,	2012).			
On	fertility,	 it	was	reported	that	soil	 fertility	 is	generally	uniform	and	the	 location	of	a	
person	 does	 not	 really	matter.	What	matters	 to	most	 farmers,	 is	 how	much	 land	 the	
Odikros	release	and	how	much	of	it	a	farmer	is	able	to	put	to	use.	Subsequently,	he	pays	
rent	based	on	 the	 farm	output	 and	 if	 in	 cash,	 at	 the	prevailing	prices	of	maize	 in	 the	
local	markets.	These	responses	from	the	FGDs	held	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	around	the	
ScanFarm	Project	are	put	in	the	Table	4.7.		
Table	4.7	Determinants	of	land	rents	from	FDGs	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	
Core	Factors	 Determinants	 Yes	 No	
Land	Characteristics		
Quality	of	land	and	fertility	
(yields)	
	
	
	
David	Ricardo	
Farm	Size		 √	 -	
Soil	Colour	 -	 √	
Soil	Texture	 -	 √	
Slope	of	Land	 -	 √	
Produce	Prices	 √	 -	
Quantity	Crop	Output	 √	 -	
Location		
	
Johan	von	Thünen	
Nearness	to	Water	Source	 -	 √	
Nearness	to	Road	Infrastructure	 -	 √	
Nearness	to	Output	Market	Outlet	 -	 √	
Source:	FGD	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire,	2012	
	
The	same	questions	were	posed	in	the	two	separate	FGDs	in	Gushie	and	Tunayili	at	the	
ITFC	project	 to	examine	the	determinants	of	 land	rents	at	a	broader	community	 level.	
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Even	though	fewer	land	transactions	were	recorded	in	this	area,	it	was	revealed	that	the	
most	 important	 factors	 considered	 in	 land	 rent	 fixing	 included	 land	 size,	 soil	 texture,	
product	prices,	 and	quantity	of	 crop	output.	 Soil	 texture	 came	up	 strongly	due	 to	 the	
comparatively	poor	soils	of	the	region	vis-à-vis	soil	quality	of	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	in	the	
Agogo	area.	Also	relevant	were	farm	sizes	and	the	quantity	of	output	of	the	major	crop	
cultivated.	 Since	 the	 introduction	 of	mango	 as	 a	 commercial	 crop	 in	 the	 district,	 land	
rents	 for	 mango	 plantations	 are	 usually	 higher	 than	 lands	 for	 seasonal	 crops.	 The	
reasons	are	 that	mango	 is	 a	 commercial	 crop	and	 the	owners	of	 such	parcels	 tend	 to	
hold	them	into	perpetuity.	To	compensate	for	the	possible	loss	of	land,	higher	rents	are	
requested.	An	elder	in	Tunayili	revealed	that	an	acre	of	land	in	the	area	will	go	for	Gh¢	
200	(US$	104	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	on	rental.	However,	they	hardly	have	people	requesting	
to	 rent	 land	 in	 the	area	 for	agriculture.	Responses	on	 the	determinants	of	 land	prices	
are	shown	in	Table	4.8.			
Table	4.8	Determinants	of	land	rents	from	FGDs	in	Gushie	and	Tunayili	
Core	Factors	 Determinants	 Yes	 No	
Land	Characteristics		
Economic	Surplus		
	
	
	
David	Ricardo	
Farm	Size		 √	 -	
Soil	Colour	 -	 √	
Soil	Texture	 √	 	
Slope	of	Land	 -	 √	
Produce	Prices	 √	 -	
Quantity	Crop	Output	 √	 -	
Location		
	
Johan	von	Thünen	
Nearness	to	Water	Source	 -	 √	
Nearness	to	Road	Infrastructure	 -	 √	
Nearness	to	Output	Market	Outlet	 -	 √	
	 Economic	Viability	of	crop	 √	 -	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013			
		
The	 descriptive	 responses	 from	 household	 surveys	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 4.1	 indicate	
similar	trends	as	those	of	the	FGDs	in	Tables	4.7	and	4.8.	Land	size	remains	paramount	
in	deciding	how	much	is	paid	for	the	use	of	agricultural	land	in	Ghana.	Also	important	to	
farmers	 in	 deciding	 land	 rents	 are	 trust	 between	 parties	 especially	 in	 sharecropping,	
land	tenure	security,	level	of	output,	relationship	with	the	tenant/landlord,	location	and	
soil	 texture	 due	 to	 the	 decreasing	 soil	 quality	 in	 northern	 Ghana.	 Ollennu	 (1962:88)	
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argues	 that	 agricultural	 land	 rent	 in	 Ghana	 is	 based	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 farm	 and	 not	
output.	 Interestingly,	 some	 other	 responses	 that	 emerged	 paramount	 in	 determining	
land	 rents	 such	 as	 trust	 and	 relationship	 could	 be	 attributable	 to	 the	 risks	 associated	
with	 sharecropping	 contracts.	 Since	 landlords	 are	 unable	 to	 supervise	 tenants,	 they	
enter	 into	 sharecropping	 contracts	 believing	 that	 tenants	 will	 stick	 to	 their	 annual	
obligations	and	will	not	under	declare	outputs	so	as	to	pay	low	rents.	Trust	also	helps	to	
prevent	 the	 possibilities	 of	 counter	 claim	 of	 land	 ownership	 by	 tenants,	 since	 land	
transactions	are	 largely	 informal	 in	many	 rural	 areas.	 Even	when	 sharecropping	 rights	
can	potentially	exist	into	perpetuity,	they	do	not	mature	into	outright	ownership.	In	the	
Agogo	area,	there	exists	a	sense	of	tenure	insecurity	between	migrant	farmers	and	the	
natives	 due	 to	 deepening	mistrust	 among	 them	 following	 reports	 of	 eviction	 in	 some	
neighbouring	communities.		
	
	
Figure	4:1	Subjective	determinants	of	land	rents	from	household	survey	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
From	 the	 multiple	 responses	 of	 smallholders	 in	 Figure	 4.1	 on	 the	 factors	 that	 are	
considered	most	 important	 in	 land	price	dynamics,	 size	of	 land,	 tenure	security,	 trust,	
relationship	 between	 parties,	 level	 of	 output	were	 found	 to	 be	most	 relevant	 in	 land	
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pricing.	It	was	also	found	that	land	quality,	access	to	roads,	distance	to	local	market	and	
operation	of	foreign	investors	in	land	were	slightly	important	to	farmers	when	they	rent	
land.	These	factors	are	different	from	the	general	expectation	that	land	rents	would	be	
largely	 driven	 by	 economic	 and	 agricultural	 factors.	 However,	 it	must	 be	 appreciated	
that	 in	 customary	 land	 transactions,	 the	 rent	 paid	 for	 agricultural	 land	 goes	 beyond	
what	may	ordinarily	be	fixed	by	demand	and	supply.	Social	networks,	relationships,	trust	
and	perceived	tenure	security	are	major	social	factors	that	may	be	left	out	in	a	majority	
of	 mainstream	 economic	 analysis.	 Berry	 (1993)	 highlights	 that	 rights	 to	 land	 and	
resources	are	 related	 to	 social	 ties,	with	access	 to	 resources	 facilitated	 through	 social	
networks	and	patronage.	Tenure	security	for	 instance	is	based	largely	on	trust,	and	on	
the	 relationship	 between	 the	 parties.	 These	 factors	 are	 more	 aligned	 with	 Ricardo´s	
ideology	 on	 agricultural	 land	 prices	 based	 on	 land	 quality	 rather	 than	 von	 Thünen’s	
proposition	 of	 location	 theory.	 For	 large-scale	 farmers,	 the	 price	 paid	 for	 land	 goes	
beyond	the	presentation	of	drinks/kola	to	the	chiefs.	It	was	found	that	land	prices	were	
hugely	 influenced	 by	 commitments	 to	 undertake	 developmental	 activities	 in	 their	
operational	communities,	and	not	just	the	land	value	per	se.		
4.5	Conclusions	
The	recent	growing	acquisition	of	large	tracts	of	agricultural	land	in	most	parts	of	Africa	
requires	critical	review	due	to	its	apparent	abilities	to	influence	land	markets	and	land	
prices	at	the	host	community	level.	The	main	objective	of	this	chapter	was	to	examine	
the	factors	that	determine	agricultural	 land	prices.	From	the	discussions	so	far,	on	the	
determinants	 of	 land	 prices	 in	 rural	 communities	 where	 large-scale	 land	 acquisition	
have	emerged,	the	study	concludes	that	land	prices	paid	in	the	form	of	drink/kola/drink	
money/kola	 money	 are	 part	 of	 the	 mandatory	 customary	 protocols	 that	 need	 to	 be	
fulfilled.	In	addition	to	this,	smallholders	pay	annual	rents	as	token	of	allegiance	in	cash	
or	 as	 a	 share	of	output	of	 the	major	 crop	 cultivated.	 In	many	 cases,	 a	maximum	of	3	
bags	of	maize	or	 the	 cash	equivalent	 is	 paid	 to	 the	 local	 land	 custodian	or	 the	 rentor	
usufruct	seasonally	or	annually,	as	may	be	agreed.	The	rent	paid	by	these	smallholders	
especially	 by	 migrant	 farmers	 has	 largely	 been	 determined	 by	 the	 size	 of	 farmland	
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cleared,	 the	 quantity	 of	 output	 realised	 at	 each	 farming	 season	 and	 the	 price	 of	 the	
produce	 in	 the	 local	 market.	 It	 is	 concluded	 that	 the	 returns	 or	 expected	 returns	 to	
farming	activities	are	major	determinants	of	agricultural	land	prices	in	Ghana.			
Furthermore,	due	to	existing	unequal	powers	between	smallholders	and	large	investors,	
smallholders	tend	to	pay	more	for	land	rents	than	large	investors	per	hectare	of	land.	In	
our	particular	case	study,	this	may	be	attributable	to	the	risks	of	default	in	rent	payment	
and	 associated	 high	 administrative	 costs,	 when	 dealing	 with	 smallholders.	 Various	
degrees	and	forms	of	land	transactions	were	already	recorded	among	smallholders	in	all	
the	 study	 communities.	However,	 land	 transactions	 are	 still	 operating	within	 informal	
land	tenure	with	its	peculiar	challenges.	Also,	 loopholes	continue	to	exist	 in	measuring	
the	extent	to	which	liabilities	and	entitlement	of	both	small	and	large	holders	are	met.	
This	 is	 attributable	 to	 the	 largely	 incomplete	 and	 undetailed	 nature	 in	 which	 these	
agreements	were	 drafted.	 It	 is	 proposed	 that	 for	 large	 lands	 required	 for	 agricultural	
purposes,	such	transactions	should	be	supported	by	national	 level	 task	teams	of	 legal,	
investment,	 tax,	 environmental,	 water	 and	 agricultural	 experts	 in	 order	 to	 secure	
communities’	entitlements.	Alternatively,	the	capacities	of	chiefs	should	be	improved	to	
directly	administer	 large	 land	deals	 in	 their	 localities	with	minimal	 interference	of	 the	
state.	Central	governments,	 through	her	 local	agencies	should	put	 in	place	checks	and	
balances	to	deal	with	matters	arising	in	land	allocation.		
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Chapter	Five :	Winners	and	Losers	in	Land	Commercialisation	in	Ghana		
	
5.1	Introduction		
The	agricultural	sector	has	always	received	global	research	attention	because	of	its	role	
in	 sustaining	 rural	 livelihoods.	 In	 the	 last	 decade,	many	 governments,	 including	 those	
from	 developing	 countries,	 have	 awakened	 in	 their	 interest	 to	 invest	 in	 agriculture.	
Most	noticeably,	 the	 recent	 food,	 fuel	and	 financial	 crises	have	 sparked	off	 increasing	
interest	 in	 large-scale	 land	 acquisition	 (LSLA)	 for	 agricultural	 investments	 in	 Africa	 by	
both	 foreign	 and	 local	 agro-investors.	 There	 are	 on-going	 discussions	 whether	 land	
grabbing	should	be	regulated	(FAO,	2012a	and	World	Bank,	2010),	discontinued	(Nyari,	
2008;	Daniel	and	Mittal,	2009)	or	promoted.	These	positions	are	hinged	on	numerous	
evidences	 of	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	 socio-economic,	 cultural,	 political	 and	 even	
environmental	implications	of	LSLAs	for	agro-investments	in	Africa.		
Already,	 several	 research	works	 have	 scrutinized	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 recent	 large-
scale	agro-investments	in	Africa	and	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	Some	of	these	existing	
studies	 have	 focused	 on	 exploring	 the	 risks	 of	 land	 investments	 on	 the	 rights	 and	
livelihoods	 of	 the	 rural	 poor	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Other	 studies	 have	 pointed	 out	
potential	opportunities	for	food	security	and	rural	development.	Notwithstanding	these	
works,	the	level	of	impact	of	these	large-land	acquisitions	on	local	land	tenure	regimes	
and	 how	 these	 have	 resulted	 in	 winners	 and	 losers	 in	 host	 countries	 in	 sub-Saharan	
Africa	are	yet	 to	be	empirically	 studied.	Ghana	 is	used	as	a	 case	 study	 in	 sub-Saharan	
Africa	because	of	its	dual	tenure	regimes	-	customary	and	statutory	systems.	Following	
the	above	state	of	the	art,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	how	changes	in	land	markets	are	
benefiting	 or	 hampering	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 smallholders.	 This	 chapter	 specifically	
identifies	 the	 winners	 and	 the	 losers	 in	 customary	 land	 transactions;	 and	 seeks	 to	
examine	 the	nature	and	extent	of	 losses	and	gains,	when	 land	prices	change.	The	 last	
objective	 explores	 available	 opportunities	 to	 ensure	 win-win	 outcomes	 for	 both	 the	
large	agro-investors	and	subsisting	smallholders.	
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The	study	is	significant	because	it	examines	the	position	that,	agricultural	modernisation	
that	 focuses	 on	 promoting	 elite,	 progressive	 and	 resourceful	 farmers,	 who	 deploy	
various	agricultural	 technologies	would	eventually	 trickle	down	 to	poor	peasants	 (von	
Braun	et	al.,	1994;	Dixon,	et	al.,	2001;	Ubink	and	Amanor,	2008).	Notwithstanding	the	
numerous	positive	promises	of	agricultural	commercialisation	for	local	land	users,	there	
are	also	potential	negative	impacts	on	local	land	markets.	Already,	recent	agro-investors	
are	 demanding	 large	 tracts	 of	 customary	 land	 for	 modernized	 agriculture	 and	 these	
have	 raised	 lots	 of	 tenure	 concerns	 due	 to	 the	 unique	 conception	 of	 customary	
landholding;	not	just	as	a	factor	of	production	but	also	a	cultural	identity	(Kasanga	and	
Kotey,	2001).	Customary	land	tenure	systems	and	land	rights	have	come	under	serious	
stress	 following	growing	demand	 for	 land	 in	Ghana	 for	agricultural	 investments.	 Since	
customary	land	tenure	in	Ghana	constitutes	a	greater	proportion	of	land,	any	disruption	
in	such	a	local	market	will	have	vicious	impacts	on	rural	peasants	who	depend	so	much	
on	 land	 for	 their	 livelihoods.	When	 smallholders	 are	 dispossessed	 of	 their	 land,	 they	
may	be	compelled	to	invent	new	forms	of	livelihoods	when	farming	in	the	vicinity	is	no	
more	an	option	(Cotula,	2013).			
Ghana	is	an	interesting	location	for	this	study	because	it	has	remained	one	of	the	major	
destinations	 for	 large-scale	 land	 acquisition	 in	 the	 sub-region.	 Particularly,	 the	
government	of	Ghana	has	directly	promoted	the	commercialisation	and	modernization	
of	agriculture	as	a	means	to	sustaining	national	food	security	(see	MiDA,	2006;	Ahwoi,	
2010).	However,	 in	promoting	 these	 land	deals	and	 investments,	 it	 should	be	 realized	
that	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 host	 communities	 ought	 to	 be	 considered.	With	 this	 in	 mind,	
Agbosu	et	al.	 (2007)	emphasized	that	when	dealing	with	people	and	their	 relationship	
with	natural	resources,	issues	of	efficiency,	equity,	consultation	and	participation	of	all	
stakeholders,	 especially,	 the	 local	 communities	 whose	 livelihoods	 depend	 on	 natural	
resources	should	be	key	in	the	transactions.	Notwithstanding	this	and	similar	cautions	in	
the	 literature,	 there	 are	 still	 some	 evidences	 of	 community	 rejections	 of	 agro-
investments	 in	Ghana	(see	Nyari,	2008).	Hence,	there	is	the	need	to	empirically	take	a	
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critical	look	at	the	nature	of	recent	large-land	acquisitions	and	operations	of	large-agro	
investments	in	Ghana,	to	identify	the	winners	and	losers.		
5.2	Impacts	of	new	large-land	acquisitions	in	Africa	
The	agricultural	sector	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	has	historically	been	under-funded,	leading	
to	 stagnation	 in	agricultural	growth	over	 the	 last	2	decades	 (see	Figure	5.1).	Over	 the	
past	 two	 to	 three	decades,	 it	was	 established	 that	 public	 investment	 in	 agriculture	 in	
developing	economies	has	either	declined	or	has	been	stagnant	(Fan	and	Rao,	2003;	Fan	
and	 Saurkar,	 2006)	 due	 to	 public	 sector	 resource	 constraints.	 Since	 agro-investments	
have	 potential	 opportunities	 for	 an	 already	 long-neglected	 sector	 (von	 Braun	 and	
Meinzen-Dick,	2009;	Deininger	and	Byer-lee,	2011;	Deininger	et	al.,	2011;	Dessy	et	al.,	
2012),	they	are	worth	the	efforts	of	governments	to	promote.	Narula	(2013)	argues	that	
the	 recent	 agro-investments	 are	 a	 means	 to	 fighting	 hunger,	 generating	 economic	
growth	 and	 reducing	 poverty.	 This	 is	 because	 large-scale	 land	 and	 agricultural	
investments	 are	 attracting	 massive	 foreign	 capital	 investments	 in	 idle/underutilised	
lands	in	Africa	(Badiane,	2011).			
	
Figure	5:1	Regional	trends	in	agricultural	production	
Source:	FAOSTAT	Data	(2014)		
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Agricultural	investments	have	the	potential	to	improve	the	much-needed	infrastructure	
and	 reduce	 poverty	 in	 host	 countries	 (Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Besides	 generating	
employment,	large-scale	agro-investments	offer	new	opportunities	for	contract	farming,	
promote	 equitable	 growth,	 encourage	 the	 transfer	 of	 technology,	 improve	 local	
producers’	access	to	credit	and	markets,	and	increase	public	revenues	from	taxation	and	
export	 duties	 (von	 Braun	 and	 Meinzen-Dick,	 2009;	 Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2011:131;	 FAO,	
2012b;	Narula,	2013).	Commercial	agriculture	can	also	increase	the	production	of	local	
food	crops	for	the	local	markets	and	supply	other	essential	food	needs	to	international	
consumers	through	the	use	of	new	technologies	(Cotula,	2013).			
For	countries	acquiring	land	abroad	to	grow	staple	foods,	such	investments	can	reduce	
over-dependence	 on	 international	 markets	 for	 food	 supply,	 and	 thus	 increase	 food	
security	 for	 investor	 countries	 (Narula,	 2013).	 The	 Government	 of	 Ghana	 views	 the	
renewed	inflow	of	agricultural	foreign	direct	investments	(FDIs)	as	a	means	of	improving	
the	 fortunes	 of	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 key	 economic	 development	
strategy	 (Ahwoi,	 2010).	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 efforts	 of	 large-scale	
investors	are	state-driven	through	policy	formulation	and	making	land	available	in	safe	
and	suitable	locations.	Ghana	has	also	generally	been	liberal	with	agricultural	FDIs,	since	
renewed	investment	in	agriculture	is	seen	as	an	opportunity	for	poverty	reduction	and	
food	security.			
Unlike	 formalised	agricultural	 land	markets,	agricultural	 land	 in	Ghana	 is	 customary	 in	
nature,	 largely	dominated	by	 informal	 transactions	and	not	completely	commoditized.	
In	 the	 past,	 traditional	 authorities	 made	 grants	 to	 migrant	 farmers	 and	 other	 users	
under	 oral	 and	 non-monetary	 terms	 (see	 Hill,	 1963;	 Amanor,	 2008).	 In	 recent	 times,	
cash-based	leases	have	become	common.	However,	informal	land	alienation	in	the	form	
of	abunu	 and	abusa	 tenancies	 continues	 to	 thrive	 especially	 in	 the	Akyem	and	Ahafo	
communities	 (see	 Amanor,	 2006).	 The	 increasing	 demand	 for	 productive	 land	 has	
potentials	 of	 worsening	 land	 tenure	 and	 livelihood	 insecurity,	 following	 competition	
among	various	 land	uses	and	users.	 It	 is	 the	view	of	 the	FoodSPAN	 (2012:2)	“that	 the	
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commoditization	 of	 land	 and	 the	 disposal	 of	 large	 tracts	 of	 land	 for	 investments	 pose	
increasing	threats	to	customary	land	rights	holders”.	Hence,	there	is	the	need	to	ensure	
that	customary	land	management	structures	in	Ghana	prevent	the	two	extremes	of	few	
winners	and	majority	losers.	The	increasing	demand	for	agricultural	land	may	jointly	be	
influenced	by	 growth	 in	 smallholder	 population	 and	 the	 activities	 of	medium	 to	 large	
agro-investors.	 Consequently,	 the	 existing	 land	 tenure	 enables	 few	 powerful-elites	 to	
usurp	 potential	 benefits,	 to	 the	 neglect	 of	 the	 larger	 vulnerable	 in	 society,	 who	 are	
merely	viewed	as	 subjects	of	allodial	groups	and	not	as	co-owners	of	customary	 land.	
Such	transaction	may	therefore	result	in	winners	and	losers.		
5.3 Analysis	and	Findings	
Based	 on	 the	 qualitative	 data	 collected	 from	 the	 study	 of	 two	 large	 agro-investment	
companies	in	Ghana	and	from	four	operational	communities,	this	section	of	the	chapter	
discusses	 the	 perceptions	 of	 smallholders	 on	 winners	 and	 losers	 in	 large	 land	
transactions.	It	also	documents	actual	gains	and	losses	from	large-scale	land	acquisitions	
in	host	communities,	and	opportunities	that	exist	for	win-win	outcomes.	
5.3.1	Perceptions	about	winners		
There	 are	 varied	 conceptualisations	 of	 the	 winners	 when	 land	 prices	 change	 due	 to	
emerging	 trends	 in	 land	markets	 in	Ghana.	From	the	case	studies	 in	Ghana,	 the	study	
identified	 winners	 in	 land	 transactions	 to	 include	 chiefs	 and	 family	 heads	 entrusted	
allodial	 lands;	 resourceful	 local	 elites,	 politicians	 and	 speculators;	 local	 government	
institutions;	and	central	government.	From	the	sampled	perceptions	of	households	on	
the	winners	and	 losers	when	 land	prices	change,	94	of	 the	 respondents	 reported	 that	
land	 rents	had	changed	considerably	due	 to	 the	activities	of	 large	 land	acquisition.	As	
shown	 in	 Figure	 5.1,	 the	majority	 of	 respondents	 believed	 that	 chiefs	 were	 the	 ones	
gaining	from	changes	in	land	prices	and	large-scale	land	transactions.	Two	reasons	could	
have	influenced	such	perceptions.	Firstly,	chiefs	in	acting	as	trustees	of	customary	land,	
front	all	land	transactions	with	limited	involvement	of	communities.	Secondly,	chiefs	are	
not	obliged	by	any	custom	to	account	for	stool	land	revenue.		
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It	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 revenue	 from	 stool	 land	 transactions	 or	 rent	 accrued	 from	
stool	lands	is	to	be	used	for	the	maintenance	of	the	stool	in	keeping	with	its	status	(see	
Article	 267(6a),	 Fourth	 Republican	 Constitution	 of	 Ghana,	 1992).	 In	 many	 instances,	
chiefs	 in	 Ghana	 have	 consistently	 implemented	 the	 constitutional	 provision	 of	 Article	
267(6a),	 but	 blatantly	 disregard	 Article	 36(8)	 that	 recognizes	 chiefs	 as	 “…fiduciaries	
charged	with	 the	obligation	 to	discharge	 their	 functions	 for	 the	benefit	 respectively	of	
the	 people	 of	 Ghana,	 of	 the	 stool,	 skin,	 or	 family	 concerned	 and	 are	 accountable	 as	
fiduciaries	in	this	regard”. Payments	for	land	or	land	related	services	through	chiefs,	has	
often	 been	 described	 as	drink/kola.	 Since	drink	monies	 are	 best	 described	 as	 gifts	 to	
chiefs,	one	is	not	compelled	to	account	for	these	gifts.		
	
Figure	5:2	Households	perceptions	on	winners	in	land	price	changes	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
Following	this	constitutional	empowerment,	chiefs	who	hold	allodial	interest	to	land,	as	
trustees,	 are	major	beneficiaries	of	 land	 transactions	 in	Ghana	due	 to	 their	 privileged	
customary	position.	Chiefs	also	serve	as	negotiators	of	land	prices,	fixers	of	land	rents,	
receivers	 of	 land	 revenues	 and	 the	 decision	 makers	 on	 the	 utilisation	 of	 the	 land	
revenue.	 According	 to	 Amanor	 (2008),	 the	 powers	 of	 chiefs	 in	 land	 transactions	 are	
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anchored	in	local	customs.	Even	though	culture	is	dynamic	to	changing	needs,	the	roles	
of	chiefs	in	land	transaction	have	remained	resilient.	Several	initiatives	by	governments	
in	the	past	to	strengthen	customary	tenure	tend	to	reinforce	the	position	for	land	to	be	
administered	 by	 chiefs	 as	 trustees.	 In	 recognition	 of	 this,	 chiefs	 are	 entreated	 to	 be	
agents	 of	 land	 reforms	 and	 to	 make	 land	 available	 for	 investments	 that	 create	
employment	opportunities	and	promote	agro-industrialisation.			
As	 was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 separate	 FGDs	 in	 Dukusen	 and	 Afrisire	 (2012),	 land	
transactions	were	negotiated	and	completed	at	the	Omanhene’s	palace,	and	community	
chiefs	(Odikro)	were	invited	for	few,	short	discussions.	It	was	revealed	that	the	payment	
of	 US$	 23,000	 as	 drink	 money	 by	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 went	 to	 the	 Agogo	 Traditional	
Council	(ATC)	while	the	Gh¢6,00029	kola	money	from	ITFC	Ltd	went	to	the	Ya	Na.	Besides	
the	kola	money	 paid	 to	 the	 chiefs,	 they	are	also	entitled	 to	a	 share	of	 annual	 ground	
rent	paid	through	the	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Lands	(OASL)30.	Communities	
around	the	ScanFarm	project	expressed	disappointments	during	the	FGDs	(2012)	about	
their	limited	involvement	during	the	land	and	investment	negotiations.		
This	 is	 apparently	 contrary	 to	 the	 customary	 tenets	 on	 land	ownership	 in	Ghana	 that	
views	land	as	a	communal	asset	(see	Ollennu	1962;	da	Rocha	and	Lodoh,	1999;	Kasanga	
and	Kotey,	2001),	and	as	such	its	disposal	must	 involve	principal	stakeholders	(Sarbah,	
1968:67).	 According	 to	 Odhiambo	 (2011:17),	 the	 lack	 of	 engagement	 of	 local	
communities	 in	 land	negotiations	 is	a	missed	opportunity	 towards	 the	actualisation	of	
promised	 benefits,	 to	 optimize	 public	 interest	 (see	 also	 Cotula	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Allodial	
titleholders	 (i.e.	 paramount	 Stools)	 have	 by	 these	 actions,	 flouted	 the	 above	 basic	
customary	 principle	 regarding	 land	 alienation	 in	 Ghana.	 Following	 these	 revelations,	
customary	 land	 tenure	 in	 Ghana	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	 one	 that	 has	 disempowered	
																																																								
29	As	of	15th	May	2014,	US$	1	is	equivalent	to	GH	¢2.90	and	1euro	was	equivalent	to	GH	¢	3.97	
30	The	1992	Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana	and	the	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Lands	
Act,	1994,	Act	841)	both	point	to	enforce	the	position	of	the	Chief	as	trustee	of	communal	or	lineage	land.	
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smallholders,	while	promoting	an	egalitarian	 system,	which	 is	unrepresentative	of	 the	
interests	of	the	community	(Amanor,	2008:78).	
	
In	 the	 northern	 regions	 of	Ghana	where	 family	 landholdings	 tend	 to	 dominate	 at	 the	
village	level,	family	heads	holding	family	land	in	trust	for	the	family	were	also	perceived	
to	 be	 benefiting	 from	emerging	 land	 transactions.	Usufruct	 families	 also	 benefit	 from	
land	price	 changes	 through	direct	 lump	 sum	payments	 and	annual	 ground	 rents	 from	
tenants.	Besides	 chiefs,	 family	heads	 also	hold	 freeholds	 interests	 in	 trust	 for	 families	
especially	 in	the	three	northern	regions	of	Ghana.	Around	stool	 land	areas,	 indigenous	
families	 and	 sometimes	 migrants	 may	 also	 own	 usufruct	 rights	 through	 long-loyal	
service	to	the	Omanhene	(paramount	chief)	or	their	usufruct	masters.			
Family	heads	are	allowed	 the	 freedom	to	alienate	 family	 land,	and	 the	proceeds	used	
for	the	benefit	of	the	entire	family.	From	the	FGDs	in	Gushie	and	Tunayili	(2013)	around	
the	ITFC	project,	proceeds	from	land	transactions	in	the	Tamale	area	are	used	to	acquire	
family	 properties	 or	 pay	 for	 urgent	 family	 expenses	 (FGDs	 in	 Tunayili,	 2013).	 While	
chiefs	do	not	account	 for	drink	money	 under	prevailing	 customs,	 family	members	 can	
compel	a	 family	head	to	give	detailed	accounts	of	 transactions	and	expenditures	 from	
family	land	revenue.	Chiefs	and	families	may,	however,	be	compelled	under	Article	36(8)	
of	the	Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992)	and	Section	1(1-3)	of	the	Head	of	
Family	 (Accountability)	 Law,	 1985	 (PNDC	 Law	 114),	 respectively,	 to	 account	 for	 land	
revenue.	 Unfortunately,	 these	 legislations	 are	 hardly	 applied.	 Where	 family	 land	 is	
severed	or	 completely	encumbered	upon	by	any	 large	 land	 transaction,	a	 family	head	
may	receive	incidental	compensation	on	behalf	of	the	entire	family.		In	a	majority	of	the	
cases,	however,	families	are	entitled	to	a	share	of	community	land,	and	any	reallocation	
by	the	allodial	chief	requires	re-instatement	on	alternative	land	as	a	right	or	payment	of	
compensation	(FGD	in	Gushie,	2013).			
However,	where	 local	 customs	do	not	 recognise	a	people	as	owners	of	 land,	 they	are	
not	entitled	to	compensation	even	when	they	are	dispossessed.	They	may	only	be	paid	
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compensation	 if	 their	 crops	 are	 destroyed.	 Following	 this	 loophole,	 most	 allodial	
custodians	undertake	land	transactions	in	the	dry	season	when	no	crops	are	destroyed	
and	hence	deny	migrant	farmers	any	form	of	compensation.	Compensation	to	title-less	
farmers	 is	 paid	 for	 crops,	 not	 for	 the	 land	 (Cernea,	 1988;	 Cotula,	 2013:131).	 It	 is	
noteworthy	 that	 lump	 sum	 compensation	 per	 se	 is	 not	 a	 panacea	 to	 the	 risks	 of	
expropriation.	 According	 to	 Cernea	 (1988),	 the	 lump	 sum	 cash	 payments	 to	
expropriated	land	users	without	the	capacity	to	convert	such	payments	into	productive	
investments	with	reliable	income	flow,	risk	losing	such	compensation.			
Around	 the	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 concession,	 affected	 usufructs	 were	 offered	 cash	
compensation	at	a	rate	of	Gh¢	33/acre	(Gh¢	80/ha	–	equivalent	to	US$	42	as	of	1st	April,	
2013),	while	migrant	 farmers	were	 not	 compensated	 for	 loss	 of	 farmlands	 (Interview	
with	ScanFarm	Ltd,	2012).	 In	the	case	of	 ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd,	a	 lump	sum	of	Gh¢	5,000	(US$	
2,602	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	was	paid	to	the	chiefs	to	be	disbursed	to	23	affected	farmers.	
During	 the	 data	 triangulation,	 it	was	 not	 confirmed	 if	 this	money	was	 disbursed,	 and	
how	much	 each	 received.	 From	 the	 household	 survey,	 15	 households	 from	 the	 ITFC	
project	and	4	from	the	ScanFarm	project	were	expropriated.	Compensation	was	paid	to	
6	out	of	the	15	affected	households	in	the	ITFC	project	while	no	compensation	was	paid	
to	the	4	affected	farmers	in	the	ScanFarm	project.	It	was	revealed	that,	uncompensated	
farmers	are	not	pursuing	outstanding	compensation	for	fear	of	victimisation.		
According	to	Fiadzigbey	(2006:7),	the	head	of	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Lands	
in	Ghana,		
	
“chiefs	 and	 heads	 of	 families	 collect	 huge	 sums	 of	money	which	 they	 term	
“drink”	 (premium)	money,	 for	 every	 parcel	 of	 land	 leased.	 Such	monies	 are	
not	 accounted	 for	 to	 the	 community	 members.	 Furthermore,	 many	 stools	
may	not	have	proper	records	of	what	and	how	much	money	they	receive	from	
rents	and	royalty	payment.	Any	records	that	may	exist	may	not	be	accessible	
to	the	community	members	who	might	want	verification	of	specific	or	general	
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transactions	undertaken	by	traditional	authorities.	They	do	not	think	it	fit	to	
inform	 their	 communities	 about	 receipt	 and	 disbursement	 of	 stool	 land	
revenues.	The	lack	of	absence	of	accountability	is	a	source	of	agitation	by	the	
youth	in	many	communities.”			
Schoneveld	et	al.	(2011)	and	Wisborg	(2012)	believe	that	the	strong	customary	system	
in	Ghana	enables	large	land	acquisition	through	traditional	authorities	at	the	expense	of	
the	 local	 citizenry.	 Chiefs	 have	 been	 very	 conspicuous	 in	 attracting,	 negotiating	 and	
alienating	customary	 land,	 to	 large-scale	agro-investors.	Boamah	(2014)	has	attributed	
the	 domineering	 stance	 of	 chiefs	 to	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 re-establishing	 authority	 over	
customary	 lands	and	boundaries	 in	Ghana.	Some	chiefs	are	motivated	by	the	fact	that	
some	customary	lands	over	the	years	are	occupied	by	non-compliant	migrants	who	fail	
to	pay	customary	tributes	(see	Boamah,	2014).	Ubink	and	Quan	(2008),	Tsikata	and	Yaro	
(2011)	and	King	and	Bugri	(2013)	have	identified	that	the	lowering	enthusiasm	of	chiefs	
towards	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 limited	 statutory	
compulsion	for	chiefs	to	deliver	on	their	mandates.	According	to	Cotula	(2013),	revenue	
accruing	 to	chiefs	 from	 large	 land	 transactions	presents	an	opportunity	 to	consolidate	
their	 chieftaincy	powers	 if	 such	 revenue	 is	 channelled	 into	developmental	projects.	 In	
another	extent,	if	the	grant	by	a	paramount	chief	is	uncontested	by	neighbouring	chiefs,	
community	members	or	government,	it	confirms	his	authority,	boundaries	and	title	(see	
Lund,	2011;	Boamah,	2014).			
Local	 and	 central	 governments	 were	 also	 perceived	 to	 be	 benefiting	 from	 new	 land	
transactions	 from	 Figure	 5.2.	 According	 to	 Article	 267	 (6c)	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Republican	
Constitution	of	Ghana	 (1992),	 and	 the	Office	 of	 the	Administrator	 of	 Stool	 Lands	Act,	
1994	(Act	481),	District	Assemblies31	receive	55%	share	of	all	revenues	from	customary	
lands	in	the	form	of	rents,	dues,	royalties,	revenues	or	other	payments,	whether	in	the	
form	 of	 income	 or	 capital.	 As	 local	 level	 planning	 authorities,	 local	 government																																																									
31	District,	Municipal	or	Metropolitan	Assemblies	are	local	government	institutions	established	under	the	
Local	 Government	 Act,	 1993	 (Act	 462)	 to	 spearhead	 decentralised	 local-level	 administration	 and	
development.		
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authorities	 particularly	 help	 in	 legitimising	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 by	 endorsing	
their	conformity	to	local	 level	 land	use	and	development	of	plans.	Fiadzigbey	(2006:7),	
however,	 describes	 the	 District,	 Municipal	 and	 Metropolitan	 Assemblies	 as	 “worst	
culprits	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 accountability”.	 In	 her	 view,	 income	 accruing	 to	 local	
governments,	as	 its	 share	of	 land	 revenue,	 is	not	always	used	 for	 the	development	of	
the	 districts.	 Yet,	 there	 are	 no	 monitoring	 mechanisms	 for	 how	 these	 monies	 are	
expended,	and	the	District	Assemblies	are	not	obliged	to	account	to	the	community	for	
the	use	of	this	revenue	or	earmark	it	for	infrastructure/services.			
It	is	probably	in	line	with	these	persisting	shortfalls	in	the	local	governments	that	many	
of	 the	 respondents	 formed	 their	 perceptions.	 As	 of	 April	 2013	 when	 studies	 were	
conducted	 on	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 and	 ITFC	 (Gh)	 Ltd,	 the	 Asante-Akim	 North	 and	
Savelugu-Nanton	 Districts	 had	 both	 not	 received	 ground	 rents	 due	 them	 from	 the	
investors	(Interview	with	OASL-Konongo,	2012	and	Savelugu-Nanton	District	Assembly,	
2013).	ScanFarm	Ltd	had	agreed	with	the	Agogo	Traditional	Council	(ATC)	to	commence	
payment	after	the	lease	registration	is	finalised	with	the	Lands	Commission.	On	the	part	
of	 ITFC	 Ltd,	 they	 had	 agreed	 to	 pay	 ground	 rent	 directly	 to	 the	 Ya	 Na	 but	 since	 the	
Dagbon	skin	remains	vacant;	such	annual	rental	payments	have	been	deferred.				
Central	government	according	to	4percent	of	the	respondents	also	benefit	 from	large-
scale	 land	 transactions	because	 it	was	believed	 that	government	had	been	paid	 some	
money. According	to	the	land	grabbing	literature,	central	governments	of	host	countries	
stand	to	benefit	 from	taxes	especially	 in	the	form	of	corporate	 income	tax	and	export	
duties	 (Cotula,	 2013;	 FAO,	 2012b).	 However,	 weak	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 from	
responsible	 tax	 agencies	 may	 leave	 these	 taxes	 uncollected.	 During	 the	 study,	 both	
ScanFarm	Ltd	and	ITFC	Ltd	were	operating	under	the	licences	of	the	Ghana	Free	Zones	
Board	 (GFZB)32	and	 the	Ghana	 Investment	 Promotion	 Centre	 (GIPC)33.	 Under	many	 of	
these	certifications,	taxes	are	usually	not	payable	until	the	investors’	operations	become																																																									
32	Set	up	under	the	Ghana	Free	Zone	Board	(GFZB)	Act,	1995	(Act	504)	
33	Established	under	the	Ghana	Investment	Promotion	Centre	Act,	1994	(Act	478)	
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profitable.	 Government	 incentives,	 such	 as	 duty-free	 importations	 and	 special	 free	
zones	 for	 agricultural	 products	 also	 further	 decrease	 the	 government’s	 sources	 of	
revenue.	 Possible	 benefits	 of	 large-scale	 land	 acquisition	 can	 also	 be	 subverted	 by	
speculative	 foreign	 investments,	which	may	 fail	 to	materialize	as	envisaged.	 In	Ghana,	
an	example	of	 such	speculative	 investment	 is	 the	Biofuel	Africa	project	 in	Alipe	 in	 the	
Northern	Region,	which	folded	up	in	less	than	3years	of	operation.			
Also,	 5percent	 of	 the	 respondents	 believed	 that,	 local	 elite	 and	 speculators	 (called	
businessmen)	were	benefiting	from	recent	large	land	transactions	in	Ghana.	Local	elites	
and	 speculators,	 who	 acquired	 agricultural	 lands	 in	 the	 past,	 were	 reported	 to	 be	
cashing-in	 on	 increasing	 land	 rents	 to	 smallholders.	 Some	 of	 these	 acquisitions	 were	
made	 privately	 while	 anticipating	 secondary	 markets	 with	 foreign	 investors	 and	 new	
settler	 farmers.	 It	 is	 feared	 that	 land	 speculation	 will	 result	 in	 the	 dispossession	 of	
vulnerable	rural	populations	and	rent	capture	(Durand-Lasserve	and	Selod,	2012:11)	by	
new	medium	 to	 large	 landlords.	 According	 to	 Deininger	 et	 al.	 (2011),	many	 investors	
acquire	more	land	than	they	have	the	ability	to	develop	and	their	speculative	behaviour	
is	detrimental	to	smallholders	who	may	be	evicted	without	alternative	production	lands.	
The	 village	 surveys	 in	 Dukusen	 and	 Afrisire	 (2012)	 revealed	 that	 some	 local	 investors	
from	 Agogo	 have	 also	 acquired	 and	 registered	 concessions	 for	 medium-sized	 tree	
plantations	 and	 are	 renting	 portions	 of	 this	 land	 to	migrant	 farmers.	 Foresight	 about	
potential	benefits	from	speculating	in	land	may	explain	why	businessmen	are	acquiring	
moderate	 tracts	 of	 land	 in	 both	 Agogo	 and	 Tamale	 for	 teak	 and	 mango	 plantations	
respectively.	
5.3.2	Perception	of	losers	
On	the	part	of	household	perceptions	on	 losers	 in	 land	price	changes,	 it	was	 revealed	
that	 sharecroppers	were	 greatly	 impacted	 as	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 5.3.	 From	 the	 study,	
migrant	 farmers	 in	 the	 four	 study	 areas	 access	 land	 through	express	 permission	 from	
the	chief/family/clan	heads	or	through	share	tenancy	arrangements	with	 local	 farmers	
or	 directly	 from	 the	 community	 chief.	 From	 the	 village	 surveys,	 both	 indigenes	 and	
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migrant	farmers	have	informal	and	unregistered	interests	to	the	lands	cultivated.	They	
could	 only	 show	 evidence	 of	 use	 and	 consolidate	 these	 rights	 annually	 by	 paying	
appropriate	 customary	 rents	 to	 their	 landlords	 or	 rely	 on	 the	 affirmation	 of	 their	
neighbours.	 Evidence	of	use	or	 continuous	use	of	 land	has	been	 identified	as	a	major	
tenure	security	measure	for	informal	tenures	generally	(Janvry	et	al.,	2015),	where	the	
opportunities	 for	 title	 registration	 are	 unavailable.	 Following	 the	 commoditisation	 of	
land	and	recent	demand-driven	rent	adjustment	as	was	reported,	one	identified	group	
of	people	 losing	out	 in	 large-scale	 land	deals	 are	migrant	 farmers.	A	 study	by	Duncan	
(2000)	documented	 that	 landlords	arbitrarily	 changed	 the	 terms	of	 share	 tenancies	at	
will,	due	to	the	verbal	nature	of	many	of	these	arrangements.		
	
	
Figure	5:3	Households	perceptions	on	losers	in	land	price	changes	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
During	the	study,	 it	was	revealed	that	migrant	farmers	now	have	to	cash-rent	 land,	or	
pay	 more	 in	 crop-share	 for	 leased	 land	 around	 the	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 study	
communities	(FGDs	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire,	2012).	Indeed	the	commoditization	of	land	
stands	 to	 favour	 greatly,	 those	 with	 purchasing	 power	 (Chimhowu	 and	 Woodhouse,	
2006),	 and	 not	 those	 whose	 rights	 are	 customarily	 and	 legally	 insecure.	 Since	
sharecropping	 is	generally	seen	as	an	opportunity	 for	 resource-poor	 farmers	 to	access	
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productive	land	and	to	minimize	their	risks	(Lavigne	et	al.,	2002),	increment	in	land	rents	
or	share	of	crops	will	be	a	major	disincentive	to	engage	in	such	land	transactions.	Two	
specific	cases	of	migrant	farmer	dispossessions	are	captured	in	Box	1	and	Box	2.	From	
these	narrations,	land	ownership	and	right	to	compensation	are	influenced	significantly	
by	 the	 citizenship	 status	 of	 a	 farmer.	 Indigenes	 have	 better	 opportunities	 to	 access	
compensation	than	migrants.	In	these	two	dispossession	stories,	it	can	be	deduced	that	
the	 grievances	 of	 dispossessed	 settler	 farmers	 go	 beyond	 their	wishes	 for	 cash-based	
compensation.	Dispossessed	migrants	may	only	wish	for	advance	notification	in	order	to	
find	alternative	parcels	before	the	next	farming	season	in	order	not	to	be	left	stranded.		
Box	1	and	2	–	Dispossession	Stories	of	a	Two	Migrant	Farmers	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013	
Case 1 
Francis Sey, Male (32years) migrated into Dukusen in 2003 after he dropped out of 
Junior High School to engage in yam production which is a very lucrative venture in the 
area. In 2008, after 5years of production on various plots on rotation bases, ScanFarm 
Ltd cleared all the lowland areas for Jatropha production. He lost these farmlands 
without any prior information. He conceded that he did not acquire this land from the 
Agogomanhene or from any native usufruct, but he paid annual ground rent to the Odikro. 
However, he expected to be informed in advance so that he could seek alternative 
farmland for his yam seeds since land preparations are usually done in the short dry 
season: the same time ScanFarm Ltd, cleared the Jatropha fields. As a settler farmer, 
Francis Sey, did not expect to be compensated, he only wished he had been informed 
ahead of time. At the time of the study, he was compelled to sell his yam seeds and take to 
maize production the next season.  
 
Case 2 
Felicia Nobi, Female (50years) and her late husband migrated from Nandom in the 
Upper West Region into Dukusen in 1993. They were in search of favourable farming 
conditions and an opportunity to start their new family together. They acquired 5acres 
(2hectares) from a native usufruct from Agogo on share-tenancy arrangement, to farm on 
his land while guarding the plot. In 2008, ScanFarm Ltd acquired the whole area 
including their parcel. Since her husband was sick at the time, there was nobody to stand 
up for her rights or communicate her grievances. She complained to the landlord who 
promised to seek redress. Subsequently, the landlord was singled out and compensated 
for loss of land as a usufruct but Felicia Nobi received no compensation for deprivation 
of use of land. As a settler farmer she received no compensation because she was a non-
native of Agogo and her land use rights are subject to that of her landlord. Since she had 
no farmland at the time of the survey, she offered farm labour to ScanFarm Ltd and 
sometimes worked for her neighbours in return for cash or food.  
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It	 was	 also	 found	 that	 women	 were	 affected	 by	 land	 market	 changes	 due	 to	 the	
widespread	 cultural	 discrimination	 in	 women’s	 access	 to	 land.	 Behrman	 et	 al.	 (2011)	
indicated	 that	 the	 gender	 differentiated	 impacts	 of	 large-scale	 agriculture	 especially	
those	targeting	infertile	lands	(example	to	cultivate	Jatropha	curcas	for	biofuel)	usually	
affect	 women	 the	most	 due	 to	 already	 existing	 limitations	 to	 land	 ownership	 in	 sub-
Saharan	 Africa	 (Gray	 and	 Kevane,	 1992)	 and	 their	 restricted	 access	 to	 fertile	 plots.	
Quisumbing	 (1998)	 has	 stated	 emphatically	 that	 refocusing	 on	 large-scale	 commercial	
agriculture	leads	to	changes	in	property	rights	-	often	to	the	detriment	of	women.	The	
privatization	 and	 commercialisation	 of	 land	 in	 West	 Africa	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	
concentration	 of	 land	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 those	 who	 can	 assert	 their	 ownership,	 to	 the	
detriment	of	poor	rural	women	or	ethnic	minorities	excluded	from	the	highly	monetized	
land	market	(Lastarria-Cornhiel,	1997).	Though	it	is	believed	that	large-scale	commercial	
agriculture	will	improve	agricultural	technology	to	smallholders,	it	is	uncertain	how	this	
will	impact	on	women	employment	opportunities	generally.			
According	 to	 Quisumbing	 (1998),	 new	 technologies	 will	 only	 increase	 women	
employment	 opportunities	 if	 these	 technologies	 make	 simultaneous	 demand	 for	
women-specific	 labour	 and	 if	 women	 control	 valuable	 resources.	 Unnevehr	 and	
Stanford	 (1985)	 explained	 that	 labour-demanding	 technological	 changes	 will	 increase	
demand	 for	 labour,	 but	 labour-saving	 technological	 changes	 will	 reduce	 employment	
opportunities	 in	 the	 host	 country.	 In	 the	 studied	 communities	 around	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	
Ltd,	 Jatropha	curcas	 cultivation	offered	more	 jobs	 for	women	 in	 the	seed	nursery	and	
planting	 fields	 than	maize	 farming	has	 done	 since	 2010.	Mango	plantations	 in	Gushie	
and	Tunayili	belonging	to	ITFC	Ltd	offered	more	jobs	to	women	on	the	nucleus	farm	and	
in	 the	park	house	while	men	were	responsible	 for	 field	clearing	and	bushfire	controls.	
Losses	to	women	under	large-scale	commercial	agriculture	are	tied	to	tenure	insecurity	
and	not	just	employment	discrimination.	It	was	generally	revealed	that	women’s	access	
to	customary	land	in	Ghana	for	agriculture	is	not	a	problem,	but	ownership	of	such	land	
is	highly	constrained.	In	all	four	(4)	communities	studied,	women	can	access	customary	
land	to	support	their	own	production	but	cannot	assert	ownership.	Most	of	these	grants	
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to	women	were	regarded	as	akyedie	(gifts	in	Akan).	According	to	the	Magazia	of	Gushie	
(2013),	women	find	it	difficult	to	rent	land	due	to	limited	resources	and	increasing	rents.	
During	the	FGDs	in	Gushie	(2013),	it	was	reported	that,	
	
“For	every	piece	of	 land	we	need	for	farming,	we	now	have	to	acquire	it	
from	our	husbands	or	from	others	who	may	need	us	to	plant	groundnuts,	
beans	 or	 other	 plants	 to	 keep	 their	 fields	 active	 and	 fertile”	 (FGDs	 in	
Gushie,	2013).			
The	common	practice	of	accessing	gifted	land	for	temporal	use	is	also	being	impeded	by	
large	acquisitions	while	pushing	communities	to	 infertile	 lands,	 farther	 farms	from	the	
villages	 and	 from	 prime	 areas	 along	 major	 roads.	 Women	 who	 benefited	 a	 lot	 from	
economic	trees	such	as	sheanuts	(Vitellaria	paradoxa)	and	dawadawa	(Parkia	biglobosa)	
in	 the	 savannah	 belt	 of	 Ghana	 have	 been	 gravely	 affected.	 Such	 economic	 trees	 are	
either	uprooted	completely	or	are	restricted	from	households.			
Another	 identified	 group	 of	 perceived	 losers,	 as	 land	 rents	 change	 in	 investment	
locations	are	the	extremely	land	and	food	poor	households	who	depend	on	community	
forests	 for	 wild	 economic	 goods	 including	 sheanuts,	 dawadawa,	 game,	 mushrooms,	
snails	and	fruits	among	others;	as	a	direct	source	of	food,	cosmetics	and	medicine.	From	
these	economic	goods,	the	rural	poor	obtain	both	household	provision	and	income.	For	
example	sheabutter	is	a	very	important	product	for	the	local	people	as	a	source	of	food	
and	 is	also	 reported	to	have	both	cosmetic	and	medicinal	 functions	 (Elias	and	Carney,	
2007).	According	to	Quaye	(2008:7),	the	eating	of	wild	fruits	and	vegetables	is	a	major	
coping	mechanism	for	food	insecurity	in	Ghana.	Similar	studies	in	Nigeria	by	Idrisa	et	al.	
(2008)	 found	 that	 10percent	 of	 food	 insecure	 households	 often	 resort	 to	 eating	wild	
fruits	as	a	coping	strategy.			
For	most	communities	in	Ghana,	poor	households	depend	on	the	wild	forest	for	a	large	
proportion	of	their	food	needs.	It	is	the	case	that	most	rural	poor	depend	on	subsistence	
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agriculture	 by	 eating	 what	 they	 produce	 and	 producing	 what	 they	 eat	 (Odhiambo,	
2011).	 Hence,	 any	 disruption	 of	 their	 productive	 space	 will	 spell	 doom	 for	 poverty	
reduction	 initiatives.	However,	 due	 to	 the	 huge	 demand	 for	 land	 by	 foreign	 investors	
and	other	medium-scale	holders,	existing	usufructs	are	warding	off	intruders	from	their	
parcels	 as	 a	 means	 of	 enforcing	 their	 ownership	 and	 to	 preserve	 resources	 from	
exploitation.	In	commercial	agriculture,	large	amounts	of	flora	and	fauna	are	lost	due	to	
clearance	 of	 vegetation	 to	 give	 way	 for	 mechanized	 farming.	 In	 most	 of	 these	 host	
communities	 in	Ghana,	 large-scale	agriculture	 is	 completely	new,	and	biodiversity	 loss	
will	 impact	on	women	 the	most.	 Rossi	 and	 Lambrou	 (2008)	 explain	 that	women	have	
specialised	 knowledge	 in	 gathering	 plant	 species	 for	 food,	 fuel	 and	 medicine.	 Many	
women	also	fall	within	the	poorer	segment	of	most	societies.		
In	the	case	of	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd,	about	200	hectares	were	initially	cleared	in	the	patchy	
grassland	close	to	Dukusen	for	Jatropha	curcas	in	the	first	year.	Subsequently,	Jatropha	
curcas	 was	 abandoned	 and	 an	 additional	 600	 hectares	 was	 cleared	 in	 one	 stretch	
towards	 the	 forest	 near	 Baamaa	 and	Nsonyameye	 for	maize	 and	 soybeans	 (Interview	
with	Dukusen	village	secretary,	2012).	This	commercial	farming	approach	raised	a	lot	of	
concerns	 for	 smallholder	 farmers,	 especially	with	 regards	 to	hunting	and	 collection	of	
snails	and	mushrooms	(FGDs	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire,	2012).	Hunting	and	trap	setting,	as	
ancestry	activities	to	supplement	household	food	and	income,	are	now	also	constricted	
to	farther	belts	or	one’s	private	farmlands.	Also,	charcoal	producers	reported	restriction	
into	 parcels	 acquired	 by	 investors,	 to	 cut	 dead	 wood	 for	 charcoal	 (Interview	 with	
Charcoal	 producer,	 Dukusen,	 2012).	 Such	 restrictions,	 according	 to	 ScanFarm	 Ltd	
(interview,	2012),	were	imposed	as	part	of	requirements	of	tree	felling	licence	from	the	
Forestry	Commission	(FC).			
In	the	Agogo	area	where	some	cash	rentals	were	reported,	lessees	reported	significant	
rent	adjustments.	During	the	FGDs	(2012)	 in	Afrisire,	a	male	member	held	the	opinion	
that	 the	 increment	 in	 ground	 rent	 was	 an	 approach	 adopted	 by	 local	 chiefs	 to	
discourage	them	from	using	productive	land	in	the	area,	in	order	for	them	to	rent	more	
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land	to	foreign	 investors	who	pay	higher	rents.	According	to	Boamah	(2014:412),	such	
approaches	by	Odikros,	who	collect	ground	rents,	are	 in	retaliation	to	several	years	of	
migrant	farmers’	evasion	of	mandated	ground	rents	together	with	agricultural	tributes.		
Similarly,	Cotula	(2013:134)	in	his	study	of	biofuel	projects	in	the	Yendi	and	Pru	Districts	
of	 Ghana	 found	 that	 monetary	 transactions	 replaced	 hitherto	 gratuitous	 lands.	 Local	
chiefs	 have	 found	 it	 convenient	 and	 efficient	 to	 collect	 revenue	 from	 large-scale	
transactions	 vis-à-vis	 the	 numerous	 defaulting	 smallholder	 tenancies.	 Large	 land	
transactions	present	an	opportunity	for	chiefs	to	receive	higher	revenues	from	investors	
than	they	would	earn	from	smallholders.	This	is	because	the	investment	companies	are	
more	 formalised	 to	 deal	 with.	 Herders	 at	 the	 village	 level	 were	 also	 impacted	 as	
confirmed	 by	 the	 respondents.	 Grazing	 lands	 in	 the	 open	 savannah	 are	 reportedly	
reduced	due	to	the	large	tracts	of	land	being	used	for	maize	farming.			
Additionally,	 recent	 land	commercialisation	presents	an	opportunity	 for	chiefs	 to	rent-
out	idle	land	that	hitherto	was	freely	granted	to	indigenes.	According	to	Amanor	(2008),	
attempts	at	land	commercialisation	have	not	only	pushed	chiefs	to	sell	land,	community	
members	especially	 the	 youth	have	been	 reduced	 to	 suppliers	of	 labour.	 This	 skewed	
form	of	 land	 allocation	 favours	 resourced	 farmers,	 especially	 foreign	 investors,	 to	 the	
neglect	of	community	members.	Considering	that	a	majority	of	Ghanaian	rural	poor	fall	
under	the	basic	needs	line	(IFAD,	2006),	land	deprivation	is	debilitating.	The	situation	is	
getting	more	complicated	 since	new	 land	 transactions	are	 formalized	and	 significantly	
different	 from	 the	 largely	 oral	 customary	 grants	 to	 indigenes.	 Recent	 large-scale	 land	
grants	 from	 chiefs	 are	 being	 made	 under	 conditions	 apparently	 more	 legally	 secure,	
with	clearly	defined	rights	than	those	offered	to	indigenes.	Though	some	portions	of	the	
new	concessions	 in	Agogo	and	Savelugu	were	appropriated	 from	usufructs,	 they	were	
hardly	contested,	since	customary	authorities	with	powers	to	define	and	redefine	land	
rights,	 authenticated	 the	 transactions.	 Even	 though	 Article	 36	 (8),	 of	 the	 Republican	
Constitution	of	Ghana	(1992)	obliges	chiefs	to	protect	and	represent	their	communities’	
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interests,	the	opportunities	of	government	control34	on	local	land	transaction	in	Ghana	
have	 been	 reduced	 to	 issuing	 consent	 and	 concurrences	 and	 not	 to	 scrutinise	 land	
transactions.		According	to	the	King	and	Bugri	(2013:10),			
“The	 government	 has	 an	 implicit	 policy	 of	 non-interference	 with	 chiefs’	
affairs,	 therefore	 the	 relevant	 government	 bodies	 tend	 to	 merely	 rubber	
stamp	 land	 deals	 negotiated	 by	 chiefs,	 to	 provide	 their	 concurrence	 in	
accordance	with	the	law	rather	than	provide	real	checks	and	balances	on	the	
nature	of	these	deals”.	
5.3.3	Beyond	Perceptions	–	actual	gains	and	losses	from	LSLAs	in	Ghana	 	
Besides	land	rental	changes	that	have	directly	affected	farmers,	the	operations	of	both	
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 and	 ITFC	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 have	 impacted	 positively	 on	 host	 communities	
especially	 in	 employment	 creation.	 For	 example,	 at	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	
ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	project,	smallholders	gained	employment	 in	field	clearance	and	de-
stumping.	At	 the	time	of	 the	study,	 female	employees	are	preferred.	This	wage-based	
farm	employment	has	potentials	 to	 increase	 the	 influences	of	women	 in	 the	home	 in	
major	 decision-making	 and	 contribution	 to	 household	 income.	 The	 interview	 with	
ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	(2012)	revealed	that	the	company	employed	55	permanent	workers	
and	 between	 40	 to	 100	 casual	workers	 at	 peak	 operations.	 Following	 the	 Company’s	
shift	 in	 operations	 from	 Jatropha	 curcas	 to	 maize	 and	 soybeans,	 they	 have	 become	
highly	mechanised,	and	hence	fewer	agricultural	labourers	are	used.	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	
is	 currently	 resorting	 to	 more	 seasonal	 and	 casual	 workers	 for	 de-stumping,	 stone	
picking,	 manual	 fertilizer	 application,	 cob	 picking	 and	 sometimes	 manual	 harvesting,	
during	heavy	rainfalls	when	the	use	of	combined	harvesters	is	impeded.		
	
																																																								
34	“The	government	has	an	 implicit	policy	of	non-interference	with	chiefs’	affairs,	 therefore	the	relevant	
government	 bodies	 tend	 to	 merely	 rubber	 stamp	 land	 deals	 negotiated	 by	 chiefs,	 to	 provide	 their	
concurrence	 in	accordance	with	 the	 law	 rather	 than	provide	 real	 checks	and	balances	on	 the	nature	of	
these	deals”	(FAO,	2013:10).	
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From	Table	5.1,	the	shift	from	Jatropha	curcas	resulted	in	a	decline	of	permanent	staff	
from	 78	 in	 2011	 to	 55	 in	 2012	while	 increasing	 casual	workers	 from	 60	 in	 2011	 to	 a	
maximum	 of	 100	 workers	 in	 2012.	 According	 to	 Deininger	 et	 al.	 (2011:39),	 the	
distribution	 of	 employment	 opportunities	 has	 greater	 impact	 on	 the	 local	 population	
when	local	hiring	policies	are	embedded	in	the	land	contract	and	when	crops	produced	
are	labour	intensive	such	as;	sugar	cane	(700	per	1000ha),	rubber	(420	per	1000ha),	oil	
palm	 (350	per	1000ha),	and	 Jatropha	curcas	 (420	per	1000ha)	 (see	also	Li,	2011:282).	
According	 to	 Rossi	 and	 Lambrou	 (2008),	 mixed	 labour	 and	 mechanised	 farming	
arrangements	 benefit	women	 especially.	 Though	 ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 initially	 recruited	
farm	labourers	from	local	communities	per	the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU),	
host	 communities	 considered	 wages	 incommensurate	 to	 the	 workload	 and	 time	
involved	and	hence	many	withdrew	their	services	after	short	engagements.	Around	the	
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 project	 area,	 some	 women	 are	 further	 benefiting	 from	 small	
businesses	in	selling	pito35	and	food	to	farm	workers.		
Table	5.1	Employment	data	of	ScanFarm	Ltd	in	2011	farming	season	
ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd														Employment	Data		 2008	 2012	
		 Male	 Female	 Total	 Total	
								General	Workers	 25	 4	 29	 No	details	
								Farm	Supervisors	 6	 1	 7	 No	details	
								Technical	Staff	 35	 3	 38	 No	details	
								Management	Staff	 4	 -	 4	 No	details	
Total	Casual	Staff	 35	 25	 60	 40	to100	
Total	Permanent	Staff	 70	 8	 78	 55	
Total	Work	Force	 105	 33	 138	 Max	-	155	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
																																																								
35	‘Pito	is	a	local	traditionally	brewed	alcoholic	beverage	in	some	parts	of	West	Africa	including	Ghana.	It	is	
produced	mainly	from	the	grains	of	guinea	corn	(Sorghum	vulgare	and	Sorghum	bicolor)	[1]	and/or	millet’	
(Duodu.	et	al,	2012:	1)	See	G.	O.	Duodu,	E.	O.	Amartey,	A.	B.	Asumadu-Sakyi,	C.	A.	Adjei,	F.	K.	Quashie,	I.	
Nsiah-Akoto,	G.	Ayanu,	Mineral	Profile	of	Pito	from	Accra,	Tamale,	Bolgatanga	and	Wa	in	Ghana,	Food	and	
Public	Health,	Vol.	2	No.	1,	2012,	pp.	1-5.	http://dx.doi.org/10.5923/j.fph.20120201.01.	
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In	the	case	of	ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd,	permanent	and	seasonal	employees	at	the	plantation,	pack	
house,	 processing	 unit,	 nursery,	 offices,	 and	 the	 bee-keeping	 project	 collectively	
employed	458	workers,	of	which	195	are	women	and	273	are	men	as	of	2012. 	At	the	
peak	of	mango	harvesting	 in	April	 and	May,	 the	 company	employs	about	2000	casual	
workers	 in	 the	 pack	 house	 and	 mango-processing	 units	 with	 majority	 of	 them	 being	
women.	The	outgrower	scheme	also	employs	1200	small-scale	farmers	(Interview	with	
ITFC,	2012).	According	to	ITFC	Ltd	(2012),	in	years	of	good	harvest,	their	labour	demand	
usually	overwhelms	supply	in	the	operational	communities	and	they	rely	on	extra	labour	
supply	 from	neighbouring	 communities	 such	 as	Diare,	Nabogu,	 Pong-Tamale,	Nanton,	
Savelugu,	and	sometimes	from	Tamale	and	Nyankpala.	The	performance	of	the	mango	
plantations	of	the	ITFC	Ltd	and	marketing	opportunities	in	the	Savelugu-Nanton	District	
have	 further	 stimulated	 private	 investments	 into	 medium-sized	 mango	 plantations.	
Cotula	(2013:160)	describes	this	as	positive	demonstration	effect.		
From	 the	 household	 surveys,	 66percent	 of	 the	 respondents	 ever	 gained	 employment	
with	 large	 agro-investment	 companies	 in	 the	 four	 study	 communities	 over	 the	 last	
decade.	 For	 respondents	 who	 gained	 employment	 in	 these	 agro-companies,	 various	
expenses	 were	 reported	 for	 the	 streams	 of	 income	 that	 helped	 augment	 family	
budgetary	constraints.	Some	32percent	of	 the	respondents	 reported	expending	wages	
on	more	food	for	household	consumption.	This	could	be	explained	by	the	seasonal	food	
insecurity	 in	 the	 savannah	 region	 especially	 between	 April	 and	 July,	 when	 most	
households	run	out	of	food	stocks.	Hence,	additional	income	from	employment	is	useful	
in	improving	the	food	and	basic	dietary	needs	of	rural	households	in	this	belt.	In	typical	
agricultural	communities,	it	would	be	expected	that	additional	income	inflow	would	be	
committed	 to	 improve	 agricultural	 productivity.	 From	 the	 data,	 22percent	 of	 the	
respondents	reported	committing	their	additional	income	to	procuring	various	forms	of	
agricultural	 inputs	 especially	 fertilizer,	 seeds	 and	 herbicides.	 Though	 this	 percentage	
may	not	be	as	high	as	one	may	expect,	 it	 is	heart-warming	 that	 some	households	are	
transmitting	 their	 additional	 income	 into	 improving	 their	 productivity.	 Health	 and	
clothing	 expenditures	 were	 also	 reported	 by	 14percent	 and	 11percent	 of	 the	
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respondents	 respectively;	while	 education,	 housing	 and	 transportation	were	 reported	
by	 9percent,	 8percent	 and	 4	 percent	 respectively.	 These	 responses	 are	 displayed	 in	
Figure	5.4			
From	the	interview	with	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	(in	2012)	and	FDGs	in	Dukusen	(in	2012),	it	
was	 reported	 that	 the	 company	 had	 assisted	 with	 building	 materials	 to	 renovate	 a	
school	 building	 at	Nsonyameye.	 ScanFarm	 Ltd	 also	 constructed	 a	main	 road	 from	 the	
Company’s	 farmhouse	 in	 Dukusen	 to	 their	 farm	 and	 through	 to	 Nsonyameye.	 At	
Dukusen,	they	assisted	in	creating	a	school	park	and	provided	some	playing	equipment	
for	 the	 pupils.	 In	 the	 past,	 they	 ploughed	 for	 some	 farmers	 without	 any	 charges.	
ScanFarm	 (Gh)	 Ltd	 also	 reported	 carrying	 out	 sanitation	 campaigns	 in	 Dukusen	 by	
providing	waste	 bins	 in	 the	 community.	 They	 talked	 about	 further	 plans	 to	 provide	 a	
community	toilet	facility,	solar	lighting	and	borehole	if	they	were	offered	suitable	sites.	
ScanFarm’s	 maize	 drying	 centre	 at	 Dukusen	 is	 also	 made	 available	 to	 farmers	 in	
surrounding	communities	to	dry	their	maize	after	harvest.		
	
	
Figure	5:4	Agricultural	household	expenses	of	wages	from	employment	
Source:	Field	Survey,	2013		
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On	the	labour	front,	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	reported	offering	additional	working	incentives	
such	 as	 wellington	 boots,	 raincoats,	 overall	 vests	 and	 health	 insurance	 for	 their	
employees.	 They	 also	provided	working	 tools	 for	 all	 the	 labourers	on	 their	maize	 and	
soybean	 farms.	 Previous	 studies	 by	Baron	 and	Rello	 (2000)	 in	Mexico,	 and	Dolon	 and	
Sutherland	 (2002)	 in	Kenya,	however,	 revealed	 that	 these	protective	clothing	may	not	
be	 enough	 protection	 against	 risks	 when	working	with	 agro-chemicals.	 Hence,	 at	 the	
FGDs	 in	 Dukusen	 (2012),	 community	 members	 expressed	 preference	 for	 health	 and	
protective	allowances	instead	of	protective	clothing	that	were	supplied	to	them	on	hire	
purchase.			
From	the	interviews	with	ITFC	(Gh)	Ltd	(2013)	and	FGDs	in	Gushie	and	Tunayili	 (2013),	
the	paramount	chief,	in	the	land	lease,	compelled	ITFC	Ltd	to	undertake	developmental	
assistance	in	operational	communities	especially	for	education,	water,	electricity,	health	
and	sanitation.	As	part	of	 these	commitments,	 ITFC	Ltd	supported	 the	construction	of	
three	(3)	primary	school	blocks	in	Gushie,	Dipale	and	Tunayili.	They	also	set	up	the	Child-
To-School	 Programme36	to	 improve	 school	 enrolment	 and	 enhance	 quality	 education.	
Under	this	education	programme,	the	studied	communities	and	ITFC	Ltd	confirmed	the	
provision	of	scholarship	schemes	to	needy	but	brilliant	students,	 teachers’	bungalows,	
teachers’	remuneration,	and	also	teaching	and	learning	materials.	In	order	to	sustain	the	
programme,	ITFC	Ltd	established	2	hectares	of	mango	plantation	(200	mango	trees)	 in	
Gushie,	and	the	proceeds	are	used	to	support	the	programme.	The	Company	also	solely	
supports	 a	 school-feeding	 programme	 in	 the	 area.	 According	 to	 ITFC	 Ltd	 (interview,	
2013),	they	also	began	a	health-screening	programme	for	their	workers	since	2008,	as	
part	of	efforts	to	tackle	HIV/AIDS	and	Hepatitis	B.		
	
																																																								
36	The	 ‘Child-To-School’	 was	 set	 up	 to	 improve	 deplorable	 educational	 conditions	 in	 the	 operational	
communities	of	 ITFC.	The	programme	 is	now	a	 fully	 fletched	educational	NGO	based	 in	Tamale	but	has	
most	of	its	activities	in	Gushie,	Tunayili,	Diare,	Tigla	and	Tamaligo.	They	provide	scholarships,	educational	
materials	–	books,	pens,	pencils,	chalk,	playing	kits;	and	cater	for	teacher	remuneration	by	paying	salaries	
of	non-trained	teachers	and	top-ups	for	posted	trained	teachers.	
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ITFC	Ltd	also	reported	of	a	biodiversity	programme	that	has	resulted	in	the	conversion	
of	part	of	their	leased	land	into	a	forest	and	game	reserve.	Under	the	programme,	they	
have	also	provided	education	on	biodiversity	 conservation	especially	of	economic	and	
medicinal	tree	species;	and	also	on	bushfire	prevention.	Besides	extending	irrigation	to	
outgrower	farms,	ITFC	Ltd	also	reported	providing	potable	water	in	Gushie,	Dipale	and	
Tunayili	 through	 a	 complex	 filtering	 system,	 using	 water	 pumped	 directly	 from	 the	
White	Volta.	According	to	the	Magazia	of	Gushie	(2013),	water	supply	to	the	community	
has	significantly	reduced	the	distance	women	walked	to	access	water	for	household	use.	
According	to	Tsikata	and	Yaro	(2011),	convenience	is	essential	in	the	access	to	resources	
by	the	poor.	During	the	interviews	(held	in	2013),	it	was	revealed	that	ITFC	Ltd	was	also	
very	 instrumental	 in	 laying	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 Organic	 Mango	 Outgrowers	
Association	(OMOA)	in	their	operational	communities.			
On	 the	 part	 of	 other	 losses,	 one	 area	 hardest	 hit	 was	 labour	 shifts	 and	 daily	 wage	
adjustment	 –	 what	 is	 popularly	 known	 to	 the	 locals	 as	 by-day.	 	 From	 Dukusen	 and	
Afrisire	 (2013)	 migrant	 farmers	 who	 mainly	 worked	 using	 the	 nnoboa37	system	 now	
have	to	pay	more	for	seasonal	migrant-labour	or	lose	them	to	the	investors.	Wages	for	
labour	 in	 both	 Dukusen	 and	 Afrisire	 are	 reported	 to	 have	 increased	 due	 to	
comparatively	 higher	 rates	 offered	 by	 ScanFarm	 Ltd.	 From	 the	 interviews	 with	 the	
village	 secretaries	 of	Dukusen	 and	Afrisire	 (2012),	while	 average	daily	 farm	wage	was	
Gh¢	5	(US$	2.6	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	in	2005,	wages	increased	to	Gh¢	10	(US$	5.2	as	of	1st	
April,	 2013)	 since	 2010.	 Also,	while	 smallholders	were	 paying	Gh¢	 40	 for	weeding	 an	
acre	of	 land,	 ScanFarm	Ltd	was	paying	Gh¢	45.	 This	 compelled	 smallholders	 to	 adjust	
their	 rates	 as	well	 so	 as	 to	 attract	 labourers.	 The	 respondents	were	 of	 the	 view	 that	
higher	wages	offered	by	ScanFarm	(Gh)	Ltd	subsequently	pushed	up	wages.	Also,	before	
ITFC	 Ltd	 pegged	 their	 daily	 wages	 at	 Gh¢	 10	 (US$	 5.2	 as	 of	 1st	 April,	 2013)	 in	 2010,																																																									
37	‘nnoboa’	 is	a	farming	system	prevalent	 in	most	farming	communities	 in	Ghana	where	a	farmer	assists	
other	farmers	on	their	farms	as	a	means	to	solicit	their	assistance	on	his	farm	as	well.	Farmers	would	form	
small	 groups	 to	 work	 on	 each	 member’s	 farm,	 as	 and	 when	 he	 was	 ready	 for	 their	 assistance.	 This	
arrangement	does	not	usually	involve	cash	payments,	just	the	provision	of	food	and	drink	and	sometimes	
transportation.	
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smallholders	generally	paid	Gh¢	7	(US$	3.6	as	of	1st	April,	2013)	for	the	same	services.	In	
Tunayili	(2013),	the	Gundaanaa	(village	chief)	reported:	
	
	“labour	has	become	expensive	these	days	because	nobody	wants	to	work	
for	 us,	 they	 all	 want	 to	work	 for	 ITFC	 especially	 in	 April	 when	 they	 are	
harvesting	 mango	 and	 we	 are	 also	 beginning	 to	 clear	 the	 fields”	
(Interview,	2013).	
	
The	Chief	of	Dukusen	(interview	 in	2012)	around	the	ScanFarm	project	 reported	of	an	
increasing	trend	of	alcoholism	and	teenage	pregnancy	in	the	community.	Some	of	these	
vices	 he	 has	 blamed	 on	 influences	 from	 farm	 workers,	 whose	 camp	 is	 built	 in	 their	
community.	Indeed,	the	Assemblyman	of	Dukusen	insisted	that	two	girls	were	pregnant	
for	some	workers	of	ScanFarm	Ltd	at	the	time	of	the	study.		
5.3.4	Opportunities	for	win-win	outcomes	in	LSLAs	
In	 line	with	 the	 above	 findings,	 several	 opportunities	 exist	within	Ghana’s	 agricultural	
and	 land	 policy	 frameworks	 to	 guarantee	 win-win	 outcomes	 for	 both	 investors	 and	
smallholders	in	host	communities.	These,	however,	need	to	be	appraised	and	diligently	
applied.	 From	 the	 interviews	with	 two	 (2)	 Senior	Officers	of	 the	 Lands	Commission	 in	
Accra,	 the	 Customary	 Land	 Secretariats	 (CLSs)	 were	 proposed	 as	 the	 appropriate	
institution	 to	 collate	 data	 on	 all	 land	 transactions	 -	 both	 large	 and	 small,	 for	 easy	
monitoring.	The	CLSs	are	public	entities	at	the	community	level	where	information	can	
be	accessed	about	land	transactions	at	a	fee.	Currently,	the	CLS	in	Agogo	is	largely	into	
urban	land	management	and	sometimes	assists	in	land	dispute	resolution	from	farming	
communities.	 In	 principle,	 if	 CLSs	 were	 made	 the	 mandatory	 contact	 points	 for	 land	
transactions	and	if	they	were	vigorously	registering	customary	grants	including	seasonal	
licenses,	 difficulties	 surrounding	 displacement	 from	 fallow	 lands	 and	 compensations	
would	be	minimized.			
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Another	opportunity	exists	in	the	recent	Ghana	Commercial	Agriculture	Project	(GCAP	–	
2012	 to	 2017).	 Since	 the	 first	 component	 of	 the	 project	 seeks	 to	 facilitate	 access	 to	
secure	 agricultural	 land	 for	 investment,	 it	 opens	 an	 opportunity	 to	 collaborate	 more	
with	traditional	leaders	in	land	transactions.	This	will	present	an	opportunity	to	spell	out	
various	 obligations	 and	 rights	 for	 government,	 investors	 and	 affected	 communities.	
Through	 the	 land	 banks	 promoted	 under	 the	 project	 (interview	 with	 MoFA,	 2012),	
government	 can	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 obtaining	 fair	 pricing	 for	 land	 and	 optimize	
benefits	 to	 local	 communities.	 	 Since	 the	advocacy	of	 the	 land	banking	began	 in	2004	
under	 the	Land	Administration	Project	 (LAP)	 (see	Aryeetey	and	Udry,	2010),	 there	has	
not	been	any	successful	agricultural	land	quality	or	crop	suitability	mapping.	Traditional	
authorities	are	 simply	encouraged	 to	 submit	 their	 lands	 to	 the	 land	banks	 for	onward	
transmission	 to	 potential	 investors.	 Though	 this	 study	 did	 not	 seek	 to	 assess	 the	
efficiency	 of	 land	 banking	 in	 Ghana,	 it	 was	 deduced	 from	 the	 reported	 complex	
processes	of	 land	acquisition	 that	very	 little	was	achieved.	 Land	prices	 continue	 to	be	
unregulated.	 Opportunities	 abound,	 if	 a	 comprehensive	 agricultural	 census	 is	
undertaken	 in	order	 to	direct	 investments	 to	areas	 that	are	more	suitable;	and	where	
the	negative	impacts	on	host	communities	is	minimal.			
Subsequent	to	the	international	voluntary	guidelines	on	responsible	governance	of	land	
tenure	 (FAO,	 2012a),	 Ghana,	 has	 formulated	 its	 tailored	 local	 guidelines	 to	 regulate	
large-scale	land	transactions.	However,	after	interviews	with	the	ATC	(2012)	and	Chiefs	
of	Dukusen,	Afrisire,	Gushie	 and	Tunayili	 (2012	and	2013),	 it	was	 apparent	 they	were	
never	aware	of	 the	existence	of	any	such	guidelines	 for	 land	tenure.	 It	 is	necessary	to	
disseminate	 such	 policies	 to	 the	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 order	 to	 empower	 them	on	
large	 land	 acquisitions.	 As	 part	 of	 Ghana’s	 land	 tenure	 regulatory	 framework,	 it	 is	
acknowledged	 that	 traditional	 leaders	may	 be	 inexperienced	 and	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	
manage	 land	 transactions	 of	 grave	 magnitude;	 and	 that	 smallholders	 and	 subsidiary	
rights	holders	are	discriminated	against	because	they	 lack	 formal	 rights	 to	 land	(Lands	
Commission,	 2012).	 Under	 the	 current	 guidelines,	 the	 regulatory	 frameworks	 seek	 to	
provide	protection	and	safeguard	the	interests	of	all	stakeholders	including	the	genuine	
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interests	of	investors.	The	land	acquisition	processes	outlined	by	the	Lands	Commission	
present	a	huge	opportunity	 for	minimizing	smallholder	 losses	 if	 it	 is	well	disseminated	
and	 enforced.	 However,	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 concrete	 regulative	 framework	 allowing	
government	 to	 directly	 intervene	 in	 stool	 land	 affairs	 presents	 a	 major	 setback.	 It	 is	
uncertain	if	deploying	the	state	powers	of	eminent	domain	is	the	way	to	go,	since	it	may	
infringe	on	the	independence	of	allodial	groups	to	deal	with	their	private	properties	in	
ways	that	they	deem	more	profitable.				
Another	huge	potential	towards	win-win	land	transactions	in	Ghana	is	the	regional	and	
national	 Houses	 of	 Chiefs.	 The	 national	 House	 of	 Chiefs	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 improve	
returns	of	LSLAs	to	host	communities.	It	is	possible	to	blend	the	experiences	of	chiefs	to	
arrive	at	 frameworks	on	regulating	LSLAs	 for	agricultural	 investments	 in	Ghana.	Chiefs	
are	constantly	 reminded	of	 their	 roles	 in	 the	execution	of	 local	development	projects.	
Besides	chiefs	assisting	in	negotiating	fair	deals,	it	is	prudent	to	commit	the	proceeds	to	
social	 projects	 that	 benefit	 the	 larger	 community.	 If	 chiefs	 ensure	 that	 broader	
community	 consultations	 are	 held	 as	 part	 of	 the	 processes	 towards	 incorporating	
community	 concerns,	 this	 will	 help	 to	 deepen	 accountability	 and	 transparency	 in	
customary	 land	 administration.	 The	 risks	 of	 local	 people	 in	 large	 land	 acquisitions	 are	
worsened	when	they	are	not	consulted.		
It	is	a	fact	that	these	days	almost	all	newly	installed	chiefs	are	elite	(Ubink,	2008:16)	and	
have	medium	to	high-level	formal	education.	Since	chiefs	also	hold	powers	bestowed	on	
them	 by	 custom,	 national	 laws 38 	and	 the	 people,	 they	 may	 perform	 some	 land	
administrative	functions	without	prior	community	consultations	(see	Ray,	2001;	Ray	and	
Reddy,	 2003;	 Ubink,	 2008).	 Provided	 chiefs	 conceive	 that	 concluding	 a	 development	
oriented	 land	deal	serves	the	 larger	 interest	of	the	people,	community	consensus	may	
be	 secondary.	 In	 many	 cases,	 if	 the	 chiefs	 and	 traditional	 council	 do	 not	 have	 the	
personal	capacity	to	handle	huge	land	deals,	they	are	allowed	to	engage	local	expertise.	
																																																								
38	See	Chieftaincy	Act,	1971	(Act	370)	and	the	Amended	Chieftaincy	Act,	2008	(Act	759)	
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In	order	to	promote	sanity	in	the	land	sector,	a	national	investment	priority	tool	kit	will	
be	relevant	in	setting	minimum	standards	of	an	investment	contract.		
5.4	Conclusions		
In	 this	 chapter,	we	examined	how	changes	 in	 land	prices	are	benefiting	or	hampering	
smallholders.	 Specifically,	we	 identified	 the	winners	 and	 the	 losers	 in	 customary	 land	
transactions;	and	the	nature	and	extent	of	losses	and	gains	when	land	prices	change.	In	
the	 study	 of	 the	winners	 and	 losers	 as	 land	markets	 change	 due	 to	 large-scale	 agro-
investments	 in	 Ghana,	 it	 is	 concluded	 that	 existing	 local	 customs	 unduly	 empower	
allodial	trustees	such	as	chiefs	and	family	heads	to	benefit	from	land	transactions.	Local	
elites,	 speculators	 together	 with	 some	 government	 agencies	 all	 benefit	 in	 various	
degrees	 from	 land	 transactions.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 title-less	 groups	 such	 as	migrant	
farmers	 and	 women	 with	 insecure	 tenures	 are	 losing	 the	 most	 on	 emerging	 land	
transactions.	 It	was	also	 found	 that	existing	customs	and	 traditions,	 largely	determine	
winners	 and	 losers	 in	 Ghana.	 Even	 though	 customs	 are	 dynamic,	 land	 tenure	
arrangements	 in	 Ghana	 do	 not	 permit	 the	 various	 stakeholders	 to	 demand	
accountability	for	land	transactions.	In	this	regard,	traditional	councils	should	endeavour	
to	document	various	social	responsibilities	and	entitlements	under	the	lease	agreement,	
and	not	just	limit	transactions	to	the	land	per	se.			
The	 lack	 of	 specificity	 and	 transparency	 of	 terms	 on	 large-scale	 land	 contracts	 and	
accountability	 for	 revenue	 thereof,	 allows	 land	 trustees	 to	exploit	 their	 fiduciary	 roles	
and	personally	benefit	from	communal	 land	proceeds.	 It	 is	the	informed	position	from	
the	case	studies	 in	Ghana	that	 large-scale	 land	acquisition	for	agro-investments	per	se	
are	 not	 bad	 due	 to	 the	 benefits	 they	 stand	 to	 provide	 to	 local	 level	 development.	
However,	 inasmuch	 as	 there	 is	 widespread	 endorsement	 for	 large-scale	 agricultural	
investment	 in	Ghana,	 there	 should	also	be	efforts	by	government	 to	 rectify	 all	 signed	
contracts	 and	 monitor	 land	 transactions.	 Abuse	 of	 land	 acquisition	 procedures	 and	
corruption	 should	 be	 sanctioned.	 The	 land	 acquisition	 procedures	 proposed	 by	 the	
Lands	Commission	should	not	just	exist	as	mere	frameworks,	but	they	should	be	able	to	
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sanction	 malpractices,	 abuses	 and	 corruption.	 The	 formulation	 of	 the	 guidelines	 for	
large-acquisition	 alone	 will	 not	 be	 the	 panacea	 to	 land	 market	 challenges	 in	 Ghana,	
unless	they	are	widely	circulated	and	enforced	to	the	letter.			
To	 reduce	 the	 negative	 externalities	 of	 customary	 land	 transactions	 on	 vulnerable	
groups,	public	sensitization	programmes	and	social	impact	assessments	reports	on	host	
communities	 should	 be	made	 a	 requirement	 for	 obtaining	 operational	 permits.	 There	
should	 also	 be	 platforms	 created	 for	 periodic	 deliberations	 on	 observed	 outcomes	 of	
large	agro-investments	by	appropriate	agencies	after	projects	 implementations.	 In	 the	
current	spate	of	 land	demand,	the	Ghana	 Investment	Promotion	Centre	(GIPC)	merely	
connects	 investors	 to	 landowners	without	 facilitating	 land	negotiations	directly.	 In	 the	
process,	 land	 deals	 are	 characterised	 by	 possible	 exploitations	 if	 customary	 land	
trustees	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	 negotiate	 good	 deals.	 There	may	 be	 the	 need	 to	 design	
simple	 land	contract	 templates	 that	offer	basic	assurances	of	benefits	 from	 large	 land	
transactions.	 Land	 custodians	 would	 then	 be	 required	 to	 rely	 on	 these	 as	 guides	 to	
design	 their	 own	 contracts	 based	 their	 local	 preferences.	 This	 may	 help	 to	 cushion	
vulnerable	groups	against	expropriation	and	loss	of	livelihoods.			
Even	when	such	desirable	social	interventions	are	documented,	they	are	sometimes	left	
vague	and	unenforceable	in	any	serious	extent.	For	example,	it	may	not	be	sufficient	to	
document	 in	a	 lease	contract	that	 jobs	ought	to	be	created	by	a	particular	 investment	
project,	 but	 rather	 go	 ahead	 to	 spell	 out	 the	 details	 about	 the	 kinds	 of	 jobs	 to	 be	
created,	number	of	jobs	to	be	created,	the	timelines	to	achieve	these	and	the	sanctions	
for	the	failure	to	do	 it.	Trusting	on	the	goodwill	of	 investors	 is	not	the	way	to	go.	The	
lack	of	specificity,	transparency	of	terms	on	large-scale	land	contracts	and	accountability	
for	revenue	thereof,	allows	land	trustees	to	exploit	their	fiduciary	roles	and	personally	
benefit	from	communal	land	proceeds.			
To	maximize	expected	benefits	from	large-scale	agro-investments	in	Ghana,	it	may	also	
be	 proper	 to	 explore	 public-private	 partnership	 arrangements	 that	 allow	 for	
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government	to	directly	contribute	to	the	investment	package	and	protect	the	rights	of	
its	 citizens	while	 securing	 the	 investors’	 investments	 and	needs.	 It	 is	 also	possible	 for	
land	ownership	to	remain	with	the	local	population	while	use	rights	are	transferred	to	
the	investors.	Alternatively,	chiefs	could	be	directly	 involved	as	partners	of	these	large	
investments	and	their	equity	contribution	will	be	to	the	total	estimated	land	value.		
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Chapter	Six :	General	Conclusions		
6.1	General	Conclusion	
The	participation	of	 large-scale	agricultural	 investors	in	African	land	transactions	raises	
concerns	about	the	 impacts	on	a	rather	 local	and	smallholder	dominated	 land	market.	
Existing	 studies	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 risks	 of	 land	 investments	 on	 the	 rights	 and	
livelihoods	 of	 the	 rural	 poor.	 These	 studies	 have	 largely	 relied	 on	media	 reports	 and	
expert	opinions,	with	limited	empirical	research	due	to	limited	access	to	data.	There	are	
still	 limited	 empirical	 studies	 on	 how	 large-scale	 agro-investments	 have	 influenced	
changes	 in	 land	 markets	 and	 impacted	 smallholders	 in	West	 Africa.	 It	 is	 against	 this	
backdrop	 that	 this	 study	 assessed	 the	 implications	 of	 large-scale	 agricultural	
investments	 on	 land	 markets	 and	 smallholder	 farmers	 with	 emphasis	 on	 the	 West	
African	 sub-region.	 The	 study	 focused	 on	 Ghana	 and	 looked	 at	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	within	its	customary	tenure	system	in	four	different	empirical	chapters.	The	
first	 empirical	 chapter	 examined	 how	 land	management	 institutions	 and	 institutional	
changes	have	impacted	on	land	markets	from	both	customary	and	statutory	land	tenure	
perspectives.	The	second	empirical	chapter	examined	land	rental	approaches	and	costs	
of	 acquiring	 customary	 land	 in	 Ghana.	 The	 third	 chapter	 studied	 the	 nature	 of	 land	
rents,	entitlements	and	 liabilities,	and	the	determinants	of	 land	prices	(rents).	The	 last	
chapter	 identified	 losers	 and	winners	 in	 land	 transactions	 in	Ghana	and	narrates	how	
these	gains	or	losses	are	emerging.			
Large	 agro-investors	 in	Ghana	have	 targeted	 areas	 that	 do	not	 pose	huge	 transaction	
costs	 –	 especially	 with	 disputes,	 compensation,	 accessibility,	 resettlement	 and	
negotiations,	 and	where	 their	 investments	are	 secured.	They	have	 so	 far	operated	on	
stool/skin	 lands	 because	 of	 the	 magnitude	 of	 land	 required	 and	 also	 because	 the	
chieftaincy	 institution	 provides	 immunity	 over	 possible	 community	 upheavals.	 Chiefs’	
involvement	 in	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 is	 a	 form	of	 security	 for	 large	 agricultural	
investors	 in	 Ghana.	 Unfortunately,	 traditional	 councils	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 capture	
fair	prices	for	land	due	to	failure	to	engage	professionals	in	land	transactions.	From	the	
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study,	 land	 survey	 and	 valuation	 professionals	 from	 the	 Lands	 Commission	 were	 not	
involved	especially	in	the	assessment	of	compensation.	Also,	government	advocacy	and	
promotion	 of	 agricultural	 investments	 in	 Ghana	 has	 influenced	 allocation	 of	 lands	 to	
resourceful	 investors	 rather	 than	 undocumented	 smallholders.	 Gradually,	 a	 market-
induced	dispossession	 is	emerging	due	to	 the	high	demand	for	 land.	Farmers	who	are	
unable	to	show	undisputable	ownership	of	land	are	not	paid	compensation	for	land	loss	
except	for	crop	losses.			It	 was	 observed	 that	 customary	 land	 institutions	 and	processes	 of	 land	 acquisition	 in	
Ghana	 have	 recorded	 some	 changes	 in	 the	 last	 decades	 from	 oral-gratuitous-
unregistered	 grants	 to	 monetized-individualised-semi-formalised	 transactions	 to	 a	
broader	extent.	 Yet	 existing	 customs	are	 silent	on	 transparency	and	accountability	on	
land	deals	and	accompanying	benefits	or	costs.	The	constitutional	provision	that…“the	
State	 shall	 recognise	 that	 the	 managers	 of	 public,	 stool,	 skin	 and	 family	 lands	 are	
fiduciaries	 charged	 with	 the	 obligation	 to	 discharge	 their	 functions	 for	 the	 benefit	
respectively	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Ghana,	 of	 the	 stool,	 skin,	 or	 family	 concerned	 and	 are	
accountable	as	fiduciaries	in	this	regard”	has	remained	ineffectual	and	has	hardly	been	
enforced	against	any	chief	(see	Article	36	(8),	Fourth	Republican	Constitution	of	Ghana,	
1992).			
Also,	the	current	institutional	arrangements	do	no	permit	collaboration	among	the	state	
agencies	directly	or	 indirectly	 involved	 in	 large-scale	 land	acquisitions	 in	Ghana.	These	
institutional	arrangements	and	identified	changes	have	influenced	the	operation	of	land	
markets	 in	Ghana	 and	 how	 land	 prices	 are	 fixed.	 At	 the	 community	 level,	 it	was	 also	
found	 that	 consultations	 with	 the	 Odokros	 (village	 chiefs)	 alone	 were	 inadequate	 in	
voicing	 the	concerns	of	smallholders	whose	 land	use	rights	were	 interrupted	by	 large-
scale	 land	 acquisitions.	 The	 study	 also	 revealed	 the	 extremely	 vulnerable	 position	 of	
migrant	farmers	in	Ghana	in	the	use	of	customary	land	without	title	and	hence,	confirms	
the	position	that	the	people	without	secure	title	stand	to	suffer	from	the	marketization	
of	land.		
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In	 addition,	 different	 processes	 were	 found	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 accessing	 land	 and	 at	
different	 transaction	 costs	 between	 the	 two	 investment	 projects.	 The	 estimated	
transaction	 cost	 of	 access	 to	 land	 at	 the	 ScanFarm	 project	 area	 was	 comparatively	
higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 Integrated	 Tamale	 Fruit	 Company	 project	 area	 due	 to	
geographical	differences	in	land	market	dynamics.	From,	the	transaction	cost	tabulation;	
it	is	cheaper	to	acquire	land	from	skin	land	areas	in	the	northern	part	of	Ghana	than	in	
stool	land	areas	in	southern	Ghana	where	the	land	markets	are	relatively	developed	for	
commercial	production	of	highly	economic	crops.	Transaction	costs	from	the	study	are	
largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 land	 tenure	 (formal/informal),	 social	 capital	
(relationships	 and	 trust),	 geographical	 location	 of	 the	 land	 (north/south	 ecological	
zones)	and	citizenship.	Citizens	of	the	farming	community	can	acquire	new	farmlands	or	
additional	 farmlands	 at	 no	 fee,	 because	 access	 to	 land	 is	 an	 entitlement	 according	 to	
local	customs.	The	costs	of	performing	customary	ceremonies	such	as	the	guaha	cutting	
and	customary	protocols	such	as	the	drink	or	kola	money	also	ultimately	influence	land	
pricing.	 The	 study	 identified	 that	 the	 remoteness	 of	 the	 communities	 limits	 land	
transactions	 to	 usufruct	 holdings	 through	 inheritance,	 seasonal	 cash-based	 or	 kind-
based	 rentals	 and	 sharecropping	 to	mostly	 relatives,	 friends	 and	 trustworthy	migrant	
farmers.		
In	the	study	of	the	winners	and	losers	as	land	prices	change	in	Ghana,	it	was	identified	
that	existing	 local	 customs	unduly	empower	allodial	holders	 such	as	 chiefs	 and	 family	
heads	 to	 benefit	 from	 land	 transactions.	 Local	 elites,	 politicians,	 speculators	 together	
with	local	and	central	government	agencies	also	perceived	to	benefit	both	directly	and	
indirectly	from	land	transactions	 in	Ghana.	On	the	other	hand	title-less	groups	such	as	
migrant	farmers,	herders	and	women	with	insecure	tenures	are	perceived	to	be	losing	
out	 the	 most	 from	 recent	 land	 transactions.	 The	 operations	 of	 large-scale	 agro-
investments	are	also	affecting	local	labour	markets,	which	the	local	farmers	depend	on	
for	 their	 own	 farming	 operations.	 Farm	wages	 have	 been	 hiked	 and	 labour	 supply	 to	
local	 farmers	 has	 dwindled,	 as	 immigrant-labourers	 now	 prefer	 to	 work	 for	 the	
companies,	which	offer	comparatively	better	wages.	
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6.2	General	Policy	Interventions	
Recent	agricultural	investments	and	large-scale	land	acquisitions	have	come	to	stay.	The	
future	of	 agriculture	will	most	 likely	 be	driven	 significantly	 by	 large-scale	 farmers	 and	
resourceful	 investors	 who	 strategically	 want	 to	 harness	 the	 growing	 benefits	 in	 the	
sector;	as	population	growth,	urbanization	and	energy	demands	for	industrialization	all	
present	 major	 opportunities.	 The	 demand	 for	 food,	 renewable	 energy	 feedstock	 and	
industrial	raw	materials	will	certainly	soar	and	smallholders,	though	efficient	in	the	use	
of	 agricultural	 resources,	 do	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	meet	 these	 growing	 demands.	
Large-scale	agro-investors	will	be	central	in	this	agricultural	transformation	process.	To	
avert	the	negative	implications	of	 large-scale	land	acquisition	on	the	poor,	there	is	the	
need	 for	 agricultural	 and	 land	 policies	 that	 are	 geared	 towards	 achieving	 win-win	
outcomes	in	Ghana.		
The	increasing	trends	of	foreign	participation	in	African	land	markets	may	have	dipped	
slightly	 in	the	last	3years,	but	the	phenomenon	may	continue	into	the	future.	 In	order	
not	 to	 undermine	 the	 concerns	of	 negative	 impacts	 of	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions	 in	
Africa,	efforts	should	be	made	towards	improving	land	markets	and	enhancing	potential	
benefits	 to	 land	 owning	 communities	 beyond	 customary	 custodians.	 Also,	 since	 some	
researchers	are	already	worried	about	the	 implications	of	 functioning	 land	markets	on	
distress	 land	 transactions,	 there	 will	 be	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 policies	 that	 offer	
alternative	safety	nets	beyond	land	sales	or	rentals.	In	line	with	this,	there	is	the	need	to	
deepen	 stakeholder	 consensus	 building,	 especially	 consultations	 with	 affected	
communities	and	land	users	even	when	they	do	not	have	any	legal	or	customary	title	to	
land.	 Agricultural	 policies	 should	 be	 directed	 towards	 ensuring	 that	 large-scale	
investments	 do	 not	 dispossess	 desperate	 and	 helpless	 smallholders,	 but	 offer	 them	
opportunities	 for	 agricultural	 growth	 through	 integration	 into	 value	 chain	 systems.	 At	
the	 national	 level,	 pro-poor	 land	 policies	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 protect	 the	 poor	 and	
vulnerable	 from	 abuse	 by	 powerful	 groups	 and	 prevent	 landlessness	 through	
exploitative	land	markets.	Since	land	pricing	has	tended	to	be	discretionary,	there	is	the	
need	for	the	standardisation	of	drink	money.	Agricultural	business	models	that	improve	
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the	 level	 of	 community	 participation	 in	 the	 large	 agro-investment	 projects	 should	 be	
encouraged.			
Also	 important	 in	 regulating	 land	 markets	 in	 Ghana	 is	 to	 redevelop	 land-banking	
approaches.	 Already,	 the	 Ghana	 Land	 Administration	 Project	 (LAP)	 commenced	
agricultural	land	banking	as	a	means	to	identify	from	stools	and	private	landholders	and	
to	map	out	lands	that	are	conducive	for	particular	agricultural	land	uses	and	at	various	
rents	across	the	country.	This	idea	was	greatly	supported	and	promoted	by	the	Ministry	
of	 Food	 and	 Agriculture	 (MoFA)	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 parcels	 for	 large	 agricultural	
investments.	Such	forms	of	land	banking	will	at	one	end	facilitate	easy	access	to	land	by	
investors	and	also	assist	to	ameliorate	the	possible	negative	impacts	of	large-scale	land	
acquisition	on	the	landless	and	poor	smallholder	land	users.	However,	until	an	efficient	
system	is	put	in	place	to	regulate	the	land	banks,	investors	may	still	find	tactics	to	evade	
government	structures	and	deal	with	customary	custodians	directly.	Since	some	chiefs	
themselves	 may	 leave	 openings	 for	 exploitation,	 there	 is	 the	 need	 for	 personal	
commitments	to	uphold	high	moral	values	and	strive	to	lead	their	people	efficiently.		
For	the	land	agencies	in	Ghana,	one-stop-shopping,	institutional	collaboration	and	data	
interoperability	should	be	the	hallmark.	Agro-investors	seeking	suitable	lands	should	be	
able	 to	 acquire	 them	 from	 identifiable	organisations.	 Land	 transactions	 should	not	be	
left	entirely	in	the	hands	of	chiefs	and	families	to	handle.	There	should	also	be	effective	
collaboration	 among	 all	 land	 agencies	 and	 the	 institutions	 that	 offer	 the	 essential	
authorisations	 and	 certificates	 for	 the	 commencement	 of	 agri-businesses.	 All	 these	
agencies	have	critical	 roles	 to	play	 in	order	 to	avert	 the	potential	negative	 impacts	of	
large	farms.	Central	governments,	through	the	local	government	authorities,	should	put	
in	place	checks	and	balances	to	deal	with	grievances	in	customary	land	transactions.	In	
the	process,	 land	markets	within	customary	 tenures	should	be	operated	 transparently	
by	requiring	that	community	consultative,	environmental	and	social	impact	reports	are	
submitted	before	land	deals	are	executed.		
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Customary	 land	 institutions	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 capacity	 weaknesses	 as	 well	 as	
legislative	inconsistencies	and	incomprehensiveness.	Since	the	customary	sector	suffers	
from	poor	linkages	with	the	statutory	agencies,	it	is	crucial	to	further	improve	upon	the	
Customary	Land	Secretariat	 (CLS)	 concept	and	 improve	 their	 capacities	 to	handle	 land	
transactions	 in	 peri-urban	 and	 rural	 areas	 as	 decentralized	units	 of	 the	 statutory	 land	
agencies.	 The	 locally	 developed	 land	 administration	 concept	 may	 need	 further	
reframing	 with	 clearly	 defined	 mandates	 and	 the	 necessary	 legislative	 backing	 to	
undertake	 these	 mandates.	 Local	 consultative	 meetings	 should	 also	 be	 properly	
coordinated	 due	 to	 the	 apparent	 power	 imbalances	 among	 existing	 stakeholders.	
Inclusiveness	and	public	deliberations	will	help	improve	transparency	and	accountability	
as	well.		
6.3	Limitations	of	the	Study		
The	timing	of	 this	study	 limited	the	assessment	of	broader	 impacts	of	 large-scale	 land	
acquisitions	on	Ghanaian	land	markets	since	most	investments	are	still	new	and	in	their	
early	stages	of	operations.	The	story	could	be	completely	different	after	some	years	of	
existence.	 It	may	be	 too	early	 to	 see	 a	 complete	 impact	of	 these	 investments	 in	 land	
price	 changes	 especially	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 apart	 from	what	 was	 observed	 in	 host	
communities.	The	informal	nature	of	customary	land	transactions	significantly	limits	the	
building	of	a	national	database	on	 land	prices.	The	general	absence	of	baseline	survey	
data	at	both	the	national	and	regional	levels	on	land	prices	made	it	difficult	to	observe	
changes	 in	 land	 prices	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 besides	 relying	 on	 household	 recall	 data,	
which	may	have	its	own	limitations.	The	predominance	of	non-monetary	transactions	of	
customary	 land	 also	made	 it	 tedious	 to	 outline	 and	document	 non-monetary	 costs	 of	
land	transactions.	These	non-monetary	costs	may	differ	to	a	great	extent	from	village	to	
village.	Hence,	what	is	captured	in	this	study	does	not	represent	the	national	picture	of	
land	prices	in	Ghana.		
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Appendices	
Appendix	1:	Household	Survey	Questionnaires		
	
Large-Scale Investment in Agriculture in West Africa - Implications for Land Markets and Smallholder Farmers  
August 2012 to April 2013 
Research undertaken by Centre for Development Research (ZEF),  
University Bonn,  
Germany 
 
 
Introduction Statement 
I come in the name of a German Research Institute / University, which is examining how large-scale agricultural 
investments in this community have impacted on land markets and smallholder farmers. Your household has been 
randomly selected to assist in this study. Please we would be very grateful if you would spare some time to respond to 
our questionnaire. The information obtained will be treated with confidentiality and only for academic purposes. The 
interview should take about 30 -45min. We are grateful for your time and assistance in the study!  
Section 1: Survey information 
1.1 Name of Village (LC1)  1.2 Interview end time  
1.3 Name of interviewer  1.4 
Questionnaire Number  
(filled during data entry)  
1.5 Date of interview (dd/mm/yy)  1.6 
Data entry by  
(filled during data entry)  
1.7 Interview start time  1.8 Date of data entry  
(filled during data entry) 
 
 
General codes: wherever not further specified use:  90=other, specify_______,  
99=don’t know 
Section 2: Respondent Data  
We would like to ask you some questions about yourself, the head of the household  2.1	 Name of Respondent  	 Q2.2	Gender	of	Respondent	 1=Male								2=Female	
2.3 
Respondent’s position in the 
household  
1=household head;  
2=spouse;  
3=child;  
90=other, specify_________ 
2.4 Age  Years  
2.5	 Any special role in the village? 	
1=no official role, 
2=Village Chief  
3=Village vice-chief 
4= religious leader 
5=healer/magician 
6=policemen 
90=other, specify---------------------------------- 
2.6	 Where	were	you	born?	  1= in this village                     [if 1 à Q2.7, continue if otherwise] 2=in another village near by  3=in another district in the region  
4=outside the region 
5= outside Ghana 
2.7 	When	did	you	move	to	this	village?	  Year  
2.8	 	Why	did	you	move	to	this	village?	[multiple	answers	possible]	   
1=to do farming  
2= to work as agricultural worker in agric investment; 3= to start a 
business 
4= no job at home/ to find employment, 5= no land at home; 6=parents 
moved  7=marriage 
8= resettlement program; 9= conflict/dispute at home 
90=other, specify_______ 
	 xiv	
2.8	 Religion	  
1=None 
2= Protestant 
3=Catholic 
4= Traditional 
5= Muslim  
6= Pentecost  
90=other religion 
2.9	 Ethnic	group	 	
1=Akan     
2= Ewe  
3=Ga-Dangme   
4=Dagbani   
5=Wali   
6=Nzema                                                          
7=Gonja   
8=Mamprusi   
9=Guan  
10=Kassena/Nankani   
11=Konkomba  
12=Nanumba  
13=Builsa 1 
90=Other(specify)--------------------------------------------- 
2.10	 Education	 	
0=no	education	1=	primary	1	2=	O-level	3=	A-Level	4=	Diploma	5=	Degree	and	more	
90= other......................... 
Section 3: Household Size and Characteristics 
3.1 List all person sharing the same kitchen space/ cooking area for most meals (=Household) 
		3.2	Provide	details	of	HH	members.	Start	with	the	household	head	and	spouse.	Exclude	children	and	relatives	who	already	formed	their	own	family	and	live	independently		Member	ID						
3.2.1Name								
3.2.2	Gender							
3.2.3	Relationship	with	Respondent					
3.2.4	Marital	Status							
3.2.5	Age							
3.2.6	Education							
3.2.7	Main	Occupation						
	 	 	 	 	 	 Number	of	Yrs	of	Sch	 Highest	level	of	education	 Name	of	profession	01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	02	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	03	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	04	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	05	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 1=Male	2=Female		 1=head	2=spouse		(1st	wife)	3=child	4=grandchild	5=parent	
1=married	(1	spouse)	2=	married	(2	or	more	spouse)	3=	single	
	 	 0=no	education	1=	primary	1	2=	O-
0=	none	1=farmer	2=business	3=labourer	4=officer	5=mechanic	
3.1.1 How many adults live in this HH? 
[age 18 and above] 
[2]  
Total men 
   
[3] 
Total 
women 
 
[1] 
TOTAL adults  
3.1..2 How many children do you have in 
total (including children not staying 
with you)? [age 1-17] 
[2]  
Total boys    
[3] 
Total girls  
[1] 
TOTAL children  
3.1.3 Sum up column 1and2  NOTE: this number should be the also the 
number filled in the next table! 
TOTAL of HH  
	 xv	
6=brother/	sister	7=relative	8=	spouse	(2nd	or	3rd)	9=worker	90=others	
(never	married)	4=divorced	/separated	5=widow(er)	90=other,	specify	
level	3=	A-Level	4=	Diploma	5=	Degree	and	more		
6=mason	7=carpenter	8=fishing	9=volunteer	90=other--------			
	
Remember:  To check with number of HH members stated on page 1 (3.1 
.3) to make sure all are included. 
 
 
4. Household Endowments/Agricultural Assets 
4.1. Ownership of Agricultural Assets 
 
Items 4.1.1 
Did you 
own any 
of these 
items 
(tick) 
 
4.1.2 
How 
many 
Units do 
you own? 
 
4.1.3 
How much are they worth in money 
to you? 
 
 
4.1.4 
Did you 
lose or 
sell any of 
these 
assets? 
 
4.1.5 
If Sold? 
 
 
 
   2000 2005 2012  a. Why? 
 
b. What 
was the 
price?  
Car         
Ox cart         
Bicycle         
Hoe,          
Axe         
Cutlass         
Pangs         
House         
Motorcycle         
Hand 
spray 
        
Water 
pump 
        
Land          
Plough         
 0=no;  
1=yes 
    0=none; 
1=lose;  
2=sell 
  
4.1.6 
 Does your 
household 
own any 
livestock? 
If no, explain 
why you do not 
have any 
livestock?  
[multiple 
answers 
possible] 
If yes, which 
Livestock do 
own? 
 
 
 
4.1.7  
How many (…) does 
the household own at 
present? 
[Include those away]  
 
[Put number, if 
nothing put 0] 
4.1.8 
 How much did 
you own… 
[present and 
away] 
4.1.9  
How 
many of 
the (…) 
did you 
sell during 
the [last 12 
months]? 
4.1.10 
Total 
amount 
obtained  
(gh 
cedis) 
4.1.11 
How many 
were 
slaughtered 
in the last 
12 months? 10 yrs 
ago? 
5 yrs 
ago? 
         
         
         
         
         
0=no  
1=yes 
 
1= They were 
stolen;  
2=struck by 
diseases;  
1=Oxen  
2=Cows  
3=Bulls 
4=Heifer 
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4.2 Purchase and Sale of Agricultural Assets 
 
Qn. 
Number 
Questions Response Codes 
 4.2.1 Did you buy any of these in the last 5years? 
 
 1= Yes   
0= No 
 4.2.2 How many did you buy?   
4.2.3 Where was your source of money to acquire 
these assets?  
 1. Sold land    
2. Rented out labour for wages    
3. Gift     
4. Sold farm produce   
5. Remittances from relatives     
6. Other 
4.2.4 What prompted the acquisition of these 
assets?  
 
 1. Needed to support production    
2. Increase Social Status      
3. Bought to sell at a later date    
4. Gift      
5. Obtained as payment for debt/labour rented 
out     
7. Others 
4.2.5 Did you sell any of these from assets in the 
last five years? 
 
 1= Yes   
0= No 
4.2.6 If Yes, what prompted the sale?  
 
 1. To buy a new one  
2. To pay debt    
3. To farm   
4. To start a business   
5. To treat Sickness   
6. To pay school fees    
7. To travel out  of the region   
8. Others 
4.2.7 What was the price you obtained for it?   
4.2.8 Did you borrow money using any of these as 
collateral? 
 1= Yes   
0= No 
4.2.9 If Yes, how much did you borrow?   
4.2.10 Which property did you use as collateral 
security for the loan? 
 
 
 1= farm land 
2= house 
3= vehicles (car, motorcycle, bicycle, other) 
4= salary 
5= others 
4.2.11 How long is the loan running?  1. 6months    
2. 1 year     
3. 2Years     
4. 5years      
5. More than 5years 
5. Land Ownership, Sale and Purchase of Land 
5.1 Land Ownership and Allocation of the Household 
 
Qtn Questions	 Response Options 
5.1.1 Does	the	household	own	any	land	(including	land	rented-out)?	  1=yes 2=no 
5.1.2 If	no,	why	not?		  1=no land available 2=not interested in farming 3=land taken away 
90=other, ___________  
3=can’t afford 
4=no interest;  
5=sold;  
90=other 
(specify)_______ 
5=Donkeys 
6=Goats  
7=Sheep 
8= Poultry  
90=Other, 
____ 
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5.1.3 If	yes,	how	was	the	land	acquired?	  
1=purchase 
2=leasehold 
3=gift 
4=sharecropping 
5=granted by government 
6= self-cleared forest 
7= inherited 
8= usufructuary 
9= borrowed  
10= Squatting  
90=others, specify---------------
------ 
5.1.4 From	whom	was	this	land	acquired?	  
1= Government 
2= Chiefs/Stool 
3= Tendamba 
4= Family 
head/Abusuapanin 
90= Other, 
specify......................... 
5.1.5 What	kind	of	interest	do	you	hold	on	this	parcel?		  
1= freehold;  
2=Usufructuary;  
3=leasehold;  
4=Sharecropping;  
5=customary licence 
90=others 
5..1.6 Did	you	ever	own/	cultivate	land	before?	  1=yes 2=no    
5.1.7 What	happened	to	this	land	you	once	owned?	  
1= ceased by gov./chief 
2= no more fertile 
3= sold 
4= leased 
5= gifted out 
6= fallow 
90= others 
5.1.8 Can	you	register	this	parcel?	  0= no 1=yes 
5.1.9 For	how	long	can	you	register	this	parcel	of	land?	  
1= 1year 
2=  10years 
3= 25years 
4= 50years 
5= 75years 
6= 99years 
7= perpetuity 
5.1.10 In	whose	name	can	this	parcel	of	land	be	registered?		  
1=Sons 
2=daughters 
3=both (children) 
4=brothers 
5=sisters 
6=Wife 
7=husband 
90= others (specify) 
 
 
 
5.2. Size and Use of Household Land and Associated Changes 
 
5.2.1 What	was	the	size	of	all	plots	you	were	farming	10	and	5	years	ago?			  Size? 2000.............................................. 2005.............................................. 
2012………………………… 
5.2.2 UNIT	(please	try	to	use	local	unit–	if	not,	stick	to	the	same	unit	for	the	remaining	part	of	this	page)	  1= Dont know;  2=acre;  3=ha;  
90=other, specify____ 
5.2.3 If	there	was	change	between	2000	and	2005:	what	accounted	for	this?	  1= gave to children,  
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[multiple	possible]	 2=bought land;  
3=rented in land;  
4= too old to farm the size;  
5=started other job;  
6=lost due to dispute;  
7= taken by Government/ 
local leader;  
8=Taken by Investor;  
9= opened unused land;  
10= no money to rent-in 
anymore; 90=Other_____ 
5.2.4 If	there	was	change	between	2005	and	2012:	what	accounted	for	this?	[multiple	possible]	  
1= gave to children,  
2=bought land;  
3=rented in land;  
4= too old to farm the size;  
5=started other job;  
6=lost due to dispute;  
7= taken by Government/ 
Chief 
8=Taken by Investor;  
9= opened unused land;  
11= no money to rent-in 
anymore; 90=Other_____ 
5.2.5 Land	use	type:						  
1. Crop production;  
2. Livestock  
3. Grazing land/pasture land  
3. Kitchen garden;  
4. Farm forestry 
5. Other (plse. specify)________ 
 
 
 
5.3 Security of Tenure  
Plo
t 
ID 
5.3.1 
Who will 
inherit this 
land from 
you? 
 
 
 
5.3.2 
Under 
what 
circumstan
ces can you 
stop 
cultivating  
this plot 
 
 
5.3.3 
Who can 
grab the land 
away from 
you? 
 
 
 
 
5.3.4 
What are 
you 
doing to 
ensure 
that you 
don’t 
lose the 
plot? 
 
 
5.3.5 
Have 
you 
had 
any 
conflic
ts on 
the 
plot? 
 
 
 
5.3.6 
What 
kind of 
conflict 
did you 
have? 
 
 
 
 
5.3.7 
Where was 
this 
conflict 
resolved? 
 
 
 
 
5.3.8 
Did 
you 
regist
er this 
parcel 
of 
land? 
 
 
5.3.9 
In whose 
name did 
you 
register it? 
 
 
 
01                
02                
03                
04                
05                
 1=Sons 
2=daughte
rs 
3=both 
(children) 
4=brothers 
5=sisters 
90=others 
 
 
 
 
  
1=Divorce 
2=Death of 
spouse 
3=Emigrati
on 
4= end of 
contract 
5= none 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Village 
Chief 
2=Brother 
3=Brother in 
law 
4=Sister in 
law 
5=none 
6= owner 
7=governme
nt 
8= uncle 
90= others 
1=Plant 
tree 
2=Fence 
3=Land 
Guards 
4= 
registere
d 
5= 
spiritual 
protectio
n 
6=none 
90=other
s 
0= no 
1= yes 
 
1=Borde
r 
disputes 
2=Plot 
ownersh
ip 
90=other
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Families 
2=Village 
chief 
3=Group 
village 
4=TA 
5=Magistr
ate court 
 
 
 
 
0= no 
1= yes 
 
1=Sons 
2=daught
ers 
3=both 
(children) 
4=brother
s 
5=sisters 
6=Wife 
7=husban
d 
90= others 
(specify) 
Source: Luduku (2009) and Tadesse (2010) 
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5.4 Sharecropping          
 
 If the farmer sharecrop in plot (fill) If the farmer sharecrop out (fill) 
Plot 
No 
5.4.1 
Why? 
 
 
5.4.2 
Input 
cost 
Share 
 
5.4.3 
Output 
share 
 
5.4.4 
From 
Whom 
 
5.4.5 
Contrac
t 
Duratio
n 
 
5.4.6 
Why? 
 
 
5.4.7 
Input 
Cost 
Share 
 
5.4.8 
Output 
share 
 
5.4.9 
From 
Whom 
 
 
5.4.10 
Contrac
t 
Duratio
n 
 
01           
02           
03           
04           
05           
Cod
es  
 
1= lack 
of 
labour  
2= 
availabil
ity of 
labour  
3= 
enough 
farm 
land  
4= 
shortage 
of farm 
land 5= 
lack of 
money 
to 
purchas
e 
fertilizer 
and 
seeds  
6= 
sick/age 
7= to 
share 
risk  
90= 
others 
 
1= 
equal 
input 
share 
2= 
tenant 
covers 
all the 
costs 
initiall
y but 
Input 
get it 
back 
later; 
3= 
landlor
d cover 
the 
initial 
cost 
but get 
it back 
later; 
4=Tena
nt 
covers 
all 
costs;  
5= 
Landlo
rd 
covers 
all 
costs 
1= equal 
share 
2=equal 
share 
after 
subtracti
ng input 
costs 
90= 
others, 
specify 
Amount 
shared: 
specify 
amount 
obtained 
in Cedis 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
relative, 
2= 
Close 
neighbo
ur 3= 
outside 
my 
4=outsi
de my 
kinship 
90= 
others, 
specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
written 
contrac
t 
approv
ed by 
LTR;   
2= 
written 
contrac
t by 
parties;   
3= oral 
contrac
t  
90= 
others, 
specify-
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= lack of 
labour  
2= 
availabili
ty of 
labour 
3= 
enough 
farm land  
4= 
shortage 
of farm 
land 5= 
lack of 
money to 
purchase 
fertilizer 
and 
seeds  
6= 
sick/disa
ble 7= to 
share risk 
90= 
others, 
1= 
equal 
input 
share 
2= 
tenant 
covers 
all the 
costs 
initiall
y but 
Input 
get it 
back 
later; 
3= 
landlor
d cover 
the 
initial 
cost 
but get 
it back 
later; 
4=Tena
nt 
covers 
all 
costs;  
5= 
Landlo
rd 
covers 
all 
costs 
1= equal 
share 
2=equal 
share 
after 
subtracti
ng input 
costs 
90= 
others, 
specify 
Amount 
shared: 
specify 
amount 
obtained 
in Cedis 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
relative, 
2= Close 
neighbour 
3= 
outside 
my3=outs
ide my 
kinship 
90= 
others, 
specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
written 
contrac
t 
approv
ed by 
LTR;   
2= 
written 
contrac
t by 
parties;   
3= oral 
contrac
t  
90= 
others, 
specify-
--- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Luduku (2009) and Tadesse (2010) 
 
 
6. Land Market Transaction and Land Price Determinants 
 
6.1 Characteristics of Owned Land Parcel 
 
Plo
t 
No
. 
 
 
6.1.1 
Plot size 
in sq. 
Metres 
 
 
6.1.2 
Distanc
e from 
home 
*time/k
m 
6.1.3 
Security 
of Land 
Tenure 
  
 
6.1.4 
Slope 
of land  
 
 
 
6.1.5 
Proximit
y to 
Irrigatio
n 
6.1.6 
Proximit
y to road 
infrastr. 
6. 1.7 
Soil  
Textur
e 
 
 
6.1.8 
Soil 
Fertility 
 
 
6.1.9 
Chan
ges 
in 
yield 
6.1.10 
Erosi
on 
 
 
 
6.1.11 
Access 
to 
Water 
 
 
01            
02            
03            
04            
	 xx	
05            
Co
de
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1=Secur
e    
0=Insec
ure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=Stee
p    
2=Gent
le    
3=Flat 
 
 
 
 
 
  1= 
Black,   
2= 
Dark 
brown,   
3= Red    
4= 
White   
90=oth
ers, 
specify
----------
-------- 
 
1.Very	fertile	2.Moderate	3.Poor	4.Very	poor	5.Not	productive	at	all  
 
1=inc
rease
d 
yield
s, 
0=no 
yield 
chan
ge, 
 -1= 
reduc
ed 
yield
s 
1=hig
h,  
2=lo
w, 
3=no
ne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= easy 
2= 
difficul
t 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Access to Water and Water Rights 
 
 Questions Responses Codes 
6.2.1 Do you have access to water in production on your parcel?  0= no  
1= yes  
  
6.2.3 If yes, what is the source of water?  1=Public irrigation 
system  
2=borehole 
3=Hand-dug well  
4=Community reservoir  
5=Pumping from river  
6=Water harvesting 
7=Rain fed 
8=Other [please. 
6.2.4 Is this water source always accessible  1= accessible 
2=inaccessible 
6.2.5 How far is this source of water?   1= very 
2= not far 
3= close by 
6.2.6 How much does it cost to bring water to your parcel of land?  
 
 State in Gh cedis 
6.2.7 How long, does it take to bring in this water for production?  1= few hrs/short time 
2= several hrs 
3= a long time 
4= other, specify 
6.2.8 What rights do you have to access this water source?   1= restricted 
2= unrestricted 
6.2.9 Do you have problems of water rights abuse in this community by the 
investors? 
 0= no  
1= yes 
 
 
6.3 Output in the Last 5years and 10years (Past and Present Output) 
 
 6.3.1 
Crop Type  
6.3.2 How much did you Harvest?   
Plot 
ID 
Harvest 6.3.3 
Indicate 
the state of 
yield in 
the 
10/5years 
6.3.4 
Indicate 
the major 
reasons 
for the 
change  
  2000 2005 2011/2012 
  Quantity Unit  Quantity  Unit Quantity Unit   
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
	 xxi	
 1=cocoa 
2=palm 
3=maize 
4=yam/cassava 
90= others 
1= basket                                                 2= oxcart 
3=pail                                                      4=wheelbarrow 
5=bags (50kg)                                         6=bags (90kg) 
7= bowls                                                  8=Olonka 
9= basin                                                   9=others--------------------- 
0= 
increasing 
1= 
decreasing 
2= 
constant 
1=soil 
fertility 
2= 
fertilizer 
subsidy 
3= others 
 
 
6.4. Decision to Participate in Land Transactions (Demand and Supply) 
 
 
Questions Response Codes 
6.4.1  
Are you 
interested in 
renting out 
some (more) 
of your land    
 
 
 0=No  
1=Yes 
6.4.5 Were 
you 
interested in 
renting out 
some land in 
last decade?  
 0=No  
1=Yes     
 
 
6.4.8 Are you 
interested in 
renting in 
some (more) 
land than you 
do?   
 0=No  
1=Yes         
 
 
 
6.4.11 Were 
you 
interested in 
renting in 
some land in 
the last 
decade? 
  
0= No 
1=Yes    
 
6.4.14 Did 
you have 
many 
candidates to 
choose from? 
 
 
 
 
 
0=No  
1=Yes    
 
 
 
  6.5 Rented-in Plot of Farm Land 
 
Plot 
ID 
6.5.1 
Did you rent in 
land in the last 
10 or 5years? 
 
 
6.5.2 
Why did 
you rent in 
the plot? 
  
 
 
6.5.3 
For how 
long is 
this rent 
lasting/ed 
 
 
 
6.5.4 
What type of 
contract do 
you have? 
  
 
6.5.5 
Will the 
contract be 
renewed 
afterwards?  
 
 
6.5.6 
From whom 
was this land 
rented in? 
 
 
 
6.5.7 
What 
is rent 
paid 
for the 
parcel 
rented-
in. 
  
6.5.8 
What is 
the 
current 
value of 
this 
parcel 
of land 
rented-
in 
10yrs 5yrs 
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
6.4.2 If No, why? 
 
 1= rent is too low    2= no person to rent to   3= not 
allowed to rent out   90= Others......................... 
6.4.3 If Yes, how 
much more land 
to rent-out? 
 
 1= rent is too low    2= no person to rent to   3= not 
allowed to rent out   90= Others......................... 
6.4.6 If No, why? 
 
 1= rent is too low    2= no person to rent to   3= not 
allowed to rent out   90= Others......................... 
6.4.7 If Yes but 
actually did not 
rent-out, what are 
the reasons  
 
 1= rent is too low    2= no person to rent to   3= not 
allowed to rent out   90= Others......................... 
6.4.9 If No, why? 
 
  
6.4.10 If Yes, how 
much more land 
to rent-out? 
 In Ghana cedis…………………………. 
6.4.12 If No, why?  
 
 1= rent is too high  2= too many people seeking rented 
land  3= no credit to rent land   4= no fertile land  
5=Others 
6.4.13 If Yes but 
actually did not 
rent- in, what are 
the reasons? 
 
 1= rent is too high  2= too many people seeking rented 
land  3= no credit to rent land   4= no fertile land  
5=Others 
6.4.15If Yes, what 
criteria did you 
use to select your 
partner? 
 
 1. Reputation;  
2. Trust;      
3. Endowments;                
4. Kinship;              
90. Others, specify 
	 xxii	
 0- no 
1- yes 
0- no 
1- yes 
1= 
availability 
of labour                                     
2= need for 
more farm 
land                  
3= 
availability 
of fertilizer 
and seeds                 
4= 
affordable 
tractor/oxen 
services  
5=increase 
in output 
demand                           
6= 
Reduction 
in land 
prices  
7= in lure of 
debt 
payment                                
90= others, 
specify 
1= Less 
than 5 
years                                       
2=More 
than 5 but 
less than 
10 years 
3=More 
than 10 
but less 
than 50 
years        
4=More 
than 50 
but less 
than 99,  
90=
Others, 
specify 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-Fixed rent 
2-
sharecroping 
3-borowing 
free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0= no 
1= yes 
2=maybe 
1= relative                                                           
2= close 
neighbour  
3=outside my 
kinship                                       
4= large 
investors 
5=government                                                    
90=others, 
specify 
 
  
        
 
6.6 Rented-out Plot of Farmland 
 
Plot 
ID 
6.6.1 
Did you 
rent out 
any plot of 
farm land? 
 
6.6.2 
Why did you 
rent out the 
plot? 
 
  
 
6.6.3 
For how 
long is this 
rent 
lasting/ted?  
 
 
 
6.6.4 
What type 
of contract 
did you 
offer?  
 
 
 
6.6.5 
Will the 
contract 
be 
renewed 
afterward
s? 
  
 
6.6.6 
To whom 
was this 
land rented 
out?  
  
 
 
6.6.7 
What 
is the 
rent 
receive
d for 
the 
parcel 
rented-
out? 
  
6.6.8 
What is the 
current 
value of 
the parcel 
of land 
rented-
out/retaine
d 
 
 10yr
s 
5yr
s 
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
	 xxiii	
Source: Luduku (2009) and Tadesse (2010) 
 
 
6.7 Rent Charged 
 
 Questions Response Codes 
6.7.1 How much is paid as rent agreeable annually  ----------------Gh¢/CFA 
 
6.7.2 Which factors did you take into consideration when you were renting 
out the plot? 
 1= foreign investors     
2= size of land    
3= land slop     
4= soil texture      
5=nearness to 
irrigation  
6= nearness to roads     
7= distance from 
home/market    
8= security of tenure 
9= high level of 
demand 
10=  limited land 
supply 
11= soil fertility 
6.7.3 Has this rent changed since it was it first agreed upon?  0=No      
1=Yes         
6.7.4 What factors accounted for the change in the initial rent agreed upon?  1=increase in demand      
2=Increase in output 
prices      
3=inflation      
4= time passage  
 
 
 
 
   Plot Bought and Plot Sold 
Plot ID 
 
6.7.5  
Where did you buy the plot? 
 
 
 
6.7.6 
Why did you buy the plot? 
 
 
 
6.7.7 
How much did you pay 
for the plot? 
 
 
01    
Code
s 
0- 
no 
1- 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0- 
no 
1- 
yes 
 
1= lack of 
labour                                    
2= 
retirement of 
farmer 
3= need for 
less farm 
land                     
4= attractive 
price in the 
market  
5= lack of 
fertilizer and 
seeds              
6= 
sick/disable  
7=to share 
risk                                        
8= lack of 
oxen to weed 
9= to pay 
debt                                        
90= others, 
specify……
….. 
1= Less 
than 5 years                                       
2=More 
than 5 but 
less than 10 
years 
3=More 
than 10 but 
less than 50 
years         
4=More 
than 50 but 
less than 99,  
90= Others, 
specify……
… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-Fixed 
rent
2-
sharecropi
ng 
3-borowing 
free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0= no 
1= yes 
2=maybe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= relative                                                           
2= close 
neighbour  
3=outside 
my kinship                                       
4= large 
investors 
5=governme
nt                                                    
90=others, 
specify…….. 
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02    
03    
04    
05    
  1=same village 
2=other village 
1=Secure more land 
2=grow cash crop 
3=grow food crops 
4= seek fertile land 
90=others 
 
In Ghana cedis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plot ID 
 
 
6.7.8 
Where did you sell the plot? 
 
 
 
6.7.9 
Why did you sell the plot? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7.10 
How much did you sell 
for the plot? 
 
 
 
01    
02    
03    
04    
05    
 1=person from same village 
2=other village 
3=immigrant 
4=urban dweller 
 
 
1=cash 
2=assist others 
3=more land 
90=others 
 
 
 
Ghana cedis 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
6.8 Distress Land Rental/Sale 
 
Plot 
ID 
Question Response Coding 
6.8.1 
 
Did you experience any of the following in the 
last 10yrs? 
 
 1=Food shortages     
2=Death of member 
3=sickness of member    
4=House damage 
5=debt      
6=high school fees 
7=marriage     
90=Others specify--------------------------- 
6.8.2 Did any of these calamities compel you to 
sell/rent out land? 
 1= Yes    0=No 
 
6.8.3 
 
 
If No, how did you get money to tackle the 
problem mentioned in 1 above? 
 
 1=Borrowed from friends   
2=Contributions from family/friends 
3=Loan from the bank    
4=Gifts/Donations 
5=Remittances      
90=Others, specify---------------- 
6.8.4 If Yes, how?  
 
 1=Rent out more land  
2=Rent out land for cash  
3=Rent out land on long-term contract for cash            
90=Others, specify 
6.8.5 
 
 
How many times (years) in the last 
10years/5years did you sell /rent out land? 
 
 1=Never                                                                        
2=Once,  
3=2-3 times                                                                    
4=4-6 times 
5= >6 times                                                                   
6=Every year 
6.8.6 
 
 
What were the reasons that accounted for the 
rent/sale of that land? 
 
 1=Food shortages      
2=Out-dooring 
3=Debt payment      
4= Funeral Expenses 
	 xxv	
5=Marry new wife     
6=Pay school/apprentice fees 
7=sickness expenses   
8= meet travel expenses 
9=Repair house     
90= others, specify----------------- 
6.8.7 How much land was rented out during this 
distress period(s)? (In locally known unit) 
  
6.8.8 Who took the decision to sell parcel?  1= government  
2= paramount chief 
3= Village Chief  
4= HHH 
5= Tendaana/Abusuapanin 
90= others 
6.8.9 How were the proceeds from the land 
distributed? 
 1= used to resolve family problem 
2= used by HHH 
3= given to wife for food 
4= invested 
90= others 
 
 
7. Determinants of Land Prices 
7.1 Factors that influence how much a parcel is sold or bought 
 
Questions Response Codes 
7.1.1 Which of the following factors do you consider most when you 
decide to charge a rent/ sell a plot of land?  
 1= foreign investors     
2= size of land    
3= land slop     
4= soil texture      
5=nearness to irrigation  
6= nearness to roads     
7= distance from home/market    
8= security of tenure 
9= high level of demand 
10= limited land supply 
7.1.2 Which of the following factors do you consider the least, when 
you decide to sell or rent a plot of land? 
 1= foreign investors     
2= size of land    
3= land slop     
4= soil texture      
5=nearness to irrigation  
6= nearness to roads     
7= distance from home/market    
8= security of tenure 
9= high level of demand 
10= limited land supply 
7.1.3 How would you rant the following factors according to their 
level of importance in influencing how much you decide to 
sell/rent land? 
 1= foreign investors     
2= size of land    
3= land slop     
4= soil texture      
5=nearness to irrigation  
6= nearness to roads     
7= distance from home/market    
8= security of tenure 
9= high level of demand 
10= limited land supply 
 
7.2 Estimating Non-Market Costs of Access to l and 
 
7.2.1 Transaction Cost of land acquisition 
 
Item Cost Estimation Comments 
Cost of access to information    
Cost of drawing up contract   
Negotiating Cost   
	 xxvi	
Communication Cost   
Cost of property   
Legal services Cost   
Inspection Cost   
Cost of valuation   
Cost of survey   
Cost of titling   
Cost of policing boundaries   
Cost of enforcing contracts   
Cost of litigation   
Time it takes to acquire a 
parcel 
  
 
 
7.2.2 Which of the following is a barrier to entry into the land market (buy/sell/rent-in/rent-out land) in this 
community/country? 
 
Item Tick Comments 
cumbersome rules and regulations imposed by government    
Initial investment capital requirement   
Registration and licensing requirements   
Rules on sale or lease of property   
Taxes   
Barriers arising from complex traditional system   
 
 
7.2.3 Enforcement Cost 
 
Item Costs Estimates Comments 
Cost of Patrolling   
Cost of Fencing   
Cost of Litigation   
Cost Boundary clearance   
Cost Land guards   
 
 
8. Use of other Agricultural Inputs  
 
8.1 Quantity of Agricultural Inputs used and Changes 
 
 Questions 
 
Responses 
 
Codes 
8.1.1 Do you use any of these inputs?  (multiple answers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Land   
 2. Labour    
3. Credits    
4. Fertilizers    
5. Improved Seeds    
6. Irrigation 
7. Pesticides 
8.1.2 Prior to 2005, how much of the following inputs did you use?  
 Input  
 
Quantity used before 
2005 
Quantity used 
before 2012 
Quantity used now 
 
Land    
Labour    
Credits    
Improved Seeds    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
 
8.1.3 How have these quantities changed in the last 5years?  1= Unchanged 
2= Improved 
3= Reduced 
	 xxvii	
8.1.4 What factors have accounted for these changes in input 
use? 
 1. New available market    
2. Government policy    
3. Agricultural policy    
4. Personal growing desire for profits 
in Agriculture 
 
8.2 List of crops/parcels cultivated and the input use in the past farming seasons vis-à-vis current input use (for 10yrs 
ago and 5years) 
 
 
8.3 Access to and use of Agricultural Credits 
 
 Question Responses Codes 
8.3.1 Did you apply for credit in the last 10years? 
 
  0= no 
1= yes 
 
8.3.2 Did you apply for credit in the last 5years? 
 
 0= no 
1= yes 
8.3.3 Did you apply for credit in the last 1 yr? 
 
 0= no 
1= yes 
8.3.4 If Yes, did you obtain farm credit?    0=No 
1= Yes      
8.3.5 If you applied but not used credit in the last 
periods, what reasons accounted for this? 
 1= the fertilizer delivered very late  
2= lenders asked me to co-sign with others not 
familiar with me 
3= the cost of credit became so high, hence 
decided not to use. 
4= due to health problem  
5= fear of repayment  
6=I do not need credit since my farm land is 
fertile  
7=I did not know the benefit from using the 
credit  
90= others (specify 
8.3.6 Did you try to borrow in the past but was 
turned down?  
 1=yes 
2=no 
8.3.7 If yes, why were you turned down?   1=insufficient income  
2=insufficient collateral security  
3=previous debt problems 
Pl
ot 
I
D 
8.2.1 Seeds 8.2.2 Pesticides 8.2.3 Fertilizer 
a. 
Type  
b. 
Source 
c. 
Qnt 
d. 
Unit 
e. 
Cost 
a. 
Type  
b. 
Source 
c. 
Cost 
a. 
Type  
b. 
Source 
c. 
Qnt 
d. 
Unit 
e. 
Cost 
01              
             
02              
             
03              
             
04              
             
05              
             
 1= own 
2=bought 
3= received 
4=coupons 
90= others 
1= own 
2=bought 
3= 
received 
4=coupo
ns 
5= others 
  1=CAN 
2=Urea 
3=23.21 0 
+4s 
4=20 20 0 
5 =D 
compound 
6= SA 
90=others 
1= own 
2=bought 
3= 
received 
4=coupon
s 
90= 
others 
 0=N
o 
1=Y
es 
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4=inappropriate purpose of loan 
90=other,____________ 
8.3.8 If no, why did you not attempt to borrow? 
[Rank the 3 most important reasons] 
1. 1=borrowing is risky  
2=interest rate is high  
3=too much paper work  
4=expected to be rejected 
5=I have no asset for collateral  
6=No money lenders in this area for this purpose  
7=Lenders do not provide the amount  
8=no credit association available 
9= fear of loss of assets 
10= didn’t want my application to be rejected 
11= too tough penalty for default 
12= high transportation cost to get the credit 
90= others____________ 
2. 
3. 
 
 
 8.4 Purposes and Status of Credits 
 
8.4.1 
Purpose of 
 credit is to 
Buy 
8.4.2 
Source  
of loan 
8.4.3 
Amt 
 in Cedi 
8.4.4 
Duratio
n 
8.4.5 
Collatera
l 
Yes/No 
8.4.6 
Kind of 
 
Collatera
l 
8.4.7 
Repaymen
t 
 status 
8.4.8 
Amount  
repaid 
8.4.9 
Amoun
t 
Unpaid 
8.4.10 
Why 
 failure to  
repay 
 
                  
 
                  
 
                  
 
                  
1=fertilizer 
2=seed 
3=animal 
4=traction 
5=consumptio
n 6=family 
problem 
90=Others 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
governmen
t   
2= credit 
unions  
3= NGOs  
4= money 
lenders  
5= relations  
6= 
neighbour  
7=susu 
groups 
8= shop 
keepers  
90= others, 
specify...... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= 
6mths 
2=1yr 
3=2yrs 
4=3yrs 
5=more  
 
 
 
 
 
0= no 
1=yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0=Unpaid 
1=Paid 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1= low 
yield 
2=low 
prices 
3=contrac
t 
extended 
4=want to 
pay later 
5=did ask 
for credit 
6=illness 
7= undue 
date 
90=other 
 
 
8.5 Labour Changes 
 
Number Questions Responses Codes 
8.5.1 Number of Adult Household members?    
8.5.2 How many Hours are spent by the adults in the household on 
family farm a day? 
  
 How many hours are spent on other on-farm activities?   
 Have some of your household members migrated out of this 
community in the last  
10years? 
5years? 
 0= No                          
1= Yes      
8.5.3 What reasons accounted for such a migration?  1= non-attractive 
agriculture 
	 xxix	
2= Farm land taken by 
investors 
3= Search for non-farm jobs 
4= search for education 
opportunities 
90= others, state---- 
8.5.4 Do you use hired labour on family farm?    0= No                        
1= Yes      
8.5.5 How many hired labourers do you use?    
8.5.6 Number of hours hired labour spent on your farm a day?  1= less than 2hrs 
3= 2hrs 
4= 5hrs 
5= 8hrs 
6= More, specify  
8.5.7 Can your household get more hired labourers on the family farm 
if they wanted? 
 0= No                        
1= Yes      
8.5.8 Where do these labourers come from?   1= the village 
2= another village nearby 
3= another district 
4= another country 
90= others 
8.5.9 Have recent agro-investment in this area increased the cost of 
labour? 
 0= No                          
1= Yes  
2= the same as ever     
8.5.10 If Yes, what were average daily wages for agricultural labour for? 
2000 
2005 
Now (2012) 
  
 
 
 
 	
9. Recent Land Deals, Contracts and Consultations 
 
9.1. Large investments and Land Acquisition 
 
9.1.1 Have	you	lost	land	due	to	large	agro-investor’s	activities	in	the	area?	  1=yes 2=no 
9.1.2 How	was	the	land	acquired?		  
1= compulsory acquisition by 
state 
2= grant by the chief 
3= granted by family head 
4= I sold it for a good price 
5= I convinced it will create 
jobs for us 
6= I wanted to assist in the 
development of my 
community 
9.1.3 If	you	voluntarily	sold	your	parcel,	was	the	price	offering	an	attraction?		  0=no  1= yes 
9.1.4 Was	the	price	you	were	offered	higher	than	what	is	generally	paid	for	all	other	parcels	in	the	community?	  0=no  1= yes 
9.1.5 If	Yes,	what	accounted	for	this	higher	price	offer?		  
1= because foreigners have 
money 
2= because I did not know 
how the land was to be used 
3= because I knew i won’t get 
it back even f I wanted 
4= because I needed a lot of 
money to solve a family 
problem 
5= because I negotiated well 
6= because I knew they were 
going to make more money 
from it 
90= others 
	 xxx	
9.1.6 If	yes:	Have	you	ever	been	compensated	for	land	you	lost	(e.g.	due	to	resettlement	or	investors	activities	in	the	area)?	  0=no  1= yes 
9.1.7 
 
If	yes,	what	was	the	compensation?		  
1= cash 
2= land replacement 
3=  settlement relocation 
4= food restocking 
90= others 
 
9.2. Recruitment and Employment Opportunities with Large Investments 
We would like to get some information about those members, looking actively for a job 
9.2.1 Who in this household applied/ tried to get a job within the last 5 months from the large farm here?   
1= Myself 
2= spouse 
3= son 
4= daughter 
5= grandson/daughter 
6= some other relatives, name............... 
9.2.2 What job position did he/she apply for with the agro-investment?  
1= casual labour  
2= daily labour 
3= headman /Foreman 
4= office and administration 
5= cooking and cleaning  
6= operator /Truck driver 
7= mechanic / crafts man 
7= guard 
8= community liaison office 
90= other, _____________ 
9.2.3 Did he/ she get a job?   0=no  
1= yes  
9.2.4 If he/she did not get the job: What was the reason to be turned down?  
1= too young 
2= too weak/ old/sick 
3= lack of education  qualification 
4= lack of practical experiences  
5= lack of flexibility 
6= could not agree on salary  
7= lack of referees 
8= discrimination of employer 
9= did not need worker at that time 
10= lack of discipline  
90=Other, ______________ 
9.2.5 If he/she got the job: 
What were the factors that worked in his/her favour? 
 
1= more casual workers were needed 
2= land contract required that we are 
employed 
3= i was the only qualified candidate 
4= i had some relatives who aided me 
5= i am a political supporter 
90= Others 
9.2.6 Is this family member of yours still currently employed with this agro-investment?  
0=no  
1= yes 
9.2.7 
If no: 
What resulted in the household member from leaving the 
employment opportunity? 
 
1= payment too low 
2= conditions too hard/ not good 
3= fight with employee (dispute) 
4= more hands needed at family farm  
5= more hands needed at home  
6=got better job offer elsewhere 
7= no transport / transport too bad 
8= got sick / health problem 
9= was sacked 
10= investor did not need me anymore  
11= competition by younger worker 
12= migrated for better offers in the city 
90; other,______ 
9.2.8 If yes: For how long has he/she been working in the agro-investment?  
1= 5yrs ago 
2= 4yrs ago 
3= 3yrs ago 
4= 2yrs ago 
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5= 2yrs ago 
6= 6months ago 
90= Others 
9.2.9 How satisfied is he/she with the working conditions?   
1= very satisfied 
2=satisfied 
3=neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
4=dissatisfied 
5=very dissatisfied 
99=don’t know 
9.2.1
0 
How satisfied Is he/she with the payment and contract terms of 
the job? 
 
1= very satisfied 
2=satisfied 
3=neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
4=dissatisfied 
5=very dissatisfied 
99=don’t know 
9.2.1
1 
If the conditions of work are bad/dissatisfactory, is this family 
member of yours still working with the agro-investment?  
 
1=yes 
2=no 
 
 
9.2.1
2 What type of working contract does he hold?  
1=daily labour/ task-paid  
2=permanent employment  
90=other, please specify___________ 
9.2.1
3 
How has this income helped to improve your living conditions?  
1= buy more food 
2= build additional house/room 
3= buy farming inputs 
4= buy a bicycle 
5= buy a motor bicycle 
6= clothing 
7= health 
8= education  
9=others, specify................. 
10= no change is noticed 
 
 
9.3 Expectations/ Promises /Disappointments 
 Questions Responses Codes 
9.3.1 What have been the expectations of this 
village when you first heard that agriculture 
investors were coming into your 
community?  
 1= employment opportunities 
2= improvement in our roads 
3= improvement in seeds  
4= improvement in  fertilizer/insecticides supply 
5= market for our produce 
6= social services – schools/hospitals/water 
7= development of irrigation sys 
8= development of agro- factory 
9= Loans to expand farms 
90=others 
9.3.2 Were any of these expectations met? 
(multiple answers are welcomed) 
 1= employment opportunities 
2= improvement in our roads 
3= improvement in seeds  
4= improvement in  fertilizer/insecticides supply 
5= market for our produce 
6= social services – schools/hospitals/water 
7= development of irrigation sys 
8= development of agro- factory 
9= Loans to expand farms 
90=others 
9.3.3 Were there any particular promises that the 
investors made when they came to acquire 
land for farming here? List them?  
 1= employment opportunities 
2= improvement in our roads 
3= improvement in seeds  
4= improvement in  fertilizer/insecticides supply 
5= market for our produce 
6= social services – schools/hospitals/water 
7= development of irrigation sys 
8= development of agro- factory 
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9= Loans to expand farms 
90=others 
9.3.4 Through whom did they make these 
promises?  
 1= Government 
2= Agric Officers 
3= Village chief 
4= Abusuapanin 
5= A village business man 
6= Assembly member 
90= Other 
9.3.5 Did this source of contact and information 
convince you that good results could be 
expected from large investments?  
 
 0= no 
1= yes 
9.3.6 Were any of these promises fulfilled?  1= employment opportunities 
2= improvement in our roads 
3= improvement in seeds  
4= improvement in fertilizer/insecticides supply 
5= market for our produce 
6= social services – schools/hospitals/water 
7= development of irrigation sys 
8= development of agro- factory 
9= Loans to expand farms 
90=others 
9.3.7 If they were never fulfilled, what reasons 
were given for this happening?  
 1= no money 
2= lack of government permission 
3= money squandered by chief 
4= lack of community support 
5= cost too high for them 
6= price of land was too much than expected at the 
beginning 
90=others 
9.3.8 Besides the above factors, will say the 
presence of large investors in this community 
has improved living conditions generally?  
 0=no 
1= yes 
9.3.9 If Yes, how has it improved your living 
conditions?  
 1= sale of food to workers 
2= transportation provision to farm workers 
3= provision of phone services 
4= sale of local alcoholic brew 
5= buying and selling land at better prices 
90= others 
 
9.3.10 If no, how has negatively affected you?   1= teenage pregnancy 
2= high divorce/ infidelity 
3= increase in alcoholism 
4= snatching of more land for investors 
5= increase in rent 
6= increase in sharecropping ratios 
9.3.11 How do you compare the overall economic 
situation of the HOUSEHOLD with  
10 year ago, 5years ago and now? 
 
 
 
 1 =Much better now 
2 =A little better now 
3 =Same 
4 =A little worse now 
5 =Much worse now 
99= Don’t know 
9.3.12 How do you compare the overall economic 
situation of the COMMUNITY with  
10 year ago, 5years ago and now? 
 
 
 
 
 1 =Much better now 
2 =A little better now 
3 =Same 
4 =A little worse now 
5 =Much worse now 
6 =Don’t know 
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9.4. Changes in Land Prices – Beneficiaries and Losers (Recall) 
 
Qnt. No. Question Resp Codes 
9.4.1 How much were land prices going for in 2000?  n/a 
9.4.2 How much were land prices in 2005?   n/a 
9.4.3 How much are land prices now?   n/a 
9.4.4 Are there any changes in land prices between 
these periods?  
 0=no 
1=yes 
9.4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
What accounted for these changes in land 
prices?  
 
 
 
 
 
  1= investor demand/offering high prices 
2= government subsidy on agric 
3= urbanization of the area 
4= government fixed land prices 
5= increase local demand for fertile lands 
6= better prices for cocoa, palm nut, cashew, etc 
90= others 
9.4.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which people in your opinion benefit from this 
change in land prices? If it reflects an increase 
and multiple answer are allowed in order of 
severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1= Central government 
2= local government 
3= tax agency 
4 = chiefs holding village land in trust – sales and 
lease revenue 
5= families holding farming land through sales 
and lease revenue 
6= Business men who bought lands earlier in this 
village and are re-selling or renting 
90= Others 
9.4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which people in your opinion are losing out as 
land prices have changed in this community? 
Multiple answer are allowed in order of 
severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 1= women have their gifts snatched 
2= sharecroppers due increasing crop share 
3= leaseholders have their rents adjusted upwards 
4= villagers enjoying community forest have their 
rights invaded by land sales 
5= herders lose grazing land to new sales 
6= migrant farmers have to now buy farmlands 
90= others 
 
 
10. Institutions, Institutional Change and Impact on Land Prices 
 
10.1 Changes in institutions attributable to recent large investments in the affected communities 
 
10.1.1 Which local land institutions exist in this are to regulate agricultural land transactions? 
10.1.2 Customs and tradition  
 
1. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.3 Agencies 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.4 What exact roles do these institutions 1 
9.3.13 
Do you think the advantages of the 
investment scheme out-weight the 
disadvantages? 
 1=yes 2=no 
Please list up to 3 impacts you see the scheme have on the local people? (3 positive and 3 negative ones) Check Questions 
 Disadvantages   Advantages 
1   1  
2   2  
3   3  
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play in the recent large scale agro-
investments? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.5 Are there any changes to these 
institutional structures in recent times 
following large land acquisition by 
investors? 
0= no 
1= yes 
10.1.6 What are these changes recently being 
observed as changes to existing land 
institutions in this community?  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.7 What processes does one have to go 
through to acquire a parcel of 
agricultural land? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.8 Have these processes changed in the 
last 10years?  
0= no 
1= yes 
10.1.9 What customary practices will one 
need to fulfil before access to 
agricultural land? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.10 Have these practices changed in the 
last 10years following the activities of 
large investors in this area? 
0= no 
1= yes 
10.1.11 If Yes, what are these changes that are 
noticed in the customary practices due 
to recent land acquisition in this area? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.12 Do people generally make land 
transactions from an informed 
position with information available?  
0= no 
1= yes 
10.1.13 What information does one need to be 
able to sell/buy (rent in/rent out) land 
in this community? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10.1.14 From whom can you acquire such 
information? 
1= government 
2= paramount Chief 
3= community Chief 
4= abusuapanin/Tendana/Other.... 
5= assembly man 
6= customary land secretariat 
90=other,_____________ 
10.1.15 How much does it cost to access this 
kind/type of information concerning 
land transactions? (give range of 
costs).  
In Ghana cedis…. 
10.1.16 After one acquires a parcel of land, are 
there instances under which his/her 
rights can be disturbed? 
0= no 
1= yes 
10.1.17 How do people generally protect their 
rights in land in this community? 
 
 
 
1= commit it to the gods 
2= register it 
3= fence it 
4= use land guards to police it 
5= use witch powers/ juju 
90= others 
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Appendix	2:	Community	survey	questionnaire	
	
Large-Scale	Investment	in	Agriculture	in	West	Africa	-	Implications	for	Land	Markets	
and	Smallholder	Farmers		
August,	2012	to	April,	2013	
Research	undertaken	by	Centre	for	Development	Research,		
University	Bonn,		
Germany	
	 	
Introduction		
	
Dear	Sir/Madam,	
I	come	in	the	name	of	the	Centre	for	Development	Research	(ZEF),	University	of	Bonn,	
Germany,	which	 is	 examining	 how	 large-scale	 agricultural	 investments	 have	 impacted	
land	markets	and	smallholders.	You	have	been	purposely	selected	to	assist	in	this	study.	
Please	 we	 would	 be	 very	 grateful	 if	 you	 would	 spare	 some	 time	 to	 respond	 to	 our	
questionnaire.	The	information	obtained	will	be	treated	with	confidentiality	and	only	for	
academic	purposes.	The	interview	should	take	about	30-45min.	We	are	grateful	for	your	
time	and	assistance	in	our	study.	
	
	
REGION:																																																																				DISTRICT:	
	
NAME	OF	COMMUNITY:																																																																																										
	
DATE	
																																																																																																																								
NAME	OF	PERSON	INTERVIEWED	
	
NAME	 SEX	
AGE	
TITLE	 OCCUPATION	
	
CO
DE	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
SECTION	1:		COMMUNITY	DEMOGRAPHIC	INFORMATION	
	
1.		NUMBER	OF	PEOPLE	LIVING																													2010	POPULATION	 	
			DAY	 	MONTH	 Y	E	A	R		 	 	 	 	 		 	
	 xxxvi	
					IN	THE	COMMUNITY:																																																					FIGURE:	
	
2.		What	are	the	principal	ethnic	groups	represented	in	this	community?	
	 LIST	IN	ORDER	OF	SIZE	
	 Akan	...........................	1																																															1st	
	 Ewe	............................	2																																																																												
	 Ga-Dangme	................	3	
	 Dagomba	....................	4	
	 Waala	.........................	5																																													2nd																																																																											
	 Nzema	........................	6	
	 Gonja	..........................	7	 	
	 Mamprusi	...................	8																																													3rd																																																																												
	 Guan	...........................	9	
	 Kassena/Nankani	.......	10	
	 Konkomba	..................	11																																												4th																																																																											
	 Nanumba	...................	12																																																																										
	 Builsa	..........................	13	
	 Other	(specify)	...........	90	
	
3.		What	are	the	major	religions	practiced	by	the	residents	of	this	community?	
		 																										Catholic…………………..1																																																																									
	 Protestant	......................	2																																																1st																																																																								
	 Charismatic/Pentecostal	3	
	 Other	Christians	.............	4																																																																									
	 Islam	...............................	5																																															2nd																																																																								
	 Traditional	......................	6																																																																									
	 No	religion	.....................	8																																																3rd																																																																									
	 Other	(specify)	………….90																																																																																																																																																																																																												
	 																																																																																															4th																																																																																																																							
																																																																																																																																										
4.		For	the	past	ten	years	(since	2000),	have	more	people	moved	to	your	community,	or	
have	there	been	more	people	that	moved	away?	
	 More	arrivals	.....................................	1	
	 More	departures	...............................	2	
	 About	the	same	................................	3	
	 Neither	arrivals	nor	departures	........	4	
	
	
	
	
	
	
RANK	
RANK	
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SECTION	2:		ECONOMY	AND	INFRASTRUCTURE	
	
1. What	are	the	major	economic	activities	of	the	people	of	this	community?	
	 LIST	IN	ORDER	OF	IMPORTANCE																																																																																				
																																																							Farming	..............	.........	1																																		1st																																																														
	 	 	 			Fishing	..................	.......2																																																																		
																																																							Trading	..................	.......3																																	2nd	
																																																								Handicraft	....................4																																																													
	 	 	 				Salt	“winning”	.............5																																																																		
																																																								Mining	.........................	6																																	3rd																																																													
	 	 	 			Sand	winning.......	.........7	
																																																							Quarrying	.....................	8																																	4th																																																																		
																																																							Other	(Specify)............90																																																													
	
2. Do	you	think	that	living	conditions	of	the	people	in	this	community	is	better	or	
worse	off	since	10	years	ago	(since	2000/2012)?	
	 															
i. Better	.........................	2	
ii. Worse	.........................	3	if	no	change,	move	to	Q4	
iii. No	change	
	
WRITE	THE	REASONS	IN	ORDER	OF	IMPORTANCE	
BETTER	
																				1			Provision	of	electricity	
																				2			Provision	of	drinking	water	
																				3			Improvement	in	access	roads	
							4			More	jobs																																																																																					1st																																																																																																																			
5			Improvement/availability	of	other	social	amenities	
6			Agricultural	Investments	
7			Construction/improvement	in	drainage	systems																2nd	
8			Peaceful	environment																																																																																																		
9			Improvement	in	business	
10	Good	prices	for	produce	
	
	
																		WORSE	
11		Unemployment		
12		Poverty																																																																																			1st																																																																																																																	
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13		Deterioration	in	social	amenities	
14		Natural	disasters/famine	
15		Wars/conflicts	
16		Migration																																																																													2nd																																																																																																																	
17		High	prices	of	consumer	goods	
18		Diseases	
	
3. Does	a	motorable	road	extend	to	this	community?	
	 YES	.........................................	1											(»	6)	
																											NO	.........................................	0	
	
4. How	far	is	a	motorable	road	from	this	community?	
																																																																																															KILOMETRES:	
	
	
5. Do	most	households	have	electricity,	or	only	a	few?	
	 Most	households	...................	1	
																										Only	a	few	..............................	2	
	
6. Do	most	households	have	pipe-borne	water,	or	only	a	few?	
i. Most	households	.......	1	
ii. Only	a	few	..................	2`	
	
7. What	is	the	major	source	of	drinking	water	for	most	households	in	this	
community	during	the	dry	season?	
i. Indoor	plumbing	...............................	1	
ii. Inside	standpipe	................................	2	
iii. Water	truck/tanker	service	...............	3	
iv. Water	vendor	....................................	4	
v. Pipe	in	neighbouring	household	.......	5	
vi. Private	outside	standpipe/tap	..........	6	
vii. Public	standpipe	................................	7	
viii. Borehole	...........................................	8	
ix. Protected	well	...................................	9	
x. Unprotected	well	..............................	10	
xi. River/stream	.....................................	11	
xii. Rain	water/spring	.............................	12	
xiii. Dugout/pond/lake/dam	....................	13	
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xiv. Other	(specify)	..................................	90	
	
8. And	during	the	rainy	season?	
i. Indoor	plumbing	...............................	1	
ii. Inside	standpipe	................................	2	
iii. Water	truck/tanker	service	...............	3	
iv. Water	vendor	....................................	4	
v. Pipe	in	neighbouring	household	.......	5	
vi. Private	outside	standpipe/tap	..........	6	
vii. Public	standpipe	................................	7	
viii. Borehole	...........................................	8	
ix. Protected	well	...................................	9	
x. Unprotected	well	..............................	10	
xi. River/stream	.....................................	11	
xii. Rain	water/spring	.............................	12	
xiii. Dugout/pond/lake/dam	....................	13	
xiv. Other	(specify)	..................................	90	
	
9. Is	there	a	communication	network	in	this	community?	
i. YES	.............................	1																					
ii. NO	..............................	0	
	
10. Is	there	a	bank	in	this	community?	
i. YES	.............................	1																					
ii. NO	..............................	0	
	
11. How	far	away	is	the	nearest	bank	from	this	community?	
	
																																																																																											KILOMETRES:	
12. Is	there	a	permanent	(daily)	market	in	this	community?	
i. YES	.............................	1																					
ii. NO	..............................	0	
	
13. Is	there	a	periodic	market	in	this	community?	
i. YES	.............................	1	
ii. NO	..............................	0																				
	
14. How	often	is	this	market?	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	
	 	
	 xl	
	
TIME	UNIT	CODES:													
																																																																																																								NUMBER	OF	TIMES:	
a. Weekly	..............1	
b. Monthly..............2	
c. Quarterly	............3	
d. Half-yearly..........4										PER	TIME	UNIT:	
e. Yearly	................5	
f. Other	(specify)...90													
	
15. How	far	away	is	the	nearest	periodic	or	daily	market?	
																																																																																										KILOMETRES:	
	
16. Does	public	transport	pass	by	this	community?	
i. YES	.............................	1	
ii. NO	..............................	0																																		(»	18)	
	
17. What	is	the	major	means	of	public	transport?	
i. Bus	(OSA,	City	Express,	STC,	GPRTU,	etc.)…1		
ii. Mini	Bus/Mummy	truck/Trotro	........	………2	
iii. Car	(Taxi,	private)	..............................	………3	
iv. Canoe/Ferry/Boat	.............................	………4	
v. Train	..................................................	………5	
vi. Tractor	..............................................	………6	
vii. Other	(specify)………………………..……….……90											
	
18. How	far	away	from	this	community	must	you	go	to	board	a	public	transport?	
	
																																																																											KILOMETRES:																																						
	
	
19. How	often	does	public	transport	pass	by	this	community?	
	 TIME	UNIT	CODES:									
																																															Daily	...............…………1				NUMBER	OF	TIMES:	
																																																												Weekly	.…………..........2	
	 																																		Monthly	.…………..……3	
																																																												Other	(specify)	…	….…...90				PER	TIME	UNIT:	
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20. Do	any	of	the	people	in	this	community	leave	temporarily	during	certain	times	of	
the		
year	to	look	for	work	elsewhere?	
i. YES	.............................	1	
ii. NO	..............................	0																																					(»	25)	
	
21. Where	do	most	of	them	go?		(WRITE	THE	NAME	OF	THE	PLACE	AND	
COUNTRY	AND	WHETHER	IT’S	A	VILLAGE,	TOWN,	ETC.)	
i. Village	in	Ghana	.........	1	
ii. Town	in	Ghana	...........	2	
iii. Outside	Ghana	...........	3	
	
22. What	type	of	work	do	they	look	for	during	these	times	of	the	year?	
i. Self-employment	(Agric.)	......	1	
ii. Self-employment	(Non-agric.)	 2	
iii. Employment	(Private)	...........	3	
iv. Employment	(Government)	..	4	
v. Other	(specify)	…………...…..90	
	
23. How	long	do	they	work	before	returning	to	the	community?	
	TIME	UNIT	CODES:									
																															Day(s)	...........…....1																							NUMBER:	
																																																									Week(s)	.....…........2	
																																												Month(s)	..…..........3	
																																																									Other	(specify)	.....90																				TIME	UNIT:	
	
	
24. What	are	the	ages	of	most	of	the	people	who	find	seasonal	work	outside	this	
community?	
i. Under	10	years	...........	1	
ii. 10	–	14	years	..............	2	
iii. 15	–	19	years	..............	3	
iv. 20	–	24	years	..............	4	
v. 25	–	29	years	..............	5	
vi. 30	–	34	years	..............	6	
vii. 35	and	Above	.............	7	
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25. Do	people	come	to	this	community	temporarily	during	certain	times	of	the	year	
to	look	for	work?	
i. YES	.............................	1	
ii. NO	..............................	0																														(»	30)	
	
26. Where	do	most	of	them	come	from?			
i. Village	in	Ghana	.........	1	
ii. Town	in	Ghana	...........	2	
iii. Outside	Ghana	...........	3	
	
27. What	two	major	types	of	work	do	they	do	in	this	community?	
i. Farming	......................	1	
ii. Fishing	........................	2																																																																										
1st	
iii. Trading	.......................	3	
iv. Handicraft	..................	4	
v. Salt	“winning”	............	5																																																																											
2nd	
vi. Mining	........................	6	
vii. Sand	winning	..............	7	
viii. Quarrying	...................	8	
ix. Other	(specify)	………90	
	
28. How	long	do	they	work	in	this	community	before	leaving?	
TIME	UNIT	CODES:									
																																	Day(s)	......…………...........1												NUMBER:	
																																																											Week(s)	.....…………..........2	
																																														Month(s)	....………….........3	
																																																											Other	(specify)..….........90																	TIME	UNIT:	
	
29. What	are	the	ages	of	most	of	the	people	who	come	here	to	do	seasonal	work?	
i. Under	10	years	...........	1	
ii. 10	–	14	years	..............	2	
iii. 15	–	19	years	..............	3	
iv. 20	–	24	years	..............	4																																																									
v. 25	–	29	years	..............	5	
vi. 30	–	34	years	..............	6	
vii. 35	and	Above	.............	7	
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30. Is	it	easier	or	more	difficult	to	find	work	in	this	community	compared	to	ten	
years	ago	(early	2000s)?	
i. Easier	.........................	1	
ii. More	difficult	.............	2	
iii. No	change	..................	3	
	
31. What	are	the	major	emerging	jobs	in	this	community?	
i. Construction………………………………………………..1						1st	
ii. Agricultural	Investments	...............................	2					
iii. Manufacturing	..............................................	3																																																																						
iv. Trading	..........................................................	4							2nd																																					
																										Other	(specify)	...............................................	90																																																																																																																																																															
	
													3rd																																												
	
SECTION	3:		EDUCATION	
	
1.			Which	of	the	following	educational	facilities	does	this	community	have:	
																											Pre-school………………..……….…..1	
	Primary	School	......................	..2																																
	 	Junior	High	School………….……..3											
																											Senior	High	School…………..…….4	
	 Tertiary	institution………..….…...5	
	
2.		What	proportion	of	the	children	in	this	community	school	going	age	is	in	School?		
	 All	attend	school	...........................................	100………1	
	 Almost	all		.....................................................	90………..2				GIRLS:	
	 More	than	half,	but	not	all	............................	75………..3	
Half	of	them	..................................................	50………...4	
	 Less	than	half	................................................	33	1/3……5	
	 Only	a	few	.....................................................	10………….6				BOYS:	
	 None	.............................................................	0……………7	
																																																										
3.		What	are	the	four	most	serious	schooling	problems	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	
people	in	this	community?	
	
						
	
	
	
	
	 	
	 	
	 		
		
	 xliv	
		LIST	IN	ORDER	OF	IMPORTANCE																																																											
	 No	problem	..........................................................	1								1st	
	 Lack	of	school	building	.........................................	2	
	 Insufficient	furniture	............................................	3						2nd																																									
	 Lack	of	qualified	teachers	....................................	4	
High	cost	of	school	fees	.......................................	5							3rd	
	 Lack	of	text	books/stationery	..............................	6																																														
	 Lack	of	accommodation	for	teachers	..................	7	
	 Lack	of	access	roads/routes	.................................	8							4th	
Poor	teaching	.......................................................	9	
	 Facilities	in	bad	condition	....................................	10																																															
	 Other	(specify)	.....................................................	90	
	 	 																																					
SECTION	4:		HEALTH	
	
1.	Which	of	the	following	Health	Facilities	is	available	in	this	Community?	
Hospital…………………………………………………..…1		
Drug/Chemical	Store…………………………...……2	
Pharmacy………………………………………….……….3	
Maternity	Home………………………………………..4	
Clinic	or	Health	Post……………………………..……5	
Family	Planning	Unit…………………………..……..6	
Traditional	Herbalist……………………………….…7	
	
2.		What	are	the	four	major	health	problems	in	this	Community?	
	 LIST	IN	ORDER	OF	IMPORTANCE	
Malaria	..............................................	1	
	 Hernia	...............................................	2																										1st																																																																
	 Guinea-worm	....................................	3	
Bilharzias	...........................................	4	
	 Measles	.............................................	5																										2nd																																																																
	 Cholera	..............................................	6	
Elephantiasis	.....................................	7	
	 Cerebro	Spinal	Meningitis	(CSM)	......	8																									3rd																																																												
	 Goiter	................................................	9	
	 Burili	Ulcer	........................................	10	
River	Blindness/Oncho	......................	11	
	 Tuberculosis	(TB)	..............................	12																								4th																																																														
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
			
	 xlv	
	 HIV/AIDS	...........................................	13	
	 Other	(specify)	..................................	90	
	 	 	 																	
3.		What	are	the	four	major	problems	with	health	services	delivery	for	the		
												people	of	this	community?																																																																		1st																																																																																																											
Lack	of	health	facilities	.................................	1	
	 Lack	of	qualified	health	personnel	................	2																																												
	 Inability	to	pay	for	health	services	................	3																		2nd	
Health	centre	too	far	....................................	4	
	 Lack	of	medicine	and	medical	supplies	.........	5																		3rd	
	 Lack	of	accommodation	for	health	personnel6	
Inadequate	health	facilities	..........................	7	
	 Other	specify)	………………………………………....																							4th	
	
	
SECTION	5:		AGRICULTURE	
1.	
		What	are	the	major	
crops	grown	by	
		the	people	of	this	
community?	
	
	
	
LIST	IN	ORDER	OF	
IMPORTANCE	
	
	
2.	
		How	
many	
		times	per		
year	is	
..........	
planted	in		
general?	
	
ONCE	.....1	
TWICE	....2	
TREE	
CROP.	….3	
OTHER	…4	
3.	
	During	which	month(s)	is	it	
mainly	planted?	
	During	which	month(s)	is	it	
mainly	harvested?	
	
	
(FOR	TREE	CROPS	ASK	
HARVEST	
ONLY)	
JAN	....1																				JUL	.......7	
FEB	....2																				AUG	.....8	
MAR	..3																				SEP	.......9	
APR	....4																			OCT	.....10	
MAY	..5																					NOV	....11	
JUN	....6																				DEC	....12	
4.	
		How	is	the	
harvested	
			................	
generally	
			sold?		Is	it	
..........	
	
At	the	local		
			market		
..........…....1	
At	the	market	
of	
		another	place	
..…....2	
To	middlemen	
…..…3	
To	public	
agencies	...4	
To	a	
cooperative	….																
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5.			Is	there	an	agricultural	extension	officer	stationed	in	this	community?	
YES	.........................................	1	
	 NO	..........................................	0	
6.			What	agency	(ies)	are	they	from?	
Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	..................	1	
	 NGO	(Local)	...................................................	2	
	 NGO	(Foreign)	...............................................	3	
	 Agricultural	Cooperatives	.............................	4	
	 Other	(specify)………………………………...90	
																																																											
7.		Is	there	a	farmers’	cooperative	in	this	community?	
YES	.........................................	1	
	 NO	..........................................	0				
	
8.		What	is	its	name	and	what	three	major	services	does	it	provide?	
								Name	of	the	Cooperative:	
	
Provision	of	employment	.....................................................	1	
	 Provision	of	credit	facilities	..................................................	2																																	
1st	
	 Provision	of	agricultural	equipment	.....................................	3	
Provision	of	agric.	inputs	(seeds,	fertilizer,	fishing	net,	etc.)	4	
	 Marketing	.............................................................................	5																																	
2nd	
	 Records/Book-keeping	.........................................................	6	
Provision	of	communal	labour	..............................................	7	
Protect	farmer	land	rights…………………………………………...8																																	3rd	
	 Other	(specify)…………………………………………………..90																																		
	 	 																																						
9.		Are	there	any	irrigated	fields	in	this	community?	
YES	.........................................	1	
	 NO	..........................................	0	
	
	
SECTION	6:	LAND	OWNERSHIP	AND	LAND	TRANSACTIONS	
	
1.		Which	people	in	this	community	own	land?				
													Government……………………………..……...1	
	
	
	
	
	
	
RANK	
	
	
	
	 xlvii	
Chiefs/Stools/Skins…………………………...2	
	 Families…………………………………………….3	
	 Individuals/Private	Persons……………...4	
	 The	gods………………………………………..…5	
	 Others……………………………………………90	
	 	
2.			What	kind	of	interest	can	be	acquired	in	land	in	this	community?		
	 Allodial/Freehold	Interest	……………………1	
	 Usufructuary	Interest…………………………2	
	 Leasehold	Interest…………………...………..3	
	 Share	Tenancy………………..………………4	
	 Customary	License………..……………….…5	
	
3.		Do	some	people	in	this	community	buy	and	sell/lease	farm	land?	
YES	.........................................	1	
	 NO	..........................................	0	
	
4.	What	were	the	prices/rents	of	agricultural	land	in	this	community		
10yrs?		
	
	
5.	What	were	the	prices/rents	of	land	in	this	community	5years	ago?		
	
	
6.	What	are	current	land	prices/rents	in	this	community?		
	
7.		Will	you	attribute	the	changes	in	land	prices	to	the	activities	of		
investors	in	this	community?		
	 Yes…………………………………..1	
No……………………………………0	
	
8.		If	Yes,	what	are	your	reasons?	
1…………………………	………………………………………………………………………	
2…………………………………………………………………………………………………	
3…………………………………………………………………………………………………	
	
9.	If	No,	what	other	factors	could	account	for	the	change	in	land	prices	in	your	
community	over	the	last	decade?	
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10.	Are	there	any	sharecroppers	in	this	community?	
YES	.........................................	1	
	 NO	..........................................	0			(»	12)	
	
11.		What	would	be	the	proportion	of	sharecroppers?	
	 All	...........................................	100………….1	
Most	Farmers	.........................	90…………...2	
	 Half.........................................	50…………...3	
	 Less	than	half	.........................	33	1/3……..4	
	 Only	a	few	people	..................	10…………...5	
	
12.		Are	there	any	leaseholders	in	this	community?	
	 YES………………………………..1	
	 NO…………………………………0		
	
13.		For	how	long	is	a	leasehold	interest	granted	in	this	community?	
	
	
14.		What	is	the	average	farm	size	of	a	household	in	this	community?		
	
	15.		How	much	money	does	an	agricultural	labourer	charge	for	a	day’s	work?	
	 	
CLEARING	
	
PLANTING	
	
HARVESTING	
OTHER	
MAJOR	
ACTIVITY	
AMOUNT	FOR	A	
MAN:	
	 	 	 	
AMOUNT	FOR	A	
WOMAN:	
	 	 	 	
AMOUNT	FOR	A	
CHILD:	
	 	 	 	
								
	
SECTION	7:	RECENT	LARGE	AGRO-INVESTMENTS	
	
1.	When	did	the	large-scale	investor	come	into	this	community?			
	
2.	From	who	was	the	land	acquired?	
	 Government…………………………,,….1	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	 xlix	
Chiefs/Stools/Skins…………………….2	
	 Families……………………………………..3	
	 Individuals/Private	Persons.………4	
	 The	gods………………….………………..5	
	 Others…………………….……………….90	
	
3.	What	kind	of	interest	was	acquired?	
	 Allodial/Freehold	Interest	……..……….1	
	 Usufructuary	Interest…………....……….2	
	 Leasehold	Interest………………………....3	
	 Share	Tenancy…………………….……….…4	
	 Customary	License……………..………….5	
	
4.	For	how	long	is	this	interest	acquired	supposed	to	last?	
	
5.	What	kind	of	contract	was	signed	with	the	investors?	
	
6.	Which	of	the	following	is	included	in	the	land	contract	terms	for	large	investments?	
	Employment	provision,	………………………..…………………..1	
Infrastructure	development……………………….…………….…2	
Services	improvement	……………………………………………….3		
Scholarships	………………………………………………..……..……..4	
Others…………………………………………………………….………..90	
7.	Have	you	seen	these	things	in	the	community?			
	 YES…………………………………1		
	 NO………………………………….0	
	
8.	If	yes,	what	has	been	provided	already	or	expected	
soon?....................................................................	
	
9.	If	no,	what	reasons	have	they	given	you	for	not	fulfilling	their	
promise?.............................................	
	
10.	What	are	your	general	impressions	about	agro-investors	so	far	in	this	community?	
	 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………	
	 2………………………………………………………………………………………………….		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
	
	
	 l	
Appendix	3:	Community	Focus	Group	Discussion	(FGD)	Guide		
Large-Scale	Investment	in	Agriculture	in	West	Africa		
August	2012	to	April	2013	
Research	undertaken	by	Centre	for	Development	Research,	
University	Bonn,	Germany	
	
History	and	Emergence	of	Recent	Agro-investments	in	Ghana	
	
Account	of	Investment	Arrivals	
1. When	did	the	large-scale	investment	come	into	this	community?	
2. What	circumstances	surrounded	the	coming	of	the	investors	into	this	
community?		
3. Where	are	these	investors	from?	
4. What	are	the	investors	cultivating?	What	do	your	people	commonly	cultivate?	
Land	Acquisition	procedures	and	associated	costs	–	non-price	costs	of	accessing	land	
1. Who	owns	land	in	this	community?	
2. Who	can	acquire	land	in	this	community	and	on	what	terms?	
3. What	kind	of	interest	can	be	acquired	in	this	community?	
4. What	are	the	processes	involved	in	acquiring	agricultural	land	in	this	community	
5. What	costs	are	associated	with	these	processes	–	monetary	payments,	time	
taken,	customary	presents,	etc?	(Estimates	at	this	point	but	get	details	from	
HHS).	
6. What	role	do	these	costs	play	in	influencing	land	prices	eventually?	
7. From	whom	can	information	regarding	land	prices/sale	be	accessed	in	this	
community?	
8. From	where	can	information	regarding	land	prices/sale	be	accessed	in	this	
community?	
9. What	is	the	cost	of	accessing	such	information?	
10. How	does	one	protect	his	interest	in	land	after	it	is	acquired?	
11. How	much	does	it	cost	to	protect	a	parcel	of	land	through	the	above	process	
(es)?	
Contracts	–	nature,	rights,	responsibilities,	consultations,	promises,	water	issues,	
dispute	resolution,	compensation	…	
1. Do	you	know	the	nature	of	the	contract	that	the	land	grantors	signed	with	the	
investors?	
	 li	
2. Were	community	members	consulted	during	the	negotiation	stages	of	the	
contract?	
3. Are	community	land	rights	affected	by	the	operations	of	large	investors?	
4. Do	you	know	the	responsibilities	that	came	with	the	grant	of	these	large	
investments?	
5. Did	the	investors	make	any	promises	when	they	started	operating	in	this	
community?		
6. From	where	does	the	community	obtain	water	for	agricultural	purposes?	
7. Are	there	any	issues	with	water	rights	and	access	between	locals	and	foreign	
investors?	
8. Are	these	issues	resolved?		
9. What	measures	have	been	outlined	for	dispute	resolution	between	community	
members	and	investors	if	they	arise?	
10. Were	community	members	compensated	for	land	taken	for	investment?	
11. If	yes,	was	this	compensation	adequate,	equitable	and	timely?	
Opportunities	and	Threats	of	Investments	
1. Is	there	evidence	of	concrete	benefits	from	these	investments	so	far	since	the	
recent	re-emergence	in	Ghana?	Enumerate	
2. Specifically,	how	have	local	population	in	these	investment	locations	benefited	
from	the	investment	activities	so	far?	Back	claims	with	data		
3. Has	this	benefit	reached	smallholder	farmers	in	these	communities?		
4. If	yes,	in	which	ways	are	local	smallholder	farmers	benefiting	large	investors?	
5. Are	there	any	groups	of	people	marginalised	or	feared	marginalised	or	who	risk	
being	marginalised	because	of	recent	land	deals	with	large	investors?	
6. How	have	the	government	assisted	in	creating	the	enabling	environment	for	
agro-investments	in	your	community?	
7. How	do	you	see	the	future	of	these	investments?	
8. How	different	are	these	investments	from	previous	state	farm	concepts	in	
Ghana?	
9. Why	do	you	think	Ghana	opted	for	large-scale	investment	in	agriculture	instead	
of	encouraging	and	investing	in	improving	smallholder	productivity?	
Effects	of	large	acquisition	on	land	market	–	prices	and	processes	-Average	
1. What	determines	land	prices	in	this	community?	
2. How	much	are	agricultural	lands	being	sold	in	this	community?	
3. How	much	were	they	sold	10years	ago?		
4. What	of	5years	ago	before	the	coming	of	these	agricultural	investments	in	this	
community?	
	 lii	
5. What	might	have	caused	the	change	in	land	prices	over	the	stated	periods?		
6. Would	you	attribute	this	increasing	land	prices	or	emerging	land	sales	to	recent	
activities	of	large	agro-investments	in	this	area?	
7. Which	people/groups	of	people	are	losing/	lose	when	land	prices	increase	in	this	
community?	
8. Which	people/groups	of	people	win/are	winning	when	land	prices	increase	in	
this	community?	
9. How	does	each	of	these	persons	win	or	lose	when	land	prices	increase	in	this	
community?		
10. What	measures	are	put	in	place	to	reduce	these	losses	of	these	people?	
Access	to	Credits	and	Other	Agricultural	Inputs	
1. Are	there	credit	facilities	in	this	community?	Name	them?	
2. If	no,	where	is	the	nearest	credit	facility	to	this	community?	Name	of	place	and	
how	far?	
3. Do	people	in	this	community	access	these	credits	for	agricultural	purposes?	If	no,	
why?	
4. What	is	commonly	used	as	collateral	for	these	agricultural	credits?	
5. Is	land	commonly	used	as	collateral	security	in	this	community?		
6. Has	the	change	in	land	prices	improved	the	grant	of/access	to	agricultural	credits	
in	this	community?	
7. Has	the	recent	agricultural	investment	led	to	an	improvement	in	the	access	to	
agricultural	inputs	like	improved	seeds,	fertilizer,	pesticides,	etc?	
8. Have	the	investors	attracted	more	people	from	nearby	communities	into	this	
area	for	agricultural	jobs?	
9. Do	some	of	your	community	members	get	to	employ	some	of	these	people	too?		
10. How	much	are	farm	labourers	generally	paid	in	this	community?	
Impressions,	Expectations	and	Disappointments	
1. What	have	been	the	expectations	of	this	village	when	you	first	heard	that	large	
agro-	investors	were	coming	into	your	community?		
2. Were	any	of	these	expectations	met?	(Multiple	answers	are	welcomed)	
3. Were	there	any	particular	promises	that	the	investors	made	when	they	came	to	
acquire	land	for	farming	here?	List	them?		
4. Through	whom	did	they	make	these	promises?		
5. Did	the	personality	of	this	contact	and	his	information	convince	you	that	good	
results	could	be	expected	from	large	investments?		
6. Were	any	of	these	promises	fulfilled?	
7. If	they	were	never	fulfilled,	what	reasons	were	given	for	this	happening?		
	 liii	
8. Besides	the	above	factors,	will	you	say	the	presence	of	large	investors	in	this	
community	has	improved	living	conditions	generally?		
9. If	yes,	how	has	it	improved	your	living	conditions?		
10. If	no,	how	have	these	investments	negatively	affected	you?		
Institutions,	Institutional	Change	and	Impact	on	Land	Prices	
1. Which	local	land	institutions	exist	in	this	area	to	regulate	agricultural	land	
transactions?	–	Customs/traditions	and	institutions		
2. What	exact	roles	do	these	institutions	play	in	the	recent	large-scale	agro-
investments?	
3. Are	there	any	changes	to	these	institutional	structures	in	recent	times	following	
large	land	acquisition	by	investors?	
4. What	are	these	changes	recently	being	observed	as	changes	to	existing	land	
institutions	in	this	community?		
5. What	processes	does	one	have	to	go	through	to	acquire	a	parcel	of	agricultural	
land?	
6. Have	these	processes	changed	in	the	last	10years?		
7. What	customary	practices	will	one	need	to	fulfil	before	access	to	agricultural	
land?	
8. Have	these	practices	changed	in	the	last	10years	following	the	activities	of	large	
investors	in	this	area?	
9. If	yes,	what	are	these	changes	that	are	noticed	in	the	customary	practices	due	to	
recent	land	acquisition	in	this	area?	
10. What	information	does	one	need	to	be	able	to	sell/buy	(rent	in/rent	out)	land	in	
this	community?	
11. From	whom	can	you	acquire	such	information?	
12. How	much	does	it	cost	to	access	this	kind	of	information	concerning	land	
transactions?	(give	range	of	costs).		
13. After	one	acquires	a	parcel	of	land,	are	there	instances	under	which	his/her	
rights	can	be	disturbed?	
14. How	do	people	generally	protect	their	rights	in	land	in	this	community?	
	
	
	
	
	 liv	
Appendix	4:	Interview	Guide	for	Large-scale	Agro-investment	Companies	
	
Large-Scale	Investment	in	Agriculture	in	West	Africa		
August	2012	to	April	2013	
Research	undertaken	by	Centre	for	Development	Research,	
University	Bonn,	
Germany	
	
Questions	for	Large	Investors	
	
1. What	 is	 the	 Size	 of	 your	 agricultural	 holding	 –	 planed/desirable	 -	 current	 holding	 –	
future	expansion	plans?	
2. What	kind	of	interest	is	being	held	in	this	holding?	
3. For	how	long	is	the	grant/lease/interest	suppose	the	last?	
4. What	were	the	processes	involved	in	acquiring	this	parcel?	
5. What	costs	are	associated	with	these	processes	above?	
6. Did	you	have	to	use	agents	or	local	support	system	to	go	through	these	processes?	
7. Did	the	use	of	agents	change	the	expected	costs	for	land	acquisition	processes?	If	yes,	
how?	
8. Did	the	acquired	land	meet	your	expectations?	-	land	size,	fertility,	water,	infrastructure,	
community	acceptance,	government	support	and	labour	supply.	
9. What	influenced	the	choice	of	your	location	in	this	community?	
10. To	what	use	did	you	plan	to	commit	this	parcel	into?		
11. And	is	this	planned	use	different	from	its	current	use?	
12. If	Yes,	what	factors	have	accounted	for	this	change	in	plans?		
13. What	are	the	future	plans	of	type	of	production	or	choice	of	crop	cultivation?	
14. What	was	paid	for	the	land?		
15. Did	 the	 community	members	whose	 lands	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 acquisition	 accept	 the	
price?	
16. Did	the	acquisition	require	the	resettlement	of	smallholders?	
17. If	Yes,	how	many	smallholder	households	were	affected	by	your	land	transaction?	
18. Did	 the	 acquisition	 affect	 community	 land	 rights	 and	 access	 to	 common	 resources	 –	
water,	dead	forest	wood	for	fire,	wild	fruits,	grazing	lands,	etc?	
19. If	Yes,	were	these	affected	people	compensated	for	the	land	acquired?	
20. After	the	acquisition	have	community	members	complained	about	the	land	acquired?		
21. If	Yes,		
i. What	were	their	complaints	of	the	community	members?	
ii. Why	were	they	complaining	or	agitating?	
	 lv	
iii. How	were	these	agitations	resolved?	
iv. Where	were	these	agitations	resolved?	
22. Have	there	been	community	upheavals/disputes	over	land	since	your	acquisition?	
23. Have	you	registered	your	lease	over	this	parcel?	
24. What	kind	of	documentation	has	been	registered?	
25. What	are	the	terms	for	the	renewal	of	such	a	lease?		
26. How	much	rent	is	agreed	per	hectare	or	over	the	land	acquired	per	annum?	
27. Which	permits	did	you	have	to	acquire	in	order	to	start	operation	in	this	area?	
28. How	much	did	it	cost	to	obtain	these	permits?	
29. To	whom	were	these	charges	paid?		
30. Were	these	charges	official	or	unofficial	(facilitation	fee)	in	nature	or	both?	
31. Was	 the	 acquisition	 conditional	 on	 company	 commitment	 to	 offer	 development	
projects,	 employment,	 services,	 scholarships,	 etc	 to	 the	 community	 to	 be	 allowed	 to	
enter	into	operation?	
32. How	do	you	plan	to	execute	these	commitments?		
33. What	has	been	done	already	for	the	people	as	part	of	these	commitments?	
34. What	has	been	the	level	of	reception	of	the	community	on	your	commitments	to	them?	
35. What	are	the	future	plans	for	expansion	in	this	investment?	Land	and	Crop	portfolio	as	
well	
36. How	do	your	activities	feed	into	the	general	agricultural	policies	of	Ghana?	
37. In	which	ways	will	 you	 outline	 that	 your	 project/investment	 has	 directly	 or	 indirectly	
benefited	smallholder	farmers	in	your	investment	communities?	
38. What	subsequent	investments	in	water	and	roads	did	you	have	to	put	up	in	this	area	to	
make	it	conducive	for	your	operations	and	investments?	
39. How	are	community	members	benefiting	from	these	investments?	
40. Did	your	acquisition	in	these	communities	attract	other	agro-investors	into	this	area?	
41. Do	you	think	there	is	still	land	available	for	similar	investors	in	this	area?	
42. For	how	much	are	lands	now	going	for	in	this	community?	
43. Are	there	any	exit	plans	after	the	initially	agreed	50year	lease	period?	
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Appendix	5:	Interview	Guide	for	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	(MoFA)		
	
Large-Scale	Investment	in	Agriculture	in	West	Africa		
August	2012	to	April	2013	
Research	undertaken	by	Centre	for	Development	Research	(ZEF),	
University	Bonn,	Germany	
	
Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture		
1. How	important	is	agriculture	to	the	people	of	Burkina	Faso?	In	terms	of	contribution	
to	GDP	and	employment	provision	
2. Before	the	last	decade,	how	did	the	agricultural	sector	perform	in	Burkina	Faso?	
3. How	will	you	describe	the	performance	of	agriculture	in	the	country	in	the	last	
decade	in	terms	of	GDP?	
4. How	much	does	the	government	of	Burkina	Faso	spend	on	the	agricultural	sector	
annually?	–	In	terms	of	research	and	innovation,	outreach/extension	services,	etc.		
5. What	called	for	a	re-focus	on	agriculture	in	Burkina	Faso	in	the	last	decade?	
6. Why	was	large-scale	(commercialisation)	agriculture	then	a	choice?	
7. How	different	are	the	recent	large-scale	agro-investments	from	past	state	farms	in	
Burkina	Faso?	
8. How	do	you	position	the	small-peasant	farmer	in	this	entire	new	agricultural	
development	trend?	
9. Which	policies	are	put	in	place	to	aid	smallholders	expands	their	farms	and	produce	
profitably?	
10. Which	policies	were	put	in	place	to	attract	the	new	investments	in	Agriculture	in	
Burkina	Faso?	In	terms	of:	
a.	Land	access		
b.	Access	to	improved	seeds		
c.	Fertilizer/herbicides	supply		
d.	Access	to	water/irrigation			
e.	Access	to	market	outlets			
f.	Access	to	labour	supply			
g.	Access	to	agro-credits	
11. Besides	the	policies	above,	which	other	factors	account	for	the	recent	interest	in	
foreign	investments	in	Agriculture	in	Burkina	Faso?	
12. In	your	opinion	why	did	some	investors	prefer	Burkina	Faso	to	other	in	West	African	
countries?	
13. Are	there	some	investors	who	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	pursued	but	who	opted	for	
other	countries	instead	of	Burkina	Faso?	Examples	
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14. What	could	have	accounted	for	this	change	in	interest	in	investing	in	Burkina	Faso?	
15. Does	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	keep	a	land	bank	to	supply	for	large-scale	
investment?	
16. If	no,	how	do	foreign	agro-investors	acquire	lands?	
17. From	whom	are	they	acquiring	these	lands	for	use?	
18. What	kinds	of	lands	are	they	looking	for?	
19. How	do	they	ascertain	how	much	to	pay	for	these	lands?	
20. Does	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	keep	a	price	list	of	lands	across	the	various	agro-
ecological	zones	in	Burkina	Faso?	
21. How	does	government	guarantee	that	local	landowners	get	fair	values	for	their	
land?	
22. What	is	the	future	of	the	recent	large-scale	agro-investments	in	Burkina	Faso?	
23. How	will	large	scale	agriculture	whether	foreign	or	locally	led	stimulate	smallholder	
productivity?	
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Appendix	6:	Framework	for	assessing	land	governance	in	Ghana	–	ScanFarm	Project	
Assessment	of	Customary	Land	Management	at	the	ScanFarm	Project	Area	in	Dukusen	and	Afrisire	
LGAF	Indicators	 Stakeholders	Scores	
Stakeholders	Notations	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 Average	
Efficiency	and	Effectiveness	
• Rules	and	procedures	of	land	acquisition	are	simplified	for	all	farmers	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 1	 1	 2	 2	 1.7	
• Duration	of	procedures	to	obtain	land	approval	are	not	laborious		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Data	capture	on	new	acquisitions	and	vacant	parcels	are	up-to-date		 2	 2	 1	 1	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1	 1.4	
• Customary	and	statutory	agencies	coordinate	in	all	functions		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Community	agricultural	land	is	completely	or	largely	mapped	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Rights	are	registered	–	through	formal	or	semi-formal	procedures	 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2.1	
Transparency																																																																																																																																																																																					
• Land	negotiation	between	right	holders	and	investors	are	transparent		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Feedbacks	on	procurements	and	expenditure	of	land	revenue	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Unrestricted	public	accessibility	to	land	information	at	the	CLS	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Avoidance	of	arbitrariness	in	expending	land	revenue		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Community	Participation		
• Dialogue	with	community	representatives	in	deciding	land	prices	 3	 1	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Consultation	allows	active	participation	of	all	stakeholders		 2	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1.2	
• There	exist	benefit	sharing	mechanisms	for	investments	in	agriculture	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Land	revenue	is	used	for	community	needs		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Accountability	
• Declaration	of	total	expected	identified	and	realised	rent/	revenue	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Revenue	from	stool	land	accounts	are	published	annually	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Land	revenue	management	is	void	of	bribery	and	corruption		 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	
• Stool/family	land	accounts	are	independently	audited	periodically		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Rule	of	Law	
• Customary	land	use	rules	and	regulations	are	impartially	enforced	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Clear	contracts	on	costs/benefits	sharing	by	investors	and	community	 3	 2	 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2.2	
• Free	access	to	the	court	to	redress	grievances	for	rights	abuse	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	
• Opportunity	to	raise	complaints	on	land	acquisitions	to	authorities		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Sustainability		
• Land	revenue	(rent)	is	adequate	to	finance	development	projects	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	
• Cost	of	monitoring	land	use	is	sustainable/self-financing	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
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• Corporate	Social	Responsibilities	are	clearly	defined	and	documented	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Equity	and	Fairness	
• Equal	access	to	land	information	for	all	groups	of	farmers	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Fair	assessment	of	land	values	to	both	large	and	smallholder	farmers	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Availability	of	competent	and	unbiased	valuation	professionals		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
• Few	land	conflicts	generated	are	quickly	resolved	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
• Existence	of	equal	rights	of	all	persons	in	customary	or	statutory	courts	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Scores:		4	–	A;	3		-	B;	2-	C;	and	1-	D		
1.	Chief	of	Dukusen	
2.	Chief	of	Afrisire	
3.	ScanFarm	Manager	
4.	Village	Secretary	of	Dukusen	
5.	Village	Secretary	of	Afrisire	
6.	Public	and	Vested	Land	Management	Division	of	the	Lands	Commission	
7.	Land	Valuable	Division	of	the	Lands	Commission	
8.	Office	of	the	Administrator	of	Stool	Lands		
9.	Director	of	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	
10.	Assembly	member			
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Appendix	7:	Framework	for	assessing	land	governance	in	Ghana	–	ITFC	Project	
Assessment	of	Customary	Land	Management	at	the	ScanFarm	Project	Area	in	Gushie	and	Tunayili	
LGAF	Indicators	 Stakeholders	Scores	
Stakeholder	Notations	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 Average	
Efficiency	and	Effectiveness	
§ Rules	and	procedures	of	land	acquisition	are	simplified	for	all	farmers	 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2.1	
§ Duration	of	procedures	to	obtain	land	approval	are	not	laborious		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
§ Data	capture	on	new	acquisitions	and	vacant	parcels	are	up-to-date		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Customary	and	statutory	agencies	coordinate	in	all	functions		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
§ Community	agricultural	land	is	completely	or	largely	mapped	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Rights	are	registered	–	through	formal	or	semi-formal	procedures	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Transparency	
§ Land	negotiation	between	right	holders	and	investors	are	transparent		 2	 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 1	 2	
§ Feedbacks	on	procurements	and	expenditure	of	land	revenue	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Unrestricted	public	accessibility	to	land	information	at	the	CLS	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	
§ Avoidance	of	arbitrariness	in	expending	land	revenue	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Community	Participation	
§ Dialogue	with	community	representatives	in	deciding	land	prices	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
§ Consultation	allows	active	participation	of	all	stakeholders		 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
§ There	exist	benefit	sharing	mechanisms	for	investments	in	agriculture	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Land	revenue	is	used	for	community	needs		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Accountability	
§ Declaration	of	total	expected	identified	and	realised	rent/	revenue	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Revenue	from	stool	land	accounts	are	published	annually	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Land	revenue	management	is	void	of	bribery	and	corruption		 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	 --	
§ Stool/family	land	accounts	are	independently	audited	periodically		 1	 1	 --	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0.9	
Rule	of	Law	
§ Customary	land	use	rules	and	regulations	are	impartially	enforced	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Clear	contracts	on	costs/benefits	sharing	by	investors	and	community	 3	 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2.3	
§ Free	access	to	the	court	to	redress	grievances	for	rights	abuse	 2	 2	 1	 2	 2	 2	 2	 1.9	
§ Opportunity	to	raise	complaints	on	land	acquisitions	to	authorities		 3	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 1	 2	
Sustainability		
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§ Land	revenue	(rent)	is	adequate	to	finance	development	projects	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	
§ Cost	of	monitoring	land	use	is	sustainable/self-financing	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
§ Corporate	Social	Responsibilities	are	clearly	defined	and	documented	 4	 4	 2	 4	 4	 2	 2	 3.1	
Equity	and	Fairness	
§ Equal	access	to	land	information	for	all	groups	of	farmers	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Fair	assessment	of	land	values	to	both	large	and	smallholder	farmers	 2	 2	 1	 2	 2	 2	 1	 1.7	
§ Availability	of	competent	and	unbiased	valuation	professionals		 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
§ Few	land	conflicts	generated	are	quickly	resolved	 4	 4	 3	 4	 4	 4	 2	 3.6	
§ Existence	of	equal	rights	of	all	persons	in	customary	or	statutory	courts	 2	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1.3	
Scores:		4	-	A;	3	-	B;	2-	C;	and	1-	D		
1.	Chief	of	Gushie	
2.	Chief	of	Tunayili	
3.	ITFC	Manager	
4.	Village	Secretary	of	Gushie	
5.	Village	Secretary	of	Tunayili	
6.	Assembly	member		
7.	Ministry	of	Food	and	Agriculture	Officer		
	 xv	
																													Appendix	8:	Adjustment	for	Inflation	in	Ghana	
		
IMF	exchange	
rate	 Consumer	Prices,	General	Indices	(2000	=	100),	FAOSTAT	
		 GHS/US$	
	
Ghana	
United	
States	of	
America	 Ghana	
United	States	
of	America	 1acre=0.4047ha	
2000	 0.544919176	 2000	 100	 100	
	
		
	2001	 0.716305158	 2001	 132.91	 102.85	
	
		
	2002	 0.792417084	 2002	 151.75	 104.47	
	
		
	2003	 0.866764327	 2003	 193.31	 106.85	
	
		
	2004	 0.899494854	 2004	 217.72	 109.7	
	
		
	2005	 0.90627897	 2005	 250.74	 113.41	 0.543645115	 0.910265671	
	2006	 0.916451773	 2006	 277.99	 117.07	 0.602727549	 0.939642026	
	2007	 0.935247846	 2007	 331.93	 120.41	 0.719678245	 0.966449956	
	2008	 1.057858333	 2008	 386.78	 125.03	 0.838601969	 1.003531584	
	2009	 1.4088	 2009	 461.22	 124.59	 1	 1	
	2010	 1.431025	 2010	 510.62	 126.63	 1.107107237	 1.016373706	
	2011	 1.51185	 2011	 555.18	 130.63	 1.203720567	 1.048479011	
	2012	 1.795816667	 2012	 607.17	 133.33	 1.316443346	 1.070150092	
	2013	 1.95405	 2013	 677.96	 135.28	 1.469927583	 1.085801429	
																														Source:	FAOSTAT	(2014)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
